RUSSIA’S RESPONSE TO SANCTIONS

In the first in-depth analysis of the effects of sanctions on the Russian political economy, Richard Connolly details the Western sanctions targeting the energy, defense and financial sectors and the Russian response. He explores how Western sanctions have caused Russian officials to formulate rapid policy responses to enable the country to adapt to its new circumstances. The sanctions and the Russian response have caused the state’s role in the Russian economy to grow stronger and led its policymakers to accelerate efforts to shift Russia’s foreign economic relations away from the West and toward Asia. Connolly analyzes how the political economy in Russia and the nature of the country’s integration with the global economy have been fundamentally reshaped. He demonstrates that a new system of political economy is emerging in Russia and how it is crucial to understanding Russia’s future trajectory.

Richard Connolly is director of the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham. His research and teaching are principally concerned with the political economy of Russia.
Russia’s Response to Sanctions

How Western Economic Statecraft is Reshaping Political Economy in Russia

RICHARD CONNOLLY
University of Birmingham
For Lucy, Freya and George
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