Introduction

Middle Imperial China in East Asian and World History

Since the earliest written records in China, dynastic chronology has framed its history. As elsewhere in world history, dynasties were defined by a succession of rulers descended from one family line. Transcending dynastic chronology, the term “Middle Imperial China” typically refers to the dynasties of Tang (618–907), Song (960–1279), Liao (907–1125), Jin (1115–1234), and Yuan (1260–1368), between the Early Imperial (Qin, 221 BCE–210 BCE, and Han, 207 BCE–220 CE) and Late Imperial (Ming, 1368–1644 and Qing, 1644–1910) periods. Institutions of centralized government under the rule of an emperor were created in the Qin and Han, and these served as the foundation for the imperial state in both the Middle Imperial and Late Imperial periods. But beyond this general framework, what does “Middle Imperial” mean and why is it important?

Sandwiched between “Early” and “Late,” Middle Imperial China is used in its widest meaning to refer to the reunified empire in the Tang dynasty, following three centuries of divided rule, through the beginning of the Ming dynasty, which restored “native” Han Chinese rule after the Mongol Yuan dynasty. In this book we adopt a more limited chronology, from the collapse of the Tang (900) through the decline of the Yuan (1350), in order to focus attention on the Song, Liao, Jin, and Yuan. One way to define what is “middle” about this period is to see it as beginning with the collapse of the Tang imperial order, both internally as a centralized empire and externally as the dominant power in East Asia, and ending on the eve of the restoration of Han Chinese rule by the Ming. Tang cultural and political influence on the Korean peninsula, in the Japanese archipelago, and in states to the south that Tang people knew as Nanzhao (modern Yunnan province) and Annam (modern Vietnam), waned with the breakdown of Tang imperial authority after the rebellion of the Turko-Sogdian general An Lushan (755–763), bringing to an end the Early Imperial period and ushering in the Middle Imperial. Middle Imperial China is equally defined by both economic and social transformations, generated by

1 Here and throughout, “Han” will be used to refer to peoples or regimes that identify as culturally/ethnically “Chinese” (or not, as in “non-Han”). This is a practical usage chosen for efficiency, acknowledging that such terminology obscures many issues and thus remains problematic.
changes begun already in the eighth century, as well as by the restoration of a unified empire under the Song. Incursions into Song territory by the Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin, and ultimately conquest by the Mongols, definitively altered political circumstances, and consequently both social and economic conditions, in the area we now think of as China.

Given the significant non-Han presence in the history of this era, what exactly does “China” in the Middle Imperial period mean? Often seen as the culmination of a long series of encounters between China and its nomadic neighbors, the Mongol conquest and the legacy of its predecessor states (Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin) greatly complicate the meaning of the China part of Middle Imperial China. In fact, the old name “Cathay,” which Europeans in the Mongol era knew as the region north of the Huai River and which was often used broadly to refer to China as a whole, derived from “Kitay” (Khitan), the people who founded the Liao Empire in Northeast Asia.2 Apart from the important question of what, if any, meaning the modern concept of ethnicity had to people of this era in what we now call “China,” native subjects of the previous Tang dynasty were not only culturally influenced by non-Han peoples and cultures from beyond the Great Wall but many — including the ruling house — were also themselves descendants of intermarriage between Han and non-Han. Consequently, although the term “Han” derives from the name of the first major dynasty, “Han” (or its opposite, “non-Han”) is of limited utility in describing people’s identities. China can also be understood in a spatial sense, as a geographic territory, the homeland of people who call themselves Han (or Chinese). But even that territorial designation is problematic, bearing as it does the anachronistic connotation of firmly drawn boundaries of the modern nation-state.3 However, in practice it is convenient to use the terms Han and non-Han and to refer to, for example, Song China, as long as it is done with the awareness that these are imprecise, and sometimes misleading, terms.

Dynastic Cycles and Historical Change

In the moral universe of Chinese historical chronicles, the character of rulers determined the rise and fall of dynasties. Dynasties experienced stages — birth, maturation, death — producing a pattern known as the dynastic cycle. Influenced


by the narrative of these chronicles, generations of historians in both Asia and the West viewed the Song dynasty founders as vigorous leaders, while later emperors, such as Huizong (r. 1101–1126), who reigned over the loss of the north to Jurchen invaders, were often seen as effete and dissipated. After the rebirth of the Song dynasty as the Southern Song (1127–1279), this regime once again fell prey to invaders from the north, the Mongols, who were building their own world empire. Because the Song was also known for its cultural achievements – notably in poetry and landscape painting – the dynasty as a whole was thus traditionally regarded as culturally and artistically vibrant but militarily and politically weak. It compared unfavorably with the exuberant Tang dynasty, whose empire dominated East Asia, producing brilliant generals as well as scholars and poets. The Mongol Yuan dynasty in turn was typically seen as a nonnative conquest dynasty that was able to take advantage of Song military weakness and for the first time conquer all of China. The Yuan was replaced after barely a century by the restoration of native rule under the Ming. Foreign rule returned with the Manchu conquest in the mid-seventeenth century, and, unlike the short-lived Mongol Yuan, the Manchu Qing ruled for nearly three centuries (1644–1911). An important responsibility of each successive dynasty was the compilation of the history of the preceding dynasty by court historians, whose objectivity was circumscribed by the need to reinforce the legitimacy of the reigning dynasty. In the case of foreign rule, the power of dynastic periodization was such that under the Mongol Yuan, the histories of Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin were incorporated into the official dynastic histories, and they were therefore regarded as legitimate inheritors of the “Mandate of Heaven,” the right to rule endowed by the moral order of the cosmos.

Dynastic periodization, and the historical patterns of rise and fall it supported, fell out of fashion when early twentieth-century Chinese historians sought to place the history of China within a universal timeline of historical progress: ancient, medieval, modern. Nationalist Chinese historians were prepared to abandon dynastic chronology associated with the collapsed empire in favor of one that measured historical change in China alongside that of the West. China’s history was thus related to world history by means of a linear evolutionary chronology culminating in the creation of the modern world. With the post-World War II and postcolonial development of a global history that questioned European Enlightenment notions of historical progress toward modernity, the record of China’s past has contributed to revisions of the ancient–medieval–modern paradigm. Nowhere is this more apparent than with studies of the Song. The Song economy in particular exhibits features that fit models of development – urbanization, industrialization, technology – in early modern Europe, thus raising fundamental questions about periodization in world history. What exactly is “early modern”? To what degree has the use of...
Adapting the ancient–medieval–modern timeline to China’s history, the
Japanese Sinologist Naitō Konan (1866–1934) was among the first to propose
the Song period as the beginning of “modern” (kinsei) China, introducing the
notion of the “Tang–Song transformation” as the crucial watershed in China’s
history.4 Prewar Japanese Sinology produced important research on the Song
that inspired and underpinned the work of Euro-American scholars beginning
in the 1950s. During this same period, in the Chinese-speaking world, both
European Enlightenment and Marxist historical models contended as inter-
pretive frameworks for the Chinese past. In the aftermath of the 1949
Revolution, and until at least the 1980s, Marxist ideas of class struggle and
economic systems as the basis of historical change prevailed in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), while Western approaches and methodologies
influenced the work of Chinese historians elsewhere (Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore).

Indebted to Japanese as well as Chinese scholarship ongoing throughout the
twentieth century, Euro-American scholars moved initially from text-based
interdisciplinary Sinology to more social-scientifc studies of Song society,
economy, and politics.5 Already during the 1950s John King Fairbank and
his colleagues at Harvard began to incorporate the idea of the Tang–Song
transformation and of the Song as an era of major economic, social, and
cultural/intellectual developments into their teaching, a perspective that
shaped the narrative of their groundbreaking 1960 textbook East Asia: The
Great Tradition. Mark Elvin’s The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and
Economic Interpretation (1973) drew extensively on both Chinese and
Japanese scholarship to promote the idea of the Tang–Song transformation
to Western scholars. Despite the fact that many of the arguments presented by
Elvin have been challenged and revised, the overall perspective he proposed
remains influential. In part as a result of Elvin’s work, by the 1970s historians
of China had begun to adopt a periodization paradigm different from (though
not unrelated to) that of ancient–medieval–modern: Early Imperial, Middle
Imperial, Late(r) Imperial. Grounded in a “China-centered” approach,6 this
new framework focused attention on changes in state–society relations and on
the economic, social, cultural, and intellectual developments that defined each

4 For a thorough and insightful review of this topic, see Richard von Glahn, "Imagining
Jakov Smith and Richard von Glahn (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 2003), 35–70.
6 Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent
Chinese Past, Studies of the East Asian Institute (New York: Columbia University Press,
1984).
period. Although the characteristic features of each of these eras were in theory drawn directly from Chinese historical experience, they still led to a modernity defined essentially by the West.

The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries saw an explosion in studies of the Song by scholars in the PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Europe, and North America.\(^7\) The digital revolution has also had a profound impact, generating biographical databases and GIS mapping for the Song (and later eras).\(^8\) Until the past two decades, studies of the Khitan Liao, Jurchen Jin, and Mongol Yuan peoples and dynasties were relatively sparse, but in recent years these have increased dramatically. Emphasis on cultural diversity as well as political issues surrounding the role of minority peoples – both in the PRC and elsewhere – have drawn attention to rulers of China whose origins lay beyond the Great Wall, and studies of the Mongol Yuan in the context of steppe empires as a global historical phenomenon have shed new light on this dynastic phase in the history of China.

What Are the Defining Features of Middle Imperial China, 900–1350?

From a dynastic perspective, the tenth century began with the collapse of the Tang dynasty and ended with reunification under the Song dynasty. The founding of the Song dynasty brought to an end to the last era of political fragmentation (Five Dynasties, 907–960) in the history of imperial China. To place the theme of unification in a broader historical context, the Roman (31 BCE–476 CE) and Han (207 BCE–220 CE) Empires created political unity at the western and eastern ends of Eurasia before eventually disintegrating. Although attempts were made to reconstitute the Roman Empire (Holy Roman Empire, Eastern Roman Empire), they never fully succeeded. By contrast, imperial unity was restored in China by the Sui (581–617) and Tang (618–907) dynasties. After the Song unification, apart from the century and a half of division between Northern (960–1126) and Southern Song (1127–1279) due to the Jurchen Jin conquest of the north, China was essentially a unified empire well into the twentieth century.

Political Unification and Power

Political unification, then, is a key theme in the history of Middle Imperial China, along with the evolving relationship between emperor and bureaucracy. Although the growth of autocracy is no longer seen as a defining feature

\(^7\) Bibliographies and reviews of scholarship in China and Japan have appeared periodically in the *Journal of Song–Yuan Studies*.

\(^8\) See the Harvard-based China Historical GIS (CH-GIS) and Chinese Biographical Database (CBDB).
of Song (as proposed by Naitō and his followers), the nature of imperial authority remains central to understanding the political history of the Song and later. Achieving balance both between civilian and military authority and between emperor and bureaucracy was a fundamental concern of Song governance. The official bureaucracy, largely recruited and selected through the civil service examinations, performed its necessary functions of administration; but at the highest levels of government, the most important officials were appointed and served at the behest of the emperor.

The Song inherited its basic institutional structure of government from the Tang: emperor at the top, overseeing a three-pronged structure incorporating military, central administrative, and censorial (a watchdog agency that monitored other government offices) functions. By the ninth century, Tang imperial power rested on the support of regional military leaders, who gradually became independent of the center and eventually withdrew even nominal support for the Tang emperor. The Song founder came to power as a military leader in one of the Five Dynasties that contended for power during the tenth century in the aftermath of the Tang collapse. Once political unification was achieved, in order to maintain its control of people and defend its territory the Song state had to collect sufficient revenues from its population to support both administrative operations and the military. The Song founder and his successors were well aware of the importance of maintaining military and fiscal control over regional administrative units. Control of the military was highly centralized, and fiscal operations were similarly controlled through central government agencies, although differing regional conditions necessitated a degree of decentralization reflected in the evolution of province-like “circuits” that formed an intermediate layer of governance.

Although both the Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin ruled over Han Chinese populations, adopting and adapting Song political institutions of centralized government, the Mongol Yuan as a dynasty of conquest was faced with the most daunting task of ruling the whole of both north and south China. Yuan rulers for the first time created the institutional structure of a nomadic–agrarian bureaucratic empire, going beyond their predecessors. Building on Song, Liao, and Jin political institutions, the Mongol Yuan crafted institutional approaches to governing that served their own distinctive political, social, economic, and cultural needs as nomadic rulers of a centralized agrarian empire.

Changes in Economy and Society

Beyond the framework of dynastic rise and fall reflected in political history, historians studying social and economic change have characterized the centuries between around 750 (mid-Tang) and 1250 (the demise of Southern Song) as experiencing an economic revolution, or at the least a transformation in both society and economy. The velocity and nature of these changes differed dramatically across regions. Beginning with anthropologist G. William Skinner’s work in
the 1970s, historians have been careful to recognize the limitations of generalizing observations for all of China. Despite his focus on regional developmental cycles, Skinner recognized the relevance of the dynastic cycle model to charting economic growth, which was dependent on the stability of the political order and its capacity to ensure the flow of goods, the functioning of markets, and so on. Following Skinner, Robert Hartwell argued that there were cycles of economic change during the Song that differed in timing and scale depending on the region. From an empire-wide perspective, Shiba Yoshinobu and Joseph McDermott have proposed a tripartite economic periodization over the course of the Song: expansion and regional development, continuity, decline. Other historians have focused studies of economic and social change where appropriate on discrete regional or local units over varying periods of time. Despite disagreements about specific features, the general nature of economic change is widely agreed upon: commercialization, the development of a market economy (including transportation and distribution networks), monetization, and urbanization.

By contrast, however, both the precise timing and the nature of accompanying social changes have been hotly debated even when the general contours of change are accepted: the decline, demise, disappearance of the great clans of the Tang and their replacement by new families who gained power not through inherited status – ascription – but through achievement, increasingly demonstrated by selection through the civil service examinations, which tested candidates’ knowledge of classical learning and awarded degrees leading to official appointments in the imperial government. John Chaffee’s 1985 seminal work on the Song examination system showed how this complex bureaucratic operation not only produced officeholders for government administration but also began to penetrate Song society and culture. Thomas Lee’s related work published in the same year focused on the education system that underpinned the examinations.

Robert Hartwell asserted that Tang aristocratic clans were replaced after the founding of the Northern Song by a professional elite whose skills in essential government tasks— in his case study, financial administration— made them vital to the operation of the state.  

Robert Hymes expanded and refined this argument by demonstrating, through a dense study of marriage patterns, kinship ties, and local activism in one prefecture, that the nature of local elite power and status shifted from Northern to Southern Song: from a “national” elite whose marriage ties extended across the empire to a local one, whose interests and patterns of marriage were essentially limited to their native locality. Beverly Bossler challenged this by showing that the perception of a shift in the nature of the elite from Northern to Southern Song was at least in part a historiographical illusion created by the nature of the sources, and that powerful families retained national ties in the Southern Song as well as being rooted in local communities.

Tracing social change begins with the primary unit of the family: marriages unite families and build kinship ties over generations, and gender relations defined in family life serve as models for society at large. During the Song period, rituals of family life were revised to accord with social ideals envisioned by scholars such as Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Song legal cases preserved in The Enlightened Judgments, a thirteenth-century collection, reflect the often contentious application of law to family disputes, and the unsurprising lack of fit between Confucian ideals and social practice. The role of women both within the family and household and beyond it was idealized by Confucian scholars, but again, as the practice of daily life often conflicted with those ideals, we should expect that many women did not fit the ideal mold that was provided for them by male scholars and expected by their male relatives.

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21 Patricia B. Ebrey, The Inner Quarters: Marriage and the Lives of Chinese Women in the Sung Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Beverly Jo Bosser, Courtesans, Concubines, and the Cult of Female Fidelity: Gender and Social Change in
Changes in economy and society under the Khitan Liao, Jurchen Jin, and Mongol Yuan are much harder to trace, in part because of limitations of written sources and in part because less scholarship has been produced. Both of these conditions, however, are changing rapidly. Although Elvin argued in *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* that the Mongol conquest brought an end to the vibrant economic revolution of the Song, subsequent research has yielded a far more complex understanding of economic – and social – change during the Yuan. The history of the Mongol Yuan, and to some extent that of the Jurchen Jin, is better documented in written sources than that of the Khitan Liao, but archaeological work has provided a rich source of new materials on the Khitan in particular that documents Khitan society and economy in far greater depth than before.  

**Intellectual and Cultural Life**

Ideas that shaped family life and gender relations in the Song were rooted in intellectual changes traceable to the late Tang. Thinkers such as Han Yu (768–824) sought to revive a classical Confucian heritage believed to have been lost in the waves of Buddhist influence that inundated China after the fall of the Han in the third century. During the Northern Song, a number of thinkers developed the fundamental principles that became associated with “Neo-Confucianism”: a cosmology based on the concepts of *li* (Principle/Pattern) and *qi* (Matter/Energy) as the primary elements of the universe. These concepts were also applied to the human world, providing an explanatory basis for ideals of human behavior and for the order of human society. The creation of a Confucian cosmology as the basis for moral cultivation has often been described as a response to Buddhist (and/or Daoist) metaphysics, thereby securing a metaphysical or cosmological grounding for classical Confucianism, based on moral codes of conduct and correct ritual practice transmitted in texts. Neo-Confucianism came to dominate the intellectual world of Song China, and Mongol rulers also adopted it as official orthodoxy for the civil service examinations, ensuring Neo-Confucianism’s dominance in the scholarly world of Yuan China.  

Literature was an integral part of intellectual life in these centuries, as it had been earlier. Poetry flourished in the Song, which saw the continuation of...

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earlier forms along with the development particularly of the song lyric (ci).\textsuperscript{25} Statesmen were poets as well as scholars, and the range of topics addressed in various kinds of poetry was vast.\textsuperscript{26} Intimate family life was as much the focus of poetry as was nature. Poetry and visual art – painting – were also linked, as poetry was inscribed on paintings in elegant calligraphy to add meaning to the visual depictions. By the early Yuan period, a new literary and cultural form had evolved: drama. Plays and musical performances were a lively part of life under the Jurchen in north China, and dramatic arts blossomed under the Mongols.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Religion and Society}

Transmitted overland and by maritime routes from the Indian subcontinent, Buddhism took root in China after the fall of the Han in the third century. Religious life at this time was dominated by Daoism, an extremely complex and diverse collection of ideas and practices that are poorly represented by a single term. Daoism, however, did provide a vocabulary that helped translate Buddhist concepts from Sanskrit and Pali scriptures into Chinese. The Sanskrit Buddhist concept of \textit{tathātā} (thusness, ultimate reality), for example, was translated by the Daoist term \textit{benwu} (original nonbeing). The spread and flourishing of Buddhism in the Tang eventually brought political, economic, and cultural backlash that resulted in prohibitions on the economic privileges of Buddhist monastic institutions, and ideological attacks by Confucian scholars on Buddhism as a foreign religion. Despite these setbacks in the ninth century, Buddhism flourished once again in the tenth through fourteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{28} Buddhism in this era is often characterized using the term “popularization,” and this is accurate as a depiction of the laicization of Buddhism and its spread throughout local communities, temples, and so on. Rulers of the Khitan Liao and Tangut Xi Xia (1032–1227) also patronized Buddhism, which flourished among their populations. Daoism also

\textsuperscript{25} For a general introduction to the topic, see Kōjirō Yoshikawa and Burton Watson, \textit{An Introduction to Sung Poetry}, Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967).


\textsuperscript{28} Peter N. Gregory and Daniel Aaron Getz, \textit{Buddhism in the Sung}, Studies in East Asian Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999).