

## I

## Religion and Reason

Kant's philosophy is usually seen historically as a retreat from religion and part of the *secularization* of modern culture under the sway of *Enlightenment reason*. Many features of Kant's philosophy support this picture. His critique was influential in discrediting the traditional metaphysical arguments for God's existence and the immortality of the soul. His moral philosophy replaces God's will with our own rational will as legislator of moral laws. Kantian aesthetics breaks decisively with the tradition that connects the experience of beauty directly with a divine order, tracing the experience of the beautiful instead to the harmony of our faculties of imagination and understanding. Kant treats experience of the sublime not as awe at the divine majesty but as our awareness of the way our own moral vocation transcends nature's power.<sup>1</sup>

Kant also offered a moral argument for God's existence, but it is usually seen as an afterthought – a pitifully weak or even half-hearted attempt to repair what his critique had successfully destroyed. Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* is viewed by the religious as an attempt to reduce religion to morality, while secularists are unable to take seriously Kant's attempts to interpret Christian doctrines sympathetically. Both camps see Kant's treatment of Christianity in the *Religion* as a kind of Trojan horse within Christianity. Kant's "rational" religion is seen as secular morality appropriating religious concepts for its own purposes, while showing incomprehension of, and even contempt for, authentic religion.

As regards Kant's influence, it would be pointless to dispute this picture, since (like much that passes for "intellectual history") it is self-perpetuating and thereby self-verifying. We assert (tautologically) that Kant has had such-and-such influence because we understand him to have had that influence. The story

<sup>1</sup> Lewis White Beck speaks of Kant's "Copernican Revolution" as also a "Promethean Revolution," in which humanity usurps the place of God (Wood, 1984, pp. 28–30).

is then only about those who tell it; “Kant” becomes merely a placeholder for our prejudices about him. We omit the inconvenient fact that our narrative grossly falsifies Kant’s own self-understanding and the intended historical effect of his philosophy. It treats the common misrepresentations as true and interprets Kant’s real aims as if they were a false mask concealing his intent.

This book tries to present critically but sympathetically Kant’s project in the *Religion*. What Kant can teach us about religion and secularism in the modern world must emerge indirectly, as we think about what might be said for and against his project. I think it could teach us a lot, if we would let it, about the potentialities of religion in the modern world and the ways they have fallen short of being actualized.

### 1.1 WHAT IS “RELIGION”?

In Kant’s philosophy, the word “religion” (like many other words in his philosophical vocabulary) has a precise technical meaning: “Religion (subjectively considered) is the recognition of all duties as divine commands” (R 6: 84, 153, cf. KpV 5:129, KU 5:460, MS 6:487–488, SF 7:36, VpR 28:997–999). It is typical of Kant, however, that this statement needs clarification. The qualification “subjectively considered” means that “religion” refers to the attitudes of individual human beings. A *religious* person is one who thinks of moral duties as having been commanded by God. Religion “objectively considered” might refer to further divine commands belonging to *revealed* religion, whose relation to *rational* religion we will explore in this book. Kant insists that there is only one *religion* because the subjective attitude to which the term refers is the fundamentally same in all who regard their duties as divine commands. Kant distinguishes *religion* from a *faith* (*Glaube*) – more precisely, an ecclesiastical faith (*Kirchenglaube*). There are many ecclesiastical faiths, corresponding to different communities of faith, with differing beliefs in alleged divine revelations, on which these various communities have been founded (R 6:107–108).

In the literature on Kant, it is sometimes said that he means to “reduce religion to morality.”<sup>2</sup> This is false, and importantly false. For Kant there is no ethical duty for us to be religious – to think of our duties as commanded by God. But as we will see in Chapter 2, Kant holds that assent to God’s existence on practical grounds is something morality gives us reasons to do. In the preface to the *Religion*, Kant puts it this way: “On its own behalf morality in no way needs religion (whether objectively . . . or subjectively)” (R 6:3), but, on the other hand, “morality inevitably leads to religion” (R 6:6). Kant would deny that a morally good person has to be a religious person, though he argues

<sup>2</sup> Hare (1996), p. 45: “Kant and the Reduction of Religion to Morality.” Hare resists the common view that Kant does this; but as we will see later (Chapter 5, §3), Hare thinks Kant provides “unhelpful translations” of religious claims into moral ones. Cf. Palmquist (1992).

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that morality provides reasons for being religious. The right way to describe the relation between morality and religion for Kant is to say that *religion goes beyond morality, adding something to it that enriches the moral life*.

One thing that clearly follows from Kant’s technical sense of the word is that “religion” for Kant is *theistic*, perhaps even *monotheistic*. This may look like a serious limitation if we think of “religion” as including polytheism, whether in the ancient world or in non-Western religious culture or in nontheistic traditions such as Buddhism. But it doesn’t mean that Kantian philosophy could not be related in interesting ways to these other religious traditions.<sup>3</sup> It means only that they do not fall under the technical concept of “religion,” which it suits Kant’s purposes to use.

Kant normally assumes that a religious person believes there is a God. But he explicitly denies that this belief is strictly *required* for a person to be religious. A person can be religious as long as that person recognizes that *if* there is a God, then all ethical duties would be commanded by God (MS 6:487). Kant says that the “minimum of theology” necessary for religion is that the concept of God is the concept of a *possible* being (R 6:153–154 n). In his treatment of rational theology, Kant thinks we are capable of establishing that much, as well as offering ourselves a fairly detailed account of the attributes of such a possible being (VpR 28:998).

For Kant there is much more to being religious than thinking of God as commanding your duties. As we will see in later chapters, Kant thinks of religion as involving attitudes of awe and gratitude toward God. We will see that you must strive to be well-pleasing to God – seeking his forgiveness. Traditionally, God is the father of a religious community, regarded as a family.

<sup>3</sup> Some argue that although Kantian philosophy and Buddhism share an emphasis on the awakening of our intellectual powers, Buddhist ethics has greater affinities to the Scottish Enlightenment’s emphasis on sentiment (see Cummiskey, 2017). This assessment, however, depends on a sadly common prejudice that stereotypes Kantian ethics as hostile to the emotional interconnectedness of human beings. This error assumes that reason excludes emotion, and it completely ignores such central themes in Kant’s ethics as the moral incentive: goodness of heart, love combined with respect, the realm of ends, and (in religion) the ethical community (see Chapters 4 and 7). Older scholars see affinities between Madhyamika Buddhism and transcendental idealism (see Murti, 2008), but these, too, strike me as spurious. A more pertinent comparison seems to me that between the Buddhist concept of “unanswerable questions” and Kant’s theoretical dialectic, especially the Antinomies (see Conze, 1963). But this book, the focus of which is on Kant’s thought about religion in his sense of the term, is not the place to explore these possible connections. As for polytheism, Kant does briefly discuss it (VpR 28: 1008, 1040). His account suggests that he would classify it as a form of what he calls “anthropomorphism,” one that assigns different departments of nature to different supernatural beings, represented according to human limitations. But Kant praises polytheistic cultures, both Asian and Western, for often seeing their many gods as expressions of a higher One Divinity from which they proceed.

## 1.2 RELIGION AS ESSENTIALLY SYMBOLIC

What does it mean to say that God is a *possible* being in the sense required for religion? For Kant there is an important distinction between merely *logical* possibility: the noncontradictoriness of a *concept*, and the *real* possibility of an *object*, which requires that our concept of the object have thinkable *content* – or, as Kant sometimes says, “sense and significance” (*Sinn und Bedeutung*). To think of God as commanding our duties, we must think of God as having an understanding and a will. For even the “minimum of theology,” therefore, we need a concept of God as a being with something analogous to human cognition and conation, hence analogous to the sensory content found in the concepts of objects we can cognize empirically. Since God is an idea of reason, not a possible object of empirical cognition, no sensory content is available from a theoretical standpoint. Kant thinks it can be supplied from a practical standpoint – through *symbols* (Ak 20:279–280, KpV 5:119–121, 134–141, KU 5:353).<sup>4</sup>

Religion provides us with a vocabulary – not merely of words but also of thoughts, feelings, images, narratives, and emotions – through which to experience our lives. For Kant this vocabulary consists of what he calls *symbols*. Religion is a way of thinking about our human existence in terms of symbols of the divine and also symbols relating our lives to the divine.<sup>5</sup>

That religion essentially involves symbolic thinking is a fact often neglected by both religious people and secular critics of religion. For both, the symbolic character of religion makes the content of religious belief harder to understand, and its neglect therefore makes life easier for them – but easy not in a good way. It makes religious beliefs easier for critics of religion to reject because when claims that are symbolic in meaning are treated as if they were not, then they often appear simply false, as when they come into direct conflict with scientific or historical truths, or seem to offer a view of the world that competes with science but is far less plausible when judged by rational standards. The same neglect, however, can make religious claims easier for religious people to accept because it facilitates their doing so dogmatically and uncritically, based on tradition, authority, and bigotry. It also seems to relieve them of the responsibility of interpreting the symbols of their faith. The failure to meet this responsibility inevitably impoverishes their religion. It often subverts or

<sup>4</sup> We give the necessary experiential content to our thought of God by representing God as really possible through *symbols*. Chignell (2010b) appeals to symbolism as a way of addressing the problem that there might be a *Realrepugnanz* among the divine perfections that would render an *ens realissimum* really *impossible*. If Chignell is right, symbols are also a way of dismissing the thought that God might not be really possible. This cannot be done on theoretical grounds; it would have to be done on the practical grounds we will discuss in Chapter 2.

<sup>5</sup> The Christian theologian who has made most profound use of the concept of religious symbolism is Paul Tillich. See Tillich (1951, 1952, 1957, 1963); cf. also Rowe (1968). This book is not the place for a detailed comparison of Kant and Tillich regarding the symbolic in religious thought. But we must not neglect to mention that Kant’s philosophy of religion is an important source of Tillich’s conceptions of religious faith and symbolism.

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corrupts the human meaning of what they profess to believe. Literalism in religion risks turning truths into lies and good into evil.

For Kant the role of symbolism in religious thinking is a consequence of his most fundamental doctrines about thought and cognition.<sup>6</sup> Kant's critique of reason famously denies that it is possible for us to have any theoretical or demonstrative knowledge of God's existence or any cognition of God's attributes. Cognition requires not only concepts but also intuitions – immediate cognitive contact with an object cognized through these concepts. Human intuition is sensible, but God is not a possible object of our senses, and we have no supersensible cognitive capacities that would permit us to achieve any cognition of God or his attributes. Our theoretical cognition can never represent God as anything but a logically possible concept of reason.

These limitations, however, do not preclude what might be called – and even what Kant himself might call – an “experience” of God. This is not in a sense of “experience” that refers to theoretical cognition but in one that refers to what we accept on practical grounds or as part of aesthetic experience. Such experiences are symbolic in character. *Symbolic* presentations of a concept correspond to *sensible* or *intuitive* ones but are importantly distinct from them. Theoretical cognition might arise from *schematic* presentations of a pure or a priori concept that enable the concept to be applied *directly* to empirical instances (KU 5:351, 352, cf. Anth 7:191). Ideas of reason (such as God or the ideal of human moral perfection), however, are pure concepts for which no direct or schematic presentation can be given. Symbols are essential to giving concrete or intuitive application to ideas of reason. All thinking about God as a really possible being, therefore, must be symbolic. “All our cognition of God is merely symbolic” (KU 5:353). (“Merely” here contrasts *symbolic* with *empirical* cognition.) When we represent our duties as divine commands, we are thinking *symbolically* about morality, simply because we are thinking about its relation to God.

Symbols are *indirect* sensible presentations, by way of *analogy*. Analogy for Kant is not a similarity between objects but a *sameness* (in the relevant respects) between the *way we think* about *different* objects (P 4:357, cf. KU 5:464, VpR 28:1023). Thoughts about our relation to God present the realities of our moral life to us indirectly, symbolically, in an aesthetically or emotionally significant way. But to think of an object by way of analogy calls our attention to our own thinking. It invites us to *interpret* our symbolic thoughts and the emotions they evoke. This means: to *reflect critically* on the thoughts we are having and *assume responsibility* for our interpretation of the symbols, rather than merely losing ourselves in our emotions. As beings who exercise rational agency, we must be both *feeling* beings and *thinking* beings.

<sup>6</sup> The theme of symbolism in Kant is crucial for his philosophy of religion. This theme has been generally neglected in the literature. Some exceptions are Kang (1985), Bielefeldt (2001), Chignell (2006), and Pasternack and Rossi (2014). I discuss religious symbolism further in this book, both in this chapter and in Chapter 5 §§ 2–4.

Kant holds that it is one of the functions of “aesthetic ideas” to represent the supersensible. Aesthetic ideas are intuitive representations that suggest an inexhaustible association of thoughts that can never be adequately grasped in any determinate concept (KU 5:313–317). Kant illustrates aesthetic ideas by (pagan) examples of the sublimity and majesty of the divine: the eagle of Jupiter and the peacock of Juno (KU 5:314–316). Kant also associates the emotions occasioned by the feeling of the sublime with the deity venerated by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; he argues that the strength of the religious emotions in these ancient monotheistic faiths depended precisely on the fact that this deity could not be an object of the senses in the form of a “graven image” (KU 5:274). The religious power of scripture, in Kant’s view, depends on understanding the words of scripture *symbolically* (R 6:110 n, 111, 136, 171, 176). Scripture often elicits emotional understanding of human situations by way of narratives and parables that move us but also cry out for interpretation if they are to apply *thoughtfully* to our lives.

Kant warns us that if we think about God in a way that is not symbolic, then we cannot think in a way that is genuinely religious. Either we lapse into “deism” (in Kant’s technical sense of the term) or fall into “anthropomorphism.” A *deistic* concept of God is a purely metaphysical concept of an *ens realissimum*. It is an idea of reason, a mere logical possibility, having no real content, no meaning for our lives and no religious significance for us. Religion must replace deism with “theism,” through symbolic representations of God. Far worse than deism from a religious standpoint is *anthropomorphism*. It thinks of God (superstitiously) as if he were a powerful yet personified natural force with power and will like a human tyrant (KpV 5:131, 136, KU 5:353, R 6:141, 168, VpR 28:1046). True religion is then replaced with slavish groveling and idolatry. Kant regards much of popular religion as susceptible to this abuse (VpR 28:1118).

As a natural and historical phenomenon, religion is as complex and ambiguous as human nature itself. The idea is still popular that there is such a thing as an irrationality that is above reason and that religion is it, or a part of it. This treacherous idea can be presented in entirely innocuous and even appealing forms, but Kant was well aware of its dangers. David Hume explored that dark side of religion in *Natural History of Religion*. For him, religion’s predilection for obscurity and unintelligibility is essential to it and closely allied to the ways it supports slavery, bigotry, and intolerance and even undermines morality (Hume, 1992). The history of every religion offers us powerful grounds to agree with Hume. Kant thinks, however, that Hume’s somber diagnosis captures only part of the truth. It can even be argued that Hume’s view of religion itself supports forms of religious irrationalism, by viewing them not as aberrations but instead treating the subversion of reason as the very essence of religion.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For an account that raises this problem, see Kail, 2007. Kant’s friend Hamann, a religious antirationalist, seems to have read Hume’s view of religion in just this way. See Berlin (1977).

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Kant's conception of religion is closer to that of Lessing, who views religion's vocation more hopefully as that of educating the human race (Lessing, 2005, pp. 217–240). Such a view enables us to see some varieties of religion as examples of true education and others as examples of miseducation. It can take account of the aspects of religion to which Hume calls attention, while at the same time offering a more hopeful picture of what religion has done for the human race and what it can still do for it. Lessing's idea that divine revelation can be seen as a source of human reason itself has affinity with the way Kant tries to understand the relation between revealed and rational religion that we will be exploring in Chapters 7 and 8.

For Kant it is only through symbolism that the pure concept of God can be presented in a way that is meaningful to human beings and therefore truly religious. It therefore gets things exactly backwards to speak of a religious concept or doctrine as “only” symbolic, if we intend by that to contrast a symbolic interpretation with some more “genuine” presentation of the divine, described as a “literal” one. On the contrary, it is the *merely literal* (i.e., the anthropomorphic) interpretation of a doctrine or scriptural text that is not genuinely religious because it is impoverished, inauthentic, corrupt, and superstitious. It substitutes the dead letter for the living spirit that the letter truly signifies. “The *ideal*,” Kant says, is then “mistaken for an *idol*” (Anth 7:192). Another Kantian term here is “delusion” (*Wahn*): the mistaking of a representation for what it represents (R 6:170–171). Like the Bible and the Koran, Kant recognizes *idolatry* (*avodah zera*, *shirk*) as both a permanent temptation to true religion and also a mortal danger to it. But it would be pointless to want to destroy the symbols, as if that could free us from idolatry in our religious attitudes. The harder path, but the necessary one, is to understand the symbols and assume responsibility for their morally and religiously enriching interpretation.<sup>8</sup>

When atheists reject religious doctrines, they usually do so on a literal interpretation. They then take them to be competing with natural science about the origin of the universe or of life, or with historical evidence about past events. So understood, religious doctrines are often fitting objects of

<sup>8</sup> Symbolic thinking is not limited to religion, and although religion would like to think of its symbols as ways of experiencing good emotions, there is no question that evil emotions can also be powerfully symbolized through beliefs, sometimes even through literally true ones. Both Kristallnacht (which actually happened) and *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (which was a forgery) symbolized hatred of Jews in Germany. The lie that Barack Obama was born in Kenya gave symbolic expression to the emotional resistance many Americans felt to an African American president. For many Americans, a border wall with Mexico is a symbolic wall separating them from a future they cannot accept. People often choose their heroes, whether Martin Luther King Jr. or General Robert E. Lee, as symbols of causes in which they still believe. Fixating on the literal object, or literal truth, of a symbolic belief is often a way of evading the question whether the emotions expressed symbolically are rational or irrational, good or bad.

intellectual contempt and even moral condemnation. What atheists reject in this way may be at least part of what many literalist (superstitious, anthropomorphic) believers actually believe. Literalism in religion is how many people perpetuate false archaic theories of the world and unreliable or merely legendary historical reports. It is how some subcultures use the authority of ancient scriptures to rationalize slavery, tyranny, racism, misogyny, and homophobia.

From a Kantian standpoint, these arguments (both pro and con) are not about religion but about anthropomorphic delusion or idolatry. To think authentically about true religion requires that we consider claims about God *symbolically*. No doubt it has been mainly philosophers and theologians who have raised the difficult questions about what religious symbols truly mean and how they are to be interpreted. Kant should be seen as this kind of philosopher. But it is a fundamental mistake to think that it is only philosophers or theologians for whom the meaning of words, concepts, and propositions used in a religious context is chiefly symbolic. In ancient times, people did not distinguish the literal meaning of religious thoughts from their symbolic significance. They seldom separated rudimentary scientific thoughts from symbolic religious thoughts. Ancient peoples also usually deferred to scriptures, traditions, and religious authorities without assuming responsibility for understanding the human (i.e., the symbolic) meaning of the thoughts they were accepting. This failure to think for themselves was an important part of the state of degrading intellectual minority from which human beings liberate themselves through the slow, never completed process Kant calls *enlightenment* (WA 8:35).

Kant thinks about the natural world in the ways we would regard as scientific. But he denies that science has the solution to all the problems of human existence. No doubt the motley collection of successful research programs we now call science can help us to understand ourselves better; many of them have already done so. But it is a far more doubtful wish that they, or perhaps some ideal combination of them, could ever suffice for us in dealing with all the absurdities and perplexities of the human condition. “Scientism” might be a pejorative term describing that ignorant, shallow, and humanly impoverished wish. One need not be hostile to science to think that human beings need other cultural resources besides science in dealing with the hard philosophical problems of consciousness, value, and freedom – as well as the existential perplexities of mortality, death, and grief; feelings of guilt and inadequacy; and hopes and fears – and in confronting the uncertain destiny of the things we care most about, including even the historical fate of the human institution of science itself. Kant regards religion as an important one of these resources. Both scientific and religious thinking might offer human beings the hope of deeper self-understanding. There is no reason why the two hopes would have to be competitors, still less, seen as mutually exclusive. It is a self-inflicted



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spiritual wound of modern culture – both on the side of science and of religion – when they are seen that way.<sup>9</sup>

#### 1.3 RELIGION IN KANT'S LIFE

Kant was a polymath. His interest in philosophy grew out of his study of natural science: physics, astronomy, and chemistry. He helped to invent the emerging sciences of physical geography and anthropology. His pragmatic anthropology was enriched by his wide reading of travel narratives and also imaginative fictional literature. Kant's theory of right exhibits detailed and subtle knowledge of Roman-based legal traditions and codes of his time. His writings on religion likewise display an acquaintance with scholastic and Lutheran theology. Kant understood his own philosophical outlook as religious.

Kant's relation to the religion around him was, however, troubled and ambivalent. His father was a poor saddler (or leatherworker). His parents, especially his mother, were devout Pietists. Pietism was a revivalist movement among German Lutherans that resembles other eighteenth-century revivalist religious movements, such as Quakerism and Methodism in England, and Hasidism among eastern-European Jews. If the eighteenth century was an age of reason and enlightenment, it was also an age of religious revival and emotionalism. The two were essentially connected. Fear of rationalist science and liberal society led many to retreat into traditional and emotional religious faith to protect themselves from the disorienting and alienating experience of modernity. Enlightenment rationalism itself was an encounter of modern thought with contemporary religious revival. In this respect, Pietism was typical of the age. It stressed literal adherence to biblical teachings and the experiential side of the religious life. A conversion or "born again" experience was regarded by most Pietists as essential to salvation. Pietism was also a proselytizing movement that emphasized the priesthood of all believers, the equality of all human beings as children of God, and the eventual hope for a church universal.

When Kant's Pietist pastor Franz Albert Schulz noticed exceptional intellectual gifts in the second son of the humble saddler, he arranged for Kant to be admitted to the newly founded Collegium Fredericianum. There Kant was not only exposed to Pietist zealotry but also prepared for a university education. In 1723, a year before Kant was born, Pietists in the court of

<sup>9</sup> Kant no doubt belongs among the intended targets of Freud's impatient remark that "where questions of religion are concerned . . . philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of their original sense" (Freud, 1964, p. 51). Freud, of course, has his own interpretation (grounded in his psychoanalytic theory) of the symbolism involved in many religious thoughts. When Freud sees religious thoughts as having symbolic psychological significance, he is engaging in the very same enterprise as the targets of the remark just quoted.

Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia had persuaded the king to exile Christian Wolff, professor at Halle, who was then the leading German philosopher of the day and the leading figure in the German Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*). Kant grew up in an atmosphere determined by this conflict. Many academic philosophers, such as Martin Knutzen, with whom Kant studied, attempted to reconcile Pietist religion with Wolffian philosophy. Kant began his university studies with Latin literature but soon came to focus instead on the natural sciences. He then turned to metaphysical issues concerning their foundation. Kant's concentration on ethics, politics, and religion came only later.

From quite early in his career, Kant was interested in the metaphysical concept of God and in defining the proper role that divine purposive design might play in the empirical investigation of nature. But it was only much later that religion, properly speaking – the moral and emotional significance of belief in God – came to be one of Kant's important philosophical interests. In the *Religion*, as we will see, Kant argues that an “ethical community” or church, founded on a revealed scripture, is necessary for the moral progress of humanity. But he also mounts strong philosophical and moral criticisms of existing religious beliefs and practices. In consequence of these criticisms, Kant refused on principle to attend services at the cathedral in Königsberg, even when his position as rector of the university included the expectation that he should.

During the reign of King Friedrich II of Prussia (Frederick the Great) (1740–1786), there flourished a relatively wide range of theological views both among the clergy of the established Lutheran church and among scholars and university academics. Some of them applied standards of modern scholarship to scripture and tried to harmonize faith with modern life. Prominent among the latter were Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768) and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781).<sup>10</sup> Reimarus was a leader in the field of historical biblical scholarship called neology: the application to scripture of the same critical methods that historians had applied to other ancient historical documents. Reimarus concluded that the historical claims of scripture were largely lacking in evidential support. Lessing, who was responsible for the posthumous publication of Reimarus's *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* (1774–1778) held a more complex theological position, but one of

<sup>10</sup> For two classic studies of these two thinkers, see Schweitzer (2005), chap. 2; and Allison (2018). Reimarus was also a representative of what was then commonly called deism – not in Kant's technical sense, explained above, but in the more frequently used sense of a belief in “natural religion” – that is, a theistic religion that dispenses with revelation or even rejects it. The title *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* might be taken to be “deism” in this sense. The title of my paper “Kant's Deism” (see Wood, 2002), if it is understood to claim that Kant is a deist in that sense, would then be asserting a falsehood, as I hope this book will show. But my article was meant to raise a question, not to assert a plain falsehood. (I've also written articles titled “Kant's Compatibilism” and “Kant's Historical Materialism.”)