I

Introduction

At the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been a spectacular rise of nonviolent youth movements in Eastern Europe. Young people called for free and fair elections to bring about political change in repressive political regimes that had emerged since the collapse of communism. In 2000, the Serbian social movement Otpor (“Resistance”), formed by a small group of students from the University of Belgrade, recruited thousands of young people and propelled electoral defeat of the incumbent president. Within three months of Slobodan Milosevic’s downfall, the youth movement Zubr (“Bison”) was set up in Belarus to press for political change during the 2001 presidential election. Similarly, the youth movement Knara (“Enough”) was established in the Republic of Georgia to challenge the current regime during the 2003 parliamentary election. This tide of youth activism continued with the emergence of two Ukrainian youth movements with the same name – Pora (“It’s Time”) – on the eve of the 2004 presidential election. The following year, the youth movements Maqam (“It’s Time”), Yeni Fikir (“New Thinking”), and Yokh (“No”) called for free and fair elections in Azerbaijan. Never before have post-communist youth mobilized against the regime on such a grand scale.

A striking feature of these youth movements was the adoption of similar strategies regarding the timing of mass mobilization, the content of movement claims, and the repertoire of contention. Almost all the youth movements were formed during an election year. In anticipation of vote rigging, youth activists campaigned for free and fair elections and targeted the incumbent president as a stumbling block to democratization. Another common attribute of the youth movements was the use of nonviolent methods. The cross-national diffusion of ideas explains, to a large degree, cross-movement similarities.1

1 The term “Eastern Europe” is here loosely applied to refer to the whole post-communist region, including Southeastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

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Since post-communist youth shared similar political values and faced a similar set of institutional constraints on political participation, the attribution of similarity provided a basis for the adoption of Otpor’s tactics.3

Some youth movements, however, were more successful than others in mobilizing young people against the regime. Thousands of youngsters joined Otpor to wage a nonviolent struggle against the incumbent. Similarly, thousands of young Ukrainians challenged the power of the ruling elite through nonviolent action in 2004. Compared with Pora, Zubr mobilized a smaller number of youth during the 2001 presidential elections. Likewise, the Azerbaijani youth groups Maqam, Yeni Fikir, and Yokh recruited a smaller fraction of the youth population than Georgia’s Kmma on the eve of the parliamentary elections.

A central argument of this book is that tactical interactions between social movements and incumbent governments explain, in part, the level of youth mobilization against the regime. Tactical interaction is “an ongoing process . . . in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-like fashion, to offset the moves of the other.”4 On the one hand, the social movement seeks to attain its goals through the deployment of innovative tactics. On the other hand, the movement’s adversary tries to devise savvy countermobilization tactics. The level of youth mobilization is affected by the extent to which the social movement and the incumbent government deploy innovative tactics and counteract each other’s action. Here innovation does not imply the generation of absolutely novel ideas. The novelty of protest tactics or state countermoves in a particular context might be sufficient to catch an opponent by surprise and gain a strategic advantage.

This study further contends that learning is vital to the development of effective tactics. The analysis focuses on two learning mechanisms: participation in previous protest campaigns and the cross-national diffusion of ideas. The underlying assumption is that both civic activists and the ruling elite can draw lessons from earlier episodes of contention. Movement participants can devise more effective tactics if they critically assess the dynamics of previous protest campaigns inside and outside the country. Similarly, the
incumbent government can deploy more effective countermobilization tactics if it takes cues from prior upheavals in politically affinitive contexts. The pace of learning by civic activists and autocratic incumbents accounts, to some extent, for cross-country differences in state-movement interactions.

This research seeks to contribute to three bodies of literature. First, this study adds to comparative democratization literature by examining the development of youth movements in the post-communist region. In recent years, copious research has analyzed origins of the so-called color or electoral revolutions in Eastern Europe. Likewise, the Arab Spring – a wave of protest events in the Middle East – has reinvigorated a debate over the causes of the autocrat’s downfall. One of the crucial factors that determined the incumbent’s loss of power was a remarkably high level of citizen participation in antigovernment protests. Young people played a prominent role.

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role in these political processes, coordinating the organization of protest events, permanently occupying city squares, and spreading information via leaflets or, more recently, social media. Insufficient attention, however, has been devoted to youth movements as an agent of social change.7 Addressing this oversight, this book traces how youth movements in five post-communist states sought to mobilize citizens against the regime on the eve of national elections.

Second, this research contributes to social-movement scholarship by analyzing state-movement interactions in political regimes falling somewhere between democracy and dictatorship. The bulk of empirical work on the topic has been done in advanced industrial democracies and hardcore autocracies.8 The proliferation of hybrid regimes in the post–Cold War period provides an understudied context for the analysis of contentious politics.9 This study argues


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that the regime type affects the timing of mass mobilization, the scope of movement demands, the repertoire of contention, and the toolkit of state repression.

Third, this study contributes to the bourgeoning body of research on nonviolent action. Within this literature, analysis of defeated unarmed insurrections is greatly outnumbered by examination of the triumphant use of nonviolent action. Unlike most previous work, this study includes cases of both successful and failed mobilization. Specifically, this book examines the development of such understudied challenger organizations as Maqam, Yeni Fikir, Yokh, and Zubr. Though the Azerbaijani and Belarusian youth movements were unable to mobilize a sufficiently large number of young people against the regime, the analysis of their tactical missteps and the governments’ countermoves can advance scholarly understanding of nonviolent resistance and inform youth’s ongoing struggle for political change.

The remainder of this chapter lays out a theoretical framework for explaining the level of youth mobilization against the regime, explains the case selection, and describes data sources.

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This study argues that tactics adopted by youth movements and incumbent governments influence the level of youth mobilization against the regime. While strategy is a long-term plan of action, tactics denote specific means to execute a

strategy. This analysis focuses on three types of movement tactics based on the
target of their action: (1) recruitment tactics targeted at the youth population,
(2) tactics vis-à-vis allies, and (3) tactics vis-à-vis opponents. Recruitment tactics
are critical to the political activation of youth because they determine the scope
and the methods of the movement’s growth. Tactics vis-à-vis allies also affect
the level of youth mobilization because the challenger organization needs to
forge alliances with other civil society actors to tip the balance of power in its
favor. Furthermore, tactics vis-à-vis opponents influence the level of youth
mobilization because novel forms of civil resistance might draw a larger pool
of youngsters into a movement.

By the same token, this study singles out different types of countermovement
tactics. State repression is often defined as “behavior that is applied by
governments in an effort to bring about political quiescence and facilitate the
continuity of the regime through some form of restrictions or violation of
political and civil liberties.” 11 Broadly speaking, this study distinguishes
between coercion, or the use of force, and channeling, a subtler form of
repressive action “meant to affect the forms of protest available, the timing of
protests, and/or flows of resources to movements.” 12 In addition, this study
considers the government’s support for regime-friendly youth organizations as
state action directed against challenger organizations.

In analyzing movement tactics and state countermoves, this book applies the
concept of tactical interaction. As defined by McAdam, tactical interaction
consists of two components: tactical innovation by the challenger organization
and tactical adaptation by its adversary. 13 A related concept describing the
dynamic relationship between the social movement and its opponents is Sharp’s
idea of “political jiu-jitsu,” which refers to the process in which nonviolent action
can turn the opponent’s repression into a liability by generating shifts in public
opinion and tilting power relationships in favor of nonviolent activists. 14 More
recently, Hess and Martin develop the concept of backfire to define “a public
reaction of outrage to an event that is publicized and perceived as unjust.” 15

The concept of tactical interaction brings closer to each other two strands of
research. One line of inquiry has focused on movement strategies and protest
tactics. 16 A major finding in this literature is that social movements tend to

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13 McAdam, Doug. 1983. “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency.” American


deploy a recurrent set of tactics to pursue their goals. Tilly develops the concept of the repertoire of contention to describe “a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice.”\textsuperscript{17} Strike, for example, is a common form of protest used by labor unions. Scholars also recognize that the repertoire of contention may undergo transformation, and a period of heightened protest activity can engender the development of innovative tactics. Tarrow, for example, finds that Italian workers devised new forms of strike during the protest cycle of the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{18} Empirical evidence further indicates that a significant political defeat may trigger the transformation of movement tactics.\textsuperscript{19} This body of literature suggests that movement participants can exercise a great deal of creativity in campaigning for their cause.

Another strand of research has analyzed patterns of state repression.\textsuperscript{20} A consistent finding in this literature is that dissent provokes a repressive action.


Davenport refers to this empirical regularity as the law of coercive responsiveness. The movement’s opponents, however, are not “actors devoid of strategic ability” who are “either blind to protests or able to crudely repress activists using the levers of the state.” Like protesters, the ruling elite can deploy a wide arsenal of tactics to safeguard its privileged position. Specifically, the coercive apparatus may modify its tactics to respond more effectively to a political threat. Della Porta, for example, demonstrates the evolution of policing styles in Italy and Germany from the 1950s to the 198os. In sum, both the repertoire of contention and the toolkit of state repression may change over time as a result of tactical interactions between the social movement and the incumbent government.

This book extends the existing literature by examining state-movement interactions in hybrid regimes. Most empirical research on tactical interactions has been done in advanced industrial democracies. There is also rich empirical literature on protests and repression in full-blown autocracies.
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Hornsby, for example, uses the recently declassified archival material to examine protests and repression in the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev. Since the collapse of communism, the rise of hybrid regimes provides an understudied political context for analyzing the interplay between social movements and their opponents.

The state-movement interactions in hybrid regimes are distinct in several ways. First, the regime type affects the timing of mass mobilization. In theory, protest events in democracies may fall on any date due to the systematic provision of political rights and civil liberties. For example, the Occupy Wall Street Movement organized its first march in New York City on September 17, US Constitution Day, during an off-election year. Compared with social movements in democracies, challenger organizations in autocracies face more cumbersome hurdles to organizing a protest campaign because autocrats routinely suppress citizens’ expression of political grievances in the public domain. Situated between these two extremes, social movements in hybrid regimes might observe a political opening during an election year due to the government’s half-hearted attempt to put up a facade of democracy. From this perspective, the elections might be seen as a prime opportunity for contentious collective action.

Second, the regime type has an impact on the scope of movement demands. Social movements in democracies can tackle a wider variety of political issues than their counterparts in nondemocracies given the nature of the political regime. Moreover, the regime type affects the urgency of certain political issues, which, in turn, influences the movement’s choice of political demands. The most pressing issue for challenger organizations in


18 On the movement’s history, see Milkman, Ruth, Stephanie Luce, and Penny Lewis. 2012. Changing the Subject: A Bottom-Up Account of Occupy Wall Street in New York City. New York: Murphy Institute, CUNY.

hybrid regimes is free and fair elections because it is widely regarded as a critical step toward democratization. A related popular demand in hybrid regimes is state provision of the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly.

Third, the regime type affects movement choices regarding the repertoire of contentious collective action. Social movements in democracies can choose a wider range of protest tactics without fear of state repression. In contrast, the imminent threat of political violence imposes significant constraints on the repertoire of contention in autocracies. The political context in hybrid regimes, falling somewhere between democracy and dictatorship, compels social movements to display a great deal of resourcefulness in developing their repertoires of contention. Specifically, civic activists in hybrid regimes try to combine protest tactics allowed in liberal democracies with those deployed in full-blown autocracies to maneuver in repressive regimes with a semblance of democratic institutions.

Furthermore, the regime type influences the toolkit of state repression. In dealing with social movements, governments in democracies are under public pressure to uphold the rule of law. In contrast, autocrats have a freer rein to unleash violence against civic activists and safeguard their monopoly on power. In hybrid regimes, however, the incumbent tries to secure a modicum of political legitimacy, which precludes the deployment of an overt violent campaign against challenger organizations. Instead, state authorities in hybrid regimes need to exercise ingenuity in manipulating laws and devising extralegal means to strip social movements of power.

LEARNING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND EXAMPLE

An additional argument presented in this book is that learning is critical to the development of effective tactics. This study singles out two learning mechanisms: (1) engagement in previous protest campaigns and (2) the cross-national diffusion of ideas. It is plausible to assume that the domestic history of civic activism affects the dynamics of state-movement interactions. Participation in previous protest campaigns may enable civic activists to strengthen their organizational skills and advance their grasp of various protest tactics. Furthermore, previous episodes of contention may create “organizational holdovers” that can be activated at a later point in time. Similarly, the incumbent may respond to an outburst of contentious collective action more effectively if he takes a long-term view of state-society relations in
