THE LAW OF FREEDOM

The Supreme Court has been at the center of great upheavals in American democracy over the last seventy years. From the end of Jim Crow to the rise of wealth-dominated national campaigns, the Court has battled over if democracy is an egalitarian collaboration to serve the good of all citizens, or a competitive struggle by private interests. In *The Law of Freedom*, Jacob Eisler questions why the Court has the moral authority to shape democracy at all. Analyzing leading cases through the lens of philosophy and social science, Eisler demonstrates how the soul of election law is a battle between two philosophical understandings of democratic freedom and popular self-rule. This remarkable book reveals that the Court's battle over democracy has shaped how Americans rule themselves, marking election law as the most dramatic judicial intervention in constitutional history.

Jacob Eisler is Associate Professor at the University of Southampton Law School where he focuses on democratic theory, election law, and corruption law. In 2023, he will join Florida State University College of Law as the James Edmund and Margaret Elizabeth Corry Professor.

The Law of Freedom

THE SUPREME COURT AND DEMOCRACY

JACOB EISLER

University of Southampton Florida State University





Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India

103 Penang Road, #05-06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge.

We share the University's mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108419826

DOI: 10.1017/9781108304269

© Jacob Eisler 2023

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.

First published 2023

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

1SBN 978-1-108-41982-6 Hardback 1SBN 978-1-108-41224-7 Paperback

Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For Darel, John, and George

* * *

In memory and to the honor of David C. Eisler, 1956–2023

> Opposition is true Friendship. –WB Man errs as long as he strives. –JWvG All is not lost; the unconquerable Will... –JM

Contents

Preface	<i>page</i> ix
Acknowledgments	xi
Introduction	1
1 The Counterpopular Dilemma	29
2 Constitutionalism and the Counterpopular Dilemma	51
3 Traversing the Dilemma: Normative Struggle over Freedom	90
4 One Person, One Vote: The Triumph of Minimal Procedural Equality	117
5 Campaign Finance: Contesting Voters' Cognitive Capacities	158
6 Parties in Democracy: Facilitators or Usurpers of Popular Self-Rule?	200
7 Race and Elections: Equity of Access or Equity of Power?	244
Conclusion: The Battle over Liberalism, the Trap of Partisanship, and the Future of Election Law	291
Selected Bibliography	313
Index	321

Preface

This book addresses a puzzle about liberal democracy and rule of law: If democracy's legitimating value is the autonomy of the people, how can an impartial court transform the terms of that autonomy?

To address that puzzle, this book does two things. First, it frames and answers the question in philosophical terms. The dignity of democratic autonomy and the justice of rule of law neutrality are both essential for legitimate liberal democracy where the people rule but individual rights are respected. But in the context of electoral process, it creates a *counterpopular dilemma*: if courts dictate terms of elections, they intrude upon the extent of democratic autonomy. The best answer cannot solve this dilemma. It can only ameliorate it. The best approach is for courts to engage in ongoing contestation over the nature of freedom, directed toward what electoral procedures will best serve popular self-rule.

Second, this book evaluates the American election law doctrine in light of this dilemma, and this answer. It shows how the Supreme Court's transformation of democratic process has consisted of a long-running, fiercely contested debate over the ideal of popular autonomy. Moreover, this debate has settled into two opposed sides: a conservative view that advances a libertarian understanding of just elections and a progressive view that advances an egalitarian understanding. Conservative libertarians see elections as a means for converting private power and position into political representation. They wish to maintain elections as a zone of private power and reject both state action and judicial interpretation that intrudes upon private power. Progressive egalitarians see elections as an expression of the mutualist aspects of a democracy that aspires toward civic equality. They wish to use the bench to advance a vision of democracy as a shared space of rule by equals.

This struggle over the meaning of freedom on the Supreme Court has shaped American democracy, and American life. The struggle reflects partisan allegiances, but it shows that deeper than the partisan divide is a philosophical dispute over the meaning of liberty. The Supreme Court's battle shows a shared commitment to the ideal of liberty, as well as how deeply the different justices х

Cambridge University Press & Assessment 978-1-108-41982-6 — The Law of Freedom Jacob Eisler Frontmatter <u>More Information</u>

Preface

understand liberty, and how much these divergent understandings mean for American democracy.

* * *

This book should be of interest to lawyers, social scientists, and anyone who wishes to deepen their understanding of how the Supreme Court has shaped American politics. The argument as a whole may be of the most interest to scholars of the Constitution, of elections, and of American democracy, but the individual chapters are meant to be accessible for any reader with an interest in a particular topic.

This book makes a unified argument, but it is also meant as an introduction to both the theory and doctrine of elections. It sets forth background that provides an overview that is both accessible and penetrating on questions of democracy, judicial review, and constitutionalism, as well as the four main areas of American election law doctrine: one person, one vote; campaign finance; parties in elections; and race in elections. Readers should feel comfortable dipping into single chapters – particularly those on substantive areas of election law – as they find useful.

The book is divided into two main parts. The first three chapters lay out the problem and answer of judicial review of elections: outlining the counterpopular dilemma of judicial review of democratic process (Chapter 1); discussing the inadequacy of existing scholarly accounts to reconcile judicial review with constituent democratic autonomy (Chapter 2); and explaining why a normative dispute over freedom on the bench is the best way through the dilemma (Chapter 3).

20 20 20

The next four chapters address the Supreme Court doctrine on elections through this lens: one person, one vote (Chapter 4), campaign finance (Chapter 5), parties in elections (Chapter 6), and race in elections (Chapter 7). Each describes how the given area of law is best framed as contestation over popular self-determination and the status of each in the egalitarian–libertarian debate. The Conclusion synthesizes the doctrinal dispute and its redemptive potential in election law and more broadly while noting the threats to this potential from partisan overdetermination and the increasing use of summary procedures.

This book is meant to answer a question and show a remarkable pattern, but also inspire and show paths for new understandings of democracy, the courts, and just liberal constitutionalism. I hope you find it useful.

* * *

Acknowledgments

The Law of Freedom was written during my time at Jesus College, University of Cambridge and Southampton Law School, University of Southampton. I am grateful to these institutions for their support, as well as to the Centre for Research in the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences at the University of Cambridge where early steps for developing this book were taken.

Furthermore, this book was presented at multiple conferences during its development, which were invaluable for its refinement. Ideas and a chapter draft were shared at the Roundtable on Systems Theory and Human Rights at Lancaster University (organized by Steven Wheatley and invited by Eric Heinze) and at the Southeastern Associate of Law Schools Conference in 2017 (organized by Atiba Ellis) and 2019 (organized by Josh Douglas and Franita Tolson). An entire early draft was presented at a conference at Southampton Law School in July 2019, attended by Greg Conti, Chris Macleod, Hayley Hooper, Adam Lebovitz, Sam Zeitlin, David Gurnham, Uta Kohl, Alun Gibbs, Haris Psarras, and Jonathan Havercroft, where I received invaluable advice and feedback that shaped the rest of the book. Further iterations of portions of the book were presented at the University of Georgia Law School in 2019 (facilitated by Lori Ringhand) and at the AALS Election Law Section in January 2021 (organized by Gene Mazo). A near-final version of the book was presented at the Southeastern Associate of Law Schools Conference in the summer of 2022 at a dedicated workshop, attended by Richard Briffault, Michael Kang, Jim Gardner, Benji Cover, Lori Ringhand, Pedro Gerson, Atiba Ellis, Anthony Gaughan, Josh Douglas, and Gene Mazo, who provided exceptional advice and thoughts on the book's completion, and at Southampton Law School in the fall of 2022. Certain persons, moreover, read multiple drafts of this book independently as well as at these events and provided thoughtful feedback that improved the book immensely. Exceptional thanks to Richard Briffault, Michael Kang, Jim Gardner, Eric Beerbohm, Adam Lebovitz, Jonathan Havercroft, Sam Zeitlin, and Samuli Seppänen. Thanks are also due to those who engaged at various points with particular chapters within or outside any formal context or engaged in vibrant discussion related to its ideas - thanks to

xii

Acknowledgments

Adriaan Lanni, Uta Kohl, Helen Carr, Nick Stephanopoulos, Rick Pildes, Derek Muller, Bertrall Ross, Mike Parsons, Peter Turner, Justin DuRivage, Evan Miller, Billy Magnuson, Michael da Silva, and Joel Fleming.

As a first major project, moreover, this book reflects long-standing investment and generosity by colleagues, mentors, and teachers, whose brief mention here can only be a gesture toward my gratitude and thankfulness. During my undergraduate years at Williams College, Darel Paul, William Dudley, Michael MacDonald, Alan De Gooyer, Nicole Mellow, Philip Weinstein, David Bullwinkle, Peter Grudin, Lynn Chick, Steven Tifft, and Stephanie Solum were more generous than could be asked and helped my intellectual and personal growth immensely. John Dunn, Quentin Skinner, and Harald Wydra were monumental presences in my time as an MPhil student at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. In my time at Harvard as a law student, Adriaan Lanni, Bruce Mann, Carol Steiker, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael Klarman were mentors as well as great teachers in the law school and have continued to be so into my career. Eric Beerbohm, Eric Nelson, Nancy Rosenblum, and Richard Tuck were extraordinarily supportive during my time as a Harvard political science PhD student and into my career as an academic. My time as a clerk with the Honorable Judge Gerard Lynch was both an apex of my time in practice and forged my skills as a lawyer, with a fantastic community of fellow clerks Ana Muñoz, Antonio Haynes, and Lena Hughes. As I joined the scholarly community, Michael Kang, Richard Briffault, George Brown, Jim Gardner, Lori Ringhand, David Landau, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Jo Shaw, and Atiba Ellis have been particularly welcoming colleagues and mentors. During my time at Jesus College, Findlay Stark, Claire Fenton-Glynn, Michael Waibel, Geoff Parks, Ian White, Simon Deakin, Jeremy Green, Grego Conti, David Howarth, Jon Morgan, Antje du Bois-Pedain, Francois Du Bois, Jodi Gardner, Alison Young, Duncan Kelly, and Peter Turner provided the finest possible support network to begin one's scholarly career. At Southampton Law School, Uta Kohl, Brenda Hannigan, Werner Scholtz, Harry Annison, Nina Jorgensen, Helen Carr, Jan Steele, Jonathan Havercroft, and Alun Gibbs have been particularly valued colleagues.

At Cambridge University Press, Matt Gallaway's wisdom has been matched only by his patience, and Jadyn Fauconier-Herry has provided excellent support through the publishing process. Kelley Friel provided an exceptionally thoughtful, timely, and helpful close edit of the text for which I am profoundly grateful, and Mabel Newton provided a heroic effort in tracking down and updating references.

None of this would have been possible without the support of a network of friends (some of whom have also been colleagues) who have provided support, intellectual and emotional, through the writing of this text. A mention here is only a glinting reflection of the gratitude I owe to Michael Eros, Michael Stern, Alexis Medina, Billy Magnuson, Evan Miller, Tom Wolf, Teddy McGehee, Eileen Bevis, Richard Rodriguez, Chris Douglas, Alexis Saba, Emily Bryk, Gabe Katsh, Si Rutherford, Peter Leek, Tim Taylor, Vanessa Badino, Pete Deutsch, Jeff

Acknowledgments

Garland, Adam Kinon, Tommy Hutton, Joel Fleming, Meg Krench, Ben Weiner, Scott Caplan, John Playforth, Ani Ravi, Sam Flaks, Lior Ziv, Julian Feldman, Chad Priest, Rob Glass, Samuli Seppänen, Elaine and Arie Hochberg, Cesar and Luann Medina, Vanessa Maire, Serene Hung, Adam Lebovitz, Graham Clure and Maddy Dungy, Tae-Yeoun Keum, Jen Page, Aidan Finley, Yaron Peleg, Thiago Uehara, Miriam Wagner, Nita Felizardo, Edmund Gazeley, Jeff Hendrickson, and Peter Turner.

Finally, wherever I have gone, I have had a home with Sue, Dave, and Jon. Thank you, and I love you.

xiii