

#### Are Politics Local?

Are politics local? Why? Where? When? How do we measure local versus national politics? And what are the effects? This book provides answers to these questions, within an explicitly comparative framework, including both advanced and developing democracies. It does so by using a statistically based and graphical account of party nationalization, providing methodology and data for legislative elections covering scores of parties across dozens of countries. The book divides party nationalization into two dimensions - static and dynamic - to capture different aspects of localism, both with important implications for representation. Static nationalization measures the consistency in a party's support across the country and thus shows whether parties are able to encompass local concerns into their platforms. Dynamic nationalization, in turn, measures the consistency among the districts in overtime change in electoral results, under the presumption that where districts differ in their electoral responses, local factors must drive politics. Each of the two dimensions, in sum, considers representation from the perspective of the mix of national versus local politics.

Scott Morgenstern is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. He is author of *Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll Call Voting in Latin America and the United States* (Cambridge University Press, 2004) and the co-editor of *Legislative Politics in Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), among other publications. His articles have appeared in the *Journal of Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Comparative Politics*, *Party Politics*, *Electoral Studies*, and other journals.



# **Are Politics Local?**

The Two Dimensions of Party Nationalization around the World

**SCOTT MORGENSTERN** 

University of Pittsburgh





# **CAMBRIDGE**UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 4843/24, 2nd Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, Delhi – 110002, India 79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108415132 DOI: 10.1017/9781108227865

© Scott Morgenstern 2017

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2017

Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-108-41513-2 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.



### **Contents**

List of Figures		<i>page</i> vii
Lis	st of Tables	ix
Аc	knowledgments	xi
PΑ	RT I DESCRIBING, MEASURING, AND COMPARING THE	
	TWO DIMENSIONS	I
Ι	Dimensions of Party Nationalization: Static and Dynamic	3
2	A Typology of Party Nationalization	30
3	Measuring Static and Dynamic Nationalization	55
4	Applying the Model: Patterns of Static and	
	Dynamic Nationalization	83
PΑ	RT II EXPLAINING PARTY NATIONALIZATION	107
5	Explaining Static and Dynamic Nationalization	109
6	Institutions, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and Party Nationalization:	
	A Statistical Analysis	134
PΑ	RT III IMPLICATIONS: NATIONALIZATION AS AN	
	EXPLANATORY VARIABLE	167
7	Regionalism, Accountability, and Party Nationalization	177
8	The Role of Party Nationalization on Party Unity and	
	Retrospective Voting	203
9	The Role of Party Nationalization on Collective Action and	
	Dissent among Co-Partisan Legislators: Roll Call Voting and	
	Bill Co-Sponsorship	225

 $\mathbf{v}$ 



vi	Contents
PART IV CONCLUSION	247
10 Summary and Conclusions	249
Appendices	260
Bibliography	280
Author Index	292
Subject Index	295



# **Figures**

I.I	Party Nationalization in Three Countries	page 14
2.1	Mapping Static Nationalization in Canada: Conservatives 2011	46
2.2	Mapping Static Nationalization in Two Canadian Provinces:	
	Conservatives 2011	47
2.3	Mapping Static Nationalization in the UK: Conservatives 2001	48
2.4	Mapping Static Nationalization in the UK: Liberal	
	Democrats 2001	49
2.5	Party Nationalization: UK Conservative Party 1997–2005	50
2.6	Liberal Party Electoral Results and Demographics in Four Canad	lian
	Ridings	51
3.1a	Varying SN, Given High DN	64
3.1b	Varying DN, Given Moderate SN	65
3.2	Two Measures of Static Nationalization	68
3.3	Graphs of Hypothetical Static Nationalization Measures	71
4.I	Nationalization around the World	88
4.2	Nationalization around the World: Nationalized and Unbalanced	1
	Quadrants	88
4.3	Support for Bolivia's MNR, 1985–2005	95
4.4a	Evolution of Static Nationalization in the United States	98
4.4b	Evolution of Dynamic Nationalization in the United States	98
4.5	M&M Static and Dynamic Nationalization in the US (Democrat	s)
	and UK (Conservatives)	103
4.6	PNS and SD of Swing in the US (Democrats) and	
	UK (Conservatives)	104
5.1	Institutional Hypotheses	III
6.1	Nationalization, SMD Countries	136
6.2	Nationalization by Executive Systems and Number of Districts	138
6.3	Nationalization by Executive and Number of Districts,	
	plus Federalism	142

vii



V111	List of Fi	gures
6.4	Ethnic Segregation, by Country	147
6.5	Ethnic Segregation and Federalism	148
6.6	Nationalization: By Federalism, Ethnic Segregation,	
	and Institutions	149
6.7	Electoral Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote (Hallerberg and	
	Marier Method)	151
6.8	Hallerberg and Marier Method for Measuring the Personal Vote,	-
	by District Magnitude	152
6.9	Nationalization by Personal Vote-Seeking Incentives	153
6.10	Nationalization and Electoral Systems by Executive Systems	154
6.11	Nationalization and Governing Experience	159
6.12	Predicted Effects: Executive System and Number of	
	Electoral Districts	164
7 <b>.</b> I	Regional Parties, Accountability, and Integration	183
7.2	Vote for Plaid Cymru across Ridings in Wales 2001–5	191
8.1	Evolution of the Vote for the PP and the PSOE in Spain's Regions	207
8.2	District-Level Vote in Spain	208
8.3	District-Level Vote in Argentina	211
8.4	Voting in Quebec 1988–93	220
8.5	Voting Patterns in Quebec and the Rest of Canada 2006–11,	
	Average Support across Districts	221
9.1	Vote Percentage and NOMINATE Scores, United States 1986–90	231
9.2	Party Nationalization in Four Countries	234
9.3	Swings and Number of Bills Co-Sponsored, US	
	104th Congress (1995–97)	237
9.4	Argentina: Co-Sponsorship and Swing, by Province	238
9.5	Peru: Co-Sponsorship and Swing, by Party	239
9.6	Uruguay: Co-Sponsorship and Swing, by Party	240
9.7	Uruguay: Co-Sponsorship and Vote Differences, by Party	241
9.8	Absolute Differences in District-Level Vote Shares and	
	Co-Sponsorship, USA, Pooled Results, 94th through	
	104th Congresses	244
9.9	Absolute Differences in District-Level Vote Shares and	
	Co-Sponsorship, Argentina	245
	Party Nationalization in Chile 1961–73	258
AI.I	Party-Level Graphs	262



#### **Tables**

2.1	A Typology of Party Types	page 31
3.I	Hypothetical Support for a Single Party in Two Countries	57
3.2	Hypothetical Problems for Gini Coefficients and the	
	Index of Variation	68
3.3	Examples of Static Nationalization Measures	70
3.4	Examples of Dynamic Nationalization Measures	77
4.I	Intra-Country Constituency on Two Dimensions	93
4.2	Evolution of Nationalization: Bolivia's MNR	95
4.3	Swings and their Standard Deviations: Hungary	96
4.4	Competed Districts: US Parties	101
4.5	Competed Districts: UK Parties	102
5.1	Summary of Predictions	123
5.2a	Outlying Parties in Countries that have Variance on Static	
	Nationalization	129
5.2b	Outlying Parties in Countries that have Variance on Dynamic	
	Nationalization	130
6.1	Nationalization and Executive Systems	135
6.2	Nationalization and the Number of Districts	137
6.3	Bolivia: Cross-District Variation in Support for the MNR	144
6.4	Ethnic Segregation: Sample Cases	146
6.5	Summary of Institutional Predictions	157
6.6	SUR Model Results, Dependent Variables: Static/Distributional	
	and Dynamic Nationalization Scores	163
7.I	Parties Failing to Compete in All Districts	187
7.2	Districts Competed by State in India 2004	190
7.3	Nationalization Accounting for States: Mexico 2006–12	194
7.4	Static Nationalization Scores Accounting for States	195
8.1	Vote for Regional Parties in Spain	209
8.2	Peronist Support and Change, 1999–2001	212

ix



> List of Tables X Citizen Views of the Economy and Vote Swings to the Parties, 8.3 Argentina 2001 215 8.4 Catalonia 2012: Economic Evaluations and Vote Choice 216 Bolivia: Support for Morales by Economic Evaluation and Region 8.5 217 Support for Morales by Race and Region 8.6 218 9.1a Weighted Rice Scores by Marginality and Swing (100th US Congress) 233 9.1b Weighted Rice Scores by Marginality and Swing (101st US Congress) 233 Explaining Collaboration in the US and Argentina Lower Houses 243 A2.1 Parties Analyzed and Variables in Regression Analysis 269 A<sub>3.1</sub> Scoring for Personal Vote Incentive Systems 276 A4.1 Independent Variable Operationalization 278

A5.1 SUR Models with One Observation/Country

279



#### Acknowledgments

This book was inspired by my graduate training, particularly by Paul Drake and Gary Cox, who 20 years ago pushed me to add a comparative perspective to literature focusing on the US Congress. A central tenet of the academic and journalistic literature, especially of the "classic period," has been that "all politics is local." But is that true everywhere? Even in the United States, the level of localism has apparently changed. While I was in graduate school, Gary Cox and his co-author Mathew McCubbins produced their opus, *Legislative Leviathan*. Their concern in that book is how locally oriented legislators can organize themselves for collective action, and they find the answer in a collective incentive for electoral outcomes. This current book, like much of my work in the past decade, explores the strength of those electoral ties in a comparative perspective. Among my findings is that the US electoral ties are very weak comparatively, and the book therefore asks about the causes and effects of this variable.

In order to begin my exploration of those ties, Richard Potthoff helped me to write a paper in 2005 that quantified the electoral ties in a comparative perspective. Without this foundation, the current book would not have been possible. Chapter 3 is based on that original paper, and thus while he has not helped directly in the preparation of this manuscript, he deserves much credit in the preparation of that chapter. Chapter 3 also bears the marks of John Polga-Hecimovich and Peter Siavelis, due to work we co-authored about different measurement techniques. Tom Mustillo was also critical to this venture, as he, along with Sarah Mustillo, helped transform my model into a more accessible hierarchical model that runs in Stata. Chapter 6 grew from a paper with Stephen Swindle, and Chapter 7 is tied to a paper with Swindle and Andrea Castagnola; their contributions are also noted in the titles to those chapters. A key section in Chapter 9 was borrowed from a paper co-authored with Ernesto Calvo, to which Jose Manuel Magallanes and Daniel Chasquetti also contributed. I also thank Octavio Amorim-Neto Brian Crisp, Maria Escobar-Lemmon, Mark

xi



xii Acknowledgments

Jones, Ekaterina Rashkova, Peter Siavelis, Ethan Scheiner, Kathleen Bawn, Andy Tow, Dawn Brancati, Allen Hicken, John Polga-Hecimovich, and others for supplying much of the data. Yen-Pin Su also deserves much credit for assisting in collecting and organizing data. Other assistants have also helped collect, organize, and analyze the data. These assistants include Ignacio Arana, Ronald Alfaro, Ronald Reha, Dana Bodnar, Ben Morgenstern, Kira Pronin, Christian Gineste, Isabel Ranner, Sofia Vera, Noah Smith, Chelsea Kontra, Emily Riley, Cindy Ling, Ben Wertkin, Christina Keller, Marina Sullivan, Clare Hoffert, Laurel Cooper, and Nathaniel Ropski, amongst others. Some of these graduate students were supported from the University of Pittsburgh's Political Science Department, some were undergraduates funded through the First Experiences in Research, and Pitt's Center for Latin American Studies helped fund the rest. Many people were helpful in setting up interviews during research trips, including Sofia Vera in Peru and Agustin Vallejo in Argentina. My friends and colleagues in Uruguay, Juan Andres Moreas, Daniel Buquet, and Daniel Chasquetti, are always helpful. Special thanks are owed to my colleagues, Barry Ames and Anibal Pérez-Líñan, who have offered friendship, support, and constructive criticism.