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Edited by Martin A.S. Hume
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VOLUME 2

EDITED BY MARTIN A.S. HUME



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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge, CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108061889

© in this compilation Cambridge University Press 2013

This edition first published 1894
This digitally printed version 2013

ISBN 978-1-108-06188-9 Paperback

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OF

LETTERS AND STATE PAPERS

RELATING TO

ENGLISH AFFAIRS

OF THE REIGN OF

ELIZABETH.

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OF
LETTERS AND STATE PAPERS
RELATING TO
ENGLISH AFFAIRS,
PRESERVED PRINCIPALLY IN THE
ARCHIVES OF SIMANCAS.

Vol. II.
ELIZABETH.
1568—1579.

EDITED BY
MARTIN A. S. HUME, F.R.Hist.S.

PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,
BY EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

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1894.

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Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

ERRATA.

- Page 15, line 16 from bottom, for “Chalelherault” read “Chatelherault.”
,, 68, note †, line 2 from bottom, for “Approbrium” read “Opprobrium.”
,, 68, date of letter No. 46, for “10th July” read “19th July.”
,, 258, line 20 from bottom, for “Forgaza” read “Fogaza.”
,, 273, date at bottom of letter No. 212, for “22nd September” read “2nd September.”
,, 378, line 9 from top, for “Beaton” read “Seton.”
,, 532, line 18 from bottom, for “sieze” read “seized.”

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

- Page 81, line 27 from bottom, “Brucel” should probably be “Bruch” or “Brug.”
,, 218, line 21 from top, “Hamberton” should probably be “Harrington.”
,, 319, line 22 from bottom, “Huggins” should probably be “Hawkins.”
,, 659, line 4 from bottom, “La Loue” should probably be “La Nouë.”

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INTRODUCTION.

THE Spanish State Papers published in the former volume of the present Calendar exhibited with great clearness the gradual change of the relations between England and Spain which took place during the first nine years of the reign of Elizabeth. The English policy of promoting dissention and division in neighbouring countries, whilst openly joining noither of the rival powers, had succeeded, perhaps better than even Cecil, its great advocate, had expected. The hands of the Queen and her government had become firmer as the powerlessness of their potential enemies became more apparent, and although the Queen's calculating fickleness and ambiguity of expression continued to confuse her rivals, she had, in the tenth year of her reign, when the papers in the present volume commence, finally thrown in her lot with the Protestant party, and had practically become the leader of the reformed faith throughout Europe. It is true that Catholics abounded all over the north of England, and that a strong party in her own Court was attached, more or less strongly, to the old religion. But the Queen was personally popular, and sought to increase her popularity with a persistence which would not be denied, and had also, by a policy of alternate severity and leniency, convinced the English Catholics that their future treatment depended mainly upon their gaining her goodwill. They had, moreover, persuaded themselves now that Philip, slow and little-hearted as he was, would not, even if he could, come and re-establish their religion again in England at the point of Spanish pikes, as they had hoped at the beginning of the reign. Nor had the behaviour of these same pikes under Alba in the Netherlands tended to increase their popularity, even amongst Catholics, in England. By the beginning of the year 1568, therefore, the Queen was able to assume an attitude towards Spain

which she would not have dared to take up ten years before. Philip's hesitancy and avoidance of risk were understood now to be a characteristic weakness of the man himself, and were seen not necessarily to hide any terrible danger behind them, as was formerly feared. His wars with the Turks, the rising of the Moriscos in the south of Spain, and the troubles in the Netherlands, kept his hands full of care and his treasury empty of doubloons. Nothing, therefore, was to be feared from Philip alone, whilst the king of France and the Emperor were, so far from being able to help him in a crusade against the reformed faith, themselves almost at the mercy respectively of the Huguenots and the German Protestant Princes. It is true that the Catholic League, which years before had been established to extirpate Protestantism the world over, still existed on paper, but the only signatory who was able, or even desirous, of carrying out its objects was the Pope; because he alone had joined it for religious rather than political reasons. Cardinal Lorraine and the other Guises were, as usual, plotting to bring the Catholic powers together again for their own ends, and, as Norris writes from Paris (15th December 1567, Foreign Calendar), were urging the Queen-Mother to utterly crush and ruin Condé, Coligny, and the Huguenots, either by force or treachery, in order that France, Spain, and the Pope might together invade England and place Mary Stuart on the throne of a united Catholic nation. It was but a dream now, and all saw that it was so but the besotted priests who urged it. Mary herself was a disgraced prisoner at Lochleven. Catharine de Medici feared and hated the dominion of the Guises little less than she did that of the Huguenots, whilst Philip of Spain, even if he had been able to do so, was not the man to risk everything by going to war with the great Protestant power, whilst his own Netherlands were ready to burst into flame at any moment, for the purpose of placing Mary Stuart on the throne of England and Scotland with a French uncle at her elbow; and so give to France again the predominant power in Europe. Religion apart, it was better for Philip's policy that

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England should remain Protestant than that this should happen; always provided that he could keep Elizabeth friendly, and either frighten or cajole her into a position of neutrality towards his own rebellious Protestant subjects in the Netherlands. He no longer attempted to dictate to her, but only sought to gain her good will; and both parties were fully cognisant of their changed position towards each other. Overbearing Feria had hectored and threatened the Queen, and treated her ministers as if they were still subjects of his sovereign; Quadra had gripped firmly under his velvet glove, until, deserted by his master and despairing of combating Cecil's bold craftiness with Philip's sole weapons of feebleness and procrastination, he died defeated and broken hearted. Guzman de Silva's task was more difficult than that of either of his predecessors, but he was well chosen to perform it. His manner and appearance were amiable and ingratiating, as a glance at his portrait in Hampton Court Palace will prove, and he became a prime favourite with the Queen, whom he flattered to the top of her bent. His Castilian pride sometimes revolted against the work he had to do, and his letters to the King contain many complaints that his flattery and suavity and "the show of simplicity and frankness," which he says he habitually adopted, and by which he had gained great influence over the Queen whilst he was with her, were counteracted by the "heretics" who surrounded her, and who were for ever whispering in her ear distrust of him and his master. His geniality seems sometimes even to have disarmed Cecil himself, notwithstanding the alarmist and exaggerated reports of Philip's sinister intentions constantly being sent by Norris in Paris and the English spies in Spain and Flanders; most of which reports are proved to be unfounded by the letters in the present volume. A good example of Guzman's adroit *bonhomie* in dealing with Cecil will be seen on page 38. Cecil was in a furious rage about the unceremonious expulsion of the English ambassador from Madrid on the pretext of his religious indiscretion, to which further reference will be made.

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He inveighed volubly and indignantly on the slight thus put upon his mistress, and denounced Guzman himself for having made mischief in the matter. Guzman met the outburst very characteristically. Relating the scene to the King he says: “I let him talk on, and, when he had done, “I waited a little for him to recover somewhat from his “rage, and then went up to him laughing and embraced “him, saying that I was amused to see him fly into such “a passion over what I had told him, because I knew he “understood differently, and that the affair was of such “a character as to be only as good or as bad as the Queen “liked to make it. She could take it as a good sister and “friend, as I hoped she would, and had shown signs of “doing which was the easiest, most just, and even neces- “sary way, since it was only right to take the actions of “a friend in good part, at least until bad intention be “proved, or she could, for other reasons, look at it in a “different light, which might make it more difficult, to “the prejudice of his Queen and of your Majesty. I did “not believe, however, that any sensible man who had “the interests of the Queen at heart would do this, and “it was for this reason, and because of my zeal to pre- “serve this friendship, that, as soon as I heard of it, I “wished to let him know so as to be beforehand with “the mischief makers, and because I knew him to be “faithful to the Queen and well disposed towards your “Majesty’s affairs. I meant him to make use of my “information privately in favour of the objects I had “stated. He asked me whether I had not told him in “order that he might convey it to the Queen and “Council, to which I replied no, that I had only told “him as a private friend, and with this he became “calmer.” The ambassador then cleverly presents the Spanish view of the case, and “at last he (Cecil) seemed more tranquil.” At the date of the opening of the present volume this cloud had not yet arisen, and England was more peaceful and assured than she had been since the Queen’s accession. The standing danger from Scotland had disappeared for the first time for many

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years. Mary was a prisoner, with a dread suspicion hanging over her, and Murray, sustained by English money and English forces, was the bounden servant of Elizabeth. France was aflame with civil war, and the royal house divided against itself by the bitter jealousy and distrust of the King for his brother Anjou, prompted by the Queen-Mother; that she might the more effectually hold the balance between the rival parties in the State. Disaffection had been ruthlessly crushed in the Netherlands by Alba, but was still glowing beneath the surface with dull ferocity, as Philip well knew; and his powerlessness for harm, alone, was made clear by the attitude of his ambassador in England, whose one object for the moment was by flattery and cajolery to induce Elizabeth and her councillors to refrain from damaging Spanish interests by countenancing the Flemish Protestants or aiding English voyages to the Spanish Indies. Under these circumstances Elizabeth could afford to drop the hollow negotiations which had been lingering for so long for her marriage with the Archduke Charles. Sussex, perhaps the only prominent person who really believed in the sincerity of the negotiations, was himself at last undeceived and was begging for his recall from Vienna, in deep disappointment and resentment against Leicester and his party, upon whom he laid the blame of the failure of his mission. A decent pretence was assumed on both sides that the project was still pending, the Emperor was given the Garter with great pomp, but the affair was practically at an end in February when Sussex left Vienna, to the relief of Philip who, for years past, had lost faith in the Queen's sincerity in the matter, and whose interests were daily drifting further away from those of his Austrian cousins. But this state of tranquil security did not last many weeks. Immunity from danger made the reforming party in England bold, and already in February (1568) steps were being taken again to worry the Catholics, in reprisal, to some extent, for the atrocities committed by Alba's troops on the Flemish Protestants, who were flocking into England by thousands with their stories of cruelty and oppression, and

deeply stirring the resentment of their co-religionists here. Whilst all Protestant England was thrilling with sympathy for the oppressed Flemings, the victims of Alba's cruelty, the Queen was strongly desirous of clearing herself from the suspicion of helping them, and she seems to have gone out of her way to reassure Guzman on the subject. With her usual clever evasion of responsibility, she assured Guzman that she knew nothing of the archbishop (Parker) of Canterbury's new attempt to force the oath of supremacy on the ecclesiastical lawyers of the Court of Arches. Guzman writes to the King (2nd February 1568, page 4): "This appears to be the case " from what she said to me about it, and what afterwards " happened, which was that she was angry with the Arch- " bishop and rated him on the subject, although sub- " sequently the earl of Bedford, Knollys and Cecil " pacified her and gave her to understand that it would " be unwise to be severe on the Archhishop for fear of " encouraging the Catholics too much." He writes again on 16th February 1568 (page 7): "News comes " from Scotland that some of the principal people have " risen against the Regent and the Government, and when " I asked the Queen whether it was true, she said it was, " and they even wanted to throw the blame on her, as " some malicious people had also tried to do respecting " the disturbances in France, and even those of Flanders, " which she said was entirely unfounded, as she is " strongly opposed to such proceedings of subjects against " their rulers, and particularly in the case of your Majesty " and your dominions, which should never be molested by " England, at least whilst she was Queen. I said that " she was quite free from any such suspicion, seeing the " loving goodwill your Majesty bore her, and she, like the " great Princess she was, could not fail to reciprocate it, " as I constantly advised your Majesty she did. As the " malice of the heretics is continually exercised in " arousing her suspicion, no opportunity must be lost to " dissipate it."

But disclaim it as she might, Protestant feeling in the

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country was deeply moved and was becoming aggressive instead of merely seeking toleration; and distrust and resentment against Philip and the Catholic league were being industriously fanned by the English agents in France and Germany, who constantly reported the intended invasion of England and its reduction to Catholicism. The attempt of England to assert equal international and religious rights with Spain and the Catholics, seems to have been precipitated at first accidentally, and resulted in a breach which grew ever wider until the final triumph of England over the Armada. In January 1568 the vicious lunacy of the miserable boy Don Carlos had reached a pitch which necessitated his isolation. Philip entered his room at 10 o'clock on the night of the 18th January and arrested his only son and heir with his own hands. It was known that he had had communications with the discontented Flemings; and John Man, the dean of Gloucester, who was English Ambassador in Madrid, thought the event of sufficient importance to dispatch a special messenger, one of his own secretaries, post haste, to carry the news to England. He arrived in the middle of February and gave an account of what had happened. In the course of conversation he told the Queen that the ambassador's household were not allowed to perform divine service according to the reformed rites, even in their own house, and Elizabeth immediately wrote to Man (21st February 1568, Foreign Calendar) peremptorily ordering him to demand the free exercise of his religion in accordance with international rights, saying that if this were refused she would at once recall him. Unfortunately, on the same day, both the Queen and Cecil also made the same request of Guzman (page 9), and Philip was therefore forewarned of the demand which was to be made by the English ambassador. That the hated heresy, which struck at the very root of the principle by which he ruled, should raise its head in his own capital, even in the house of an ambassador, was too much for Philip. The demand for international recognition of the dreaded thing alarmed him and he determined to forestall it. Before the am-

bassador could formulate his complaint, he had a series of accusations drawn up against Dr. Man, and a number of the English Catholic refugees who lived in Madrid, mostly on Philip's bounty, were called to testify to unbecoming words pronounced by the ambassador against the Catholic religion and the Pope, at the dinner table and elsewhere in private conversation. An English spy called Robert Hogan or Huggins, who betrayed both Spain and England in turn, writes to Cecil (30th March 1568, Foreign Calendar) that he, like others, had been forced to testify against Man, who, he says, will certainly get into trouble, although entirely by his own fault and foolishness, and his "too liberal tongue." It is mainly the duke of Feria's doing, he says, as he is Man's deadly enemy; although elsewhere Hogan calls the Duke the friend of the English, which he certainly was not in any sense. Man was never afforded an opportunity of making his complaint. Philip saw him no more; he was hurried out of Madrid to a village called Barajas and thence contemptuously packed off to England, without being allowed even to take leave of the King. Guzman smoothed the matter over as best he could, with many loving messages from his master to the effect that another English ambassador who was more modest and respectful to the Catholic religion would be welcomed with open arms; but the blow was a heavy one to the pride of Elizabeth and her Protestant advisers, and their wrath was nursed silently until ample revenge could be taken. They were revenged a hundred-fold as will be shown, although the exaction of their retribution gave rise to events which, it is not too much to say, in the end left their indelible mark upon the fate of christendom.

In the meanwhile the rising of the Catholic lords in Scotland against Murray and the belief that French forces would be sent to aid them if the Huguenots were disposed of had caused more countenance to be given by the English Government to Condé and the Huguenots on the one hand and to the Flemish Protestants on the other, whilst the English Catholics were more vigorously prosecuted than they had been for some time. Guzman mentions a rumour

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(10th April 1568) that Cardinal Lorraine was raising 1,200 harquebussiers to send to Dumbarton, and this, together with the passage of a French envoy to Scotland, deeply alarmed the Queen, notwithstanding the solemn assurance of the king of France and his mother that, out of gratitude for Elizabeth's neutrality in the French troubles, they would not allow any French force to be sent to Scotland; a covert threat that if she openly helped Condé they would retaliate by helping Mary. The apprehension was immensely increased by the news of Mary's escape from Lochleven (after her first unsuccessful attempt of which an interesting account is given by Guzman, page 26), but the policy which had been so successful before was promptly adopted again. Fresh encouragement was given to the Huguenots. Protestantism in the Netherlands was accorded a more hearty sympathy than ever, and expeditions of refugee Flemings were allowed to fit out in English ports to go over and help their compatriots. Against this Guzman protested over and over again, but only got vague promises of redress or hypocritical professions of ignorance; and when at last orders were given for the prohibition of such expeditions, they were easily evaded, and the current of help and sympathy still flowed, as it flowed for many years afterwards, from the Protestants in England to their struggling co-religionists across the North Sea.

On the 21st May 1568 news reach Elizabeth and her advisers which, whilst increasing their perplexity and danger, changed the base of trouble and brought it nearer to their own doors. The battle of Langsyde had been fought six days before, and Mary was already a fugitive, and practically a prisoner, in England. Guzman, at this point, represents Elizabeth as being desirous of treating Mary as a sovereign, which, considering her views of the royal state, was probably her first impulse. He says (22nd May), "If this Queen has her way now, they will be obliged to treat the queen of Scots as a sovereign, which will offend those who forced her to abdicate, so that, although these people are glad enough to have her in

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“ their hands, they have many things to consider. If
“ they keep her as in prison, it will probably scandalise
“ all neighbouring princes, and if she remain free and
“ able to communicate with her friends, great suspicions
“ will be aroused. In any case it is certain that two
“ women will not agree very long together.”

If it were ever Elizabeth’s intention to receive her
unfortunate cousin as a sovereign the idea must have
disappeared promptly on the reports received from Drury
and her other officers in the north of England. All the
country side, they said, Catholic to the backbone, was in
a ferment of excitement and rejoicing at the arrival in
their midst of the Catholic princess, upon whom their hopes
were fixed. Norris in Paris (4th June, Foreign Calendar)
writes to say that an effort will be made to carry Mary to
France, “but he is assured that Cecil will rather, as he
“ writes, help and counsel the Queen to make her profit
“ of her there than consent to her coming hither.” In
any case Elizabeth did not hesitate long as to the course
which would best serve her own interests. Her uncere-
monious treatment of Mary’s envoys, Herries and Fleming,
is fully detailed by Guzman, for whom and the duke of
Alba they brought letters from their fugitive mistress.
The envoys complained bitterly of their treatment, and
threatened if aid was refused by England to appeal to
“ France, your Majesty, or even the Pope.” “The Pope,”
said Bedford, as if shocked with the bare idea. “Yes,” said
Herries, “and even the Grand Turk, or the Sophi, seeing
the need my Queen is in.” Such talk as this was too
dangerous to be endured for very long, and on the 24th
June Guzman writes to the King, “The Queen has given
“ a decided answer to Herries and Fleming, and has
“ refused to give leave to the latter to go to France
“ respecting the Scotch queen’s affairs. Her answer is
“ that she has ordered their Queen to approach nearer to
“ her, and has sent word to the Scotch government to
“ send representatives to the same place, whither she
“ herself will also send persons to treat with both parties.
“ If she is assured that their Queen was not an accomplice

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“ in the murder of her husband, she will help her, and if
“ she was privy to it, she will try to reconcile her to the
“ government.” Herries and Fleming conveyed this
answer to Guzman, and asked for his advice, which he
gave, as follows (26 June): “ I replied that their Queen
“ should show full confidence in this Queen, and should
“ act, at present, in such a way as to give to the latter no
“ reasonable excuse for not helping her and treating her
“ well. She should be very careful, I said, to avoid all
“ suspicion that she had any pretensions to the crown
“ during this Queen’s life ; and, as regards satisfying her
“ respecting her husband’s death, their Queen should say
“ that she herself desired to do so, loving her as she did
“ as a sister and friend, but by other means than by judicial
“ action and question and answer with her own subjects,
“ which would be a derogation of her dignity and unfitting
“ to her rank.” The first portion of this sound advice
Mary, unfortunately for herself, did not follow, very different
counsel being given to her subsequently by those who
succeeded Guzman as her advisers, but the latter portion,
no doubt, led to her sudden change of front in refusing to
acknowledge an investigation for which she had formerly
professed herself anxious. Guzman had a long conversation
with Elizabeth on the 29th of June about Scotch affairs,
particularly with reference to the answer which had been
given to the special envoy from the king of France, M. de
Montmorin. Elizabeth told him that there were difficulties
in the way of her giving armed help to restore Mary to the
throne, and the result of such an attempt would be un-
certain, and she thought the best course would be to come
to terms with Murray. “ These terms she said must be
“ hard, as Murray and his gang would never be safe if
“ the Queen returned as a ruler, even though she pardoned
“ them now, as she could easily find an excuse afterwards
“ to be revenged on them.” She said very emphatically
that on no account would she allow Mary to go to France,
“ and, as for sending her back alone after she had placed
“ herself under her protection, that would be a great dis-
“ honour for her (Elizabeth) and her country. Seeing also

“ the pretensions she had to the English crown, it would
 “ be dangerous, she said, to allow her to be free in this
 “ country, as she might take opportunities of satisfying
 “ people here about past events, and gain them over. She
 “ therefore had determined to bring her to some place in
 “ the interior of England, both that she might be safer
 “ from her enemies, and also in order that, if she attempted
 “ to escape clandestinely to Scotland, her flight should be
 “ made longer and more difficult; as between Carlisle
 “ and Scotland there was only one small river which
 “ could easily be crossed.” The determination thus early
 expressed by Elizabeth to keep her cousin under guard
 for good was no doubt prompted by the knowledge
 that Mary was clamouring for foreign aid on all hands,
 and that the people of the north, forgetting her misdeeds,
 were burning to help her. Norris was persistent in
 his alarmist reports of Popish plots in her favour and
 Murray himself begged Drury to warn Elizabeth to
 keep people from access to his sister, “as she has
 “ sugared speech in store, and spares not to deal part
 “ of it now.”

Guzman says that Fleming is constantly coming confidentially to him about his mistress's affairs; but neither the instructions nor the peaceful disposition of the ambassador allowed him to hold out hopes of Spanish help. He says
 “ I have shown him great goodwill, and have, in general
 “ terms assured him of your Majesty's sincere affection
 “ for his Queen, as I am letting the Catholics, her friends,
 “ also understand.” But at the same time he took great care to keep in the good graces of Elizabeth, who appears to have been sincerely attached to him.

In February 1568 Guzman, who had been complaining of ill-health for some time, begged the King to withdraw him from London. All, he said, was now quiet and friendly, and another person could easily fill his place. Unlike the bishop of Aquila he was a wealthy man, but his means were nearly exhausted with the great expense of the embassy, and the poverty or penuriousness of the King. Philip was not in the habit of taking into account the

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personal wishes of his servants, and if it had not suited him to remove Guzman he certainly would not have done so. No answer to the ambassador's request was sent until 13th May, when, as has been shown, the whole aspect of matters had changed and the prospect had become anything but "quiet and friendly." Philip was evidently in great trepidation as to the way in which his high-handed treatment of the English ambassador would be received, and it is possible that when he saw the apparent submissiveness of the Queen under the blow, he may have thought that a rougher tongued representative than Guzman would be more likely to serve his purpose. He may have considered, moreover, that Guzman was too tolerant and yielding to the "heretics"; particularly as the ambassador gives as one of the reasons for desiring his recall, the danger to which Catholics are exposed who dwell long amongst "heretics," and witness their laxity in religion, and their freedom from restraint (page 10). Be that as it may, Philip appointed as his successor a man diametrically opposite to him; a fiery Catalan knight called Guerau de Spes, as haughty and intolerant as Feria himself, a man, as it afterwards turned out, entirely wanting in discretion at a time when, of all qualities, discretion was that most needed. At first sight it is difficult to understand why so close an observer of men as Philip appointed such a firebrand as this to represent him, unless he had determined to adopt an aggressive policy towards England, contrary to that which he had hitherto followed, and it has been usually assumed by English historical writers that this was the case. Norris' letters of the time certainly give colour to the assertion that Philip sent Don Guerau with instructions to forward a Catholic conspiracy in England in union with Cardinal Lorraine and the duke of Alba, for the purpose of expelling Elizabeth and crushing the Protestant power; but Norris, zealous Protestant as he was, eagerly accepted and repeated all the news his spies could bring him that was damaging to the Catholics, and was ignorant of or underrated Philip's difficulties. The present letters, for the first time, show

clearly that, whatever may have been the wish of Philip's heart, it was absolutely impossible for him to embark upon a war with England, beset as he was on all hands. Guerau de Spes was doubtless sent with the idea that a less complaisant envoy than Guzman would be able to exert more influence over the Queen by fear than by suavity, an idea encouraged doubtless by the quiet way in which she had accepted her ambassador's contemptuous dismissal. As will be seen, however, Don Guerau did not stop at rough words or haughty demeanour; like the hot partizan he was, he began more or less overt plotting with the disaffected as soon as he arrived in the country, and probably even before. The ostensible reason for Don Guerau's coming was to give explanations about the expulsion of Dr. Man, but Elizabeth, full of Norris' sinister reports, was much perturbed by the withdrawal of her favourite Guzman. "She hoped to God," she told the latter, "that there was no mystery behind this change," and reproached him personally with her usual coquetry for wanting to leave her. Cecil was more outspoken and professed to believe that Guzman himself had arranged the plot; which we now know Norris had informed him, Cecil; that Don Guerau was engaged in. Guzman was surprised and indignant, he, at all events, having had no hand in the matter, as Cecil indeed well knew. Guzman tells the story to the King in his letter of the 9th August 1568:—"On my return to London, I " talked with Cecil and told him of the coming of Don " Guerau and my departure, whereat he expressed sorrow " and assured me that the Queen would be greatly pained, " especially as it would seem to confirm what had been " conveyed to him from several quarters, that Cardinal " Lorraine had arranged a treaty with the duke of Alba, " respecting this country and the queen of Scots; which " had been negotiated through me, as the French ambas- " sador here could not be trusted. It was said also that " the queen of Scotland herself was in communication " with me and sent me letters for your Majesty, and it " was asserted that, now that I had arranged what was

“ wanted, I wished to leave, in order that my successor,
“ and not myself, should witness the carrying out of the
“ plan. It was known that I had a person at Dieppe to
“ advise people in France of these matters, and that Don
“ Francés de Avila (the Spanish ambassador in France)
“ never left the side of Cardinal Lorraine. My own belief
“ is that Cecil invented the whole of this because
“ I am told that the letter that the queen of Scotland
“ wrote to me with a letter to your Majesty, together with
“ another for the French ambassador, fell into Cecil’s
“ hands.” Guzman repudiated the accusation with much
spirit and evident truthfulness, and doubtless confirmed
Cecil in his knowledge that, whatever were the instructions
of the new ambassador, the main object of the departing one
was to preserve peace and amity between the two nations.
A perusal of the substance of the instructions to Guerau
de Spes (page 66) will show how limited was the mission
confided to him. He was to satisfy the Queen about
Dr. Man, beyond which his functions were mainly to send
to the duke of Alba and the King constant reports of all
that was passing in England. He is instructed, over and
over again, that he is to do nothing without the orders of
the duke of Alba, and, indeed, so far as can be gathered
from his instructions and the letters sent to him, his
functions were more those of a spy than a minister. The
following sentence from the instructions will prove that it
was not Philip’s desire at the time to break with England :
“ You will give the Queen my letter, saluting her gaily
“ and graciously from me, saying that I have appointed
“ you the successor of Diego de Guzman to reside near
“ her as my ordinary ambassador, with instructions to
“ serve and gratify her on every possible occasion, *as, in*
“ *fact, I wish you to do, trying to keep her on good terms*
“ *and assuring her from me that I will always return her*
“ *friendship as her good neighbour and brother.*”

At a time when the bad faith of Elizabeth in seizing the
specie destined for the pay of Philip’s troops, and the indis-
cretion of Guerau de Spes had embittered the relations of the
two governments to the last degree, the correspondence in

the present volume between the King and the duke of Alba proves indisputably the (perhaps necessarily) peaceful attitude of Philip towards England and the fear entertained both by the King and his Viceroy of the indiscretion and meddlesomeness of the ambassador. As the letters in question were confidential and there was no fear of their being seized they certainly contained the real sentiments of the writers. It will be seen by reference to them that so hardly pressed were the Spaniards for money and so beset with difficulties, that their only desire at the time was to recover the Spanish property seized in England and re-open their suspended trade, leaving the idea of vengeance for a future time. Alba several times complains that Don Guerau's zeal is out-running his discretion, and that he allows himself to be drawn into compromising positions by exceeding the instructions sent to him. This correspondence is mentioned here out of its chronological order to enforce the view that the treasonable plots in which Don Guerau was certainly concerned during the whole of his residence in England, and his complicity in which contributed largely to the subsequent bitterness between the countries, were entered into by him in the first place in violation of the spirit of his instructions and of his master's desire; and that the secret aid afterwards given by Philip to treason in England was bestowed in consequence of the misleading reports sent by the ambassador with regard to the strength and resources of the disaffected. These reports, indeed, as will be seen in the present volume, were evidently pervaded more by the zeal of the partizan than by the dispassionate scrutiny of the minister. A further proof that Guerau de Spes was not sent by Philip for the purpose of plotting the overthrow of Elizabeth in favour of Mary is afforded by the letter from the King to the duke of Alba, dated 15th September 1568 (page 71), written at the time when De Spes had just arrived in England. In it the King refers to Mary's letter to him complaining of her imprisonment and invoking his aid, with earnest professions of her Catholicism. "I have," he says, "refrained

“ from taking any decision or answering her autograph
“ letter, of which I enclose a copy, until you tell me what
“ you think of her business, and in what way, and to what
“ extent, I should assist her. I therefore beg and enjoin
“ you to write to me on this by the first opportunity, and
“ to encourage the Queen from there” (*i.e.*, the Netherlands) “as best you can, to persevere firmly in her good
“ purpose,” (namely, to remain a firm Catholic) “as it is
“ clear that whilst she does so God will not abandon her.”
Guerau de Spes arrived in Paris in July 1568 after suffering much insult and maltreatment on his way through the south of France, of which he complained to the Queen-Mother, who told him that the King was not obeyed in that part of the country. He does not mention that he saw Cardinal Lorraine privately, but merely says that he and Cardinals Guise and Bourbon, with the dukes of Nemours and Guise, were present at the audience, and “recommended the affairs of the queen of Scotland to me.” The bishop of Glasgow, Mary’s minister in France, was ill, but, says De Spes, “he sent two gentlemen to recommend
“ his mistress’ affairs to my care. She appears to found all
“ her hopes on your Majesty’s favour, and I have told him
“ that I have orders on my arrival to do what I can for her.”
However strong may have been De Spes’ sympathy for the queen of Scots, it is clear from these general expressions that he was charged with no deep plot in her favour by his master, as has been assumed on the strength of the information sent to England by Norris and others. The account he sends of his interview with the duke of Alba bears out this view, as it principally refers to the commercial grievances existing between England and the Netherlands, still left unsettled by the provisional agreement of Bruges. In this letter, however, written before he arrived in England, he shows how different are his methods from those of Guzman de Silva, who invariably palliated and minimised points of difference. “Antonio
“ de Guaras,” he says, “has sent me two slanderous papers
“ printed in England, which the heretics of that country
“ have made up to entertain their gang, and to endeavour
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“ to diminish the favour your Majesty extends to the
 “ Catholics, and the justice and equity which you maintain
 “ in your States. If your Majesty wishes, they can be
 “ copied and sent to you in Spanish. I shall be glad to
 “ be directed as to whether I should speak to the Queen
 “ about these insults.” Needless to say that on his arrival
 in England the queen of Scotland’s friends approached
 him, and thenceforward a constant correspondence was
 carried on between him and Mary through them, most of
 which correspondence was, of course, well known to the
 English Court through their spies. On the 30th October
 1568 (page 81) when he had only been in London about
 seven weeks, writing to the King *à propos* of the meeting
 of the Commission in York to settle Scotch affairs, he says,
 “ I am of opinion that this would be a good opportunity
 “ of handling successfully Scotch affairs, and *restoring*
 “ *this country to the Catholic religion, and if the Duke were*
 “ *out of his present anxiety and your Majesty wished, it could*
 “ *be discussed.*”

On the 6th November he wrote :—“It appears as if the
 “ time was approaching when this country may be made
 “ to return to the Catholic Church, the Queen being in
 “ such straits and short of money. I have already
 “ informed your Majesty of the offer made by Viscount
 “ Montague’s brother-in-law on condition that they may
 “ hope for protection from your Majesty.” These are
 the first suggestions of a design to overthrow Elizabeth,
 and, as will be noted, they do not come from Philip, but
 are only tentatively made to him by his ambassador. In a
 letter dated 12th December 1568 (page 85) he assures the
 King that “ whenever Flemish matters are calm, and your
 “ Majesty and the French king choose to stop English
 “ commerce, without even drawing the sword, they (the
 “ English) will be obliged to adopt the Catholic religion;”
 and he enclosed for the King’s approval a draft of a long
 address of exhortation which he proposed to deliver to the
 Queen, thinking thereby to convert her to Catholicism
 (page 85). Philip, who knew well the tremendous forces
 arrayed against him, may well have smiled at the simplicity

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of his envoy in supposing that a turgid speech from a hot-headed bigot could revolutionise the consummate statecraft of Elizabeth and Cecil. With such an ambassador as this, it was naturally not long before matters between England and Spain reached an acute stage. Cardinal Chatillon was at Elizabeth's Court arousing sympathy and obtaining aid for the Huguenots in France; the Flemish refugees were spreading abroad a feeling of indignation against Alba's atrocities in the Netherlands, and money was being sent daily across to help their brethren against their oppressors; privateers, and pirates who called themselves such, were already swarming in the Channel, and few vessels bearing the flag of Spain escaped their depredations. Early in December, Cecil wrote to De Spes (Foreign Calendar) complaining of practices of his which had been discovered, and the envoy retaliated by almost daily complaints, couched often in very intemperate language, of the piracies in the Channel. Norris and others, as usual, were reporting unceasingly the terrible things which were to be done in England as soon as the Netherlands were quieted and the Huguenots suppressed. The Queen told De Spes himself (18th December 1568, page 89) that "she knew that, after the king (of France) " had pacified his country, he would turn upon her for the " sake of religion, as she was assured by persons in her " favour who were members of his Council." Similar ideas had been current in Guzman de Silva's time, but he wisely and adroitly laughed them aside. Guerau de Spes, on the contrary, fanned the flame by his manifest plotting with the Catholic party; and at the interview referred to above, told the Queen that whilst she allowed the Huguenot privateers to enter her ports, it would be very difficult for her to preserve her friendship with the States of Flanders. In view of the fears thus engendered and encouraged by the indiscretion of the envoy, it is not to be wondered at that when chance threw into the way of the Queen a means of crippling her enemy and averting the threatened danger, she should have adopted it, even at the expense of honesty and international rights. She herself was hardly

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pressed for money to fit out a fleet to help the Huguenots and defend her coast, and had not only borrowed to the full extent of her credit, but, says De Spes (page 83), had pledged some of her jewels to raise the required sum.

Late in November 1568 several vessels carrying a large amount of treasure from Spain to Flanders were chased by pirates in the Channel, and for safety put into the ports of Southampton, Plymouth, and Falmouth respectively. The money, on its arrival in the Netherlands, was to be advanced to the king of Spain by its owners, certain Genoese bankers, for the purpose of paying Alba's troops and enabling him to continue his operations for the suppression of the Protestants. Two of the cutters, shrewdly suspecting, that they were in as much danger from the English on shore as from the pirates themselves, boldly left port the day after they had taken refuge there and ran the blockade of pirates, arriving duly at Antwerp. The rest, consisting of a large vessel with 31,000*l.* in Southampton and three or four cutters in the western ports, continued to be assailed or threatened by the privateers, even whilst in harbour, and, ostensibly for the protection of the treasure from their depredations, it was landed and placed in safety by the shore authorities. The transaction is related diversely by the two parties interested, and both sides of the question are set forth in the present volume; but there seems to be no doubt that Spinola, the great Florentine banker in London, who was charged with the forwarding of the money in case it came to England, informed the Queen that it was being conveyed to its destination at the risk of the lenders, and could not be rightly called the property of the king of Spain until its arrival in the Netherlands. Prior to this information being given the Queen had signed (12th December) passports and safe-conducts for the money to be sent overland to Dover, or under convoy by sea from the ports, but on learning the state of affairs from Spinola, orders were given for the landing of the money, which was done on the 21st. There is no doubt that it had been determined at this time to retain the money if, on examination, Spinola's statement