Prolegomena
For a Sociological Approach to Civil Wars

December 2012, a house in a village in the North of Syria, we are guests for the night, the meal is finished, and the mood is relaxed. Children are in our midst. One of our hosts brings out his mobile phone and starts to show us some videos: summary executions, desecrated bodies, a man buried to his neck and then run over by a car, a head, shot off by a missile fragment, then held at arms' length. We are about to see signs of individual and collective trauma on a massive scale. Objective figures later confirm our first impressions: since 2011, out of 22 million Syrians, nearly 500,000 were reported killed, around 6 million are in exile, close to 7 million have been displaced, hundreds of thousands of people have been tortured in the regime's prisons. These numbers include the 11,000 deaths between 2011 and 2013, documented by a photographer code-named "Caesar," a defector from the Syrian Army.[1] Not to be forgotten are the repeated gas attacks on civilians by the Syrian army, the persecution of religious minorities by Islamic groups (kidnappings, seizure of goods, assassinations, rapes), and the dozens of journalists and aid workers kidnapped or killed.

Beyond the destruction of Syrian society, this crisis represents a pivotal moment in the transformation of the Greater Middle East, from Sahel to Afghanistan. Since the end of the cold war, the American interventions in Iraq (1991 and 2003–2011) and in Afghanistan (since 2001), the failure of authoritarian regimes, and the Arab revolutions are the cause or the symptom of an instability that affects a long list of countries to different degrees: Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Bahrain,

[1] The 2014 report is available at www.carter-ruck.com/images/uploads/documents/Syria_Report-January_2014.pdf. More can be found in the December 2015 Human Rights Watch Report, "If the Dead Could Speak: Mass Deaths and Torture in Syria's Detention Facilities," available at www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/16/if-dead-could-speak/mass-deaths-and-torture-syrias-detention-facilities. A French journalist carried out hours of interviews with the turncoat photographer. Garance Le Caisne, *Opération César: Au cœur de la machine de mort syrienne*, Paris, Editions Stock, 2015.

Libya, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria. The violent turn of the "Arab Spring," except in Tunisia so far, has strengthened radical jihadist movements that are challenging borders established in the Near East since the First World War. To make matters worse, regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran exacerbates the cleavage between Sunnis and Shias. Increases in war crimes, massacres, ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial executions, and indiscriminate bombings of civilians, including in schools and hospitals, make Syria the most violent of our contemporary conflicts. In addition, the flow of refugees and the spectre of terrorism bring a global dimension to the crisis and provide the impetus for foreign involvement. The presence of armed forces from Russia, Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the United States, and other NATO countries and of foreign fighters from all over the world makes Syria's one of the most internationalized civil wars. It has also precipitated some surprising strategic realignments that, for example, have the United States arm the PKK, classified as a terrorist movement by its agencies, which is fighting Turkey, a NATO member country; or there is Israel taking care of fighters of Jabhat al-Nusra, a movement affiliated with al Qaida.

Yet qualifying the events taking place in Syria since 2011 as a "civil war" fails to carve out a natural object from the continuum of history[2]; as is the rule in all research, how we account for reality depends on the theoretical perspective we adopt. However, the prevailing theories reveal themselves as unsuited because they prevent us from understanding, or even simply posing, the questions that hold the most interest for us. We will lay out our definition of civil wars, namely the coexistence on the same national territory of competing social orders engaged in a violent relationship, and the questions that form the outline of a research program. Yet, first we must dissect the aporetic propositions of the dominant paradigm. The readers less interested in the following theoretical development might skip the prolegomena and proceed directly to the introduction.

The Limits of Neopositivism

Beginning in the 1990s, publications in political science and economics multiplied that were intent on accounting for the emergence and dynamics of civil wars by mathematical formalizations associated with

[2] As do the quasi-totality of actors in contemporary civil wars, the Syrians widely reject the term "civil war". Nevertheless, we use it; for us, it has no moral connotation and does not signal siding with one party to the conflict but indicates instead a desire to come within the scope of an academic sub-field, that of the theories of civil wars. Using the term enables us to think about this conflict in general categories that are open to comparison.

quantitative studies. This led to an academic field organized around several research centers (Stanford, Yale, MIT, Harvard, PRIO, Oxford, ETH Zurich) that can be qualified as neopositivist. It is an approach distinguished by its partiality to rational choice theory (RCT), naturalization of research objects, limiting studied objects as a function of their statistical measurability, and an epistemic closure that translates into a refusal to regard other paradigms as scientific.[3] This return to positivism points to the possibility of theoretical regression in social sciences. Today, it is essential to engage in a debate with this paradigm that goes beyond discussions on the technical aspects of collecting data or its mathematical treatment. The triviality of the published results, despite an ever more labored mathematical formalization, and the repetitive nature of the subjects discussed in fact raise questions about neopositivism on three levels: the conception of rationality, the methodology, and the choice of objects.

The Exhaustion of a Paradigm

By adopting RCT, the neopositivist works execute a theoretical power grab whose radicalism has several consequences. First, this way of thinking explicitly rejects a century's worth of social science research on the pretext that the works it produced do not tally with scientific criteria. Rejecting this intellectual heritage has created the conditions for a sort of professional amnesia that translates into a tendency to reinvent extant concepts, as demonstrated by certain recent works on transnationalism and socialization.[4] Next, the lion's share of studies on civil wars these days is produced by researchers with limited or no direct on-the-ground knowledge or even of the secondary literature dealing with the countries in question. Young researchers are explicitly discouraged from gathering data by observation and non-structured interviews. The result is that the neopositivists, bereft of contextual knowledge, frequently are incapable of putting forward sociologically relevant causes to explain the correlations found. The *American Political Science Review* recently furnished an example in the form of a disastrous study on the demarcation line during the German occupation of France, in which the authors failed to account for the presence of a railroad line as

[3] The RCT does not necessarily involve quantitative data processing and these techniques are not the exclusive domain of a particular paradigm or discipline, see, for instance, Durkheimian and Marxist approaches, the Annales School or Social Movement Theory.

[4] Jeffrey Checkel, *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015; Jeffrey Checkel, "Socialization and Violence: A Framework Essay," *Simons Papers in Security and Development* 48, 2015.

the, one would have thought, obvious reason for the Resistance's sabotage actions.[5] Beyond this one questionable article, the more general problem is that leaving historians out of the referee process leads to texts being vetted strictly based on the formal validity of the methodology employed.

Then, the epistemic closure of the neopositivist movement has the effect of shielding its findings against all substantive criticism. It has been pointed out for a long time, by Donald Green and Ian Shapiro in the United States or Raymond Boudon in France among others, that RCT, the anthropological model favored by the neopositivists, suffers from a design flaw.[6] The neopositivists shut off the discussion by challenging the validity of critiques that do not accept their premises, at the risk of making them look highly partisan. Thus, in 1996, Robert Bates, professor of political science at Harvard and president of the Comparative Politics section of APSA (American Political Science Association), called for drawing a distinction between "*social scientists*" who line up behind RCT and "*area specialists*" whose output is reduced to a literary form.[7] With respect to civil wars, recurrent critiques have been leveled against RCT since the late 1990s. Here, the debate over greed vs. grievances, growing out of the studies by Paul Collier and Anka Hoeffler as well as by James Fearon and David Laitin, exemplifies this epistemic closure.[8] Despite the theoretical and empirical criticisms leveled at these works,[9] their categories are regularly revived, for instance by Jeremy Weinstein when he contrasts predatory rebellions (oriented toward greed) with politically engaged rebellions (mobilized

[5] Jeremy Ferwerda and Nicholas L. Miller, "Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment," *American Political Science Review* 108 (03), 2014, pp. 642–660. Matthew Kocher and Nuno Monteiro in a detailed critique highlighted the many problems with this article: Matthew Kocher and Nuno Monteiro, "What's in a line? Natural Experiments and the Line of Demarcation in WWII Occupied France (July 31, 2015)." Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2555716.

[6] Raymond Boudon, *Raison, bonnes raisons*, Paris, PUF, 2003; Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994.

[7] Robert Bates, "Letter from the President: Area Studies and the Discipline," *APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics* 7 (1), 1996, pp. 1–2.

[8] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, 1998, pp. 563—73; James Fearon, David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003, pp. 75–90.

[9] Christopher Cramer, "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War," *World Development* 30 (11), 2002, pp. 1845–1864; Roland Marchal and Christine Messiant, "De l'avidité des rebelles: l'analyse économique de la guerre civile selon Paul Collier," *Critique internationale* 16, 2002, pp. 58–69; Mike McGovern, "Popular Development Economics – An Anthropologist Among the Mandarins," *Perspectives on Politics* 9 (2), 2011, pp. 345–355.

by grievances).[10] Similarly, most of the analyses put forward to explain the duration and occurrence of civil wars follow the same pattern of opposing poverty and institutional weakness[11] to inequalities.[12]

Finally, and this is probably the crucial point, the advances made in understanding civil wars thanks to research that relies on the RCT paradigm have been remarkably limited, particularly considering the scale of the resources expended.[13] Specifically, game theory has only very marginally contributed to clarifying the reality of the conflicts. Barbara Walter, in applying game theories to civil wars, reworks three factors previously proposed by James Fearon in his 1995 paper on the occurrence of international conflicts: asymmetric information, commitment problems, and issue indivisibilities.[14] From this, she concludes that governments confronted with separatist movements employ violence as a means of snuffing out other secessionist demands. This conclusion, which has limited scientific interest, is – more importantly – impervious to proof. Indeed, unfazed by this *non-sequitur*, the author extrapolates the strategies of States from the observation of individual behaviors in laboratory settings.[15] Even research that is more empirically based presents similar limitations. In his classic book, Stathis Kalyvas examines the spatial distribution of violence in civil wars as a function of the degree of micro-scale control exerted by the insurgents.[16] His theory of a joint production

[10] Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[11] Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009; Sylvain Chassang and Gerard Padro i Miquel, "Economic Shocks and Civil War," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 4 (3), 2009; Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni, "Persistence of civil wars," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8, 2010.

[12] Joan Esteban and Gerald Schneider, "Polarization and Conflict: Theoretical and Empirical Issues," *Journal of Peace Resolution* 45 (2), 2008; Lars-Erik Cederman, Kirstian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, *Inequalities, Grievances and Civil Wars*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[13] Similar comments have been made in the past about the vote and international security. See, respectively, Raymond Wolfinger, "The Rational Citizen Faces Election Day, or What Rational Choice Theories Don't Tell You About American Elections," in M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann (eds.), *Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren E. Miller*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1993; Stephen Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis: Rational Choice and Security Studies," *International Security* 23 (4), 1999, pp. 5–48.

[14] Barbara Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, 2009, pp. 243-61; James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49 (3), 1995, pp. 379-414.

[15] Barbara Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

[16] Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

of selective violence by fighters and civilians rests on a radical reductionism derived from his hypotheses about rationality. Notably, because of "urge to survive" the individual is supposed "to be good at" calculating threats and opportunities but unaffected by emotions and the past and incapable of anticipating.[17] Kalyvas very well perceives that his hypotheses are extremely restrictive but suggests, based on anecdotal evidence, that civilians overestimate the stability of control of armed groups and that they make their decisions essentially according to local information and events. It therefore follows that violence produces obedience among those who suffer it.[18] However, there are many examples of resistance to violence, of the porosity between civilians and militaries, of the importance of governance of armed actors, of a capacity for anticipation or the importance of national or international information.[19] In fact, any consideration of the sociohistorical context implies a renunciation of the RCT. Thus, Elisabeth Wood argues that, in El Salvador, the long-term mobilization of peasants in the armed movement does not depend on the economic situation, but on the political culture produced during and by the struggle. Unable to get around the Olsonian paradox inherent in the RCT paradigm, she draws on the theory of social movements. Hence, in a specific case she revisits the findings of Tarrow, McAdam, and Tilly.[20] The attempt to revert to the RCT in the appended formal model forces a non-operationalizable definition of personal interest: "defiance, an intrinsic motivation, and/or pleasure in agency."[21]

The Obsession with Quantification

The neopositivist investment in the RCT paradigm explains the obsession with quantification mistaken for scientificity that runs through their work. Since the 1990s, neopositivist studies of civil wars have been

[17] *op. cit.*, p. 207.
[18] *op. cit.*, pp. 207–208.
[19] *op. cit.*, pp. 27–28 and 91–104. For cases of resistance against a disproportionately stronger opponent, see for Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005; for Abkhazia, Anastasia Shesterinina, "Collective Threat Framing and Mobilization in Civil War," *American Political Science Review* published online 24 October, 2016; concerning Syria, see chapters 2 and 3.
[20] Elisabeth Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 20. Furthermore, Sydney Tarrow, in reviewing the book, reminds us that "*Wood is not the first to argue that political culture matters, or that the attribution of injustice is necessary to produce collective action*," recalling especially the classic works on this subject by E. P. Thompson, Barrington Moore Jr., or David Snow. Sydney Tarrow, "Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War," *Perspective on Politics* 5 (3), 2007, p. 593.
[21] Elisabeth Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

structured around quantitative techniques whose mastery confers a badge of legitimacy in the field. While, during the 1980s, the work of historians and sociologists (Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, Barrington Moore) dominated the interpretations of civil wars, a number of economists and political scientists changed the nature of the debate with mathematical modeling of quantitative data, thus expanding the area for application of the neopositivist paradigm.[22] Since then, the body of works that can be considered relevant has shrunk drastically and crucial theoretical choices are buried under methodological questions. The systematic use of quantified data, of mathematical and statistical formalizations obscures serious methodological problems.

Indeed, far from the image of cumulative scientific progress enabled by a rigorous accumulation of data, the reality is much more disappointing. During the mid-2000s, most of the research relied on the same American database inaugurated in 1963, one that is regularly updated with the same methodological options: "Currently, about a dozen research projects have produced civil war lists based on apparently divergent definitions of civil war, but there is less pluralism here than one might think. Most projects do not conduct original historical research and depend heavily on COW [Correlates of War]. The result may be replication of errors due to the original COW coding rules and uncertainty about whether different definitions generate different results."[23] COW is of decisive importance, because it has imposed definitions, thresholds, and criteria that all the studies of the ensuing years incorporated. Subsequently, certain researchers, confronted by the repetitive nature of the results, focused on producing alternative databases (PRIO/UPCD dataset) and on accessing databases of international institutions (World Bank) or national ones (American army). Then, methodological innovations, including the use of surveys in war zones, field experiments, and process-tracing ended up largely monopolizing the debate.[24]

Collectively, these studies pose numerous problems of data selection and category definition. To begin with, fundamental to how this corpus is constituted, we find unscientific empiricist definitions of civil war through the setting of thresholds (25 or 1,000 dead, without taking into account

[22] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *op. cit.;* James Fearon and David Laitin, *op. cit.*
[23] Nicholas Sambanis, "What is Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6), 2004.
[24] Concerning these methodologies, James Druckman, Donald Green, James Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia (eds.), *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, 2009, 367–378; Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (eds.), *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

the size of the population). However, only theoretical hypotheses ought to define a series of empirical situations to be retained as a function of a question derived from a research program. Next, the "variables" are defined in a simplistic manner. The notion of identity, frequently reduced to that of ethnicity, is pegged to fixed criteria and an objective membership despite anthropological works that for decades have demonstrated the opposite to be true.[25] Finally, badly constructed quantitative data can lead to contradictory conclusions as a function of the dependent and independent variables chosen. Thus, the quantitative works have managed to show correlations *both* between resource scarcity and civil war, on the one hand, and resource abundance and civil war, on the other.[26]

Add to this that the twin obsessions with measurability and with innovative methodology produce data sets that are increasingly problematic. First, while qualitative approaches may not be entirely lacking, they remain in the minority, serve as window dressing, and are denied legitimacy. Hence, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Stathis Kalyvas repeatedly insist on the impossibility of alternative approaches because the discourses are not reliable and because the actors, consciously or not, may hide their "true motives."[27] Yet databases do not solve this issue: they aggregate facts that have already been interpreted, which – contrary to neopositivist practice – calls for a critical analysis of how they are produced.[28] The coding categories thus are seldom explicit, which leads to ignoring the theoretical and, at times, normative options of the authors, while on the other hand the practical work of coding is left to students or jobbers. Repeatedly, specialists on conflicts have cast serious doubt on the quantitative data collected in their fields.[29] The most serious problem appears to be that a number of interviews (structured or semi-structured)

[25] See, for instance, the Minority at Risk and All Minorities at Risk databases. For a critical perspective of such a static understanding of identity, following the seminal work Fredrik Barth, see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity'," *Theory and Society*, 29 (1), 2000, pp. 1–47; Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, Long Grove, Waveland Press, 1969.

[26] Stormy-Annika Mildner, Gitta Lauster, and Wiebke Wodni, "Scarcity and Abundance Revisited: A Literature Review on Natural Resources and Conflict," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 5 (1), 2011.

[27] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2355, 2000, Stathis Kalyvas, *op. cit.*

[28] Yoshiko Herrera and Devesh Kapur, "Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities," *Political Analysis* 15 (4), 2007, pp. 365–386; Christian Davenport and Patrick Ball, "Views to a Kill: Exploring the Implications of Source Selection in the Case of Guatemalan State Terror, 1977–1995," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (3), 2002, pp. 427–450.

[29] Roland Marchal and Christine Messiant, *op. cit.;* Ibrahim Abdullah, "Man Does Not Live by Bread Alone," *African Review of Books* 2 (1), 2006, pp. 12–3. The same holds true in Afghanistan and in Iraq, where data collection conditions also lack rigor.

are not done by the researchers themselves but are subcontracted to local interviewers or private firms that use badly trained or untrained local staff under conditions that make it impossible to check the quality of the data collection. Finally, a significant share of the studies relies on databases produced by large national and international institutions without any critical reflection on the bureaucratic and ideological biases that mathematical rigor camouflages. One of the most striking examples in recent years is the use of internal data of the American army in Iraq and Afghanistan by researchers around Jason Lyall at Yale, at Princeton around Jacob N. Shapiro, and around Eli Berman at UC San Diego. Not only are conditions under which these data were produced unknown, but they have also not been compared with other sources, which prevents any possible biases surfacing. In the same vein, Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikopolov, respectively a World Bank employee and two academics contracted by the World Bank, solely use the evaluation of a rural development program's impact in their work to describe the transformations of Afghan society.[30]

An Arbitrary Reduction of Legitimate Objects

A deceptively rigorous methodology and problematic conception of rationality translate into a naturalization of research objects and an arbitrary discounting of legitimate subjects. Generally, the neopositivists claim that their categories objectively describe actions. Thus, acts of violence are often subsumed under the category of homicides, excluding injuries and despite the difficulties that the social qualification of these acts poses. In practice, the neopositivists generally adopt the classifications produced by international and Western institutions. The literature on refugees is particularly instructive in this regard, since the statistics and hence the definitions of the international agencies (HCR, IOM) are adopted without debate.[31] Similarly, the distinction between civilian and combatant is a reification of categories taken from international

[30] See especially Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, "Empowering Women through Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," *American Political Science Review* 107 (3), 2013, pp. 540–57. Their final audit report is available at www.nsp-ie.org/reports/finalreport.pdf. Conversely, Alessandro Monsutti researches the design and implementation of this program; see Alessandro Monsutti, "Fuzzy Sovereignty: Rural Reconstruction in Afghanistan, between Democracy Promotion and Power Games," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54 (3), 2012, pp. 563–591.

[31] For a critique of the notion of refugees, see Anthony Richmond, "Sociological Theories of International Migrations: The Case of Refugees," *Current Sociology* 36 (2), 1988, pp. 7–26.

law. In the real world, a man fights for part of the day, an individual shelters a fighter, a judge serves the insurrection: in a civil war context are they then civilians? It is telling that these questions, ignored by the neopositivists, do not escape the actors: thus, the Taliban movement and UN Office of Human Rights in Afghanistan engage in repeated discussions on the status of policemen when the latter are not engaged in combat operations. Here, too, the uncritical adoption of categories injects a normative bias in lockstep with the institutions that produce them.

Legitimate research objects are reduced depending on how feasible quantification is and are co-produced with the institutions that provide the data. Thus, after Kalyvas, works multiplied that dealt with the occurrence of violent civilian deaths and the degree of control over territory based on their measurability rather than their intrinsic interests. Similarly, the forming of armed groups is reduced to inquiries into cohesion and the process of engagement to a mere decision.[32] In addition, access to institutional databases (World Bank, American army) most often presuppose a co-definition of the research object.[33] Publications are legion that pose questions directly inspired by these institutions: for instance, the effects of aerial bombardment on the support for Western intervention in Afghanistan and the role of cell phones in the insurgent attacks in Iraq – both studies funded by the U.S. Air Force.[34] Similarly, the conclusions drawn by Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikopolov – to wit that involving women in the distribution of aid has a partial effect on their social position; that bypassing the local elites in aid distribution gives villagers a sense of participation without increasing effectiveness; and

[32] Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2014; Ana Arjona and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fighters," in Yvan Guichaoua (ed.), *Understanding Collective Political Violence: Conflict, Inequality and Ethnicity*, New York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011, pp. 143–171; Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (4), 2011, pp. 496–528; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2), 2008, pp. 436–455.

[33] The American army's biases are evident, especially the fact that the reports in part are bureaucratic artefacts for the hierarchy justifying itself internally. For an analysis of World Bank biases, see Béatrice Hibou, "The Political Economy of the World Bank's Discourse: from Economic Catechism to Missionary Deeds (and Misdeeds)," *Etudes du CERI* 39, 2000.

[34] Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai, "Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan," *American Political Science Review* 107 (4), 2013, pp. 679–705; Jacob Shapiro and Nils Weidmann, "Is the Phone Mightier Than the Sword? Cellphones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq," *International Organization* 69 (2), 2015, pp. 247–274.