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NOTE ON RIGVEDA I. 48 (Hymn to the Dawn), 15.

THE second half of this verse runs as follows:

Prá no yachatād avṛkám pṛthú chardíh prá devi *gómatīr íshaḥ;*
"Do thou proffer to us a wolfless wide shelter, do thou, O goddess, proffer to us — —"

The last two words, *gómatīr íshah,* are generally explained as an instance of metonymy, which is common in the Rigveda: '*drinks having cows,*' i.e. '*drinks having milk, milky drinks.*' This is perhaps the meaning which Delbrück assigns to the words under discussion, for in the Index to his Vedische Chrestomathie (1874) he translates the adj. *gōmant* in this passage by '*kuhreich*' (p. 68), and *ísh* by '*Saft, Trank, Labung*' (p. 57), so that his translation would be '*kuhreiche Tränke*' by which he presumably means '*milky drinks.*' If this translation is correct, we may compare the similar metonymy in Hymn III. 42 (276), 1 and 7:—1, Úpa nah sutám ấ gahi sómam indra *gávāçiram* "O Indra, do thou come to our pressed soma-juice, mixed with *milk* (lit. 'mixed with *cows*')," and 7, Imám indra *gávāçiraṃ* yávāçiram ca nah piba "O Indra, do thou drink this our *milk-* (lit. *cow-*) mixture and our barley-mixture."

That *ísh* often has the meaning '*Trank, Labetrunk, Nah-*

rungssaft, insbesondere Milchtrank' (the first meaning given to it by Grassmann, Wörterb. zum RV. 1873) will be denied by none; but this is not the only meaning. The fifth and sixth meanings given by Grassmann are '*Kraft*' and 'vielleicht *Beute* [vgl. *vāja*].' Cf. Fick, Vergl. Wörterb. der Idg. Sprachen, I^4 p. 176, who gives '*Saft und Kraft, Fülle, Gedeihen.*' And it seems that in the meanings '*Kraft, Fülle, Gedeihen,*' we have the key to the explanation of *gómatīr íshah* in the passage under discussion.

The Idg. word **is* (Skr. *ísh*) is doubtless the first component of Skr. *ish-irá-s* translated '*eilend, regsam, frisch*' by Brugmann, Grundr. II. § 74, Greek Att. *ἐρό-ς* translated by Brugmann (l. c.) '*regsam, frisch, kräftig, heilig*' (cf. the analysis of the words by Brugmann l.c., and Osthoff in Morph. Unters. IV 151 and Zur Geschichte des Perfects p. 439). It seems thus that the primitive meaning of the Greek word is '*strong*' (cf. Leaf on Homer Iliad I 366 and Fick op. cit. pp. 7, 176, 359). This meaning '*strong*' is probably still to be seen in Homer Il. I 366 *ἐρὴν πόλιν Ἠετίωνος*; [V 499 *ἐρὰς κατ' ἀλωάς*]; XVI 407 *ἐρὸν ἰχθύν*; VIII 66 *ἐρὸν ἦμαρ* and XI 194 *κνέφας ἐρόν*; X 56 *φυλάκων ἐρὸν τέλος*, XXIV 681 *ἐροὺς πυλαωρούς*, and Od. XXIV 81 *Ἀργείων ἐρὸς στρατός*. (See the editions of Walter Leaf and D. B. Monro.) Thus then the fifth meaning '*Kraft*' assigned to Skr. *ísh* by Grassmann must have been Idg. or at any rate as old as Graeco-Indian.

May we not find the best explanation of *gómatīr íshah* in this meaning '*Kraft,*' or even in Grassmann's sixth meaning '*Beute* [vgl. *vāja*]' which is merely the outcome of the fifth meaning? Fick's '*Fülle, Gedeihen*' are moreover nearly synonymous with '*Kraft.*' '*Strength in cows*' or '*wealth of cows*' was naturally an object of great importance among the pastoral people of the Rigveda; to quote one instance out of many: Rigveda VII 67 [Hymn to the Açvins (= 583)] 9, "Verily may ye two be inexhaustible to the wealthy sacrificers, who with their wealth urge on liberality, who help on their friends with good hymns, pouring out abundantly wealth *composed of cows* and of horses." And, indeed, twice already in our own hymn (I 48. 2 and 12) the poet has sung of *cows*:—

Verse 2. "They (the Dawns) being rich in horses, *rich in cows*, often used to come (= have come) to shine."

Verse 12. "O Dawn, do thou there be pleased to place (i.e. give) among us *wealth of cows* and wealth of horses, give us wealth worthy to be praised, give us abundance of male children."

Does it not seem likely, and quite in keeping with Vedic poetry, that at the close of his hymn the bard repeats his prayer for '*strength in* (i.e. *wealth of*) *cows*,' as being that on which his social position most chiefly depended?

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PLATO'S LATER THEORY OF IDEAS.

THE following pages contain only a negative and partial criticism of the interpretation of Plato put forward by Dr Jackson under the above title in earlier volumes of this Journal. The same interpretation appears also, with certain modifications, in Mr Archer Hind's editions of the *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*. My criticism is directed against one part of it only, though that a central and perhaps vital part: but I must endeavour in the first place to give briefly a general summary of the "later theory" as conceived by Dr Jackson[1]. I do so for the sake of clearness, and in order to recall the main points to those already familiar with them, rather than in the attempt to make a very intricate piece of argument intelligible to any readers to whom it is here presented for the first time.

According to traditional opinion, the Theory of Ideas as stated in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* is the clearest and most positive account of Plato's philosophical convictions. Against this opinion Dr Jackson maintains that these dialogues represent an immature phase of Plato's thought, which was later subjected to unsparing criticism: and that he afterwards developed a new and elaborate dogmatic system, which is preserved in the six dialogues *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, as well as in certain allusions in Aristotle.

[1] Dr Jackson's six papers are contained in Volumes X, XI, XIII, XIV and XV of this *Journal*. References in the following pages are made as follows: (on *Sophist* 205) always means Dr Jackson's article and the page of the *Journal*, while a number simply following the name of a dialogue (*Sophist* 250) refers to the marginal page of Plato's works.

According to Dr Jackson, the "later theory of ideas," while it retains the fundamental proposition—

> "Besides sensibles there are eternal and immutable existences called ideas,"

rejects the two corollaries attached thereto in the earlier period:—

(1) Wherever we find a plurality of particulars called by the same name, we assume a corresponding idea (*Rep.* 596 A).

(2) A particular is what it is by reason of the presence (*παρουσία*) or immanence of the idea, or by its participation (*μέθεξις*) in the idea.

For these two propositions the "later theory" substitutes the statement that the only true substantial ideas (*αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*) are "natural types" of the *infimae species* of living things, and perhaps also of the four elements. These ideas are not present or immanent in particulars, and particulars do not participate in them. The only relation between ideas and particulars is that the former are types (*παραδείγματα*) which the latter imitate (*μίμησις*).

These ideas cannot be objects of human knowledge, though by the study of particulars we may approximate to knowledge of them. They are known only to universal or absolute mind.

Besides these substantial ideas, however, Dr Jackson's statement of the "later theory" admits also certain unsubstantial ideas, as I shall call them (*μὴ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*), which are not under any obligation (as the ideas proper are) to be unities, but in which, it is stated, the particulars may still be said to participate. The nature of these unsubstantial ideas will form a main subject of the subsequent discussion.

The theory above summarised raises many questions which I shall leave untouched. In particular I am not concerned with the elaborate metaphysical development of it which is based chiefly on the *Timaeus*. The main point that I wish to raise is easily put in a single question. The earlier theory of ideas was devised, as Dr Jackson says, largely as an explanation of the problem of predication or judgment. Does the "later theory" afford a satisfactory substitute for the old explanation?

Let us start with the *Theaetetus*, a dialogue which gives trouble to all interpreters of Plato, and not least to the advocates of the "later theory." In a central passage (*Theaet.* 156) Socrates expounds a theory of sensation based on the doctrine of universal flux in its most thoroughgoing form. This theory is attributed to certain persons not named, but described as "much more subtle[1]" (*κομψότεροι*) than certain other materialist Philistines. Who are these "more subtle" persons? According to Dr Jackson, the *κομψότεροι* "represent Plato himself" (on *Soph.* 204). This view is supported by a historical argument (on *Theaet.* 255), as to which I will here say only that it does not seem to me convincing[2]. The decision must turn on the internal evidence. Is the doctrine of the *κομψότεροι* identical or compatible with that which we recognise elsewhere as Plato's own?

"According to the *κομψότεροι* subject and object are potentialities" which are "actualized in the process of sensation" (on *Theaet.* 268). What grounds have we for attributing this view to Plato? First, does he reduce the subject to a potentiality of sensation? We have only to turn one page forward or a few pages back, to find Dr Jackson calling our attention to the "weighty passage" in which Plato "notes that sensation does not account for the whole of the soul's furniture." How could a potentiality of sensation possess furniture—much more the very peculiar sort of furniture in question, the capacity of apprehending what is not given in sensation? But perhaps then Dr Jackson and the *κομψότεροι* do not really mean to deny outright that the mind is a unity, that it has a "synoptic" faculty in virtue of which it binds together its manifold sensations? Let us go further.

According to the *κομψότεροι*—and Plato therefore—(on *Soph.* 205), "mind is pluralised both in space and time, pluralised in space so that one mind differs from another mind, pluralised in time so that the thought of each mind at one

[1] The word is I think more than half ironical, as usual.

[2] Perhaps I may appeal to those familiar with Plato's way of speaking whether a description of himself as "much more ingenious" than the Philistines is in accord with his usual attitude of haughty self-effacement.

moment differs from its thought at another moment[1]." Dr Jackson observes elsewhere: "Plainly the paradox of the impossibility of error was one which, however futile, Plato could not afford to ignore." Certainly he could not, if the *κομψότεροι* represent him; for according to this doctrine Error and Truth are equally impossible; Contradiction also, so that Antisthenes was right after all. How can I say, "Error is possible"? By the time I have finished speaking I mean both by "Error" and "possible" something different from what I meant when I began, since my thought at one moment differs from my thought at another moment. Still more clearly the person whom I address understands by "Error" and "possible" something different from what I do, and is therefore unable either to agree or contradict. "Without the consciousness that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before," all judgment, true or false, is impossible.

It is just the same with the "object." If Plato, as is alleged, held that "things are sensations within the mind," and that "the existence of the thing is the recurrence of the sensation" (on *Tim.* 21, 22), not only will it on this basis be very difficult to explain Error, but we must further ask, how do we come to speak of the "thing" in the singular? We hear something of a "fictitious externalisation" due to the mutual externality of the percipient minds; but it must be replied, first that if the unity of the object is a fiction, fiction is the only possible foundation of fact: and secondly that the fiction is one of which the human mind is on the hypothesis of the *κομψότεροι* incapable.

It is supposed that we are led to the fiction by observing "the identity or, to speak more exactly, the similarity" of our sensations[2]. But this perception of similarity among sensations is just what the *κομψότεροι* have no right to ascribe to a mind which is merely a potentiality of sensations. There may be a

[1] For reasons indicated below, I venture to detach this statement from the context, which, it should in fairness be stated, greatly qualifies it.

[2] It will appear throughout that I follow Plato in thinking that by *μεγάλη ἀνάγκη* (*Parm.* 132 D), similarity, speaking exactly, can be nothing but partial identity.

sensation of smell one day, and a sensation of smell next day, but the resemblance between the two cannot be smelt.

I am quite aware that the above criticisms appear captious, and depend on a rather one-sided and unfair treatment of certain phrases. But it seems worth while to set them forth, because the looseness of statement covers the real and central difficulty of the "later theory." Dr Jackson does not, it appears, really mean to deny outright that the mind has Thought as well as Sensation: but he does not make clear exactly how much he allows to Thought. In the passages quoted, his intention is to shew that Plato has seen through materialism; but as he for some reason declines to recognise the idealism which bases things on Thought, he has to force on Plato the so-called idealism which reduces things to sensations. He is divided between the attempt to deny Thought altogether, and the attempt to treat it as an actual mental phenomenon, which is yet deceptive or fictitious.

The question is—what explanation does the later theory offer of predication or judgment? The earlier doctrine of the *Republic* and *Phaedo* was devised largely as an explanation of this problem. To what extent was it abandoned, and what is the evidence of its abandonment? Dr Jackson holds that "the paradox of predication" is solved in the later period by the discovery that *great* and *small*, *like* and *unlike* denote *relations*, and that consequently "the theory of the immanence of the idea" becomes superfluous. Further, it becomes impossible, since the objections raised against it in the *Parmenides* are held to be fatal—fatal, that is, to the unity and substantiality of the idea. Consequently in the "later theory" the true substantial ideas are not immanent, nor participated in by particulars.

I cannot think that the problem is so easily solved by the mere application of the term "*relation*," or that Plato was ever really unaware of the fact that "it is by comparison with one thing that Simmias is tall, and by comparison with another that he is short" (on *Parm.* 321). Rather, to say that likeness is a *relation*, is not to solve the problem, but to state it: with some hint perhaps of a solution, inasmuch as *relation* implies

that something relates, and thus points to the unifying activity of mind. Indeed, it is an essential object of the Theory of Ideas, early or late, to shew that the activity of the mind in relating is not "arbitrary" or merely subjectively valid, and that relations are no more "fictions" than anything else.

And when Dr Jackson argues (on *Th.* 271) that "the declaration that these notions [the *κοινά* of *Th.* 184, *like*, *unlike* etc.] are obtained by comparison implies that the *Theaetetus* belongs, not to the period of the *Republic* and *Phaedo*, when likeness and unlikeness were regarded as qualities attached to individuals taken separately," but to the later period: we should remember the early formula (*Phaedrus* 265 D, cf. 249 B) *εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα*, and the far-reaching saying, *ὁ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ* (*Rep.* 537). And as to the *Phaedo*, the above interpretation seems to me to contradict the emphatic "indenture-like" statement (102 C, D): "Simmias is surpassed by Phaedo not because Phaedo is Phaedo [i.e. the quality is *not* attached to the individual taken separately] but because Phaedo has greatness *as compared with* (in relation to) Simmias' smallness." It is to be noticed throughout how often the word *πρός* and the genitive case (the Greek expressions for "relation") are repeated.

But the question can be brought to a clearer issue. In a passage of the *Theaetetus* (155 B) which Dr Jackson quotes, Socrates comments on the fact that he, Socrates, without either growing or diminishing, is yet at different times greater and smaller than Theaetetus owing to the growth of the latter. Dr Jackson proceeds (on *Theaet.* 268): "The Socrates of the [*Theaetetus*] needs no such artifice [as the theory of the immanent Idea in the *Phaedo*]. Expressly remarking that no change has taken place in himself, he recognises in the growth of Theaetetus a sufficient explanation of the fact that, whereas at one time he is taller than Theaetetus, at another he is shorter." Hence "the intervention of the immanent idea is wholly unnecessary." Conclusion: the *Theaetetus* belongs to a period when the theory of the *Phaedo* had been discarded.

As it stands, there is a certain plausibility about this statement. But I would appeal to any unprejudiced reader whether

the plausibility does not disappear when the passage is read in its context. The result of the above speech of Socrates is not, as might have been expected, that his interlocutor exclaims, "Now at last I see through that tiresome puzzle of Zeno's!" No, Theaetetus, in spite of his experience in such matters, confesses himself "utterly dumbfoundered and befogged"! One might think that this would irritate Socrates after he has just given a "sufficient explanation"; but no! his retort (can his εἰρωνεία have become irony?) is to congratulate Theaetetus on his truly philosophic turn of mind: such perplexity, or wonder, he says, is the true source of philosophy.

Surely, if we are to take Plato seriously, he means that he still regards such difficulties, as he did the similar difficulties in *Republic* VII., as being ἑλκτικὰ πρὸς οὐσίαν, introductory to the theory of ideas.

On the objections raised in the *Parmenides* to the theory of the immanence of the idea, and the participation of particulars in it, I can only touch briefly. So far from agreeing with Dr Jackson in thinking that they destroy the theory, I believe that they are meant to remove misconceptions of it—perhaps to point out obscurities still attaching to it. The comparison e.g. of the idea as ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς to a sail which covers many men, seems to me only one degree more formidable than the objection ascribed to Antisthenes (*Euthydemus* 301 A): "If the presence of beauty is what makes things beautiful, does it not follow that when an ox is present to you, you are an ox?" The moral is not that ideas cannot be present in particulars, but that the terms "participation" and "immanence" are, in a sense, metaphors which must not be pressed with materialistic literalness. Is there any reason to attribute to Plato the belief that the relation between the immaterial unextended idea and the material extended thing was more than inadequately symbolised by the relation between a material extended whole and the parts which by their juxtaposition compose it? Or shall we taunt him with the "glaring inconsistency" involved in talking of the ἀχρώματος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος οὐσία as θεατή (how can you look at that which has neither colour nor shape?) and even of εἴδη which are