THE SUPREME COURT

This book presents a quantitative history of constitutional law in the United States and brings together humanistic and social-scientific approaches to studying law. Using theoretical models of adjudication, Tom S. Clark presents a statistical model of law and uses the model to document the historical development of constitutional law. Using sophisticated statistical methods and historical analysis of Court decisions, the author documents how social and political forces shape the path of law. Spanning the history of constitutional law since Reconstruction, this book illustrates the way in which the law evolves with American life and argues that a social-scientific approach to the history of law illuminates connections across disparate areas of the law, connected by the social context in which the Constitution has been interpreted.

Tom S. Clark is Charles Howard Candler Professor of Political Science at Emory University. His research focuses on judicial decision-making and his recent work has focused on the development of law. His first book, The Limits of Judicial Independence, won the William Riker Award for the best book in political economy from the American Political Science Association.
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(continued after the Index)
THE SUPREME COURT

An Analytic History of Constitutional Decision Making

TOM S. CLARK

Emory University, Atlanta
For Madeleine and Isabelle
Contents in Brief

List of figures page xiv
List of tables xviii
Acknowledgments xx

1 The History of Constitutional Law: Inside and Outside 1
2 Modeling Constitutional Doctrine 15
3 An Empirical Model of Constitutional Decision Making 47
4 The Cases, Votes, and Opinions 77
5 Patterns in Constitutional Law 99
6 From Civil War to Regulation and Federal Power 143
7 War, Security, and Culture Clash 223
8 Conclusion 302

Appendix: Constitutional Law Cases, 1876–2012 323
Bibliography 407
Index 423
Contents

List of figures page xiv
List of tables xviii
Acknowledgments xx

1 The History of Constitutional Law: Inside and Outside 1
1.1 A Motivating Example 2
1.2 A Model of Legal Development 5
1.3 Explanation or Description? 9
1.4 The Scope of this Project 10
1.5 A Roadmap to the Book 11

2 Modeling Constitutional Doctrine 15
2.1 Studying Constitutional Law: Approaches and Barriers 15
2.1.1 The US Constitution, Its Elements, and Judicial Interpretation 16
2.1.2 Political Science Approaches to Constitutional Law 19
2.1.3 Political Development and the Law 21
2.1.4 Case-Space Modeling of the Law 23
2.1.5 A Scholarly Divide 25
2.2 The Theory of Latent Political Dimensions 29
2.2.1 Politics as an Organization of the Law 29
2.2.2 Microfoundations and Macropatterns 34
2.2.3 From Microtheories to Political Cleavages and Macropatterns 43
2.3 Conclusion 45

3 An Empirical Model of Constitutional Decision Making 47
3.1 Modeling Judicial Topics and Voting 48
Contents

3.2 A Model of Judicial Voting 50
  3.2.1 Derivations of Statistical Models of Voting 51
  3.2.2 Extending the Model to Multiple Dimensions 60
3.3 A Model of Case Topics 63
3.4 A Unified Model 68
3.5 Conclusion 74

4 The Cases, Votes, and Opinions 77
  4.1 The Constitutional Cases 78
  4.2 The Justices and their Votes 84
  4.3 The Opinions 88
  4.4 Conclusion 93

5 Patterns in Constitutional Law 99
  5.1 The Topics of Constitutional Law 99
    5.1.1 Selecting Dimensionality 100
    5.1.2 The Dimensions 102
  5.2 The Preference Dimensions of Constitutional Law 116
    5.2.1 The Justices and their Preferences 116
    5.2.2 The Cases and Cleavages 128
  5.3 Legal Issues and Political Cleavages 134
    5.3.1 Interpreting Preference Dimensions 134
    5.3.2 The Dimension We Do Not Find 137
  5.4 Conclusion 138

6 From Civil War to Regulation and Federal Power 143
  6.1 Constitutional Law Before the Civil War 145
  6.2 Post-bellum Politics and the Shrinking World 152
    6.2.1 Macropatterns of Industrialization in Constitutional Law 154
    6.2.2 Decision Making and the Politics of Ideological Divides 165
    6.2.3 Politics Beyond the Court 172
    6.2.4 Politics Inside and Outside the Court 177
  6.3 From War to Crisis to Political Realignment 178
    6.3.1 Macropatterns in Constitutional Law, 1920–1940 180
    6.3.2 Regulating the Economy 186
    6.3.3 Regulating the Individual 208
    6.3.4 Internal and External Forces, Structure, and Contingency 216
  6.4 Conclusion 220

7 War, Security, and Culture Clash 223
  7.1 The End of Dual Federalism: Civil Rights, Civil Liberties, and Crime 226
Contents  xiii

7.1.1 Civil Liberties, Civil Rights, and Federalism  231
7.1.2 Federalizing Criminal Law  236
7.1.3 Federalism and Transition  245

7.2 From Transition to Culture Revolution  246
7.2.1 Civil Liberties and Federalism  249
7.2.2 Social Strife and Constitutional Law  260
7.2.3 Social Change and Constitutional Decision Making  274

7.3 Culture War and Conservative Revolution  275
7.3.1 Law and Order: From the Cold War to the War on Drugs to the War on Terrorism  279
7.3.2 Individual Freedom, Privacy, and Culture Clash  290

7.4 The End of an Era?  299

8 Conclusion  302
8.1 Lessons Learned  303
8.1.1 Social Organization and the Law  304
8.1.2 Electoral Politics and the Path of Constitutional Law  306
8.1.3 Path Dependence and Reinforcing Institutions  311

8.2 Remaining Puzzles  313
8.2.1 There’s More to Constitutional Law than Politics  313
8.2.2 Is This Social Science?  317
8.3 American Politics and Analytic History  319

Appendix: Constitutional Law Cases, 1876–2012  323

Bibliography  407
Index  423
Figures

2.1 Example of case-space model with one-dimensional search-and-seizure cases. page 24
2.2 Total Statutes Enacted, Federal Rules Published, and Pages Published in the Federal Register, 1937–2014. 30
2.3 Depiction of multidimensional case spaces, with different political cleavages. 35
3.1 Examples of discrimination parameters for cases that are more or less divisive on ideological grounds. 53
3.2 Example of a multidimensional voting model. 61
4.1 Number of constitutional law cases over time, 1877–2012. 79
4.3 Number of cases each year referencing each of 30 provisions of the Constitution. 82
4.4 Sizes of majorities in constitutional cases, 1877–2010. 85
4.5 Proportion of the Court’s docket composed on constitutional law cases, 1791–2014. 87
4.6 Majority coalition sizes in Supreme Court constitutional law cases, 1877–2002, separated into landmark and non-landmark cases. 89
4.7 Total number of opinions written per case in constitutional law cases, 1877–2010. 90
4.8 Distribution of opinion lengths in constitutional law cases, 1877–2014. 91
4.9 Length of constitutional law opinions over time, 1877–2014. 93
4.10 Total number of words in all majority opinions in all cases each year, against the total number of constitutional law cases, 1877–2012. 94
List of Figures

5.1 Fit for voting component in LDA+IRT model using different numbers of topics in constitutional law cases, 1877–2005.
5.2 Representation of each of the six topics of constitutional law on the Court's docket each year, 1877–2012.
5.3 Distribution of posterior assignment probabilities for each of the six topics.
5.4 Distribution of posterior assignment probabilities conditional on at least 40% assignment probability for each other topic.
5.5 Distribution of posterior assignment probabilities conditional on at least 50% assignment probability for each other topic.
5.6 Estimated ideal points for all justices, in each of the six dimensions.
5.7 Correlations of justices' ideal points in each combination of topics.
5.8 Location of median justice in each ideological preference dimension, 1877–2012.
5.9 Number of unique median justices by term, 1877–2012.
5.10 Polarization of ideal points in each ideological preference dimension, 1877–2012.
5.11 Location of cases in latent preference space, 1877–2012.
5.12 Location of cases in latent preference space, 1877–2012, separated by the case disposition direction in the Supreme Court Database.
5.13 Traceplots for each case parameter for a random sample of 100 cases.
5.14 Traceplots for each justice in each of the six dimensions.
5.15 Distribution of maximum posterior assignment probabilities for all cases.
6.1 Average number of times select words relating to judicial restraint appear in constitutional law cases, 1877–1950.
6.2 Supreme Court decisions, cases filed and cases pending, 1791–2015.
6.3 Median justices in constitutional cases decided between 1877 and 1920.
6.4 Median justice conservatism in and ideological polarization among the justices in each of the six dimensions, 1877 through 1920.
6.5 Percent of dispositions in constitutional decisions that have a liberal orientation, 1877–1920.
List of Figures

6.6 Representation of each of the six preference dimensions among the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions, 1877–1940. 180
6.7 Median justices in constitutional cases decided between 1915 and 1940. 181
6.8 Location of the median justice and ideological polarization among the justices in each of the six dimensions, 1915 through 1940. 184
6.9 Percent of dispositions in constitutional decisions that have a liberal orientation, 1915–1945. 185
6.10 Representation of each of the six preference dimensions among the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions in cases coded as involving economic activity as the major issue area, 1877–1940. 188
6.11 Relationship between Socialist Party membership in each state in 1910 and the number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, arising out of that state, between 1910 and 1930. 195
6.12 Illustration of justices’ ideal points and case locations in Morehead and West Coast Hotel cases. 206
6.13 Transition in the political cleavage activated by First Amendment cases, 1910–1945. 210
6.14 Fit of policy issues to mix of preference dimensions in constitutional cases, 1877–1945. 219
7.1 Representation of each of the six preference dimensions among the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions, 1935–2006. 224
7.2 Location of the median justice and ideological polarization among the justices in each of the six dimensions, 1935 through 1953. 227
7.3 Median justices in constitutional cases decided between 1935 and 1953. 228
7.4 Estimated coefficient from multinomial regression model predicting the estimated median justice from the topic mixture in the case. 230
7.5 Loading onto Balance of Power and Crime and Punishment preference dimensions among cases in the Criminal Procedure Issue Area in the Supreme Court Database. 242
7.6 Consequences of changing the case topic mixture for prediction of the case disposition. 244
7.7 Location of the median justice and ideological polarization among the justices in each of the six dimensions, 1950 through 1975. 248
List of Figures

7.8 Median justices in constitutional cases decided between 1950 and 1975. 249
7.9 Membership numbers in the Communist Party of the United States of America, as of 1952. 251
7.10 Membership numbers in the Communist Party of the United States of America, as of 1952. 252
7.12 Relationship between the number of First Amendment cases heard by the Supreme Court, 1950–1970, and state liberalism, 1960. 257
7.13 Time series of social conditions during the middle of the twentieth century. 261
7.14 Number of cases decided each year by the Supreme Court in Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Issue Areas, 1950–1980. 262
7.15 Correlation between number of cases the Supreme Court hears in Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Issue Areas and social conditions in the United States. 264
7.16 Case disposition polarities, 1935–1980. Points show individual case disposition polarity, according to Supreme Court Database. 266
7.17 Location of the median justice and ideological polarization among the justices in each of the six dimensions, 1950 through 1980. 268
7.18 Location of the median justice and ideological polarization among the justices in each of the six dimensions, 1960 through 2012. 276
7.19 First-time drug use rates, for all ages, 1965–2002. 280
7.20 Theoretical cost-benefit analysis for different levels of government power in crime prevention. 281
7.21 Consequences of Nixon appointments along each of the six preference dimensions. 284
7.22 Size of United States prison population and public opinion about spending on crime. 289
7.23 Case locations for First Amendment cases decided between 1960 and 2012. 297
8.1 Theoretical representation of a preference profile and two possible ways that a racial element of a case could affect how a justice votes. 314
### Tables

1.1 Examples of factors influencing constitutional law.  

3.1 Summary of notation and terminology used in the LDA model.

3.2 Summary of notation used in LDA+IRT ideal point model.

A.1 Summary of justices and their votes in constitutional law cases, 1877–2012.

5.1 Top words associated with each topic for varying numbers of topics.

5.2 Top words associated with each of six constitutional law topics, 1877–2005.

5.3 Relationship between topic distribution and discrimination parameters.

5.4 Relationship between union membership and presence of Business and Economics preference dimension language in Supreme Court opinions, 1881–1930.

6.1 Relationship between union membership and presence of Business and Economics preference dimension language in Supreme Court opinions, 1881–1930.

6.2 Relationship between labor strength and presence of Economics and Business preference dimension language in Supreme Court opinions, 1881–1930.

6.3 Relationship between representation of six preference dimensions and likelihood of each of three justices being the estimated median.

6.4 Relationship between state-level Socialist Party membership and the number of economic activity cases originating in the state.

6.5 Relationship between Social Party Membership and case loading onto Balance of Power preference dimension.

7.1 Relationship between yearly violent crime rate and estimated distribution of preference dimensions in cases, 1933–1980.
List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Relationship between social conditions and justices’ likelihood of voting in</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a liberal direction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Correlation between rates of drug use and justices’ voting, 1965–2002.</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Empirical model of justices’ voting in criminal procedure cases, 1978–2012.</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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xx
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