Introduction

In November 2014, the media reported that in a single month, the attacks perpetrated by sixteen different jihadi groups killed more than 5,000 people; most of this bloodshed befell Iraq, followed by Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Syria.[1] At least since September 11, 2001, the world media has frequently covered Muslim perpetrators in terrorism, minor conflicts, and wars. The prominence of Muslims in this coverage cannot entirely be disregarded as journalistic sensationalism or bias. Scholarly data support the disproportionate attention to Muslims in reporting on violence. Two-thirds of all wars and about one-third of all minor military conflicts in 2009 occurred in Muslim-majority countries.[2]

Muslim-majority countries have also experienced disproportionate rates of authoritarianism, which is a major factor leading to violence. In 2013, Freedom House classified less than one-fifth of the forty-nine Muslim-majority countries as electoral democracies, while classifying three-fifths of the 195 countries in the world as electoral democracies. Authoritarianism is also a multifaceted phenomenon; it is associated with several factors, especially socioeconomic underdevelopment. Around 2010, Muslim-majority countries' averages of gross national income per capita (GNIpc), literacy rate, years of schooling, and life expectancy were all below world averages, as Table I.1 indicates. These data lead us to ask: Why are Muslim-majority countries less peaceful, less democratic, less developed?

[1] Ian Black, "Jihadi Groups Killed More than 5,000 People in November," *Guardian*, December 10, 2014.
[2] See Table I.1. For the data showing Muslim groups' disproportionate involvement in terrorism, see Chapter 1.

1

TABLE 1.1 *Muslim-Majority Countries and the World (around 2010)*

	Muslim-majority countries (49)	**All countries (around 195)**

Violence (total numbers)	Wars: 4
	   Minor conflicts: 9
		Wars: 6
		   Minor conflicts: 30

Authoritarianism	Electoral democracies: 14%	Electoral democracies: 60%
Underdevelopment (averages)	GNIpc: $9,000	GNIpc: $14,000
	Literary rate: 73% Schooling: 5.8 years Life expectancy: 66 years	Literary rate: 84% Schooling: 7.5 years Life expectancy: 69 years

Sources: Violence: Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) 2009 data quoted in Harborn and Vallensteen 2010, 506–7. UCDP defines conflicts that cause at least 1,000 casualties as wars and those that lead to between 25 and 999 casualties as minor conflicts. Electoral democracies: Freedom House 2013. GNIpc: World Bank 2010. In my calculation, I excluded Qatar's GNIpc ($179,000), which was about three times higher than the second highest in the world, Luxembourg ($61,790). Literacy rates: United Nations Statistics Division 2013. Years of schooling and life expectancy: United Nations Development Programme 2011.

Contemporary problems of Muslim-majority countries[3] are especially puzzling given the scholarly and socioeconomic achievements of their predecessors between the eighth and twelfth centuries. During that period, the Muslim world produced creative polymaths, such as Farabi, Biruni, and Ibn Sina, and played a pivotal role in intercontinental trade,[4] while Western Europe[5] was a marginal corner of the Old World.[6] This historical experience shows that Islam was perfectly compatible with scholarly flourishing and socioeconomic progress.

[3] For the sake of simplicity, from now on, I will refer to "Muslim-majority countries" as "Muslim countries."

[4] During that period, Muslim merchants invented several economic tools, such as the check and the bill of exchange. Braudel 1982, 556; Udovitch 1979, 263, 269; Van Zanden 2009, 61. The "Persian word *sakk* is the origin of our word 'check.'" Bloom and Blair 2002, 114.

[5] In analyzing the Middle Ages, this book generally uses the terms "Western Christians" or "Catholics" when comparing them with another religious/cultural entity, "Muslims." Yet, especially by the Reformation and the Enlightenment, it becomes increasingly difficult to use these terms given the complex religious and secular identities in Western Europe. Thus, for modern periods I use the term "Western Europeans," referring to a cultural/civilizational, rather than simply geographical, entity. By Western European countries, I mean present members of the European Union, excluding Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Greece (which are in Eastern Europe), and adding Switzerland and Norway.

[6] In the late eighth century, Muslim economic influence on Western Europe was so deep that in the English kingdom of Mercia, King Offa minted imitations of the Abbasid gold coin carrying the bungled Arabic inscriptions "There is no deity but God [Allah], who is without associates" and "Muhammad is the Prophet of God [Allah]." Beckett 2003, 58.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, a gradual process of reversal in terms of comparative levels of scientific and socioeconomic development started between the Muslim world and Western Europe. Especially between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Western Europe experienced multiple progressive transformations, while the Muslim world became stagnant and fell behind. When widespread Western colonization of Muslim lands began in the mid-nineteenth century, Muslims had already faced multiple intellectual, socio-economic, and political problems.

Hence, contemporary Muslim countries' political and socioeconomic problems have long-term historical origins and cannot simply be explained as the result of either Islam or Western colonialism. The difference between the intellectually and economically dynamic Muslim world during its early history, on the one hand, and the stagnant Muslim world during its later history, on the other, requires more nuanced and sophisticated explanation. What historical factors explain this difference and constitute the roots of Muslims' contemporary problems?

THE ULEMA–STATE ALLIANCE

I argue that the relations between religious, political, intellectual, and economic classes have been the main engine behind the changes in and reversals between the levels of development in the Muslim world, as well as in Western Europe. In early Islamic history, Islamic scholars generally regarded close entanglements with political authorities as corrupting; they preferred to be funded by commerce and maintained close relations with merchants. According to one analysis I will elaborate later, from the eighth to the mid-eleventh century, 72.5 percent of Islamic scholars or their families worked in commerce and/or industry.[7]

Islamic scholars' distance from state authorities went back to the mid-seventh century, when the Umayyads established their dynasty by persecuting the Prophet Muhammad's descendants and violently crushing any opposition to their rule. This violent consolidation of power led to the disenchantment with the political authority in the eyes of many Islamic scholars. These scholars' aloofness with respect to political authorities was reinforced in the late Umayyad and early Abbasid eras, from the mid-eighth to the mid-ninth century. During this period, the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) were founded by independent scholars – Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafii, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal – all of whom refused to be state servants. Moreover, these founders were imprisoned and persecuted by authorities due to their dissenting opinions. Shii religious leaders faced even more persecution by the political class.

In early Islamic history, Islamic scholars' independence from the state and the economic influence of merchants enabled the freedom of thought enjoyed by

[7] Cohen 1970, 36 (table A-I).

philosophers, a diverse group including not only Sunni and Shii Muslims, but
also Christians, Jews, and agnostics. These philosophers were funded by both
merchants and political authorities. The rulers particularly patronized the trans-
lation of ancient works (from Greek, Syriac, Middle Persian, and Sanskrit into
Arabic). Yet there were no state-led schools to standardize philosophy. Thus,
state patronage of philosophers in early Islamic history was less harmful for
intellectual flourishing than what would become the state patronage of Islamic
scholars (the ulema; sing. *alim*) following the eleventh century.

What happened in eleventh-century Central Asia, Iran, and Iraq was a multi-
dimensional transformation. Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad, severely weakened by
the rising Shii states in North Africa, Egypt, Syria, and even Iraq, called for the
unification of Sunni Muslims to meet this threat. In order to unify Sunni sultans,
ulema, and masses, two Abbasid caliphs declared a "Sunni creed" in the early
eleventh century; those whose views were deemed to contradict this creed,
including certain Shiis, rationalist theologians (Mutazilis), and philosophers,
were declared to be apostates and faced the threat of execution. This call for
the formation of a Sunni orthodoxy coincided with the rise of the Ghaznavids, a
Sunni military state in Central Asia. Later, the Seljuk Empire (1040–1194)
emerged as an even more powerful Sunni military state that ruled over a large
territory including most parts of Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, and Anatolia.

Central to Seljuk rule was the expansion of the *iqta*, an existing system of land
revenue assignment and tax farming designed to bring agricultural revenues
in particular and the economy in general under military control. This policy
weakened the economic capacity and social position of merchants, who had
previously provided funding to both the ulema and philosophers. One Seljuk
grand vizier (minister) also initiated the foundation of a series of madrasas, the
so-called Nizamiyyas, to synthesize competing Sunni schools of jurisprudence
and theology and to produce Sunni ulema who could challenge Shiis, Mutazilis,
and philosophers. A genius scholar, Ghazali, played a key role in this project,
writing multiple influential books criticizing these three "unorthodox" groups.

From the twelfth to the fourteenth century, the Seljuk model of the ulema–
state alliance spread to other Sunni states in Andalus, Egypt, and Syria, par-
ticularly the Mamluks. The Crusader and Mongol invasions accelerated the
spread of this alliance because Muslim communities sought refuge from the
chaos of foreign invasion in military and religious authorities. Later, around
the sixteenth century, Muslims established three powerful military empires: the
Sunni Ottoman, the Shii Safavid, and the Sunni-run (but non-sectarian) Mughal
Empires. These empires established versions of the ulema–state alliance in
territories extending from the Balkans to Bengal.[8] These empires were militarily

---

[8] Although these three empires dominated the Muslim world, there existed other Muslim political
entities, including small states in what we call today Indonesia and Malaysia. Unlike the three
empires, several of these Southeast Asian states did not have an ulema–state alliance and they
were mainly mercantile. Hefner 2000, 14, 26; Lombard 2000, 120; Reid 1993a, chs. 1 and 2.

very powerful, but they failed to revive early Muslims' intellectual and eco-
nomic dynamism because they virtually eliminated philosophers and marginal-
ized merchants.[9]

While the Muslim world was losing its intellectual and economic momen-
tum, Western European progress began. In the second half of the eleventh
century, three transformations occurred in Western Europe. First, the Cath-
olic Church and royal authorities tried and failed to dominate one another,
leading to the institutionalization of the separation between them as a *modus
vivendi*. This substantially contributed to decentralization and balance of
power among Western European actors and institutions. Second, universities
started to be established and provided an institutional basis for the gradual
emergence and increasing influence of the intellectual class. Many revolution-
ary thinkers, from Aquinas to Luther, from Copernicus to Galileo and
Newton, would be university graduates and professors. Third, the merchant
class, which would be the engine of Western European economic break-
throughs, began to flourish.[10] These new relations among religious, political,
intellectual, and economic classes eventually drove various progressive pro-
cesses, including the Renaissance, the printing revolution, geographical
explorations, the Protestant Reformation, the scientific revolution, the Ameri-
can and French Revolutions, and the Industrial Revolution. As a result of
these processes, Western Europe surpassed its once-superior competitors, the
Muslim world and China.

After nearly a century of Western colonialism, Muslims began to establish
independent states in the 1920s and 1930s. These states inherited deep political
and socioeconomic problems as a result of centuries of intellectual and eco-
nomic stagnation followed by colonial exploitation. In order to address the
problems of violence, authoritarianism, and socioeconomic underdevelopment,
Muslim countries needed creative intellectuals (i.e., thinkers who criticize
established perspectives and produce original alternatives) and independent
bourgeoisie (i.e., economic entrepreneurs, such as merchants, bankers, and

These states, however, could not provide an alternative model of class relations to the Muslim
world for two main reasons. First, even as late as the sixteenth century, Islam co-existed with
local religious beliefs and practices in these states. According to Anthony Reid (1993b, 156),
"no Islamic texts in Southeast Asian languages which date before 1590 have come to light."
See also Reid 1993a, ch. 3. Second, European colonization began as early as the seventeenth
century in this region. Hence, the period between Islamization and colonization was too short
to establish a Southeast Asian model. Moreover, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
Middle Eastern interpretations of Islam influenced Southeast Asian Muslims, rather than vice
versa. Hefner 2009, 15–23.

[9] After Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) in history, Ali Kushji (d. 1474) in astronomy, and Taftazani
(d. 1390) and Jurjani (d. 1414) in theology, the Muslim world very rarely produced scholars
in that caliber, with few exceptions such as Takiyuddin (d. 1585) in astronomy and Mulla Sadra
(d. 1640) in philosophy.

[10] European universities taught translations of several works of Muslim polymaths, such as Ibn
Sina, until the sixteenth century.

industrialists).[11] Yet these two classes did not emerge in most Muslim countries, an absence I attribute to the historical (post-eleventh-century) dominance of the ulema–state alliance. Nonetheless, starting with Turkey and Iran in the 1920s, new states that were formed in the Muslim world – with few exceptions such as Saudi Arabia – did away with the ulema–state alliance and embraced more secular arrangements of political power. But why, even in these cases of political secularization, did independent intellectual and bourgeois classes not emerge in an influential manner?

SECULARISTS AND ISLAMIC ACTORS

Despite their century-long struggles against each other, secularists and Islamic actors have both contributed to the enduring marginalization of intellectuals and the bourgeoisie in their societies. There are three main explanations for the secularists' contribution. First, most twentieth-century secularist leaders in such cases as Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Pakistan, and Indonesia were former military officers. By training and socialization, they were unlikely to truly appreciate the importance of intellectuals and the bourgeoisie for the political and economic development of their countries. Second, these secularist leaders were generally under the influence of socialist and fascist ideologies, in particular, and authoritarian modernist ideas, in general. Thus, they imposed ideological views to society and established state control over the economy by restricting the intellectual and bourgeois classes. Third, many secularist rulers have arbitrarily tried to use Islam to legitimize their regimes. Such cooptation has eventually promoted the established ulema at the expense of independent Islamic scholars and intellectuals.

Though they were founded by secularist leaders, many modern states in the Muslim world experienced Islamization of public life as a result of policy failures of the secularists and general conservatism of Muslim societies. Islamization has elevated the status of three groups of Islamic actors, who have shared negative attitudes toward intellectuals and the bourgeoisie. One group is the ulema, who are trained in madrasas or their more modernized equivalents (such as Turkey's departments of theologies) in Islamic disciplines, including jurisprudence, the hadith, and Quranic exegesis. Another group is the Islamists, who engage in electoral or other types of politics through political parties and movements. The third group is the Sufi shaykhs, who are mystical and social leaders of Sufi orders (*tariqa*s).

Despite their internal disagreements, these Islamic actors have shared negative attitudes toward the independent bourgeoisie, given their statist and hierarchical outlook, according to which religious and political authorities are

---

[11] According to Eric Hobsbawm (1987, 170), the definition of the bourgeoisie is "notoriously difficult" and various Western languages include such "shifting and imprecise categories" as "big bourgeoisie" or "petty bourgeoisie."

supposed to hold the highest social status. These Islamic actors have also had a common anti-intellectual attitude. This attitude follows the ulema's epistemology, which is based on four hierarchical sources: the Quran, hadiths (the records of the Prophet's words and actions), consensus of the ulema (*ijma*), and analogical reasoning (*qiyas*).[12] Two characteristics of this epistemology discourage new interpretations of Islam, particularly by Muslim intellectuals. First, it restricts reason to making analogies on points where the literal meanings of the Quran and hadiths offer no clear ruling, and where there is a lack of consensus among the scholars.[13] Second, and relatedly, it establishes the consensus of the ulema as an entrenched authority, which weakens alternative views.

In fact, the basis of consensus as a jurisprudential concept is a hadith: "My community will never agree upon an error." The term "community" here referred to Muslim people at large. If it had continued to be understood in this broad manner, this concept could have provided opportunities for participation and change. However, the ulema have monopolized the concept of consensus by exclusively interpreting it with reference to themselves, turning it into "a bulwark of conservatism."[14]

Early Muslims actually assigned a more significant and emancipatory role to reason. Abu Hanifa (699–767), the founder of earliest Sunni school of jurisprudence, acknowledged a jurist's reason-based judgment as an important source of jurisprudential authority. Two generations later, however, Shafii developed the jurisprudential method that prioritized the literal understanding of the Qur'an and hadiths followed by the consensus of the ulema, limiting the role of reason to mere analogy. Moreover, with the works of such eminent ulema as Ghazali, Shafii's jurisprudential method influenced other fields of Islamic knowledge such as theology and Sufism.[15] At first, Shafii's method was one of the many alternative jurisprudential approaches. By the establishment of the ulema–state alliance starting in the eleventh century, however, it gradually became the main pillar of Sunni orthodoxy. Ultimately, Hanafis adopted this methodology, as did Malikis and Hanbalis.[16]

---

[12] The way the Muslim Brothers led the drafting of a new Egyptian constitution in November 2012 reflects Islamists' acknowledgment of the ulema's authority to interpret Islamic law. In this drafting, Islamist Brothers constitutionally empowered Al-Azhar's senior ulema with a consultative authority "in matters relating to" Islamic law (article 4), which was "the principle source of legislation" in Egypt (article 2). See also Euben and Zaman 2009, 19; Roy 1996, x.

[13] The Shii ulema's epistemology is similar, though for them consensus is less authoritative, and they put more emphasis on reason. Weiss 1998, 36. The overwhelming majority (87–90%) of Muslims in the world are Sunni and the rest (10–13%) are Shii. Pew Research Center 2009, 1. Among Muslim countries, forty-five are Sunni-majority, while the remaining four (Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain) are Shii-majority.

[14] Lambton 1981, 10, 12.   [15] Al-Ghazali 2015 [c. 1097].

[16] Lambton 1981, 4; McAuliffe 2015, 196; Abou El Fadl 2014, xxxiv–vii.

Consequently, Shafii's jurisprudential method became a dominant episte-mology that came to order other aspects of knowledge in the Muslim world. "If it were admissible to name Islamic culture according to one of its products," wrote Mohammed Abed al-Jabri in the 1980s, "then we would call it 'the culture of *fiqh* (jurisprudence)' in the same sense that applies to Greek culture when we call it a 'culture of philosophy' and contemporary European culture as a 'culture of science and technology.'" For Jabri, the rules of jurisprudence established by Shafii "are no less important in forming Arab-Islamic reason than the 'rules of methodology' posited by Descartes about the formation of French reason."[17]

There have been some attempts to include additional sources of knowledge into this jurisprudential epistemology. Although Ghazali was a leading pro-moter of this epistemology, particularly its sidelining of reason, he was also a sophisticated scholar with complex, if not always consistent, ideas. He pro-moted the idea of the five "higher objectives" of Islamic law. About three centuries later, the Andalusian jurist Shatibi elaborated these five objectives – the protection of religion, of life, of intellect, of progeny, and of property – as a way of making jurisprudence more flexible.[18] Sufi shaykhs' promotion of mystical knowledge was another attempt to relax the epistemological con-straints on Muslim intellectual life.[19] Nonetheless, these efforts have mostly remained inconsequential in comparison to the dominant epistemology origin-ally formulated by Shafii, which assigns a marginal role to reason and no role to empirical experience. This epistemology has been a source of the anti-intellectualism among the ulema, Islamists, and Sufi shaykhs.

From the 1980s onward, many Muslim countries experienced Islamization of the public life,[20] as part of the global rise of religious movements.[21] The ulema, Islamists, and Sufis gained more public influence and reinforced the marginalization of the intellectual and bourgeois classes. The secularists by and large have been similarly anti-intellectual and anti-bourgeois in implementing their authoritarian secularist ideologies and policies. Under these class condi-tions, Muslim countries have mostly failed to solve their multifaceted and historically rooted problems.

[17] Al-Jabri 2011 [1984], 109, 114.
[18] Opwis 2010; Masud 1995; al-Raysuni 2005; Zaman 2012, ch. 4.
[19] Ghazali also played a role in promoting mystical knowledge. He depicted the emphasis on *fiqh* as an exaggeration and tried to balance it with Sufism. Ghazali (2015 [c. 1097], 87–90) noted that the word *fiqh* mentioned in the Quran and hadiths does not mean jurisprudence (in terms of knowing the details of legal issues) but rather implies such broader things as understanding, piety, and mystical insight. For more on Ghazali, see Chapter 4.
[20] A recent survey conducted in fifteen Middle Eastern and North African countries between 2002 and 2010 shows that 70 percent of respondents define themselves Muslim above all national or other identities. Tessler 2015, 81.
[21] Casanova 1994; Berger 1999; Juergensmeyer 2007.

   Those who see Islam as inherently rejecting religion–state separation may regard my explanation as pessimistic. For them, if the ulema–state alliance is the source of Muslims' problems, then there is no way to solve them, because the alliance is based on Islam's essentially non-separationist approach to religion–state relations. However, my analysis actually explains that the ulema–state alliance is neither an essential part of the Quran and hadiths nor a permanent feature of Islamic history. Early Islamic history includes examples of religion–state separation, and it is a mistake to see Islam as inherently rejecting such separation. But what might be the cause of this widespread and by now conventional misunderstanding?

RELIGION AND THE STATE (*DIN WA DAWLA*)

There are two main sources of the conventional view about Islam's relationship with the state. One source is the body of work by Western (i.e., North American and Western European) scholars who have taken the ulema's quasi-Islamic political views written during and after the eleventh century as the definition of what is essentially Islamic. In his well-known book, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, Erwin Rosenthal falsely attributes a saying to the Prophet Muhammad: "[R]eligion and ('secular') power are twins."[22] Rosenthal claims that it is Ghazali who quotes this "hadith."[23] In *Moderation in Belief* – cited by Rosenthal – Ghazali does indeed define religion and the state as twins: "[I]t has been said that religion and sultan are twins, and also that religion is a foundation and the sultan is a guard: that which has no foundation collapses and that which has no guard is lost."[24] Yet, when Ghazali wrote, "it has been said," he was not referring to a hadith. In fact, the maxim "religion and royal authority are twins" was a well-known saying, not of Prophetic but of Sasanian origin.[25]

   A century and a half before Ghazali, the historian Masudi quoted an Arabic translation of a Sasanian text in his book. In Masudi's narrative, the founder of the Sasanian Empire, Ardashir I (r. 224–42), provided the following advice in his testament: "Religion and royal authority are twins, who cannot exist without each other; because, religion is the foundation of royal authority and royal authority is the guard of religion. Any structure that does not repose on a foundation collapses, and any structure that is not guarded perishes."[26] Before Masudi, the Testament of Ardashir had been translated from Middle Persian into Arabic several times, the first of which was completed as early as the eighth century.[27] In sum, the origin of the idea of religion–state

[22] Rosenthal 1958, 8. For a similar perspective, see Lambton 1981, xv.
[23] A "[h]adith he [Ghazali] quotes . . .: 'Religion and (temporal) power are twins.'" Rosenthal 1958, 39.
[24] Al-Ghazali 2013 [1095], 231.   [25] Bagley 1964, xlii; Abbès 2015, 56.
[26] Quoted in Maçoudi 1863 [947], 162. See also "Le Testament d'Ardasir" 1966 [n.a.], 49, 62.
[27] Askari 2016, 155; Boyce 1968, 14.

brotherhood in the Muslim world is a Sasanian, not an Islamic, text. I elaborate more on this issue in Chapter 4.

In various episodes of his life, Ghazali (1058–1111) had inconsistent relations with state authorities – another indication that Islam–state relations have never been straightforward. Early in his career, Ghazali taught in a state-controlled madrasa and was subject to direct influence from the rulers. Later on, Ghazali renounced all affiliation with the state to become an independent Sufi and scholar, by declaring his regret for previous entanglements with state authorities.[28] Things changed again toward the end of Ghazali's life, when he briefly returned to teaching in a public madrasa. Ghazali's writings reflect this inconsistent relationship with the state. In his magnum opus, *The Revival of Religious Sciences*, which promotes Sufism, Ghazali reiterated his lines about religion–state brotherhood[29] but also urged the ulema to avoid close connections with rulers, defining the latter as generally corrupt and repressive.[30] Thus, despite the construction of the ulema–state alliance in the eleventh century, the earlier ulema's ideas about the necessary distance between scholars and political authorities partially survived in Muslim lands.

Islamist propaganda is the second source of the misperception of Islam as inherently opposed to religion–state separation. Although Islamists have gained power in only a few countries, they have helped drive the Islamization of the public sphere across the Muslim world and informed perceptions of Islam around the globe. Throughout the twentieth century, Islamist leaders, including Hassan al-Banna (the founder of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt), Abul Ala Maududi (the founder of Jamaat-i Islami in the Indian subcontinent), and Ruhollah Khomeini (the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran), rejected the notion of a secular state and championed the integration of religion and state, going beyond the pre-modern notion of a religion–state alliance.

Al-Banna (1906–43) popularized the idea that Islam is both religion and the state, "*al-Islam din wa dawla.*"[31] Khomeini (1902–89) was both a prominent member of the Shii ulema and an Islamist revolutionary leader.[32] For Khomeini, the "slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs" are

[28] Griffel 2009, 43–4.
[29] "[T]he state and religion are twins. Religion is the foundation whiles the state is the guard. That which has no foundation will certainly crumble and that which has no guard is lost." Al-Ghazali 1962 [c. 1097], 33–4. See also Gazali 1974a [c. 1097], 51.
[30] Al-Ghazali 1962 [c. 1097], 172–6; al-Ghazali 2015 [c. 1097], 199–203; Gazali 1974b [c. 1097], 344.
[31] Al-Banna 1979 [1938–45], 179; also 18, 317–18, 356. The Muslim Brothers, according to Banna, are calling people to Islam and "government is part of it." If the critics say, "This is politics!" they should reply: "This is Islam, and we do not recognize such divisions." Al-Banna 1978 [1938–45], 36. See al-Banna 1979 [1938–45], 110.
[32] Maududi also had a madrasa education but concealed that fact. Nasr 1996, 19; Moosa 2015, 24.