

## THEORETICAL VIRTUES IN SCIENCE

What are the features of a good scientific theory? Samuel Schindler's book revisits this classical question in philosophy of science and develops new answers to it. Theoretical virtues matter not only for choosing theories 'to work with', but also for what we are justified in believing: only if the theories we possess are good ones (qua virtues) can we be confident that our theories' claims about nature are actually correct. Recent debates have focused rather narrowly on a theory's capacity to predict new phenomena successfully, but Schindler argues that the justification for this focus is thin. He discusses several other theory properties – such as testability, accuracy and consistency – and highlights the importance of simplicity and coherence. Using detailed historical case studies and careful philosophical analysis, Schindler challenges the received view of theoretical virtues and advances arguments for the view that science uncovers reality through theory.

SAMUEL SCHINDLER is Associate Professor at the Centre for Science Studies at Aarhus University in Denmark. He has published on methodological issues in science, discovery, the realism debate, and explanation in journals such as *The British Journal in Philosophy of Science*, *Synthese*, and *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*. He has received two major external grants from national research foundations in Germany and Denmark.



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*Uncovering Reality through Theory*

SAMUEL SCHINDLER

*Aarhus University, Denmark*



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*For Flori*



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