Introduction

Approaches to State Formations

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Ours is a large topic, with its two cross-cutting questions – state formations in time and space, the boundary between state and society – and four problematics – definitions, foundings, agendas, and memberships. Our opening and closing chapters pursue two agendas, one framed by theory, the other by history. Here in our introduction we provide a very brief, simple sketch of the broad streams of theoretical commitment on the state, and particularly on the question of its relative autonomous demarcation from society. We then review the chapters in this volume with an eye toward their position on the issue of state autonomy or embeddedness, and propose ways in which they might contribute to a hybrid approach. Our conclusion returns to these theoretical problems, but puts them in motion in time and space, attempting a sketch of a synthesis of the shifting character of state formations from the Bronze Age to modernity.

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A volume considering the state in history must necessarily address basic questions about the very nature of the entity. What exactly is a state? Where does it begin and end? What is its relationship to the society it claims to rule? How should it be defined and circumscribed as an object of analysis? These are central questions for an account of state formations, whether in the distant past or in the modern world. Here we lay out a brief genealogy of thinking about the state from its late nineteenth-century beginnings to contemporary debates. We see broadly two competing lineages initially framed by Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci, focusing respectively on a macro approach to institutions and capacities and a micro approach to cultures and practices.
A word of caution is required here. While there is clearly a continuous Weberian tradition focusing on the bounded autonomy of the state, the countervailing approaches that posit the state as fundamentally embedded in cultures and societies have segmented into competing perspectives that cannot described as a whole as “Gramscian”: even the catch-all term of “culturalist” that we use here is probably inadequate. If these competing orientations are often seen as contradictory and mutually exclusive, they are certainly potentially complementary; we will be looking for suggestions of a fruitful integration of macro and micro, of institutions and practices. And it is striking that political scientists, historians, and archaeologists, working in layers of modern and premodern time, have recently begun to converge around common conversations deriving from Weber and the various culturalist approaches to the state.

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Theoretically informed approaches to the longer history of the state run back ultimately to Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes and their visions of the secular prince and the leviathan state standing above mere society. We begin, however, with the classical sociology of the late nineteenth century. Marx would eventually be important, but because his thoughts on the state were scattered, and seemingly shaped by an assumption that the state was little more than a mechanism of class rule, his influence would await later development. So the field was really left to Max Weber, whose influence has been pervasive and enduring. Building on the evolutionary stage theories so central in the thinking of Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, G. W. F. Hegel, and Auguste Comte, Weber separated pre-state from state, and laid out three types of routine state authority, in two flavors. Pre-state societies were governed by the gerontocratic or patriarchal authority of either councils of elders or chiefs. When the household and lineage authorities of “patriarchal” chiefs were expanded by administrative followers, their domains – on the way to statehood – became patrimonial: kings were divinely anointed patriarchs to entire societies. Pre-state gerontocracy and patriarchy and state patrimonialism were all grounded in “traditional authority,” though monarchy would require a considerable degree of Weber’s “charismatic authority” to maintain its grip on sovereignty. Patrimonial monarchs gradually expanded their household staffs into increasingly autonomous bureaucracies, eventually moving the state to a new “legal-rational authority.”
As a good subject of the Prussian Kaiser, Weber did not have much to say about the end of monarchy in political revolutions. But his modes of authority – traditional (exercised in patrimonialism), legal-rational (expressed above all by routinized, specialist bureaucratic structures), and charismatic (most frequently expressed by the founders of great religions) – have had a long and enduring reach. Weber’s typologies are ideal types and are therefore quite static, and he never explicitly proposed how pre-state societies transitioned to patrimonial states, how patrimonial states transformed into bureaucratic ones, or how charisma fades or continues to animate either traditional or legal-rational authority. These questions are the history of the state writ large.¹

Approaches to the state in history running back to the beginning of the twentieth century began with the assumption that the state was a real and autonomous entity. Taking their cues from Weber and the imperatives of nation building in the era of the Industrial Revolution, particularly in Germany, scholars of the state through World War II felt no need to justify and refine their assumptions about the state: it was simply self-evident that the state existed.² As World War II ended and the Cold War settled in, American political scientists backed away from the concept of “the state” since it was indelibly linked with Soviet and Nazi “totalitarianism.” For two decades, liberal pluralists, notably David Easton, Robert Dahl, and Gabriel Almond, focused on process and culture as self-regulating systems rather than structures and institutions of enduring states. In this view, there was no real state, only a “system” in which social groups competed on increasingly equal grounds for the advancement of their interests.³

By the early 1970s, the obvious role of the state in foreign war and domestic turmoil had reawakened interest in its workings and nature, launching a rediscovery of the classical political sociology of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Marx, and Weber. This renewed interest was manifested first – paradoxically – in Samuel Huntington’s conservative Political Order and

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*Changing Societies* (1968), and Perry Anderson’s Marxist *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974).\(^4\) A distinct “fiscal-military” school developed around the work of Charles Tilly and Michael Mann, examining the rise of the state in early modern and modern Europe in terms of military power and state capacity.\(^5\) They were closely allied with a rising and influential neo-autonomist school, which published manifestos for the study of the state as a bounded, autonomous entity in the early 1980s, particularly Theda Skocpol’s *States and Revolutions* (1979), which offered a structural analysis of social revolutions in agrarian empires. This seminal book was followed by a collection coedited by Skocpol with Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, *Bringing the State Back In* (1985), which stands as the pivotal manifesto for the neo-Weberian state autonomy school.\(^6\) The leading exemplars of this understanding, by Skocpol, Hendrik Spruyt, Rueschemeyer, Tilly, and Mann, with a later generation of scholarship best exemplified by Thomas Ertman, Philip Gorski, and Julia Adams, have tilted heavily toward European and American contexts. Within these European limits, Thomas Ertman’s *The Birth of the Leviathan* has provided the comprehensive Weberian interpretation of the emergence of rational-bureaucratic governance out of traditional patrimonialism. Ertman surveys the entire continent from the collapse of Rome to the eve of the eighteenth century, mapping European state formation in terms of a matrix of patrimonial and bureaucratic infrastructure and absolutist and representative regimes. While Philip Gorski offers a challenge to Ertman in arguing (with another side of Weber) that Calvinism was critically important for an effective bureaucratic revolution in Europe, Julia Adams’s subtle account of the role of powerful merchant families in

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\(^6\) Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
the coalescence of the United Provinces of the Netherlands extends and deepens Ertman’s analysis of the grip of patrimonial governance in early modern Europe.7

The presumption of state autonomy, however, was quickly challenged by a countervailing notion of state embeddedness. Where the autonomous state derives from Weber, the embedded state derives ultimately from Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, brushed by an early encounter with the liberal systems theorists, and then reformulated in the wider “cultural turn” into distinct, if related understandings. Broadly speaking, the culturalists argue that state power is deeply embedded in and enacted through social networks and cultural constructions, to the point that its hard objective, “autonomous” existence is a mirage.8

Writing from Italian prisons in the 1930s, Gramsci argued that hegemonic culture shaped by class actors in civil society was a critical dimension in any “state formation.” European and American Marxists had been cutting their ties with Soviet orthodoxy since 1956, and by the late 1960s a series of lines of inquiry had opened up, all in some way connected to Gramsci. Throughout the 1960s, E. P. Thompson, in his work on class, power, and culture in early modern and early industrial England, was a formative figure in the Gramscian revival; he with anthropologist James C. Scott stressed “subaltern” resistance to hegemonic culture.9 Gramsci stood at the center of the debate on state autonomy between Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband that dominated British Marxist circles for a decade after 1968. Both argued that in key respects the state was


unreal, a phantasm. Against Miliband’s relatively orthodox understanding that the liberal state was directly controlled by capital, Poulantzas argued that the state was not so much a free-standing entity as a complex “relationship of forces” in a wider society, and as such was a highly volatile, contested arena.10

Poulantzas’s framework has been carried forward in the wider work by Bob Jessop on the “strategic relational approach,” and has been influential in the wider cultural approach to the state.11 So too has been a seminal commentary on the Poulantzas-Miliband debate by Philip Abrams, written in 1977 and published posthumously in 1988. Abrams suggested that there is a “state-system” of discrete institutions and practices, and a “state-idea” of ideals and myths: the dynamics between these domains, rather than simply “the state” as an isolated agent, should be the center of analysis.12 Michel Foucault had already launched his powerfully influential reversal of Gramscian Marxism. Rather than focusing on a bourgeoisie consciously crafting hegemony in civil society as a cultural bulwark to the control of the levers of state power, Foucault focused on the ways in which the institutions of the state itself acted to reshape society, to discipline the individual.13 At the same time, in lectures given at the Collège de France between 1975 and 1979 but published in English only in the past decade, Foucault outlined a wider analysis of the history of the state. In his early lectures looking at the patrimonial premodern state,

11 See Jessop, Chapter 2, this volume, and Jessop, The State: Past, Present, and Future (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016). In addition to the Gramscian-Poulantzas analysis, Jessop’s analysis has been shaped by Abrams, Foucault, Mitchell, and Bourdieu, discussed briefly in what follows.
Foucault discussed the nobility’s claims of history against royal bureaucracy, and he embedded sovereignty in the sacred homology of royal body and body politic. Examining the ways in which the modern state has taken up the “biopolitics” of population management, Foucault argues that the modern state was similarly embedded in the cultures and institutions of “governmentality.” Articulated in a web of forms of knowledge power, including modern science, of institutional penetration, including schools, hospitals, prisons and modern militaries, and new purposes of power, and of the enhancement of population health and well-being, governmentality both extends and entangles the state in a wider network of power and institutions, enmeshing state citizens in this web of power relations.

Foucault’s understandings, with Gramsci as a background echo, had a formative, shaping role on key studies published in the 1980s and 1990s, most importantly Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch* (1985), Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (1988), and George Steinmetz, *Regulating the Social* (1993), positing, respectively, English state formation as a cultural revolution, British occupation of Egypt as grounded in an earlier bilateral cultural colonization, and German local regulation variably shaping the rise of the welfare state. Gramsci, Scott, and Corrigan and Sayer’s *Great Arch* all shaped the noted 1994 collection of essays on Latin America, *Everyday Forms of State Formation*, in which Gil Joseph and Daniel Nugent argue for a complex interaction of state institutions and popular culture in a process of “negotiation of rule.”

At the same time, Timothy Mitchell reformulated Abrams’s paradox into


what he calls the “state effect” – the agency of state actors and practices spread far into the fabric of society and economy in a reciprocal interpenetration, to the point that “the state” has no clear boundaries, but is manifested as an effect of this interaction.\footnote{Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”; Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” in Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture, 76–97; Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For an extended discussion, see Chapter 3 in this volume.}

James C. Scott in 1998 reversed his field of vision from subaltern peoples to state actors, arguing that states seek to make their worlds “legible,” engaging in “high modern projects” that sweep aside local complexity.\footnote{James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).}

Gramsci’s hegemony, Jessop’s strategic relations, Foucault’s governmentality, Mitchell’s state effect, Scott’s all-seeing state: these comprise competing approaches that shape the contemporary cultural analyses of state formations. To these we should add Jürgen Habermas’s “public sphere” and Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” – models of the configurations of print culture and associational life that shape citizens’ relationships with state and nation.\footnote{Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society; translated by Thomas Burger in association with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Forms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, William Rehg, trans. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2006).}

Habermas and Anderson are similarly indebted to an early encounter with Gramsci, before that to the Frankfurt School, and back distantly to the competing influences of Marx and Hegel. Thus the intellectual history of the state over the past century has moved from Weberian origins through a postwar pluralist systematics to the modern debate, which is shaped by two broad schools of thinking, stressing the autonomy of the state from society and the embeddedness of the state in and through society. Inevitably there are voices and influences that blur these boundaries. Most importantly, Pierre Bourdieu, who succeeded Foucault as the leading voice in French sociology, made what might be called a move from culture to the state. Famous in symbolic anthropology for his structural analysis of the Berber house and more widely for his analysis of the “field of cultural production,”\footnote{Pierre Bourdieu, “The Berber House, or the World Reversed,” Social Science Information 9 (1970), 151–170; Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).} Bourdieu constructed a sociology that posits that social formations are defined by...
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discrete fields of action governed by field-specific “habitus” and “doxa”: an individual’s socialized practice and behavior and the wider culture’s rules for a given social field. In the late 1980s, he turned his field theory to the problem of the state, developing a history of the state in a series of recently published lectures, revisiting and revising Weber in an account of the evolution from the familial politics of the monarch to the bureaucratic politics of the modern state. While critiquing Weber in arguing that the state wielded a monopoly of symbolic as well as physical violence, Bourdieu nonetheless is self-consciously Weberian in his analysis of the autonomy of the state as a social field, with its own rules and practices. While Weberians have embraced Bourdieu’s field theory of the state, it has been attacked as “insipid Whiggery,” reviving Emile Durkheim’s search for stability and glossing over the reality that modern states are typically forged in revolution “with iron and fire wielded by real human beings.” And even more broadly, one of our contributors, William Novak, has issued a call for state histories that go “beyond Max Weber,” and beyond a theory of the bureaucratic state rooted in monarchist, aristocratic Prussia, to rethink democracy: “to finally re-center a more democratic understanding of the nature and extent (for good and ill) of modern state power.”

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At the other end of the longer history of thinking on the state, the comparative analysis of the premodern state lies within the domain of anthropological archaeologists who, from somewhat different starting points, have developed a debate that mirrors that on the modern state. Where the history of the modern state began with Weber, archaeologists began with Marx, and consequently they avoided the state until comparatively recently. Here the founding thinker was V. Gordon Childe, who forced analytical rigor on the typological studies of artifacts that

dominated archaeology at the beginning of the twentieth century. Childe focused archaeological analysis on questions of technology and modes of production; by the 1940s and 1950s – systematized by Julian Steward as “cultural ecology” – his thinking shaped what was known as “processual archaeology.” Reacting against the ahistorical structural-functional school of anthropology, the processualists were “neo-evolutionary” – sketching human history over the long term in relation to the natural environment – they were nonetheless suspicious of the contingency and necessarily tight chronology of an archaeology of the state. 25

Over the past thirty years, processualism has shifted – and been challenged – creating an alignment of debate analogous to that over the modern state. The shift among processualists was to incorporate Weberian problematics much more explicitly, in a new focus on authority, power, and capacity that puts work by archaeologists Kent Flannery, Joyce Marcus, Bruce Trigger, and Timothy Earle in conversation with state autonomists like Charles Tilly and Michael Mann. 26 Challenges come from two directions. Richard Blanton and Lane Fargher reject the limits of neo-evolutionary thinking, and are essentially neo-Weberian; their 2008 Collective Action in the Formation of Pre-modern States in particular establishes a rigorously empirical comparative global map of Weberian problems of state capacity, bureaucratization, and accountability that reaches back to antiquity. A more absolute challenge has come from the self-described post-processualists, participating in the wider cultural turn, developing new approaches of archaeological interpretation that are explicitly concerned with the problem of states and state formations. Norman Yoffee, in Myths of the Archaic State, extends James Scott’s account of the “high modern project” to the efforts of ancient state authorities to impose “legibility”; Seth Richardson argues provocatively that these were efforts to create the image of sovereign authority where its reality was sorely lacking. 27 Bruce Routledge engages directly

