

Index

- Aaton Company, 47
 adjustment costs
 economic geography and, 31–32
 factor mobility and, 56
 geographic concentration and, 93–96
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (WTO) (SCM Agreement), 208–213
 agriculture
 geographic concentration in, 29–30
 government partisanship and policies in, 55n.15
 subsidies in, 71n.17
 Airbus, 210–213
 Anderson, Kim, 71n.17
Appellations d'Origine Contrôlées (AOC) (France), 109–110
 Ardelean, Adina, 11–12
 asset specificity
 subsidy spending and, 145–156
 geographic concentration and, 93–96
Association Viticole Champenoise, 109–110
 audio-visual services industry (France), 46–48, 210–213
 Australia
 subsidies in, 1–2, 18–19, 20–21, 43n.4
 wine industry subsidies in, 70–72
 Austria
 electoral system in, 120–124
 farm-gate wine subsidy in, 23–24, 120–130, 201–202
 geographic concentration in, 73–74
 non-EU-compliant wine subsidies in, 106
 policy-targeting incentives in, 197–198
 special interests and subsidies in, 33–34
 wine industry subsidies in, 97–99
 Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), 127–128
 automotive industry, 33–34
 ballot access
 open-list systems, 143–144n.8
 measurement of, 79
 geographically concentrated sectors and, 92
 Bawn, Kathleen, 96, 145–156
 Beauchaud, Jean-Claude, 117–120
 Belgium, subsidies in, 170
 beneficiaries of subsidies, diversity of, 18
 biotechnology industry (United States)
 government subsidies to, 61–62
 economic geography of, 32
 Blum-Byrnes agreement (1946), 46–48
 Boeing Aircraft, 210–213
 Brazil, policy-targeting in, 197–198
 British Airways, government subsidies for, 20–21
 British Steel, government subsidies for, 20–21
 Brühlhart, Marius, 27, 30, 75n.24, 76–78
 budget process (Norway), 183, 185n.26, 192n.57
 bureaucrats
 interviews with, 173
 control of, 184, 186–188
 preferences of, 186
 bureaucratic decision-making
 government control over, 184, 186–188
 letters of assignment (Norway), 187
 Norwegian government structure and, 188–190
 Norwegian subsidies and, 184–188
 subsidies and, 173, 185–188
 Busch, Marc L., 36–38
 business subsidies, 64–65. *See also* industrial subsidies; particularistic economic policies.
 Bussereau, Dominique, 111, 114, 116–120

- Canada
 - legislative dynamics in, 56–58
 - political effects of geographic concentration in, 36–38
 - dairy subsidies in, 16–17, 210–213
- candidate-centered electoral competition, 48–51
 - Austria and absence of, 124
 - ballot systems and, 79
 - geographic diffusion and, 92
 - legislative dynamics and, 56–58
 - list type and district magnitude, 205
 - open-list systems, 140–142
- capital mobility, economic geography and, 31–32
- Carey, John M., 142–144
- Cassing, James, 27–29
- causal complexity, 61–62
- Center Party (*Senterpartiet*) (Norway), 188–190
- Chang, Eric C. C., 83n.36
- “checker board problem,” in geographic concentration, 74–75
- China
 - government subsidies in, 20–21
 - exports from, 13–15, 34–35
- Chirac, Jacques, 117n.38
- closed-list systems
 - in Austria, 123–124
 - characteristics of, 137–138
 - cross-electoral district subsidy variations in, 25–26
 - cross-national subsidy comparisons, 147–156
 - de facto, 142–144
 - electoral competitiveness and, 59–60
 - economic geography and, 138–140, 147–156, 169, 202–203
 - institutional differences in, 134–137
 - measurement of, 142–144
 - in Norway, 156–161, 178–179
 - personal vote seeking and, 166
 - policy outcomes and, 138–140, 170–182
 - policy-targeting incentives and, 197–198
 - proportional representation systems, 24–25, 170–182
- coalition governments, 156
- Cognac producer subsidies, 107–120, 201–202
 - Austrian wine subsidies compared to, 128–129
 - electoral competitiveness and, 117–120
 - electoral institutions and, 110–112
 - interest group politics and, 109–110
 - parliamentary questions about, 113–116
 - partisanship and, 112–113, 116–117
- concentration, geographic measurement
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - disproportionality and, 88–92
 - district magnitude and list type measurement, 161–166
 - electoral systems, 82–83, 87–88
 - manufacturing subsidies, 83–87
 - measurements of, 28–29, 144
- constitutional design and reform, 16–17, 207
- consumer prices
 - impact of subsidies on, 64–69
 - in proportional rule democracies, 12–13, 83n.36
- corporate welfare. *See* industrial subsidies.
- costs of production, economic geography and, 31–32
- cotton industry, subsidies for, 39–42
- country size
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - manufacturing subsidies and, 88
- country-specific geographic concentration
 - data, 76–78
 - country size and, 81–83
 - wine industry subsidies and, 106
- Cox, Gary W., 56–58
- cross-national comparisons
 - economic geography and, 22, 31–32
 - electoral competitiveness, 58–60, 145–156, 171n.2
 - electoral systems, 76, 136
 - of geographic concentration, 74–75
 - government expenditure/subsidy spending ratios, 145–156, 201
 - government partisanship, 55
 - manufacturing subsidies, 72
 - methodologies for, 142–156
 - of non-EU-compliant subsidies, 99–104
 - results analysis, 147–156
 - sector-specific subsidies, 70–72, 97–99
 - of subsidies, 21–22, 144–156
- data availability 73–74
- decomposed values
 - entropy indices, 75–76
 - geographic concentration measurements, 74–75
- de Mesquita, Bueno, 12–13
- democratically-elected governments
 - politics of economic policies and, 1–3

- democratically-elected governments (cont.)
 - single member districts and, 79–80
 - special interests and, 199–201, 204–206
 - subsidy spending in, 97–99
- Démocratie libérale (DL) party (France), 116–117
- D'Hondt election method, 123, 178–179
- dispersion bonus, 9–10, 138–140
- disproportionality
 - measuring electoral systems and, 79, 88–92
- Norwegian electoral system, 178–179, 203–204
- policy targeting and, 25–26, 203–204
- subsidy budget shares and, 92
- distributive policies, 17–21
- district magnitude
 - economic geography and, 35–36
 - empirical expectations concerning, 51–53
 - list systems and, 136–137, 161–166
 - measurement of, 79–80
 - Norwegian district-specific electoral competitiveness and, 190–192
 - personal vote seeking and, 162
 - in proportional representation systems, 24–25
- district-specific electoral competitiveness
 - Norwegian subsidy distribution and, 193–194
 - Norwegian vote margins and, 190–192
 - in plurality-based systems, 46–48, 175
 - policy-targeting incentives and, 197–198
 - proportional representation systems, 171–173, 175–176
 - wine subsidies and, 130–133
- Duverger, Maurice, 79–80
- e-certificates, as subsidies, (Norway) 66–67
- economic geography
 - causal complexity and, 61–62
 - constitutional design and, 207
 - cross-national variations in, 22, 31–32
 - defined, 29–30
 - electoral district size and, 35–36
 - electoral systems and, 3–5, 13–15, 23–24, 39–42, 199–201
 - factor mobility and, 56
 - government expenditure on subsidies, 169
 - government partisanship and, 53–55
 - international implications, 208–213
 - legislative dynamics and, 56–58
 - measurements of, 28–29, 144
 - non-economic politics and, 16–17, 206–208
 - particularistic economic policies and, 2–3
 - plurality electoral systems, 5–7
 - politics and, 31–32, 34–35
 - proportional representation and, 7–13
 - quantitative analysis of, 22
 - subsidies and, 17–21
 - wine subsidies and, 130–133
 - within-country subsidy measurement and, 156–161
- economic policy
 - democracy and politics of, 1–3, 199–201
 - electoral competition and, 39–42, 48–51, 58–60
 - electoral institutions and, 39–42
 - factor mobility and, 56
 - government partisanship and, 53–55
 - income and production redistribution and, 27–29
 - special interests and, 64–65
 - uneven dispersion of employment and production and, 27–29
- economic security
 - effects of subsidies, 40, 67–70, 130–133
 - voters shared preferences and, 3–5
- “effective votes,” 43–44
- electoral competitiveness
 - in closed-list PR systems, 170–182, 202–203
 - Cognac subsidies and, 117–120
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 58–60, 145–156, 171n.2
 - defined, 173n.5
 - dispersion bonus of subsidies, 50–51
 - district-level competitiveness, 58–60, 171–176
 - economic policy and, 39–42, 48–51
 - empirical expectations concerning, 51–53
 - in France, 117–120
 - international subsidy restrictions and, 210–213
 - legislative dynamics and, 56–58
 - measurement of, 188–190
 - in Norway, 176–177
 - in open-list systems, 197–198, 202–203
 - in proportional representation systems, 50–51
 - wine subsidies and, 130–133
- electoral institutions
 - in Austria, 122–124
 - comparison of, 134–137
 - district size and, 35–36

- economic geography and, 3–5, 23–24, 199–201
- empirical expectations concerning, 51–53
- endogeneity of, 92–93
- factor mobility and, 56
- in France, 110–112
- geographic concentration and, 36–38, 81
- government partisanship and, 53–55
- institutional differences in, 134–137
- legislative dynamics and, 56–58
- measurement of, 78–80, 81–83, 88–92
- multiple parties in, 96
- plurality systems, 5–7
- policy outcomes and, 39–42, 204–206
- proportional representation and, 44–45
- subsidy budget shares and effect of, 88–92
- wine subsidies and, 110–112, 120–124, 130–133, 201–202
- within-country subsidy measurement and, 156–161
- electoral tactics, 196n.66
- Ellison, Glenn, 74–75
- employment
 - economic geography and patterns of, 22, 29–30
 - electoral competition and concentration of, 48–51
 - geographic concentration of, 31–32, 73–78
 - geographic diffusion of, 86
 - manufacturing sector, 82
 - Norwegian policies for equality in, 190–192
 - proportional systems and distribution of, 44–45
 - relative concentration benchmarks for, 76
 - sector-specific subsidies and, 159
 - subsidies' impact on, 40
 - uneven distribution of, 27–29
 - vote maximization and, 43–44
 - wine industry subsidies and levels of, 105–106
- entertainment industry, 29–30
- entropy indices
 - limitations of, 76
 - EU employment data, 76–78
 - geographic concentration measurement, 75–76
- ethnic politics, 16–17, 206–208
- European Commission
 - bias in rulings by, 101n.9
 - member-states subsidy data from, 99–104
 - non-EU-compliant subsidy cases and, 100–101
 - reform to subsidy rules by, 213–215
- European Council, EU subsidy rules and, 100n.6
- European Court of Justice, 100–101
- European Union
 - Austrian subsidy violation, 122
 - case studies of subsidy programs, 99–104
 - entropy indices for employment data from, 76–78
 - French subsidy violation and, 106
 - manufacturing subsidies in, 67–68
 - non-EU compliant subsidies cases, 99–104
 - State Aid rules in, 23–24, 72, 97–99, 208–215
 - subsidies by, 18–19, 66–67, 72
 - subsidy wars and, 210–213
 - wine industry subsidies and rules of, 106
- Evans, Carolyn L., 11–12, 92–93, 151–156
- exchange rate manipulation, 68
- Export-Import Bank, 210–213
- exports, 40
- factor mobility, economic geography and, 56
- farm-gate wine merchants,
 - Austrian subsidies for, 120–130, 201–202
- electoral system and, 122–124
- policy outcome for, 129–130
- politics and, 124–129, 197–198
- federalism
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - electoral system measurement and, 82
- Fédération des Syndicats de la Champagne*, 109–110
- fishing industry, 41, 159, 161
- financial sector, 29–30
- Finland
 - open-list system in, 137–138
 - particularistic economic policies in, 1–2
- firm-based subsidy targeting (Norway), 184–188
- firm location decisions, 32
- first-best reelection strategy using subsidies, 51–53
- foreign steel imports, duty imposition on, 6
- foreign trade
 - manufacturing subsidies and reliance on, 87–88
 - subsidies and, 19

- forest sector
 - geographic diffusion of, 10–13, 40–41, 44–45
 - subsidies for, 10–13, 40–41, 44–45
- France
 - Cognac subsidies in, 23–24, 107–120, 170, 201–202
 - economic geography in, 29–30
 - electoral competition in, 48–51, 117n.38
 - electoral institutions in, 110–112
 - EU wine subsidies in, 108–109n.18
 - film industry in, 46–48, 210–215
 - government subsidies in, 20–21
 - non-EU-compliant wine subsidies in, 106
 - particularistic economic policies in, 1–2
 - reform to subsidy policies in, 213–215
 - resistance to subsidy restrictions in, 210–213
 - wine industry subsidies in, 97–99
- Freedom Party of Austria/Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/FPÖ, 126–127
- “Frozen” (film), distribution and marketing in Norway of, 10–13
- Gallagher’s disproportionality index, 88–92
 - Norwegian electoral system and, 178–179
- Least squares index, 79
- GDP per capita
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - electoral system measurement and, 81–83
 - subsidies and, 88
- geographic concentration
 - country-specific measures of, 76–78
 - customer base and, 29–30
 - causal complexity and, 61–62
 - closed-list systems, 169
 - defined, 33–34
 - district magnitude and list type, 161–166
 - electoral competition and, 48–51, 62–63
 - electoral systems and, 88–92
 - entropy indices, 75–76
 - French electoral institutions and, 110–112
 - French wine subsidies and, 109–110
 - Gini indices, 74–75
 - government subsidy spending and, 156–161, 169
 - measurement of, 73–78, 158–160
 - manufacturing subsidies and, 83–87
 - “no-concentration” benchmark for, 76
 - in Norway, 158–160
 - open-list systems, 147–156, 169
 - in plurality systems, 5–7, 23–24, 46–48, 87–92, 147–156, 169
 - political consequences of, 204–206
 - production factors and, 93–96
 - in proportional systems, 36–38, 50–51, 92–93, 169
 - relative concentration benchmarks, 76
 - special interests and, 169
 - trade policies and, 36–38
 - of unemployment, 206–208
 - vote maximization and, 39–42
 - wine industry subsidies and, 97–99, 105–106
 - within-country subsidy measurement and, 156–161
- geographic diffusion
 - closed-list systems, 138–140, 147–156
 - district magnitude and list type, 161–166
 - electoral competition and, 48–51
 - government subsidy spending and, 169, 172–173
 - manufacturing subsidies and, 83–87
 - in Norway, 160–161
 - party-centered *vs.* candidated-centered systems and, 92
 - personal vote seeking and, 162
 - production factors and, 93–96
 - proportional representation and, 10–13, 23–24, 44–45, 88–92, 147–156, 169, 202–203
 - of subsidies, 50–51, 160–161
 - vote maximization and, 39–42, 43–44
- Germany
 - geographically diffuse industries in, 43–44
 - geographic diffusion and subsidies in, 44–45
 - government subsidies in, 20–21
 - mixed-member electoral system in, 78–80
 - non-EU-compliant wine subsidies in, 106
 - ballot system measurement in, 142–144
 - particularistic economic policies and, 1–2
 - vote maximization in, 40–41
- Gini indexes, geographic concentration measurements and, 74–75
- Glaeser, Edward L., 74–75
- globalization
 - economic geography and, 13–15, 20–21
 - politics and, 34–35
 - subsidies and, 87–88
 - uneven distribution of economic activity and, 27–29

- government expenditure on subsidies
 cross-national comparisons,
 145–156, 201
 district magnitude and list type, 161–166
 economic geography and, 199–201
 federal systems and, 82
 geographic concentration and,
 156–161, 169
 geographic diffusion and, 169, 172–173
 list type and district magnitude, 161–166
 Norwegian subsidies, 156–161, 190–192
 plurality-based electoral systems,
 83–87, 169
 proportional representation systems, 22,
 50–51, 83–87, 93–96, 147–156, 169
 ratio of subsidies to total spending,
 67–68, 69–70, 144–156
 reform initiatives for, 213–215
 sector-specific subsidies, 70–72, 183–184
 spending patterns in, 69–70
 Grossman, Gene M., 11–12, 27–29,
 179–182
- Hankla, Charles R., 35–36
 Hansen, Wendy L., 13–15, 36–38
 Helpman, Elhanan, 11–12, 27–29, 179–182
- ideology, 116–117. *See also* partisanship.
 left-leaning governments, 82–83,
 145–156
- imports, 6, 68
- income distribution, 27–29
- incumbents
 district-level competitiveness and, 175
 legislative dynamics and, 56–58
 in open-list systems, 140–142
 PR *vs.* plurality electoral systems and
 subsidies by, 102–103
 subsidy funding by, 39–42
- India
 government subsidies in, 64–65
 trade negotiations and subsidies in, 16–17
- industrial policy 20, 54. *See also* sector-
 specific subsidies.
- industrial strategy. *See* sector-specific
 subsidies; May, Theresa.
- industrial sector
 cross-national subsidy comparisons,
 97–99
 economic and political benefits of
 subsidies in, 20
 electoral district size and, 35–36
 geographic concentration in, 3–5, 13–15
 government partisanship and, 55
 stock prices and political influence of,
 69–70
 trade policies and geographic
 concentration in, 208
 vote maximization and concentration in,
 39–42
- Industry Act of 1972 (United Kingdom),
 20–21
- inequality
 distribution of subsidies and, 18–19
 uneven distribution of production and
 employment and, 27–29
- Innovation Norway, 184–188
- international accounting rules, sector-
 specific subsidies and, 70–72
- international agreements
 economic geography and, 16–17,
 208–213
 resistance to, 210–213
 restraints on subsidies in, 72, 98–99
 subsidies and, 19
- international conflict, 213–215
- Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE
 database, 5n.9, 143–144n.8
- Italy
 EU wine subsidies in, 108–109n.18
 government subsidies in, 20–21
 policy-targeting incentives in, 197–198
- Japan,
 subsidies in, 19, 68
 unemployment programs, 208
- job security
 economic geography and, 29–30
 subsidies as tool for, 40
- Johnson, Joel W., 142–144
- Jospin, Lionel, 117n.38, 118–120
- Kayser, Mark Andreas, 12–13, 60n.20
- Kongeriget Norges Hypotekbank*, 176–177
- Krugman, Paul, 74–75
- labor mobility
 cross-national comparisons of subsidy
 spending and, 145–156
 economic geography and, 31–32
 geographic concentration and, 93–96
 Labour Party (DNA) Norway, 188–190
 least-squares index, 79
 left-leaning governments, 82–83, 145–156
 legislative dynamics
 Austrian farm-gate wine merchant
 subsidy, 124–129
 closed-list systems, 138–140

- legislative dynamics (cont.)
 - economic geography and, 56–58
 - French electoral institutions and, 110–112
 - in open-list systems, 140–142
 - parliamentary questions, 113–116
 - sector-specific subsidies and, 71–72
- letters of assignment, for bureaucrats (Norway) 187
- Liberal Party (Venstre) (Norway), 9–10
- Lindstädt, René, 60n.20
- list-type, 78–80, 134–137. *See also* closed-list systems; open-list systems
 - in Austria, 120–123
 - district magnitude and, 161–166
 - measurement of, 142–144
 - policy outcomes and, 138–142
 - in proportional representation systems, 24–25
 - variations in, 137–138
- lobbying activities
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - French wine industry subsidies and, 109–110
 - government partisanship and, 53–55
 - ministry-level decision making and, 56–58
 - in Norway, 176n.9
 - by trade organizations, 47–48
- Maisons de Champagne*, 109–110
- majoritarian systems, policy-targeting
 - incentives and, 11–12. *See also* plurality electoral systems.
- manufacturing sector
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending in, 145–156
 - employment variations in, 82
 - entropy indices for employment in, 75–76
 - geographic concentration in, 27–30, 74
 - Norwegian subsidies for, 173–176
 - subsidies for, 18, 19–20, 64–65, 67–68, 72, 83–87
 - voter turnout and, 195–197
- market mechanisms
 - cognac producers subsidies and, 112–113
 - geographic concentration and, 31–32
- Mary Kay (United States), 33–34
- May, Theresa, 19–20, 54–55
- McGillivray, Fiona, 13–15, 35–38, 171n.3
- McKeown, Timothy J., 27–29
- mean district magnitude
 - measurements of, 79–80
 - geographically concentrated sectors and, 92
- Meier, Erhard, 125–127
- Mexico
 - electoral competition and policy in, 60–61
 - government partisanship in, 54
 - subsidies in, 71–72
 - unemployment program, 208
- Milner, Helen V., 13–15, 36–38
- minimum threshold requirements, in proportional systems, 50–51
- mining industry
 - electoral competitiveness, 60
 - geographic concentration of, 29–30
- mixed-member proportional systems
 - in Germany, 78–80
 - measuring list systems in, 142–144
- modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), 76–78
- Movement for the Defense of Family Farmers (MODEF) (France), 112–113
- multicollinearity
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - electoral system measurement and, 81–83
- multi-party government coalitions
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - subsidy spending in, 96
- narrow interests. *See* special interests
- National Assembly Elections Act (2000) (Slovenia), 40–41
- national price levels, 69–70
- national vote-share thresholds,
 - proportional representation and, 8
- nation-wide constituencies, proportional representation and, 7
- neo-institutional theory, economic
 - geography and, 204–206
- Netherlands, industry concentration in, 36–38
- New Zealand, vote maximization in, 40–41
- “no-concentration” benchmark
 - geographic concentration measurement and, 75–76
 - relative concentration *vs.*, 76
- Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), 76–78
- nominal-tier elections, 78–80
- non-EU-compliant subsidies
 - cases involving, 99–104
 - predicted number of, 102–103
 - proportional representation and, 101–102

- non-tariff barriers, 12–13
- non-zero tariffs, plurality-based electoral systems, 11–12
- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
 - import protections and, 13–15
 - industry concentration and, 36–38
- Norway
 - bureaucrats in, 173
 - construction industry subsidies in, 9, 138–140
 - dispersion bonus in, 9–10
 - district-level subsidy distribution and vote margins, 193–194
 - electoral competitiveness in, 176–177
 - electoral systems in, 177–179
 - employment concentration in, 29–30
 - Farmer's Party in, 55n.15
 - firm-based subsidy targeting in, 184–188
 - firm location and subsidies in, 32
 - geographic concentration measurement in, 76, 152, 158–160
 - geographic diffusion of subsidy distribution in, 160–161
 - government structure in, 188–190
 - income and production redistribution in, 27–29
 - lobbying activities in, 176n.9
 - manufacturing-sector subsidies in, 190–192
 - list type in, 142–144
 - policy outcomes in, 170–182
 - policy-targeting incentives in, 179–182, 197–198, 203–204
 - population density and subsidy distribution in, 195–197
 - proportional representation in, 7, 170–182
 - sector-specific subsidies in, 71–72, 170–171, 183–184
 - subsidies in, 66–67
 - variations in subsidies within, 173–176
 - vote maximization in, 40–41, 44–45
 - within-country subsidy measurement in, 156–161
- number of parties in government, 156
- Ochs, Jack, 27–29
- OECD countries
 - agricultural subsidies in, 71n.17
 - geographic concentration in, 29–30
- Office of Fair Trading (United Kingdom), 40n.2
- Oloffson, Maud, 39–42
- open-list systems
 - ballot access and, 143–144n.8
 - characteristics of, 137–138
 - cross-national subsidy spending comparisons, 147–156
 - empirical expectations concerning, 51–53
 - geographic concentration in, 147–156, 169
 - geographic diffusion of subsidies in, 202–203
 - measurement of, 142–144
 - personal vote strategies in, 169
 - policy outcomes and, 140–142
 - policy-targeting incentives in, 197–198, 202–203
 - in proportional representation, 24–25
- parliamentary questions (PQs), 113–116
- parochial interests. *See* special interests
- particularistic economic policies
 - absence in Norway of, 176–177
 - definitions of, 204–206
 - electoral institutions and, 39–42
 - plurality electoral systems, 5–7
 - proportional representation systems and, 12–13
 - subsidies as, 1–3
- partisanship. *See also* ideology.
 - electoral systems and, 53–55
 - French cognac subsidy and, 114
 - in Mexico, 54
 - policy outcomes and, 53–55
 - Socialist Party (France), 114, 117n.38
- party-based electoral competition, 48–51
 - in Austria, 23, 122–124
 - closed-list systems, 138–140, 156–161
 - French electoral system and, 48–51, 114, 117n.38, 118–120
 - geographic diffusion and, 92
 - legislative dynamics and, 56–58
 - measurement of, 78–80
 - Norwegian electoral system, 178–179
 - open-list systems and, 140–142
 - vote margins in, 188–190
- People's Action Future for Finnmark (*Folkeaksjonen Framtid for Finnmark*), 8, 40–41
- People's Republic of China (PRC),
 - government subsidies in, 20–21. *See also* China.
- personal vote seeking
 - district magnitude and list type, 162–167, 169
 - geographic diffusion and, 162

- personal vote seeking (cont.)
 list systems and, 140–142, 150
 subsidy spending and, 147–156, 197–198
 Persson, Torsten, 11–12, 27–29, 92–93,
 151–156
 petroleum industry, 76
 plurality electoral systems
 conventional wisdom concerning, 11–12
 cross-national comparisons of subsidy
 spending and, 145–156
 district-level competitiveness in,
 46–48, 175
 district size and, 35–36, 80n.33
 economic geography and, 13–15, 32,
 36–38
 electoral competitiveness in, 48–51,
 58–60, 171–173
 empirical expectations concerning, 51–53
 federalism in, 82
 in France, 110–112
 geographically-concentrated subsidies in,
 5–7, 23–24, 46–48, 87–92,
 147–156, 169
 government expenditure on subsidies,
 83–87, 169
 Grossman and Helpman model, 11–12
 institutional differences in, 134–137
 legislative dynamics and, 56–58
 manufacturing subsidies in, 83–87
 non-EU-compliant subsidies and,
 102–103
 party discipline in, 58
 policy outcomes and, 204–206
 reform to subsidy policies in, 213–215
 single-party governments and, 96
 social welfare spending in, 206–208
 special interests in, 64–65
 subsidy budget shares in, 83–87, 169
 vote types in, 43–44
 vote maximization in, 39–42, 46–48
 wine industry subsidies and, 97–99,
 105–106, 110–112
 Poland, 40–41
 polarization in politics, 34–35
 policy outcomes
 Austrian farm-gate wine merchant
 subsidies, 129–130
 closed-list systems, 138–140, 170–182
 district size and, 35–36
 economic geography and, 13–15, 23–24,
 31–32, 204–206
 electoral institutions and, 39–42,
 204–206
 French Cognac subsidy, 120
 government partisanship and, 53–55
 list-based proportional electoral systems,
 138–142
 open-list systems, 140–142
 proportional representation systems,
 170–182
 wine subsidies and, 130–133
 policy-targeting incentives
 in closed-list systems, 138–140, 156–161
 subsidies and, 25–26
 district magnitude and list type, 161–166
 electoral competition and, 58–60
 empirical expectations concerning,
 51–53
 firm-based subsidy targeting, 184–188
 legislative power and, 11
 in Norway, 179–182
 in open-list systems, 140–142
 in plurality-based electoral systems,
 11–12
 in proportional representation systems,
 171–173, 179–182
 proportional systems and, 197–198
 sector-based targeting, 183–184
 special interests and, 64–65
 subsidies defined as, 66–67
 wine subsidies as, 130–133
 politics
 Austrian farm-gate wine merchant
 subsidy and, 124–129
 Cognac producers subsidies and,
 112–113
 economic geography and, 31–32, 34–35
 economic policy and, 39–42
 electoral district size and, 35–36
 EU-compliant subsidies, 100n.6
 manufacturing subsidies and, 72
 of non-EU-compliant subsidies,
 101–102
 sector-specific subsidies and, 70–72
 subsidies' effect on, 20, 67–70
 wine industry subsidies, 105–106
 population density, subsidy distribution
 and, 195–197
 populism, 15–16
 pork, fiscal, 5, 65, 172–176
 procurement, by governments, 29, 66
 producer subsidies, 1n.2, 64–65
 economic and political benefits of,
 64–65
 Norwegian firm-based subsidy targeting
 and, 184–188
 Norwegian policies for employment
 equality and, 190–192

- production factors
 cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 economic geography and costs of, 31–32
 geographic concentration and, 73–78, 93–96
 geographic diffusion and, 93–96
 uneven distribution of, 27–29
 “Project Socrates,” 54–55
 promotional activities, Cognac producer subsidies, 112–113
 proportional representation (PR)
 systems, 3–5
 in Austria, 120–124
 causal complexity, 61–62
 conventional wisdom about, 12–13
 cross-electoral district subsidies and, 25–26
 cross-national comparisons of subsidies in, 24–25, 145–156
 dispersion bonus in, 138–140
 district-level competitiveness in, 171–173, 175–176
 district size and, 35–36, 80n.33, 161–166
 economic geography in, 7–15, 32
 electoral competitiveness in, 50–51, 58–60
 empirical expectations concerning, 51–53
 geographic concentration and, 36–38, 50–51, 92–93, 169
 geographic diffusion and, 10–13, 23–24, 44–45, 88–92, 147–156, 169, 199–201
 government expenditure on subsidies, 22, 50–51, 83–87, 93–96, 147–156, 169
 government partisanship and, 53–55
 institutional differences in, 134–137
 international trade dependency and, 81–83
 left governments associated with, 82–83
 list-type variations, 137–138, 142–144
 measurement of, 78–80
 multi-party governments and, 96
 non-EU compliant subsidies and, 99–104
 in Norway, 7, 170–182
 open lists and subsidy spending in, 147–156
 personal vote seeking in, 162
 policy outcomes in, 170–182, 204–206
 policy-targeted incentives in, 171–173, 179–182, 197–198
 preference votes in, 138
 reform to subsidy policies in, 213–215
 single-country study, 24–25
 social welfare spending in, 206–208
 special interests in, 33–34, 64–65
 subsidy budget share in, 22, 50–51, 83–87, 93–96, 147–156, 169, 202–203
 vote categories in, 43–44
 vote maximization in, 39–42, 44–45
 wine industry subsidies and, 97–99, 105–106
 within-country subsidy measurement and, 156–161
 quarrying, geographic concentration of, 29–30
 Quentin, Didier, 111, 114
 Reagan, Ronald, 54–55
 recovery cases, of non-EU-compliant subsidies, 100–101
 Reinfeldt, Fredrik, 39–42
 Reinhardt, Eric, 36–38
 relative concentration measure, of sector-specific employment, 76
 rent seeking
 electoral competition and, 58–60
 Norway, 188
 particularistic economic policies and, 2–3
 resource redistribution, economic policies and, 1–3
 Reynaud, Marie-Line, 111, 114
 Roads to Recovery Program (Australia), 43n.4
 Rodrik, Dani, 72
 Rogowski, Ronald, 12–13, 81–83
 Roland, Gerard, 11–12, 27–29
 Rosenbluth, Frances, 96, 145–156
 Saab (Sweden), 33–34, 39–42
 safe districts
 electoral competitiveness and, 58–60
 subsidy distribution and, 193n.58
 Sainte Laguë allocation formula, 177–178
 Scania AB (Sweden), 33–34
 Schreiner, Erich, 126–128
 sector employment
 cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 economic geography and, 29–30
 manufacturing employment, 82
 Norwegian policies for, 190–192
 subsidy distribution of, 65
 sector-specific subsidies
 government priorities for, 70–72
 in Norway, 176n.10
 Norwegian vote margins and, 190–192
 policy-targeting incentives, 183–184
 within-country measurements of, 156–161

- service sector, geographic distribution of, 29–30
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 78–80, 142–144
- single member districts (SMDs)
 - Cognac producer subsidies politics and, 112–113
 - measuring, 79–80
- single-party governments
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - subsidy spending in, 96
- single transferable vote systems, 134n.1, 137n.4
- Slovenia, 40–41
- Social Democrats (SPÖ) party (Austria), 124
- Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*) (Norway), 188–190
- Socialist Party (France), 114, 117n.38
- social welfare programs
 - economic geography and, 206–208
 - subsidies' impact on spending for, 64–69
- Soziale Marktwirtschaft* (Germany), 1–2, 20–21
- Spain
 - EU wine subsidies in, 108–109n.18
 - list type in, 142–144
- special interests
 - democracies' responsiveness to, 199–201, 204–206
 - economic geography and, 3–5, 33–34, 204–206
 - electoral systems and, 64–65
 - French wine subsidies and, 109–110
 - geographic concentration and, 82–83, 169
 - government subsidies as response to, 69–70
 - particularistic economic policies and, 2–3
- spending priorities, 64–69
- state-owned institutions, 1–2
- State Aid. *See* European Union State Aid rules; government expenditure of subsidies
- statistical analysis of subsidies
 - electoral politics and, 22
 - list systems and, 24–25
- steel industry (United States), 5–7, 33–34
- stickiness of government policies, 54n.14
 - causal complexity and, 61–62
 - subsidy persistence and, 82–83
- structural adjustment program, 116
- subsidies
 - benefits and limitations of, 72
 - budgeting process (Norway), 186
 - case studies of, selection criteria for, 99–104
 - categories of, 66–67
 - causal complexity of, 61–62
 - in closed-list systems, 139
 - cross-district variations in, 25–26
 - cross-national comparisons, 20–22, 24–25, 145–156
 - dispersion bonus from geographically diffuse subsidies, 9–10
 - economic geography and, 17–21
 - electoral competitiveness and, 48–51, 58–60, 170–182
 - empirical expectations concerning, 51–53
 - firm location and, 31–32
 - for geographically diffuse industries, 43–44
 - statistics on, 67–68
 - government partisanship and, 53–55
 - international restraints on, 23–24, 72
 - in left-leaning governments, 82–83
 - measurement of, 144–156
 - ministry-level decisions on, 56–58
 - Norway's history of, 176–177
 - in open-list systems, 140–142
 - particularistic economic policies, 1–3
 - plurality electoral systems, 5–7, 46–48
 - political benefits of, 9, 67–70
 - producer's demands for, 1n.2
 - in proportional systems, 13, 50–51, 83–87, 93–96
 - as share of government expenditure, 67–68
 - socioeconomic benefits of, 3, 67–70
 - vote maximization and, 39–42
 - voter preferences distribution and, 81
 - within-country measurements of, 156–161, 173–176
- subsidy wars, international agreements and, 210–213
- sugar industry (United States)
 - subsidies for, 64–69
 - vote maximization and concentration in, 39–42
- surplus votes
 - in Austrian electoral system, 122–124
 - economic geography and, 43
 - in plural systems, 46–48
 - vote maximization and, 43–44
- Sweden
 - dispersion bonus of subsidies in, 50–51
 - district-specific electoral competitiveness in, 191–192n.55
 - geographically diffuse groups in, 10–13

- open-list system in, 137–138
- particularistic economic policies in, 2
- special interests and economic geography in, 33–34
- subsidies in, 20–21
- vote maximization in, 39–42
- Swinnen, Johan F. M., 71n.17
- Syndicat du Commerce des Vins de Champagne*, 109–110
- Tabellini, Guido, 11–12, 27–29, 92–93, 151–156
- targeted transfers, government spending patterns and, 69–70
- tariffs. *See also* trade policy.
 - electoral district size and, 35–36
 - plurality systems and incentives for, 11–12
 - subsidies and, 19, 54n.14, 68, 99
- taxpayers, cost of subsidies for, 64–69
- tax policy
 - Austrian farm-gate wine merchant tax break, 124–129
 - Austrian wine subsidies and, 121–122
 - government-funded subsidies and, 17–21
 - tax incentives in, 66–67
- technical support, Cognac producer subsidies, 112–113
- Thomas, Kenneth P., 82–83
- tourism, Norwegian support for, 10–13
- Trade Adjustment Assistance, 206–208
- Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (United States), 6
- trade organizations, lobbying for subsidies by, 47–48
- trade policy
 - cross-national comparisons of subsidy spending and, 145–156
 - electoral systems and, 81–83
 - district size and, 35–36
 - factor mobility and, 56, 58
 - geographic concentration and, 36–38
 - plurality systems and, 11–12, 46–48
 - single member districts and, 79–80
 - subsidy restrictions and, 19, 210–213
 - unemployment and, 206–208
- Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 210–213
- Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 16–17, 210–213
 - subsidies as response to, 19, 68
- Transvideo (France), 47
- Trump, Donald, 6, 19–20
- turnout, voter (Norway) 195–197
- unemployment
 - economic geography and programs for, 206–208
 - Norwegian subsidy programs and, 191n.50
 - voting patterns and, 195–197
- Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) (France), 117n.38, 118–120
- United Kingdom
 - Chinese imports and Brexit support in, 13–15
 - electoral competitiveness in, 60
 - film industry in, 213–215
 - firm location and subsidies in, 32
 - geographic concentration and, 74–75
 - government partisanship and policy in, 54–55
 - legislative dynamics in, 56–58
 - manufacturing subsidies in, 19–20
 - particularistic economic policies in, 1–2
 - reform to subsidy policies in, 213–215
 - sector-specific subsidies in, 70–72
 - subsidy programs in, 20–21
 - surplus votes and economic geography in, 43
 - textile industry subsidies in, 40
 - uneven distribution of production and employment in, 27–29
- United States
 - biotechnology industry in, 32
 - district size in, 35–36
 - geography of Chinese imports and political outcomes in, 13–15
 - government partisanship and policy in, 54–55
 - government subsidies and vote maximization in, 39
 - import penetration and politics in, 34–35
 - legislative dynamics in, 56–58
 - manufacturing subsidies in, 19–20
 - plurality electoral systems in, 5–7
 - political effects of geographic concentration in, 36–38
 - special interests and geography in, 33–34
 - subsidies in, 18–19
 - subsidy wars in, 210–213
 - Trade Adjustment Assistance program, 206–208
 - uneven distribution of production and employment in, 27–29

- Verdier, Daniel, 82–83
 Volvo (Sweden), 33–34
 vote margins
 electoral competitiveness measurement
 and, 188–190
 Norwegian manufacturing-sector
 subsidies and, 190–192
 subsidy distribution in Norway and,
 193–194
 turnout and unemployment and, 195–197
 vote maximization
 cross-national comparisons of subsidy
 spending and, 145–156
 economic policy and, 39–42
 electoral competition and, 48–51
 mechanisms for, 43–48
 in open-list systems, 140–142
 in plural systems, 39–42, 46–48
 in proportional systems, 39–42, 44–45
 voters' shared preferences
 district magnitude and, 161–166
 economic geography and, 3–5
 geographic distribution of, 81,
 204–208
 open-list systems and, 140–142
 vote swing
 electoral competition and, 58–60
 proportional representation and, 8–9,
 44–45
 vote maximization and, 43–44
 wages, subsidies' impact on, 40
 Wales (United Kingdom), 29–30
 Wallack, Jessica S., 142–144
 “wasted votes,” 43–44
 Wattenberg, Mark P., 78–80
 Welfare
 Social, spending in plurality systems,
 206–208
 Social, spending and economic geography
 and, 206–208
 Social, subsidies' impact on spending for,
 64–69
 wealth redistribution, subsidies and, 17–21
 wine industry subsidies
 Austrian farm-gate merchants' subsidy,
 120–130, 201–202
 characteristics of, 106–107
 cross-national comparisons of, 97–99
 electoral institutions and, 110–112,
 120–124, 201–202
 EU subsidies, 108–109n.18
 exogeneity of geography in, 105–106
 French Cognac producers subsidies,
 107–120, 201–202
 politics of, 130–133
 Wine Tax Act (Austria), 129–130
 winning coalitions, 12–13
 within-country measurements
 geographic concentration, 74–75
 policy outcomes, closed-list systems,
 170–182
 subsidy spending, 156–161, 173–176
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 Agreement on Subsidies and
 Countervailing Measures, 208–213
 subsidy regulation by, 23–24, 66–67, 72,
 97–99
 trade disputes and, 79–80
 wine subsidies and, 107n.15