

ARISTOTLE ON THE USES OF CONTEMPLATION

Traditionally, Aristotle is held to believe that philosophical contemplation is valuable for its own sake, but ultimately useless. In this volume, Matthew D. Walker offers a fresh, systematic account of Aristotle's views on contemplation's place in the human good. The book situates Aristotle's views against the background of his wider philosophy and examines the complete range of available textual evidence (including neglected passages from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*). On this basis, Walker argues that contemplation also benefits humans as living organisms by authoritatively guiding human life-activity, including human self-maintenance. Aristotle's views on contemplation's place in the human good thus cohere with his broader thinking about how perishable organisms live well. A novel exploration of Aristotle's views on theory and practice, this volume will interest scholars and students of both ancient Greek ethics and natural philosophy. It will also appeal to those working in other disciplines including classics, contemporary ethics, and political theory.

MATTHEW D. WALKER is Assistant Professor of Humanities (Philosophy) at Yale-NUS College. His work focuses on ancient Greek philosophy and cross-cultural ethical theory, and has been published in numerous leading journals.

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Matthew D. Walker
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MATTHEW D. WALKER
Yale-NUS College



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Note on Texts, Translations, and Abbreviations

For Plato and Aristotle, I have used Oxford editions when possible, Budé and Loeb editions when necessary, and other editions when appropriate (e.g., as with Aristotle's *De Motu Animalium* and Plato's *Alcibiades*). Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own, although I have consulted several good translations, which are mentioned in the Bibliography. Given how much can turn on Aristotle's choice of words, I have sought to provide extremely literal "Eek" translations. Although often barbarous, such translations, I believe, serve a useful philosophical purpose.

For Aristotelian works, I use the following abbreviations:

<i>An. Post.</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i>
<i>DC</i>	<i>De Caelo</i>
<i>GC</i>	<i>On Generation and Corruption</i>
<i>DA</i>	<i>De Anima</i>
<i>Somn.</i>	<i>De Somno</i>
<i>Insomn.</i>	<i>De Insomnis</i>
<i>Long.</i>	<i>De Longitudine Vitae</i>
<i>Iuv.</i>	<i>De Iuventute et Senectute</i>
<i>Resp.</i>	<i>De Respiratione</i>
<i>HA</i>	<i>History of Animals</i>
<i>PA</i>	<i>On the Parts of Animals</i>
<i>MA</i>	<i>De Motu Animalium</i>
<i>IA</i>	<i>De Ingressu Animalium</i>
<i>GA</i>	<i>Generation of Animals</i>
<i>EN</i>	<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
<i>MM</i>	<i>Magna Moralia</i>
<i>EE</i>	<i>Eudemian Ethics</i>