

SELF-CONTROL, DECISION THEORY, AND RATIONALITY

Thinking about self-control takes us to the heart of practical decision making, human agency, motivation, and rational choice. Psychologists, philosophers, and decision theorists have all brought valuable insights and perspectives on how to model self-control, on different mechanisms for achieving and strengthening self-control, and on how self-control fits into the overall cognitive and affective economy. Yet these different literatures have remained relatively insulated from each other. *Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality* brings them into dialog by focusing on the theme of rationality. It contains eleven newly written essays by a distinguished group of philosophers, psychologists, and decision theorists, together with a substantial introduction, collectively offering state-of-the-art perspectives on the rationality of self-control and the different mechanisms for achieving it.

JOSÉ LUIS BERMÚDEZ is Professor of Philosophy and Samuel Rhea Gammon Professor of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University.

SELF-CONTROL, DECISION
THEORY, AND
RATIONALITY

New Essays

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-42009-9 — Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality
Edited by José Luis Bermúdez
Frontmatter
[More Information](#)

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India
79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.
It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108420099
DOI: 10.1017/9781108329170

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First published 2018

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

NAMES: Bermudez, Jose Luis, editor.

TITLE: Self-control, decision theory, and rationality : new essays / edited by
Jose Luis Bermudez, Texas A & M University.

DESCRIPTION: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press, 2018.

IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 2018027623 | ISBN 9781108420099

SUBJECTS: LCSH: Self-control – Philosophy. | Decision making – Philosophy.

CLASSIFICATION: LCC BF632 .S524 2018 | DDC 153.8–dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2018027623>

ISBN 978-1-108-42009-9 Hardback

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Acknowledgments

The papers in this collection were all presented at the Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality Workshop held at Texas A&M University on May 15–16, 2017. The workshop was funded by a grant from the Philosophy and Psychology of Self-Control Project at Florida State University, itself funded by the John Templeton Foundation. I am grateful to the Philosophy and Psychology of Self-Control Project and the Templeton Foundation for their financial support, to the contributors for the timeliness and quality of their contributions, and to the Department of Philosophy at Texas A&M University for financial and administrative help. Finally, it has been a pleasure to work with Hilary Gaskin and the team at Cambridge University Press.