INTRODUCTION

Antiochus from the city of Ascalon, a philosopher who at the end of the second century BCE moved to Athens from the periphery of the Greek-speaking world in order to become a member of the Academy, stands at the crossroads of many important developments. During his lifetime, Rome conquered Athens and the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean; as a consequence of this development, Athenian philosophical schools closed down and Greek-speaking intellectuals moved to Rome popularising philosophical discourse among the Romans. Favoured by the Roman interest in Greek culture, the original writings of Plato and Aristotle received renewed attention. Amid these developments, Antiochus professed to recover in his lectures and writings the original teaching of the early (fourth century BCE) Academy.\(^1\)

Part of Antiochus’ philosophical activity is revealed by the titles of works that are attributed to him by ancient authors. Thus, Sextus mentions a treatise *Canonica*, a doxographical work, where Antiochus laid down diverse views on the criterion of truth; Sextus twice makes reference to Antiochus as a source, once in the part of the doxography which conveys the views of the Academic Carneades,\(^2\) and a second time when referring to the

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\(^1\) It is not clear whether Antiochus officially called his school Old Academy as Glucker (1978) 106 suggests, or whether he professed to be merely recovering in his lectures and writings the teaching of the early Academy.

\(^2\) Antiochus F2 = Sextus Empiricus *Against the Professors* 7.162–63: οἷον προσβλέπαντες τινι, φησίν ὁ Ἀντίοχος, διατίθεμαι πως τὴν ὅψιν, καὶ οὕχ οὕτως αὕτην διακειμένην ἱερομνων ώς πρὶν τοῦ βλέψαι διακειμένην εἴχομεν. κατὰ μένι τὴν τοιαύτην ἄλλοισιν δυεῖν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἵνα μὲν αὐτῆς τῆς ἄλλους, τουτέστι τῆς φαντασίας, δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ τῆς ἄλλους ἐκτιθεσθέντος, τουτέστι τοῦ ὀρατοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησεων τὸ παραπλήρειον. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ φιλοσοφικό τε ἐκτίθησι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐτως καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἀρχιγος οὔσα τῆς πρὸ τοῦ ξονεν εἴδησεος, φωτος δέκιν ἱατρήν τε ἐμφάνιζεν ὀφείλει καὶ τοῦ ποιηθέντος αὐτῆς ἑναρχοῦ ἐνδεικτική καθιετάναι. References to Antiochus’ fragments follow Mette (1986), as reproduced also in Sedley (2012b).
epistemological views of Asclepiades the medic.\(^3\) Another testimony mentions a (lost) Antiochean treatise *On the Gods*.\(^4\) This information is the most that we can get from the sole verbatim fragment that may securely be ascribed to Antiochus in Sextus Empiricus\(^5\) and from *testimonia* about the philosopher which survive independently of Cicero.

It is only in Cicero that Antiochus emerges as more than a name and as a key player on the Roman philosophical scene. If one takes at face value Cicero’s explicit remarks about the authorship of the speeches that he puts in the mouths of his interlocutors, then we can be confident that three of the speeches that appear in his dialogues from 45 BCE contain major Antiochean content, with only minor Ciceronian interventions in the philosophical ideas that they express.\(^6\) In the *Lucullus* (11–62), the homonymous character

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\(^3\) Antiochus F2 = Sextus Empiricus *Against the Professors* 7.201: ὅτι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τὶνες τὸ τοιούτο ἀξίωμα, προφήτης πεποίηκεν Ἀντίοχος ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐν δεύτερο τῶν Ἀκαδημείαν ῥητοῖς γράφωσα ταῦτα ἄλλας ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῆς ἐν ἱεροτεχνίᾳ, ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις διότι καὶ ἀληθείας ἀντέλης εἶναι, λέγω τις μὲν ἄλλος ἡμῶς καταλαμβάνεται.

\(^4\) Antiochus T7 = Plutarch *Life of Lucullus* 28.8: ταύτης τῆς μάχης Ἀντίοχος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐν τῇ Περὶ θεῶν γραφη μνησθείς ὅτι ποτιν ἄλλην ἕρμαρτειν ταὐτάτην τὸν θόλον.

\(^5\) Although F2 contains the only sentences in Sextus that may be guaranteed to originate from Antiochus, some scholars have defended the view that larger parts of the doxographical account of epistemology in Sextus’ *Against the Professors* 7 is dependent upon Antiochus. Both Tarrant (1985) and Sedley (1992); (2012a) 88–93 have defended the view that Antiochus is the main source of Sextus Empiricus *Against the Professors* 7.141–260, whereas Tarrant claims an Antiochean influence for the paragraphs 7.89–140 as well. Against this view, see Brittain (2012) 109–13. The doxographical part of Sextus’ book contains summaries, in Stoic terminology, of Plato’s views (7.141–44) but also of a position attributed jointly to Aristotle and Theophrastus (7.217–26). If genuinely Antiochean, the accounts may be taken to show how Antiochus interpreted the epistemological views of the old tradition in light of his Stoic commitments in this domain of philosophy, as endorsed in the *Lucullus* as well. Sedley (2012a) 88–101 argues that Antiochus followed in these accounts (belonging to his early phase) the aim of ‘maximising the continuity between the early Academy and Stoicism’.

\(^6\) Despite Cicero’s explicit markers of Antiochean authorship, the identification of Ciceronian texts that can with security be attributed to Antiochus has been disputed in scholarship: Luck (1953) 73–94 identifies eighty-six fragments as Antiochean choosing only passages in Cicero which contain explicit references to Antiochus’ name; however, in his commentary he seems to adopt a more ‘loose’ criterion for the identification of Antiochean material, which leads to the inclusion of passages whose connection to Antiochus is only vague. Giusta (1964) 93 expresses scepticism about the Antiochean origin of Piso’s account in *On Ends* 5 and takes Cicero to have combined Antiochean views on the telos with a Peripatetic doxographical source. Mette (1986), on the other hand, reduces the number of fragments that may be ascribed to Antiochus to eleven but includes there extensive passages from the *Academic Books*, the *Lucullus* and the *On Ends*; still, he takes Piso’s account at *On Ends* 5.24–70 not to be securely
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conveys Antiochen views on epistemology. The Roman general becomes the mouthpiece of the epistemological views of Antiochus by virtue of the fact that the latter served as his philosophical advisor for many years; accordingly, the fact that Lucullus heard the doctrines of the school at first hand is invoked in *Lucullus* 10 as a guarantee of the trustworthiness of the account. Cicero’s authorial remarks seem to point to an Antiochian work as a source, one which set out to defend the Stoic criterion of truth against the criticisms of Academic sceptics.

The other two major Ciceronian sources for Antiochus are more doxographical in character: they are contained in Piso’s speech in *On Ends* 5 (9–74) and Varro’s account in the fragment that survives from the second book of the *Academic Books* (15–42). In these accounts, the two Antiochian spokespersons explicitly offer an account of the ethics of the Old Academy and of the main points of the Old Academic system in all three branches of philosophy, respectively. Cicero goes to great lengths in the last book of *On Ends* to show the book’s Antiochian credentials; thus, Piso is chosen as the mouthpiece of Antiochus because he had the Peripatetic philosopher Staseas of Naples in his household for many years, but also because he himself heard the lectures of Antiochus in Athens. Cicero in addition asks Brutus, the

Antiochian and only paraphrases the bulk of the account. Barnes (1989) takes Piso’s speech in *On Ends* 5, Lucullus’ speech in *Lucullus* and Varro’s report in the *Academic Books* to be securely reporting Antiochian views. He is followed by Fladerer (1996) xiii; cf. also Karamanolis (2006) 44 n.1. The newest collection of Antiochian fragments and testimonia by Sedley (2012b), on which the present study is based, contains eleven fragments, including the entire speeches of Piso, Varro and Lucullus in the *On Ends, Academic Books* and *Lucullus* respectively. Fragment 10 also includes material from the *Tusculan Disputations* (3.59–60; 5.21–3) and fragment 11 from *On the Nature of the Gods* (1.11:1.16). A further category of texts, without being assigned explicit Antiochian authority, may be deemed Antiochian on the basis of their content, e.g. by references to Antiochus’ (exclusive) thesis that the Academy and the Peripatos form part of the same tradition. The critique of Stoicism by the ‘sceptic’ Cicero in *On Ends* 4 may count among these passages. For a defence of the Antiochian pedigree of *On Ends* 4, see Sedley (2012a) 80.

7 *Lucullus* 10: *tamen expecto ea quae te pollicitus es Luculle ab Antiocho audita dicturum*. Later on, Lucullus stresses that he heard Antiochus ‘undistracted and with great interest, more than once on the same topic’: *vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno studio, eadem de re etiam saepe*. 8 *On Ends* 5.8: *censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Neapolitanum multis annos habueris apud te et compluris iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere*. Note how Cicero is keen to stress at *On Ends*
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dedicatee of the dialogue, to be particularly attentive and check the accuracy of Piso’s presentation of Antiochean philosophy, with which Brutus became acquainted through attending the lectures of Antiochus’ brother, Aristus.\(^9\) We are thus invited to take the claim of Antiochean authority at face value and assume that Piso’s account presents accurately the Antiochean positions which, in the case of \textit{On Ends} 5, are taken to represent the ethical theory of the Peripatos as well. Varro finally is chosen as a spokesperson for the Antiochean material in the revised version of the \textit{Academic Books} because he is himself a well-known follower of Antiochus.\(^{10}\)

The picture of Antiochus that emerges from the study of Piso’s and Varro’s accounts is going to be the main focus of the book.\(^{11}\) It is only in these two latter sources that we encounter a key

\(^5\) – \(^7\) that Piso gave an account of the Peripatetic telos which in some significant points diverges from that of Staseas of Naples who favoured a more ‘Theophrastean’ line. On the latter Chapter 3, \textit{infra}. For a discussion of the few surviving evidence on Staseas see Moraux (1973) 217–21. Cicero signals with this that he conveys Antiochus’ own reconstruction of Peripatetic ethics, which in some points diverges from that of other contemporary Peripatetics: ‘quod quidem eo probavi magis, quia memini Stasean Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilium sane Peripaticum, aliquanto ista secus dicere solutum, adventientem iis qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis ponerent.’ ‘Est, ut dicis,’ inquit; ‘sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius quam a Stasea dicebantur.’ However, for an alternative view on the role of Staseas see Inwood (2014) 72 who speculates that Cicero could have adopted the theory of ‘Aristotelian naturalism’ that features in Piso’s speech in \textit{On Ends} 5 from Staseas.

\(^9\) Ibid, 5.8: cuius oratio attende, quaeo. Brute, satinsae videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi, qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris, maxime probatam existimo. See also Cicero’s remarks in \textit{Academic Books} 1.12 that Brutus studied under Antiochus’ brother Aristus. For the importance of Cicero’s reference to Brutus for the Antiochean pedigree of Piso’s speech, see Gärler (2011) 333. For a more sceptical reading of these remarks, see Giusta (1964) 98 who believes that Cicero combines in \textit{On Ends} 5 Antiochean views with a (separate) Peripatetic doxographical source.

\(^{10}\) Numerous remarks on the choice of Varro as a suitable dramatic character to convey Antiochus’ views in Cicero’s new edition of the \textit{Academic Books} survive in Cicero’s letters; see F5a–6e = \textit{Letters to Atticus} 13.12.3; 13.16.1–2;13.19.3–5;13.25.3; \textit{Letters to Friends} 9.8.1 (which contains the dedicatory letter of the second edition to Varro): tibi dedi partis Antiochinas, quas a te probari intellectisses mihi videbar, mihi sumpsit Philonis.

\(^{11}\) Instead I will have less to say about Antiochus’ views as they are expressed in the \textit{Lucullus}. The reason for this is that the Antiochean speech in the \textit{Lucullus} largely reflects Stoic views about epistemology. One may hypothesise that Lucullus’ account is based on a work belonging to a different phase of Antiochus’ philosophical activity than the works which formed the basis for Piso’s speech in \textit{On Ends} 5 and for Varro’s speech in the \textit{Academic Books}. A developmental view about Antiochus’ philosophical activity is advocated in Sedley (2012a).
hermeneutical assumption of Antiochus’ reconstruction of the philosophy of the ‘ancients’, namely that the philosophical traditions of the Academy and the Peripatos represent a single, harmonious body of doctrines. In these sources we also encounter the idea that the Stoa merely modified (on the level of terminology) the views that it received from the old tradition. Consequently, Antiochus’ views, as they appear in the accounts of Piso and Varro, require a subtle approach, which does justice to the complex allegiance of the Old Academy.

The scholarship on Antiochus reflects this complexity as well: here, we may notice two tendencies. The one is a reductionist approach which wishes to ascribe to Antiochus an exclusive identity, whether Stoic, Platonic or Peripatetic. Another approach sees in Antiochus an eclectic, or syncretist, philosopher who combined different, and perhaps even incompatible, views in his Old Academic system.

The interpretation of a ‘Stoic’ Antiochus has been known since Antiquity; according to this view, Antiochus, although claiming to be recovering Platonic and Aristotelian views, is in reality a ‘most faithful Stoic’. This seems to largely match Antiochus’ defence of Stoic views in the domain of epistemology—an area where perhaps Antiochus recognised the Stoics as making a positive contribution, and even going beyond the ‘ancients’. If Antiochus recognised Stoic authority in this one area of philosophical discourse, the polemic of Cicero, who attacks Antiochus in the second part of the Lucullus as abandoning his professed

12 See Lucullus 132: per ipsum Antiochum, qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem si perpauca mutavit germanissimus Stoicus. For the most clear expression of this accusation, see Antiochus F1 = Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.235: ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν Στοὰν μετήγαγεν ἐν τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ, ὡς καὶ εἰρήθησα εἰπ’ αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ Στοικά ἑπεδείκνυε γὰρ ὅτι παρὰ Πλάτωνι κεῖται τὰ τῶν Στοικῶν δόγματα. Since the reference to Antiochus is preceded in Sextus by the exposition of Philo of Larissa’s epistemological views, we may infer that Antiochus’ ‘Stoic identity’ addresses primarily the epistemological views he advanced. Cf. Antiochus T5a = Plutarch Cicero 4.1–2 (which notes, more carefully, that Antiochus switched to favouring the Stoic account ‘in most matters’): τῶν Στοικῶν ἐκ μεταβολῆς θρασύπολων (sc. ὁ Ἀντίοχος) λέγον ἐν ταῖς πλεῖστοις. Aenesidemus who attempted a revival of Pyrrhonist philosophy in the first century BCE also attacked contemporary Academics for adopting Stoicism, clearly with Antiochus in mind; see Photius Library 212.170a: Οἱ δ’ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδήμης, φησί, μᾶλλον τῆς νῦν, καὶ Στοικαῖς συμφέρονται ἐνίοτε δόξαις, καὶ εἰ χρῆ τάληθες ἐπείν, Στοικοὶ φαίνονται μειχάμενοι Στοικοῖς.
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school, seems to be based on the assumption that Antiochus is a ‘Stoic’ in all areas of philosophy. However, this does not fit with the obvious anti-Stoic staging of the Antiochean account in Cicero, when it comes to the domain of ethics; in On Ends the Antiochean speech is offered as an alternative to Stoicism and as representative of a different school of thought, namely that of the Platonic-Peripatetic camp of the Old Academy. A ‘Stoic’ reading of Antiochus in this domain is also not supported by the polemic against Stoicism which is expressed in both Piso’s and Varro’s accounts; such a polemic is primarily motivated by the aim of subsuming Stoicism under the old tradition as a derivative school of thought. Thus, even if an interpretation traces ‘Stoicising’ features in Antiochus’ ethical account (in line with the abundant appropriation of Stoic terminology by Antiochus), it should also show how such features are connected with the reconstruction of the Platonic and Peripatetic doctrines that Antiochus professes to offer.

On the other hand, a strand of modern scholarship has emphasised Antiochus’ Platonic identity. There, Antiochus appears as the precursor of a series of Platonists who attempted to revive the dogmatic teaching of Plato in the first two centuries CE; thus, according to Theiler, Antiochus was the ‘founder of Platonism in the Imperial period’ and Dillon ranks him as the first among the ‘Middle Platonists’. An important qualification, however, is

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13 See e.g. Lucullus 134, where Cicero traces an inconsistency between the Stoic and the Old Academic conception of the telos: ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno in una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. quid Antiochus? etiam ‘inquit ‘beatam, sed non beatissimam’. Conversely, the ‘sceptic’ Cicero at On Ends 5.76 assumes that Piso does not defend Stoic epistemological views, since he advocates Peripatetic views in ethics: itaque have cum illis (sc. Stoicis) est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane. Antiochus could, however, admit Stoic authority solely in the domain of epistemology, whereas assuming a different stance in the domain of ethics; see Chapter 2, infra.

14 This is underlined also in Schofield (2012b) 241–42.

15 See, for example, Theiler (1930) 51 and Luck (1953) 27 who speak of an association of Antiochus with the Alexandrian Eudorus. However, as Barnes (1989) 52 notes, ‘no text associates the two men’; cf. Glucker (1978) 90–7. Sedley (2012a) 81 also maintains a distance from the view that Antiochus ‘anticipated the main Middle Platonists’. Another line of scholarship has focused on the way Antiochus influenced later Platonists, especially by co-opting Aristotle for the understanding of Plato; thus, Karamanolis (2006) 45 takes Antiochus to be the first in a series of Platonists ‘to draw attention to the value of Aristotle’s philosophy as a means for accessing that of Plato’ and Bonazzi (2012) 311 claims that ‘Antiochus’ contribution to the development of
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needed in the presentation of Antiochus as the precursor of Platonists who were active in the first centuries CE. Even if later Platonists incorporated Aristotelian ideas and terminology into their work, they did it with the primary goal of interpreting Plato and his dialogues, since the latter represented for them the highest wisdom. In line with this, one of the hallmarks of Platonists became a strong claim of the infallibility of Plato’s words in their own right, against a lesser authority of Aristotle and subsequent philosophers. This claim of infallibility but also the thesis of the exclusivity of Platonist authority is missing in Antiochus who believes that Platonic views can and should be supplemented by Academic, Aristotelian and, in some cases, even Stoic ideas, in order to meet contemporary, systematic standards of philosophical debate.

Furthermore, one should acknowledge the significant shift in philosophical focus attested in later Platonists: whereas metaphysics and the independent ontological status of Platonic forms is not (explicitly at least) discussed in Antiochean passages, much of the identity of a Platonist in the subsequent centuries is connected with a quest for intelligible principles. Forms acquire thereby central importance and feature in the scheme of Middle Platonist ‘first principles’, imperial Platonism is evident when it is considered that he was the first to insist both on Aristotle’s Academic credentials and on his importance for a correct assessment of Plato’s philosophy. Cf. Tarrant (2007).

17 Cf. Boys-Stones (2001) 103: ‘Platonists were able to commit themselves to the truth of a proposition on the grounds that Plato had said it, and, it might be, even before they themselves understood why it was true.’ Plotinus and Simplicius co-opt Aristotle but only in so far as it serves the understanding of the ‘divine’ Plato; see also Karamanolis (2006) 4.

18 Sedley (2012a) 81 points in the same direction when he says: ‘[I]t is no accident that he (sc. Antiochus) calls himself an Academic rather than a Platonist, because his interest is in realigning himself with the mainstream tradition of the Academy as a school, not with the thought of Plato in particular.’ Cf. ibid.: ‘For Antiochus, Plato’s unique importance as founder of the school did not imply his infallibility.’ As Boys-Stones (2001) 143 notes Antiochus’ position is ‘an argument from the consensus established by Plato, not to the authority of Plato’. On the idea that Antiochus’ Academic project also involved an attempt to incorporate Stoicism into the Academic tradition, cf. Gerson (2013) 184 n.15.
19 Cf. Karamanolis (2006) 63: ‘Antiochus does not share the strong metaphysical concerns of later Platonists, concerns which will give rise to objections of a different order.’
20 For Eudorus’ role as the first ‘Platonist’ to turn attention to metaphysics see Karamanolis (2006) 84.
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alongside god and matter.\textsuperscript{21} In the domain of ethics, ‘assimilation to god’, a formulation which does not yet have special importance in Cicero, becomes identified for later Platonists with the Platonic telos.\textsuperscript{22} Emphasis on such ideas, which proved to be hallmarks of Platonism in the subsequent centuries, seems to be missing in Antiochus. What we find in Antiochus, instead, is a reading of Plato which conforms largely to the Stoic agenda and focuses predominantly on the domains of ethics and epistemology.\textsuperscript{23} Finally, taking Antiochus to represent exclusively Platonic authority has come at the cost of disregarding the importance of the Peripatetic elements of his philosophy and has turned scholarly attention away from evaluating them in their own right; that such Peripatetic elements play an important role in Piso’s account at \textit{On Ends} is suggested by the frequent references in the account to Aristotle and Theophrastus and by Cicero’s own characterisation of the work as a ‘Peripatetic’ treatise.\textsuperscript{24} While Antiochus would have probably defended the view that the Platonic Academy and the Peripatos agree on all essential ethical points, the explicit Peripatetic character of \textit{On Ends} strongly suggests that the Peripatos had for Antiochus a special authority, at least in the domain of ethics. This, as we shall see, is compatible with the use of occasional ‘Socratic’ elements in

\textsuperscript{21} See e.g. Alcinous’ theological chapters in his \textit{Handbook of Platonism} 8–10.

\textsuperscript{22} The formula appears, perhaps for the first time, in the anonymous commentary to Plato’s \textit{Theaetetus}, see Sedley (1997) 127. Other early occurrences include a passage in the first part of the chapter of ethical doxography in \textit{Stobaeus’ Selections}, 49.8–50.10 Wachsmuth and in Alcinous’ \textit{Handbook of Platonism} 28.1. Boys-Stones (2014) highlights how post-Hellenistic Platonists reacted to the Stoic and Peripatetic (or Antiochean) attempt to ground ethics in \textit{οἰκείωσις} and how they appeal instead to ‘assimilation to god’ as an ethical principle.

\textsuperscript{23} This is exemplified by the way Antiochus reads the Platonic \textit{Timaeus} along largely Stoic lines, omitting any reference in his physical account to the transcendent Ideas. See Chapter 2, infra.

\textsuperscript{24} This is explicitly stated in \textit{Letters to Atticus} 13.19.4: \textit{ita confeci quinque libros \περὶ \Τελῶν} ut Epicurea L. Torquato, Stoica M. Catoni, Περιπατητικὰ M. Pisoni darem. The Aristotelian/Peripatetic character of Piso’s account has sometimes been ignored in scholarship. Suggestive is that Moraux (1973) in his seminal work on the revival of Aristotelianism in the first century BCE does not devote a chapter to Antiochus. However, the Peripatetic character of Piso’s account has recently been reappraised by Inwood (2014) 17, who deems \textit{On Ends} 5 to be perhaps ‘the peak of neo-Aristotelian thinking before Alexander’.
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Piso’s ethical account, which seem to derive from the Platonic aporetic dialogues.

Another camp in modern scholarship attempts to rehabilitate the historicity of Antiochus’ claims by tracing in his views original Peripatetic teaching, thus doing justice to Cicero’s remarks that the Antiochean account can even be, at least with regard to ethics, identified with a Peripatetic position. Dirlmeier’s 1937 seminal study Theophrastus’ Theory of Oikeiosis (Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrast) has seen in Theophrastus a major inspiration for Antiochus’ ethical views in Cicero’s dialogue On Ends. Dirlmeier has gone so far as to ascribe a whole theory of natural appropriation (oikeiosis) to Theophrastus, which was allegedly reproduced by Antiochus in the last book of On Ends.25 In more recent years, Gigon has argued that On Ends 5.24–70 (esp. 24–58) is “a rather precise excerpt” from Theophrastus’ On Happiness.26 However, the attempt to identify a single Greek source for Antiochus’ teaching, or even an exclusive Peripatetic identity, brings with it the danger of a reductionist account. Whereas it is a plausible hypothesis that Theophrastus was, alongside Plato and Aristotle, a major inspiration for Antiochus’ theses (and this hypothesis will be explored in this book), the dialectical context against which the Peripatetic views are expressed in Antiochus give them a new shape and make them respond to novel philosophical challenges which did not form part of the intention of their originators. As the analysis which follows will attempt to show, Antiochus was able to select among the sources of the ‘ancients’ the ones that were most relevant for his purposes and the ones that could respond most to the demands raised by a contemporary (predominantly Stoic) philosophical agenda. We may conclude that he did not passively preserve the material he revived but

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25 See especially Dirlmeier (1937) 66; 73. There is not, however, enough evidence in Theophrastus’ fragments to support this hypothesis; still, the word oikeiosis appears for the first time in a philosophical text in Theophrastus’ Fr. 435 FHS&G but belongs there to the context of natural science rather than to ethics.

26 Gigon (1988) 263; 269. Gigon also adds that paragraphs 5.77 and 5.86–95 are a free adaptation from the same source. For a refutation of the idea that Theophrastus’ On Happiness is the sole source of On Ends 5, see Gorler (1998) 324. At least on the point of the sufficiency of virtue for a happy life, Antiochus (at On Ends 5.85) clearly keeps a distance from the views expressed in the Theophrastean treatise.
shaped it into a new form. Thus, while one should attempt to do justice to the ‘historic’ view that Antiochus reconstructed genuine Academic philosophy (of which a major part may be ascribed to the Peripatos), one needs to retain an open attitude as to the methods and sources that he used in order to do so. Such an interpretative stance should also be able to accommodate the fact that Antiochus, while aiming at giving a reconstruction of Platonic and Peripatetic views, is operating within a largely Stoic terminological and classificatory framework.27 This need not, however, compromise the Peripatetic, and for that matter Platonic, character of his ethical philosophy.

The Peripatetic character of Antiochus’ teaching is supported by the comparison of the Antiochean ethical account in Cicero’s On Ends 5 with a doxographical source which follows a similar project and explicitly attempts to convey the main points of the ethical theory of the Peripatos: the summary of Peripatetic ethics entitled Of Aristotle and the Rest of the Peripatetics on Ethics (Aristotelous kai tôn loipôn Peripatētikōn peri tôn étikhōn)28 in Stobaeus’ Selections 2.7.29 The summary forms part of an epitome written by a certain philosopher Didymus, who has been customarily, but perhaps falsely, identified with Arius Didymus, the court-philosopher of Augustus.30 Similarities between the two

27 In a similar vein Gill (2016) 228–29 cautions against an exclusive focus on the Aristotelian character of Antiochus’ oikeiōsis theory.
28 All references to Didymus’ text henceforth are given following the pagination in Wachsmuth (1884). Deviations from Wachsmuth’s text, and English translations, follow the edition and translation by Tsouni in Fortenbaugh (2017).
29 There are two titles attributed to Didymus in Stobaeus. The first is a ‘Summary’ or an ‘Epitome’ (see the lemma Ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου Ἐπιτομῆς in Book 4, chapter 39.28); the second is a work ‘On Philosophical Sects’ (Διδύμου ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ αἱρέσεων in Book 2, chapter 1.17). One may assume that they both refer to a single work belonging to the doxographical genre περὶ αἱρέσεων. In this work, Didymus seems to have collected the views of the most important sects of his time, and most probably those of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, presumably on all three branches of philosophy, i.e. physics, ethics and dialectic. The doxographical piece entitled Ἀριστοτελῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἢθικῶν belongs to the ethical part of philosophy (Περὶ τοῦ ἢθικοῦ ἒδους τῆς φιλοσοφίας) and marks the transition from epistemological to ethical topics. It is the third of three ethical doxographies in a row and is often designated in scholarship as ‘Doxography C’; see Hahn (1990) 2945.
30 Since the publication of Diels’ Doxographi Graeci, the prevailing hypothesis has been that the author of the Peripatetic and Stoic doxographies in Stobaeus’ Selections 2.7 is Arius Didymus, a Stoic philosopher who lived in the time of Augustus. See Diels (1879).