

CAMBRIDGE LIBRARY COLLECTION

Books of enduring scholarly value

Philosophy

This series contains both philosophical texts and critical essays about philosophy, concentrating especially on works originally published in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It covers a broad range of topics including ethics, logic, metaphysics, aesthetics, utilitarianism, positivism, scientific method and political thought. It also includes biographies and accounts of the history of philosophy, as well as collections of papers by leading figures. In addition to this series, primary texts by ancient philosophers, and works with particular relevance to philosophy of science, politics or theology, may be found elsewhere in the Cambridge Library Collection.

The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy

A major philosophical mind in his day, William Paley (1743–1805) wrote in a lucid style that made complex ideas more accessible to a wide readership. This work, first published in 1785, was based on the lectures he gave on moral philosophy at Christ's College, Cambridge. Cited in parliamentary debates and remaining on the syllabus at Cambridge into the twentieth century, it stands as one of the most influential texts to emerge from the Enlightenment period in Britain. An orthodox theologian, grounding his utilitarian ethics in strong religious faith, Paley held notably progressive views on issues of toleration and the slave trade. His perspicuity prompted one contemporary to remark that the book 'presents a subject which has always been considered as harsh and difficult, in the most agreeable and intelligible form ... we sit down to be informed of our duty, and are surprised to meet with amusement'.



Cambridge University Press has long been a pioneer in the reissuing of out-of-print titles from its own backlist, producing digital reprints of books that are still sought after by scholars and students but could not be reprinted economically using traditional technology. The Cambridge Library Collection extends this activity to a wider range of books which are still of importance to researchers and professionals, either for the source material they contain, or as landmarks in the history of their academic discipline.

Drawing from the world-renowned collections in the Cambridge University Library and other partner libraries, and guided by the advice of experts in each subject area, Cambridge University Press is using state-of-the-art scanning machines in its own Printing House to capture the content of each book selected for inclusion. The files are processed to give a consistently clear, crisp image, and the books finished to the high quality standard for which the Press is recognised around the world. The latest print-on-demand technology ensures that the books will remain available indefinitely, and that orders for single or multiple copies can quickly be supplied.

The Cambridge Library Collection brings back to life books of enduring scholarly value (including out-of-copyright works originally issued by other publishers) across a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences and in science and technology.



The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy

WILLIAM PALEY





CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge, CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

> www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108066006

© in this compilation Cambridge University Press 2013

This edition first published 1785 This digitally printed version 2013

ISBN 978-1-108-06600-6 Paperback

This book reproduces the text of the original edition. The content and language reflect the beliefs, practices and terminology of their time, and have not been updated.

Cambridge University Press wishes to make clear that the book, unless originally published by Cambridge, is not being republished by, in association or collaboration with, or with the endorsement or approval of, the original publisher or its successors in title.



MORAL AND POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY.



THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

MORAL AND POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY.

BY WILLIAM PALEY, M.A.
ARCHDEACON OF CARLISLE.

L O N D O N:

PRINTED FOR R. FAULDER, NEW BOND STREET.

M.DCC.LXXXV.



TO

THE RIGHT REVEREND

EDMUND LAW, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF CARLISLE.

MY LORD,

HAD the obligations which I owe to your Lordship's kindness been much less, or much sewer, than they are; had perfonal gratitude lest any place in my mind for deliberation or for enquiry; in selecting a name which every reader might confess to be prefixed, with propriety, to a work, that, in many of its parts, bears no obscure relation to the general principles of natural and revealed religion, I should



[ii]

should have found myself directed by many confiderations to that of the Bishop of Carlifle. A long life, fpent in the most interesting of all human pursuits, the investigation of moral and religious truth, in constant and unwearied endeavours to advance the discovery, communication, and fuccess of both; a life so occupied, and arrived at that period which renders every life venerable, commands respect by a title, which no virtuous mind will dispute, which no mind sensible of the importance of these studies to the supreme concernments of mankind, will not rejoice to fee acknowledged. Whatever difference, or whatever opposition, fome, who peruse your Lordship's writings, may perceive between your conclufions and their own, the good and wife of all



[iii]

all persuasions will revere that industry, which has for its object the illustration or defence of our common Christianity. Your Lordship's researches have never loft fight of one purpose, namely, to recover the simplicity of the gospel from beneath that load of unauthorized additions, which the ignorance of some ages, and the learning of others, the fuperstition of weak, and the craft of designing men, have unhappily for its interest heaped upon it. And this purpose, I am convinced, was dictated by the purest motive; by a firm, and, I think, a just opinion, that whatever renders religion more rational, renders it more credible; that he, who, by a diligent and faithful examination of the original records, difmisses from the system one article, which

a 2

contra-



[iv]

contradicts the apprehension, the experience, or the reasoning of mankind, does more towards recommending the belief, and, with the belief, the influence of Christianity, to the understandings and consciences of serious enquirers, and through them to universal reception and authority, than can be effected by a thousand contenders for creeds and ordinances of human establishment.

When the doctrine of transubstantiation had taken possession of the Christian world, it was not without the industry of learned men that it came at length to be discovered, that no such doctrine was contained in the New Testament. But had those excellent persons done nothing more by their discovery,



[v]

covery, than abolished an innocent superstition, or changed some directions in the ceremonial of public worship, they had merited little of that veneration, with which the gratitude of protestant churches contemplates their fervices. What they did for mankind was this, they exonerated Christianity of a weight which funk it. If indolence or timidity had checked these exertions, or suppressed the fruit and publication of these enquiries, is it too much to affirm, that infidelity would at this day have been univerfal? I do not mean, my Lord, by the mention of this example to infinuate, that any popular opinion which your Lordship may have encountered, ought to be compared with transubstantion, or that the assurance with which

ı we



[vi]

we reject that extravagant absurdity, is attainable in the controversies in which your Lordship has been engaged; but I mean, by calling to mind those great reformers of the public faith, to observe, or rather to express my own persuasion, that to restore the purity, is most effectually to promote the progress of Christianity; and that the same virtuous motive, which hath fanctified their labours, fuggested yours. At a time when some men appear not to perceive any good, and others to suspect an evil tendency, in that spirit of examination and research which is gone forth in Christian countries, this testimony is due not only to the rectitude of your Lordship's views, but to the general cause of intellectual and religious liberty.

That



[vii]

That your Lordship's life may be prolonged in health and honour; that it may afford whilst it continues an instructive proof, how serene and easy old age can be made, by the memory of important and well intended labours, by the possession of public and deserved esteem, by the presence of many grateful relatives; above all by the resources of religion, by an unshaken confidence in the designs of a "faithful Creator," and a settled trust in the truth and in the promises of Christianity, is the servent prayer of, my Lord,

Your Lordship's dutiful,

Most obliged,

And most devoted servant,

WILLIAM PALEY.

Carlisse, Feb. 10, 1785.





PREFACE

In the fubject of morals, I appear to myself to have remarked the following impersections—either that the principle was erroneous, or that it was indistinctly explained, or that the rules deduced from it, were not sufficiently adapted to real life and to actual situations. The writings of Grotius, and the larger work of Puffendorf are of too forensic a cast, too much mixed up with the civil law, and with the jurisprudence of Germany, to answer precisely the design of a system of ethics—



(ii)

the direction of private consciences in the general conduct of human life. Perhaps, indeed, they are not to be regarded, fo much as institutes of morality, calculated to instruct an individual in his duty, as a species of law books and law authorities, suited to the practice of those courts of justice, whose decisions are regulated by certain general principles of natural equity combined with the maxims of the Roman code: of which kind, I understand, there are many upon the continent. To which may be added, concerning both thefe authors, that they are more occupied in describing the rights and usages of independent communities, than is necessary in a work which professes not to adjust the correspondence of nations, but to delineate the offices of domestic life. The profusion also of classical quotations, with which many of their pages abound, feems to me a fault from which it will not be easy to excuse them. If these extracts be intended as decorations of ftyle, the composition is overloaded with ornaments of one kind. To any thing more than ornament



(iii)

ornament they can make no claim. To propose them as serious arguments; gravely to attempt to establish or fortify a moral duty by the testimony of a Greek or Roman poet, is to trisse with the attention of the reader, or rather to take it off from all just principles of reasoning in morals.

Of our own writers in this branch of philosophy, I find none that I think perfectly free from the three objections which I have stated. There is likewise a sourth property observable in almost all of them, namely, that they divide too much the law of nature from the precepts of revelation; some authors industriously declining the mention of scripture authorities, as belonging to a different province, and others reserving them for a separate volume: which appears to me much the same desect, as if a commentator on the laws of England should content himself with stating upon each head the common law of the land, without taking any notice of acts of parliament; or should chuse to give his readers the common law in one book,

a 2

and



(iv)

and the statute law in another. "When the obligations of morality are taught," says a pious and celebrated writer, "let the sanctions of Christianity never be forgotten; by which it will be shewn that they give strength and lustre to each other; religion will appear to be the voice of reason, and morality the will of God." *

The manner, also, in which modern writers have treated of subjects of morality, is, in my judgment, liable to much exception. It has become of late a fashion to deliver moral institutes in strings or series of detached propositions, without subjoining a continued argument or regular differtation to any of them. This sententious, apothegmatizing style, by crowding propositions and paragraphs too sast upon the mind, and by carrying the eye of the reader from subject to subject in too quick a succession, gains not a sufficient hold upon the attention, to leave either the memory surnished, or the understanding satisfied.

How-

* Preface to the Preceptor, by Dr. Johnson.



(v)

However useful a syllabus of topics, or a series of propositions may be in the hands of a lecturer, or as a guide to a student, who is supposed to consult other books, or to institute upon each subject researches of his own, the method is by no means convenient for ordinary readers; because sew readers are such thinkers as to want only a hint to set their thoughts at work upon; or such as will pause and tarry at every proposition, till they have traced out its dependency, proof, relation, and consequences, before they permit themselves to step on to another. A respectable writer of this class * has comprized his doctrine of slavery in the three following propositions.

- " No one is born a flave, because every one is born with all his original rights."
- "No one can become a flave, because no one from being a person can, in the language of the Roman law, become a thing, or subject of property."

" The

* Dr. Ferguson, author of " Institutes of Moral Philosophy," 1767.



(vi)

"The supposed property of the master in the slave, therefore, is matter of usurpation, not of right."

It may be possible to deduce from these sew adages such a theory of the primitive rights of human nature, as will evince the illegality of slavery; but surely an author requires too much of his reader, when he expects him to make these deductions for himself? or to supply, perhaps, from some remote chapter of the same treatise, the several proofs and explanations, which are necessary to render the meaning and truth of these affertions intelligible.

There is a fault, the opposite of this, which some moralists who have adopted a different, and, I think, a better plan of composition, have not always been careful to avoid; namely, the dwelling upon verbal and elementary distinctions, with a labour and prolixity, proportioned much more to the subtlety of the question, than to its value

and



(vii)

and importance in the profecution of the subject. A writer upon the law of nature, * whose explications in every part of philosophy, though always diffuse, are often very successful, has employed three long fections in endeavouring to prove, that, " permissions are not laws." The discussion of this controversy, however essential it might be to dialectic precision, was certainly not necessaly to the progress of a work defigned to describe the duties and obligations of civil life. The reader becomes impatient when he is detained by disquisitions which have no other object than the fettling of terms and phrases? and, what is worse, they, for whose use such books are chiefly intended, will not be persuaded to read them at all.

I am led to propose these strictures, not by any propensity to depreciate the labours of my predecessors, much less to invite a comparison between the merits of their performances and my own, but solely

by

Dr. Rutherforth, author of "Institutes of Natural Law."



(viii)

by the confideration, that, when a writer offers a book to the public upon a subject, in which the public are already in possession of many others, he is bound by a kind of literary justice, to inform his readers distinctly and specifically, what it is he professes to supply, and what he expects to improve. The imperfections above enumerated are those which I have endeavoured to avoid or remedy. Of the execution the reader must judge, but this was the defign. Concerning the principle of morals it would be premature to speak; but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that principle, I have fomewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the universities, and in that department of education to which these chapters relate, afforded me frequent occasion to observe, that, in discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it required much more pains to make them perceive the difficulty, than to understand the solution; that, unless the subject was so drawn up to a point, as to present the full



(ix)

full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt, before any explanation was entered upon; in other words, unless some curiosity was excited before it was attempted to be satisfied, the labour of the teacher was loft. When information was not requested, it was seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in the following work; that is, upon each occasion I have endeavoured, before I suffered myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete possession of the question; and to do it in the way that I thought most likely to stir up his own doubts and folicitude about it.

In pursuing the principle of morals through the detail of cases to which it is applicable, I have had in view to accommodate both the choice of the fubjects, and the manner of handling them, to the fituations which arise in the life of an inhabitant of this country, in these times. This is the thing that I think to be principally wanting in former treatises, and, perhaps, the chief advantage which will

h



(x)

will be found in mine. I have examined no doubts, I have discussed no obscurities, I have encountered no errors, I have adverted to no controversies, but what I have seen actually to exist. If some of the questions treated of appear to a more instructed reader minute or puerile, I defire fuch reader to be affured that I have found them occasions of difficulty to young minds; and what I have observed in young minds, I should expect to meet with in all who approach these subjects for the first time. Upon each article of human duty, I have combined with the conclusions of reason, the declarations of scripture, when they are to be had, as of co-ordinate authority, and as both terminating in the same fanctions.

In the manner of the work, I have endeavoured fo to temper the opposite plans above animadverted upon, as that the reader may not accuse me either of too much haste, or of too much delay. I have bestowed upon each subject enough of dispersal accuse a fertation



(xi)

fertation to give a body and substance to the chapter in which it is treated of, as well as coherence and perspicuity; on the other hand, I have seldom, I hope, exercised the patience of the reader by the length and prolixity of my essays, or disappointed that patience at last, by the tenuity and unimportance of the conclusion.

There are two particulars in the following work for which it may be thought necessary that I should offer some excuse. The first of which is, that I have scarcely ever referred to any other book, or mentioned the name of the author whose thoughts, and sometimes, possibly, whose very expressions I have adopted. My method of writing has constantly been this; to extract what I could from my own stores, and my own reflections in the first place; to put down that; and afterwards to consult upon each subject such reading as fell in my way: which order, I am convinced, is the only one whereby any person can keep his thoughts from sliding into other men's

b 2 trains.



(xii)

trains. The effect of fuch a plan upon the production itself will be, that whilst some parts in matter or manner may be new, others will be little else than a repetition of the old. no pretentions to perfect originality: I claim to be fomething more than a mere compiler. no doubt is borrowed; but the fact is, that the notes for this work having been prepared for fome years; and fuch things having been from time to time inserted in them, as appeared to me worth preferving; and fuch infertions having been made, commonly, without the name of the author from whom they were taken, I should, at this time, have found a difficulty in recovering these names with sufficient exactness to be able to render to every man his own. Nor, to speak the truth, did it appear to me worth while to repeat the fearch merely for this purpofe. When authorities are relied upon, names must be produced: when a discovery has been made in science, it may be unjust to borrow the invention, without acknowledging



(xiii)

knowledging the author. But in an argumentative treatife, and upon a subject, which allows no place for discovery or invention, properly so cal ed; and in which all that can belong to a writer is his mode of reasoning, or his judgment of probabilities; I should have thought it superfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crouded my margin with references to every author, whose sentiments I have made use of. There is, however, one work to which I owe so much, that it would be ungrateful not to confess the obligation; I mean the writings of the late Abraham Tucker, Esq; part of which were published by himself, and the remainder fince his death, under the title of " The Light of Nature pursued, by Edward Search, Esq." have found in this writer more original thinking and observation upon the several subjects that he has taken in hand, than in any other, not to fay, than in all others put together. His talent also for illustration is unrivalled. But his thoughts are diffused



(xiv)

diffused through a long, various, and irregular work. I shall account it no mean praise, if I have been sometimes able to dispose into method, to collect into heads and articles, or to exhibit in more compact and tangible masses, what, in that otherwise excellent performance, is spread over too much surface.

The next circumstance for which some apology may be expected, is the joining of moral and political philosophy together, or the addition of a book of politics to a system of ethics. Against this objection, if it be made one, I might defend myself by the example of many approved writers, who have treated, de officiis hominis et civis, or, as some chuse to express it, " of the rights and obligations of man, in his individual and social capacity," in the same book. I might alledge also, that the part a member of the commonwealth shall take in political contentions, the vote he shall give, the counsels he shall approve, the support he shall afford,

or