CAMBRIDGE LIBRARY COLLECTION

Books of enduring scholarly value

British and Irish History, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries

The books in this series focus on the British Isles during the Tudor period, as interpreted by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historians. With their emphasis on dynastic and ecclesial matters, and their increasing use of primary source material, they shed light on the historiography of the Reformation and the Elizabethan period during the heyday of the British empire.

Calendar of Letters and State Papers Relating to English Affairs

Published in four volumes between 1892 and 1899, this collection contains assorted correspondence and papers between Spain and Spanish dignitaries in England from the accession of Elizabeth I in 1558 through to her death in 1603. Revealing the changing relationship between Spain and England, the documents offer detailed insights into Elizabeth's reign from a continental and Catholic perspective. Derived in large part from the archives at Simancas, they have been carefully edited and translated into English by Martin Andrew Sharp Hume (1843–1910), a respected historian of Spain and a scrupulous archival researcher. Each volume is arranged chronologically, contains an introduction that provides helpful historical context and closes with an index that includes both letter writers and recipients. Volume 3 (1896) covers the period 1580–86 and shows both the English and Spanish perspectives on the build-up and beginning of the Anglo-Spanish war.

Calendar of Letters and State Papers Relating to English Affairs

Preserved Principally in the Archives of Simancas

VOLUME 3

EDITED BY MARTIN A.S. HUME

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge, CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.
It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108061896

This edition first published 1896
This digitally printed version 2013

ISBN 978-1-108-06189-6 Paperback

CALENDARS.

Instructions to Editors.

The Master of the Rolls desires to call the attention of the Editors of Calendars to the following considerations, with a view to secure uniformity of plan in the important works on which they are engaged:—

He is anxious to extend, as far as is consistent with proper economy and despatch, the utility of the Calendars of State Papers now publishing under his control: 1st. As the most efficient means of making the national archives accessible to all who are interested in historical inquiries; 2nd. As the best justification of the liberality and munificence of the Government in throwing open these papers to the public, and providing proper catalogues of their contents at the national expense.

The greater number of the readers who will consult and value these works can have little or no opportunity of visiting the Public Record Office, in which these papers are deposited. The means for consulting the originals must necessarily be limited when readers live at a distance from the metropolis; still more if they are residents of Scotland, Ireland, distant colonies, or foreign states. Even when such an opportunity does exist, the difficulty of mastering the original hands in which these papers are written will deter many readers from consulting them. Above all, their great variety and number must present formidable obstacles to literary inquirers, however able, sanguine, and energetic, when the information contained in them is not made accessible by satisfactory Calendars.

The Master of the Rolls considers that, without superseding the necessity of consulting the originals, every Editor ought to frame his Calendar in such a manner that it shall present, in as condensed a form as possible, a correct index of the contents of the papers described in it. He considers that the entries should be so minute as to enable the reader to discover not only the general contents of the originals, but also what *they do not* contain. If the information be not sufficiently precise, if facts and names be omitted or concealed under a vague and general description, the reader will be often misled, he will assume that where the abstracts are silent as to information to be found in the documents, such information does not exist; or he will have to examine every original in detail, and thus one great purpose will have been lost for which these Calendars have been compiled.

A 84541. Wt. 17445.

As the documents are various, the Master of the Rolls considers that they will demand a corresponding mode of treatment. The following rules are to be observed :—

1st. All formal and official documents, such as letters of credence, warrants, grants, and the like, should be described as briefly as possible.

2nd. Letters and documents referring to one subject only should be catalogued as briefly as is consistent with correctness. But when they contain miscellaneous news, such a description should be given as will enable a reader to form an adequate notion of the variety of their contents.

3rd. Wherever a letter or paper is especially difficult to decipher, or the allusions more than ordinarily obscure, it will be advisable for the Editor to adhere, as closely as is consistent with brevity, to the text of the document. He is to do the same when it contains secret or very rare information.

4th. Where the Editor has deciphered letters in cipher, the decipher may be printed at full length. But when a contemporary or authorised decipher exists it will be sufficient to treat the cipher as an ordinary document.

5th. Striking peculiarities of expression, proverbs, manners, &c. are to be noticed.

6th. Original dates are to be given at the close of each entry, that the reader may know the exact evidence by which the marginal dates are determined.

7th. Where letters are endorsed by the receivers and the date of their delivery specified, these endorsements are to be recorded.

8th. The number of written pages of each document is to be specified, as a security for its integrity, and that readers may know what proportion the abstract bears to the original.

9th. The language of every document is to be specified. If, however, the greater part of the collection be in English, it will be sufficient to denote those only which are in a different tongue.

10th. Where documents have been printed, a reference should be given to the publication.

11th. Each series is to be chronological.

12th. The Prefaces of Editors, in explanation of documents in the volume, are not to exceed fifty pages, unless the written permission of the Master of the Rolls to the contrary be obtained.

*** Editors employed in foreign archives are to transcribe at full length important and secret papers.

CALENDAR

OF

LETTERS AND STATE PAPERS,

ENGLISH AFFAIRS,

OF THE REIGN OF

ELIZABETH.

CALENDAR

OF

LETTERS AND STATE PAPERS

RELATING TO

ENGLISH AFFAIRS,

PRESERVED PRINCIPALLY IN THE

ARCHIVES OF SIMANCAS.

Vol. III.

ELIZABETH.

1580—1586.

EDITED BY

MARTIN A. S. HUME, F.R.HIST.S.

PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,
BY EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

And to be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from
EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE, EAST HARDING STREET, FLEET STREET, E.C.; or
JOHN MENZIES & Co., 12, HANOVER STREET, EDINBURGH, and
90, WEST NILE STREET, GLASGOW; or
HODGES, FIGGIS, & Co., LIMITED, 104, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

1896.

LONDON: Printed by EYRE and SPOTTISWOODE,
Her Majesty's Printers.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE documents calendared in this third volume are drawn mainly from similar sources to those dealt with in the previous volumes, namely, the correspondence of the Spanish agents in England, and other papers relating directly to English affairs preserved in the Spanish Archives at Simancas.

The documents in the present volume against which no marginal reference is placed are contained in packets numbered 833 to 839 of the papers belonging to the Secretaria de Estado of the Archives in question; but it will be observed that a considerable number of the papers dealt with are derived directly from the National Archives in Paris. This arises from the fact that during the Peninsular war most of the documents in the Simancas Archives relating to France were abstracted by the orders of Napoleon and conveyed to Paris, where they still remain. As after the expulsion of Mendoza from England in January 1584 English affairs were managed from Paris by the same ambassador, the letters from the King to him during his residence in London were included by mistake in the papers taken to Paris. The correspondence relating to England written whilst Mendoza was ambassador in France are of course in the Paris Archives, and it has therefore been necessary to seek them there. The "Simancas papers" in Paris relating to Scottish history of the date covered by this volume, were edited by M. Teulet, in Spanish with a French summary, for the Bannantyne Club in 1851, and most of Mary Stuart's letters in the same Archives were printed in Prince Labanoff's collection. They have, however, been included in the present volume in order that the whole of the documents may be before the reader. As practically all of the correspondence was originally in cipher no distinctive type has been adopted to mark the fact.

The year 1580 opened full of anxiety for Elizabeth. Mendoza had carefully fostered her alarm at the ostentatious preparation of Philip's fleet, the Irish insurgents, she knew, were being actively supported by Spain and the Pope, the seminary priests were busy all over England, and the adherents of Mary Stuart were daily gathering courage and confidence. For the first time almost in her reign the Queen's own popularity had suffered an eclipse in consequence of the repulsion of her people at the projected marriage with the duke of Alençon. Her position was full of difficulties and dangers, which no person but herself could adequately appreciate; and it is now evident that the only policy by which she could be extricated was that of profound dissimulation with regard to her matrimonial intentions which she successfully adopted. Orange, unwavering in his object, the only inflexible element in the situation, was determined to attract once more to the national cause the Catholic Flemings and Walloons whom Parma's diplomacy had drawn to the Spanish side. Elizabeth, powerful supporter as she was with his Protestant Hollanders, was a hindrance rather than a help to him, so far as the Catholics were concerned; the archduke Mathias had turned out a broken reed, and, as the only means of saving his cause, Orange persisted in his intention to call in the Catholic French prince to assume the sovereignty of the States. Elizabeth had threatened and cajoled in vain, William of Nassau was as firm as a rock, and the English queen had to turn the difficulty she could not banish. A French domination of Flanders would have been far more injurious to English interests than the continuance there of the Spanish power; and Elizabeth had more than once declared that she would sacrifice her last shilling and her last Englishman to prevent it. It was therefore imperative for her to contrive that if Alençon went to Flanders at all, he should go under her patronage and influence, and with the support of the French

Huguenots. With this object her aim was to prevent a complete reconciliation between Henry III. and his brother, and between the former and the French Protestant princes; whilst, on the other, hand she could not afford to widen the breach so far as to drive the French king into the arms of Spain, which would have ruined the cause of Flemish liberty, and have united France, Spain, the Guises, and the League, in support of Mary Stuart's ceaseless intrigues to obtain the crown of England. Her obvious course therefore was to beguile Henry III. with the idea of his family aggrandisement, and perhaps eventual dynastic predominance, which might ensue from a marriage between his brother and the queen of England. It would have been moreover an advantage to him if he could thus peacefully have got rid of his turbulent heir presumptive, and kept the Huguenots busy out of France; and it suited him, and especially his mother, to keep up the pretence of a belief in the sincerity of the marriage negotiations, although at the time the present volume opens they were quite aware of the real purpose underlying them. The aged king of Portugal was on his death-bed, and Philip claimed the succession. The increase thus to accrue to the power of Spain could best be met by a closer understanding between England and France, and the rendering of Philip powerless in Portugal by causing a recrudescence of the troubles in Flanders. Alençon, for his part, had his own game to play. Orange and the Protestant States had given him clearly to understand that the duchy of Brabant and the sovereignty of Flanders would only be offered to him in consideration of the additional support he could bring to the national cause, and for the moment it appeared that he would be more likely to obtain such support from Elizabeth than from his brother. He was moreover dazzled with the idea of so brilliant a match as that suggested to him, was clearly outwitted by Elizabeth's feminine tactics, and was himself hoping against hope that she was really in earnest. In any case

it was important for him to convince the Hollanders that the queen of England would certainly marry him and aid him with all her power in Flanders, whilst he dared not appear too acquiescent in the matter of religion for fear of alienating the very men whom he was principally intended to conciliate, namely, the Catholic Flemings and Walloons.

It will thus be seen that the contending interests were many and complicated; but it has been necessary to define them broadly, in order that the allusions contained in the letters which commence the present volume may be the better understood.

At the end of November 1579 Simier, after much importunity, had been sent off to Alençon and the King with Elizabeth's amended draft conditions for the marriage, but at the last moment she characteristically insisted upon the insertion of a new clause which left her a loophole for escape. The articles were to remain in suspense for two months to enable the Queen to overcome her people's repugnance to the marriage; and, as an additional means of introducing obstacles to the conclusion of the match, she sent Sir Edward Stafford, with Simier, with instructions to say that still further amendment would be required in the articles before they could be finally accepted. The first letter in the present volume shows how these dubious tactics were received respectively by Henry III. and his brother. The King understood the object—as he wrote to his ambassador at the time—and could afford to appear accommodating. If, he said, his brother would agree, the English who had drafted the articles might amend them. He would consent in any case. Alençon dared not say thus much. He sent Stafford back with an eager letter, in the seal of which was embedded a fine emerald, pretending to believe that all was settled, and suggesting his speedy coming to England, in the hope, doubtless, that his personal presence might, as on his former visit, influence the Queen's judgment in his favour. The Prince had learnt o

Leicester's deadly feud with Simier, and of the Earl's and Walsingham's constant opposition to his suit. He therefore sought by every means to attract Leicester to his side. Leicester at first stood aloof, and refused all advances, which he described as "nothing but French chatter," until Stafford arrived. The earl then apparently thought the matter was settled, and hastened to make the best terms for himself (page 2) and his belief was apparently shared by Mendoza.

On page 4 of the present volume is an important letter from Philip's ambassador in Paris, Juan de Vargas Mejia, which opens out an important new element of intrigue directed by the Guises against Elizabeth's policy, their unfortunate cousin Mary Stuart being made their prime instrument to her own eventual destruction.

Beaton told Vargas that Guise was trying to prevent an agreement between Alençon and the Huguenots, and then confidentially came to the real object of his visit. He impressed upon the Spanish ambassador that Guise and himself (Beaton) had prevailed upon Mary Stuart "to "place herself, her son and her realm, in the hands and "under the protection of his catholic Majesty unre-"servedly; sending her son to Spain, if his Majesty "wishes, and having him married there entirely according "to his Majesty's pleasure." This meant, of course, the detachment of the Guises from French interests, and Vargas at once saw its importance. "Such," he says, "is the present condition of England, with signs of revolt "everywhere, the Queen in alarm, the Catholic party "numerous, the events occurring in Ireland, and the "distrust aroused by your Majesty's fleet, that I really "believe that if so much as a cat moved the whole affair "would crumble down in three days beyond repair. . . . . "If your Majesty had England and Scotland attached to "you, directly or indirectly, you might consider the "States of Flanders conquered, in which case you . . . . "could lay down the law for the whole world." Guise's adhesion made all the difference, because his influence

would prevent France from interfering, and thus the main power that had held Philip's ambition in check would be paralysed. Mary herself was unfortunately only too ready to join in any plot for the destruction of her rival. Beaton assured Vargas that she was determined not to leave her prison "except as queen of England, and he "assured me that her adherents and the Catholics were so "numerous in the country that, if they rose, it would be "easy even without assistance, but with the help of your "Majesty it would soon be over, without doubt" (page 13). These approaches through Beaton and Guise on behalf of Mary Stuart were seconded by the despatch of Fernihurst by D'Aubigny to Spain, and by the efforts of Englefield in Madrid; and Philip was eager, in his non-committal way, to accept the tempting offers made to him. He would, he said, lovingly welcome the king of Scots to Spain and treat him as his own son, and would help and assist the Queen when the time arrived (page 23), the arrangements for the capture and deportation of James being left in the hands of his mother, and the matter scrupulously kept secret from the French. The disgrace of Morton, however, made the plan unnecessary for a time, and the death of De Vargas in Paris in July 1580 suspended the negotiations, which were subsequently revived under more favourable auspices, as will be seen in the course of the correspondence. From this first suggestion of armed intervention in England by the aid of the Scots Catholics, until the full plan of the Armada was developed, the project of the invasion is traced step by step in the present correspondence more fully than elsewhere. No point is more curious to follow than the gradual alienation and elimination of the Guises from the plot, as James Stuart's right to the succession is pushed into the background by Allen and the English Catholics, and Philip's claim to the English Crown cautiously brought into the forefront.

Whilst the Scottish Catholics, the Guises, and the Spaniards, were busy with intrigues which, if successful,

would have made Great Britain an appanage of Spain, humiliating, and perhaps dismembering France, and crushing protestantism in the Netherlands, Mendoza, who was afterwards to become the arch plotter of them all, was principally concerned in London with the ever increasing power of England on the seas.

Rumours had reached England some months previously of Drake's devastations in the Pacific, and the Spaniards were now fully aware of the gigantic booty which had rewarded his boldness. Whither he had gone afterwards no man knew, and the long delay in his arrival in England was causing great anxiety as to his fate. Relief expeditions were fitted out to seek him in the Atlantic, and Mendoza had agents in the English western ports eagerly watching for his coming with the plundered treasures of the Spaniards. The ease with which the great captain had swept the seas, and the abject terror with which the privateers had inspired the Spanish merchantmen, had already swollen high the "terrible insolence" of the English seafarers, and their ultimate monopoly of the carrying trade is foretold by Mendoza in a letter to the King on 20th February 1580 (page 8). Philip could not entirely prohibit the export the teeming products of southern Spain and so ruin his country; but Mendoza begs him earnestly to render the trade capricious and precarious, in the hope that the English may therefore cease to build ships. "It (the Spanish trade) is the "principal source of their wealth and strength, which "consists mainly of the great number of their ships. "They are daily building more; but the moment the "Spanish trade fails them and they are not allowed to "ship goods in Spain they will stop building, as they "have no other trade so profitable, both on account of "the vast sums of specie they bring . . . . and the "richness of the merchandise they carry. This makes "them almost masters of commerce in other parts as "well, as they have the monopoly of the shipping, "whereby they profit by all the freights. . . . . The

"principal reason why they have grown so rich in the "last ten years being that they have had the carrying "trade of Spanish goods" (page 8). British enterprise, however, was not entirely confined either to plunder or to Spanish trade. Mendoza mentions (page 20) that the London merchants trading with Muscovy and Persia had fitted out "two small ships to try to discover a road to the "kingdom of Cathay by the northern coast of Muscovy, "the exact opposite of the voyage attempted last summer "by Frobisher in which he found so much difficulty. No "doubt this attempt will encounter similar obstacles, "as no passage has been found beyond the river Obi. "This is the river that Strabo Dionysius, the poet, "and Pliny believed ran out of the Caspian sea, "and according to all arguments of astrology and "cosmography, the sea there must be impassable in "consequence of the excessive cold, as much as 70 or "80 degrees, the nights lasting, as do the days, many "months" (page 20). On a subsequent page (365) Mendoza gives an extremely interesting account, furnished by an ingenious friend of his named Baron Gaspar Schomberg, of the English attempts to open up a trade with Persia and the East Indies by way of the White Sea, the Dwina, the Volga, and the Caspian, thus avoiding the Mediterranean and diverting the Eastern spice and drug trades from the Venetians. At the same time the Turkish and Levant trades were to be tapped through the Don, the sea of Azov, and the Black Sea. The Don and the Volga, we are told, were not more than a German league apart at one point where a depôt and means of transport where to be established pending the cutting of a canal. This same German baron describes to Mendoza (page 368) his invention of a revolving cannon with seven barrels, of which the recoil, apparently by a screw action, was to bring each barrel successively uppermost.

The long expected arrival of Drake at Plymouth with his booty took place in October 1580, almost at the same time as the landing in Ireland of the Papal forces

despatched from Spain to the aid of the insurgents; and during the rest of the time that Mendoza remained at Elizabeth's court, these two standing subjects of complaint were for ever being pitted one against the other, whilst the ambassador's relations with the Queen and her people became more and more acrimonious. As soon as Drake arrived Mendoza sought audience of the Queen to claim the restoration of the plunder, but he was told that until she had got to the bottom of the Spanish aid to the Irish insurgents she could not receive him. This was a good excuse to avoid his importunities until the treasures were landed and disposed of, although it is clear that some of the more timid or disinterested members of the Queen's Council were apprehensive at the magnitude of the injury done to Spain. Mendoza was warned by the Council that he was talking too freely about the matter, and "Leicester also sent a secretary of his to say that my "talk about Drake's robberies was causing much fear "amongst the merchants that your Majesty would declare "war about it, and this would oblige the Queen to send "all her ships to sea and raise foreign troops. In view "of present circumstances he would leave me to judge "whether it would be advantageous for your Majesty's "interests for the Queen to arm at this time, now that "the French were urging her to marry Alençon and bind "herself to them. He therefore thought that it would be "better to come to some arrangement about Drake. I "told him that until I had seen the Queen and conveyed "your Majesty's message to her, I had nothing to say "upon the matter of Drake; and as for the rest, I would "only say that, in my capacity of a simple soldier, whose "weapon was his arm rather than his tongue, I had done "my best to keep the Queen from provoking your "Majesty to lay hands upon her; and as for her marrying "Alençon and joining the French, that concerned me "little, as I was sure that both parties would understand "the importance of not offending so powerful a monarch "as your Majesty" (page 61). It was this hectoring

tone that Mendoza henceforward adopted towards the Queen and her Ministers, until his final expulsion from England; but a report from Captain Cabreta to Philip in the present volume (page 56) shows how powerless Spain really was at the time to resent English naval aggression. The King is told "At present the coasts are in such a condition "that it cannot be said that your Majesty's position at sea "is strong, since people presume at any time to offend "you with impunity. Be it understood that this arises "from the great lack of all sorts of marine requisites "and especially seamen and gunners." But, clamour as Cabreta might for ships of the "new invention" and for greater naval expenditure, Philip's hands were full of care, and his treasury empty of doubloons; and Mendoza could only chafe and storm about his master's strength, until the English merchants were panic stricken with fears of reprisals, and put pressure upon the Court to make some sort of restoration of the plunder. The Spanish merchants who had been robbed were also anxious to come to terms, by which they might get, at all events, some of their property back, and sent one of their number, a man named Zubiaur, to London to negotiate, the King himself being favourable to this mode of procedure. But Mendoza, haughty and jealous, would have no such knuckling down (page 73), and stood out for full and complete public reparation through him as ambassador; and in the end the Spaniards got nothing. Drake's successful return gave a great impetus to further expeditions from England. In his first announcement that the plunder had been landed (page 55). Mendoza says that "Drake had arranged "to return with six ships, and offers to adventurers for "every pound sterling subscribed to return them seven "within the year. This has so great an influence over "Englishmen that everybody wants to have a share in "the expedition." By January 1581 it was decided that Drake with ten ships should return to the Moluccas by way of the Cape of Good Hope; young Knollys

was bound for Brazil with six vessels, and then to try to get through the Straits of Magellan to join Drake in the Pacific; Humphrey Gilbert was to go and plunder Cuba, Santo Domingo, and the Spanish Main; and Frobisher was once more to search for a north-west passage to Cathay. "Doubtless," says Mendoza, "these people will meet with great obstacles in "the execution of their various designs, but the success "of Drake encourages them to make light of them all." Mendoza's one unceasing remedy for it was that every English ship encountered should be sent to the bottom and not a soul spared; but Spanish sailors were few and panic stricken, and Spanish ships were old and slow, so the swift privateers still swept the seas unmolested. Drake, moreover, had discovered by chance what the Spaniards did not yet know, namely, that Tierra del Fuego was an island, and that, whilst the Spanish war ships were waiting for him in the Straits of Magellan, he could get round the Horn. The news is conveyed by Mendoza to his master in an interesting letter dated 20th April 1582 (page 340). This discovery had been kept very secret, and was only learnt by Mendoza at great trouble and expense a year and a half after Drake's arrival. In the meanwhile Drake was naturally in high favour with his sovereign. "He is," says Mendoza, (page 74), "squandering more money than any man in "England, and, proportionately, all those who came with "him are doing the same. He gave to the Queen the "crown which I described in a former letter as having "been made here. She wore it on New Year's day. It "has in it five emeralds, three of them almost as long as "a little finger, and two round ones worth 20,000 crowns. "He has also given the Queen a diamond cross of the "value of 5,000 crowns as a New Year's gift. The Queen "shows him extraordinary favour and never fails to speak "to him when she goes out in public, conversing with "him for a long time. She says she will knight him on "the day she goes to see his ship. She has ordered the

" ship itself to be brought ashore, and placed in her " arsenal near Greenwich as a curiosity." All this time Mendoza was excluded from the Queen's presence and had to content himself with threats and violent language meant to frighten the merchants and indirectly to reach the ears of the Queen. He was offered a bribe of 50,000 crowns to moderate his tone, but replied that he would give much more than that to punish so great a thief as Drake. However much his threats might alarm the merchants, the Queen and her Ministers were too well aware of Philip's position to attach very much importance to them. Elizabeth repeated the policy she had successfully adopted when she had seized the Spanish treasure in English ports (*see* Volume II. of this Calendar) and demanded explanations and redress from Philip before entertaining the question of restoration. The papal forces in Ireland had by this time been ignominiously slaughtered at Smerwick. Fitzmaurice and Sanders were dead, the Irish Chiefs were falling out amongst themselves, and the rebellion was being crushed by Lord Grey's ferocity. Elizabeth was greatly shocked that her " good brother " the king of Spain should help rebels, seeing how vulnerable he was to attack on that side himself, and steadily refused to receive Mendoza until excuses or apologies were sent. Philip's hands were full in Portugal, where he was, with the aid of Alba, conquering his new kingdom; and Elizabeth well knew that he could not now spare a man nor a ducat to injure her. She and Catharine de Medici moreover were once again united in their opposition to Spain; and she was managing the Alençon marriage negotiations with more consummate address than ever. Mendoza relates (page 14) how Castelnau, the French ambassador, waited upon the Queen on the very day when the two months' delay expired and peremptorily requested an answer as to whether she would marry Alençon or not. When she began to fence, as usual, he threatened, much to her indignation, that the prince would publish her love letters in his own defence if she did not marry him. The Queen was much

disturbed at this and, as Mendoza relates, summoned the Archbishop of York and Cecil to advise her. "Here am "I," she said, "between Scylla and Charybdis. Alençon "agrees to all the conditions I sent him and is asking me "to tell him when I wish him to come and marry me." If I do not marry him, she continued in effect, I shall make him my enemy, and if I do I shall lose all the advantages of my present position. What shall I do? She could get no decided advice from the Archbishop, but upon pressing Cecil—who was probably as much mystified as everyone else—he replied that she should either marry Alençon or give him a decided answer declining him. This is exactly what she did not wish to do, and in a few tart words let Cecil know as much (page 15). Circumstances as usual aided her. On the day before the ambassador saw her, envoys arrived in London from La Noue, the great Huguenot chief in the service of the States, and from the Prince of Condé, asking her to aid Alençon in Flanders. This meant that, in despite of the Guises, Alençon and the Huguenots had come to terms, and, so long as Alençon was principally supported by Protestant forces, she had nothing to fear from his presence in Flanders. She seized the opportunity with avidity and promised all sorts of help, being perfectly sure that Alençon would not be unduly importunate about the marriage if he could hope for her co-operation without it. At the same time the pretence of marriage negotiations was kept up more actively than ever in order to save appearances and disarm the French Government. On the receipt of a letter from Alençon on 7th March, announcing that he only awaited her permission to send Marshal de Cossé to settle the final conditions, she took the very unusual course of visiting the French ambassador, and by every means sought to bring about an understanding with the French Government before she pledged herself too deeply with Alençon in the troubled affairs of Flanders. It was all very well to have Alençon and the Huguenots under her thumb, but she must make sure she did not drive Henry III. into the opposite camp.

This did not suit Alençon, who knew full well that, if Elizabeth could arrive at a cordial understanding with his brother, neither party need trouble very much about him or his plans, or risk a rupture with Spain by helping him. He therefore began to grow ardent again, and for the next few months he and Simier kept pouring out to the Queen their fervent protestations of affection, their heartrending entreaties, and threats of vengeance if the prince were jilted. To all these letters, says Mendoza, replies containing many sweet words but no decision were sent, and "in this way both parties are weaving a "Penelope's web simply to cover the designs I have "already explained to your Majesty" (page 31). But in May a terrible disaster happened to the Protestant cause in Flanders, which altered the position of affairs. La Noue was routed and taken prisoner by the Spaniards. Orange then gave Elizabeth to understand that, unless she married Alençon, and threw all her weight into the scale, the Flemish cause must collapse. Alençon, too, redoubled his importunity, and hinted that, if she did not help him, he would accept the offers of the States and enter Flanders independently of her. This would not have suited her at all, and a council was hastily held on the 5th June; requests being sent off at once to the King of France for a special embassy to be despatched to England. At the same time Stafford was sent to Alençon to obtain his co-operation. But he found the prince in the sulks. He knew that a formal embassy from his brother would be more likely to lead to an alliance than to his marriage on terms satisfactory to his ambition, and he only grudingly gave his consent to the embassy on condition that it should be empowered solely to negotiate his marriage and not a national alliance. When at last all was arranged to Alençon's satisfaction, and he informed the Queen that the embassy would soon leave for England, she again began to cool. There was no great hurry, she said, for the ambassadors to come unless the king of France made peace with the Huguenots and countenanced

Alençon s plans in Flanders. She was determined in any case not to be drawn single-handed into opposition to Spain. Thanks to her pressure, and the efforts of Alençon and his mother, the peace of Fleix between the King and the Huguenots and Henry of Navarre was signed in November, and the horizon of Alençon began to brighten somewhat. Tempting offers had been made to him from Spain if he would abandon his enterprise, and Elizabeth learnt this from Simier. This fact, and the conclusion of the peace of Fleix, at once smoothed over all difficulties, the embassy should now be cordially welcomed, and the Queen promised, as soon as conditions were settled, to give Alençon 200,000 crowns of Drake's plunder, as well as subsidising Hans Casimir and his mercenaries to cross the frontier and co-operate with him. But it was not easy to settle with Henry III. the personality and powers of the embassy. Cobham was trying his hardest in Paris to lure the King first into a rupture with Spain on the pretext partly of Catharine de Medici's claim to the Portuguese crown. But Henry III. and his mother were wary, and would make no move until Elizabeth did so. During the long drawn out negotiations with regard to the preliminaries of the embassy, Alençon himself sent an embassy to England to look after his interests. The principal ambassador was Clausse de Marchaumont, who for a considerable period afterwards was a prominent person in the English court, deep in the Queen's confidence. Much piquant information is given in the present letters as to his proceedings with the Queen in forwarding his young master's lovemaking, and this should be read side by side with his extraordinary correspondence in the Hatfield Papers (Vol. 3, Hist. MSS. Com.), especially the series he signs with the pseudonym "Moine." Alençon's frequent references in his letters to the Queen (Hatfield Papers) to her "bele jartiere" is explained in a letter from Mendoza to the King (page 101) as follows:—"Marchaumont also sent by De Mery a "purple and gold garter belonging to the Queen, which

"slipped down and was trailing as she entered Drake's "ship. Marchaumont stooped and picked it up and "the Queen asked for it, promising him that he "should have it back when she reached home as she "had nothing else with which to keep her stocking up. "Marchaumont returned it, and she put it on before "him, presenting him with it when she got back to "Westminster." Mendoza gives a curious piece of information about the knighting of Drake on the occasion of the Queen's visit to the "Pelican" at Deptford, on page 95. "On the 4th instant the Queen went to a "place a mile from Greenwich to see Drake's ship, "where a grand banquet was given to her, finer than "has ever been seen in England since the time of King "Henry. She knighted Drake, telling him that there "she had a gilded sword to strike off his head. She "handed the sword to Marchaumont, telling him she "authorised him to perform the ceremony for her, which "he did. Drake, therefore, has the title of 'Sir,' . . . "and he gave her a large silver coffer and a frog made "of diamonds, distributing 1,200 crowns amongst the "Queen's officers." It is impossible to follow step by step within the limits of this Introduction the ever-changing aspects of the marriage negotiations; but by reference to the letters in the present volume it will be seen that Mendoza, keenly alive to the importance of the matter, kept his master fully informed of every movement. The pompous embassy from Henry III. which came in April 1581, and of whose splendid reception Mendoza gives an account, was considered by Philip and De Granvelle to portend rather a national alliance than a marriage, and this was clearly the Queen's aim (page 110). Don Antonio, the Portuguese pretender, was now a fugitive in France, and active negotiations were being carried on by his adherents both with Elizabeth and Catharine de Medici for aid to restore him to the Portuguese throne. An alliance, therefore, between England and France would have been a terrible blow to

Philip, who was already hardly pressed enough; and Mendoza in London was working ceaselessly and secretly to arouse public feeling in England against the French; and especially against the Alençon match. Whilst Elizabeth was fencing with the French special embassy with a view to bringing about an alliance, and pledging Henry III. to war with Spain, without burdening herself with a husband, the French King and his mother were exhausting every means, threats, entreaties, and cajoleries, to dissuade Alençon from his intended entrance into Flanders. On the issue of a proclamation by Henry III. ordering that all levies in France for the service of his brother should be dispersed by force of arms, Mendoza reports (5th June 1581, page 126) that Alençon suddenly embarked at Dieppe and appeared secretly in England, where he was recognised by the son of Sir James Crofts, who was in the pay of Spain, and Mendoza was informed of his arrival. This fresh escapade of Alençon deeply chagrined the French ambassadors, who plainly saw, and said, that the Queen was playing with them and begged leave to depart. Not a word is said in their correspondence about Alençon's alleged visit on this occasion; and, so far as I have been able to ascertain, the present Calendar is the only authority for it, excepting some enigmatical references in the letters of "Moine" in the Hatfield Papers.

During the presence of the French envoys in London hints had been given to Mendoza to induce him to request an audience; but he was cautious and feigned illness, seeing that the Queen's object was to get better terms from the French by making out that the Spaniards were courting her. At length, on the 4th June 1581, an event happened which forced his hand. Some time before, two Hollanders had approached Mendoza in London with a proposal to betray Flushing. The ambassador jumped at the bait and parted with a considerable sum of money to them, besides giving them important information. The whole affair was a trick, and the Spanish force from Gravelines which was to co-operate with the Hollanders

was entrapped and sacrificed. One of the Hollanders had left his son with Mendoza as a hostage, and at nine o'clock at night on the 4th June, in the ambassador's absence, his house was forcibly entered by London constables, accompanied by a secretary to the prince of Orange, and the boy taken away. Mendoza arrived just in time to prevent bloodshed, and was told that the constables were acting under the authority of the Council. Mendoza, thinking this a good opportunity for obtaining an audience on favourable terms with a new grievance, began to bluster and threatened to return to Spain at once unless full reparation were made for the violation of his domicile. Elizabeth exerted all her feminine arts of flattery and cajolery to defer such an interview until the French embassy had left, and in the end had her way (page 133). At length she received the ambassador in private audience in a gallery overlooking the river at Whitehall. A full account of the interview is given by Mendoza to the King in his letter of 24th June (page 134). Lightly brushing aside the Queen's complaints about Ireland, Mendoza claimed immediate redress for the violation of his ambassadorial privileges. Elizabeth promised strict inquiry into the matter, and then again reverted to the Spanish aid sent to the insurgent Irish. She pretended to have been informed that Mendoza wished to see her for the purpose of offering an apology, notwithstanding the persistent assurance of the ambassador that the affair concerned the Pope alone. "It is impossible," he wrote, "to express to your Majesty the insincerity "with which she and her Ministers proceed. In "addition to repeating to me the very opposite of "the message she had sent me, she contradicts me "every moment in my version of the negotiations. ". . . If I had not shown spirit, which is the thing that "moves the Queen and her Ministers most, I have no "doubt, such is their insolence, that I should never have "been able to get conference with them. This alone "has enabled me to hold my own with them until now."