

HISTORY OF BRAZIL

CHAPTER XIX.

A Truce for ten years between Portugal and the United Provinces. The Dutch take advantage of it to get possession of Serigipe, Loanda in Angola, the Isle of St. Thomas, and Maranham. Antonio Telles da Sylva Governor of Brazil. Expedition of the Dutch against Chili. The Portugueze of Maranham recover the Island, and compel the enemy to abandon S. Luiz. Nassau is recalled. His last advice to the Great Council.

One of the first acts of the Viceroy after the news of the Acclamation reached him, had been to dispatch a vessel to Recife with the intelligence. Instead of bearing a flag of truce, and waiting off the harbour, as usual, to obtain permission for entering, the ship appeared drest out with gala colours, sailed in at once, firing repeated salutes of musquetry, and anchored in front of Nassau's residence, who rewarded the messenger with a jewel of great value. The tidings of this Revolution were received with equal joy by the Pernambucans and the Dutch; the former hoping to receive from a Portugueze King that efficient succour which they knew it was in vain to look for from

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The revolution in Portugal announced to Nassau.

Valeroso Lucideno. l. 2. c. 2. p. 108.

April.

CHAP. Madrid, the latter expecting easily to extend their conquests
 XIX. during the confusion which would ensue. Three days were
 1641. set apart for public rejoicings; on the first the sports were after
 the Portugueze manner, horse-races, running at the ring, throwing
 the cane, and pelting with *alcanzias*, or hollow earthen
 balls, filled with flowers, ashes, or powder, a sort of carnival
 hand-grenade, which the name seems to refer to a Moorish
 origin: on the second the entertainment was Flemish; a mag-
 nificent dinner was given by Count Mauritz to the gentry of
 both nations and sexes, and the order of the day was, that who-
 ever erred in a toast should drink it a second time; on the third
 the horse-exercises were renewed, and the whole was concluded by
 a public supper. Before this was over a ship arrived from Hol-
 land with dispatches, announcing that a truce for ten years had
 been agreed upon between the States and the Court of Portu-
 gal, . . . and the last bumper was drank in honour of the joyful
 tidings.

Cast. Lus.
 5. § 18.

*Truce for
 ten years
 concluded
 with Hol-
 land.*

But the Brazilians had little cause for rejoicing at the arrange-
 ments made between Portugal and Holland. Immediately
 after the Acclamation of Joam IV., ambassadors from Lisbon
 were dispatched to Paris, London, and the Hague, to solicit
 the alliance of the three courts. Tristram de Mendoza was
 charged with the last and most important of these missions.
 A colleague had been nominated with equal powers, but as
 something occurred which prevented this person from accepting
 the charge, it was thought that the deficiency might be supplied
 by appointing Antonio de Sousa Tavares secretary to the em-
 bassy, and annexing to it two merchants as counsellors, one of
 whom was a Dutchman, naturalized and married in Lisbon.
 Circumstanced as the new King was, it was so essential that
 his cause at foreign courts should be entrusted to men of rank
 and fidelity, that where these qualifications were found, he was

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fain to dispense with the talents which would at other times have been required. But the plan of appointing counsellors to the ambassador had inconveniences which might have been foreseen: it might wound his pride, and it lessened his responsibility. He was instructed to negotiate for the restitution of all the Portugueze conquests and colonies which had been captured; for it was argued, that as Portugal had only been involved in the war with Holland as dependant upon Spain, in consequence of an usurpation which she had shaken off, it was not just that Holland, with whom she was now engaged in a common cause against Spain, should retain possessions taken from Portugal under such circumstances. However cogent in equity this reasoning might appear to the Portugueze, they could hardly expect that it should be admitted. Willingly or unwillingly, the forces and treasures of Portugal had been employed against the United States during their arduous struggle with the mighty power of Spain, and the conquests which the Dutch had effected in their foreign possessions had been made fairly in open war. Discussions upon this point were set aside for the present by the expedient of concluding a truce for ten years, and it was stipulated that in the course of eight months Portugal should send plenipotentiaries to treat for a definitive peace; but whatever might be the issue of this fuller negotiation, the truce was to hold good for the whole term specified. A year was allowed for notifying it to the Dutch commanders in India, with a proviso that if the intelligence should arrive sooner, the truce was immediately to commence. Of this article the Portugueze complained, and censured the conduct of their diplomatist who submitted to it; but the letter of the treaty would not have been objectionable, if the Power by whom it was dictated had had no sinister object in view. On these terms their High Mightinesses agreed to supply the Por-

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Ericeira.
 l. 153-5.

June 12.

CHAP. tuguéze with arms and ammunition, of which their country
 XIX. had been stript by Spain, and to send troops and ships to Lis-
 1641. bon, to be employed against the common enemy. Meantime
Treachery of in their advices to Nassau, (who, finding that the Company were
the Dutch. jealous of his power, and listened willingly to complaints which
 envious factions or discontented individuals sent home against
 him, had requested to be recalled,) they required him to con-
 tinue in the command, and ordered him to seize the present
 opportunity of extending their conquests as widely as possible.
 Especially, they observed, it was of importance to get possession
 of Bahia, and if he should not think it practicable to win the
 city either by fraud or force, they recommended him to besiege
 and blockade it, as in that case means might be found of ob-
 taining it when peace was made. It is a Dutch historian who
 relates this, and he states it openly, without appearing to per-
 ceive the iniquity of the transaction, or offering the apology
 with which the members of the Dutch Government perhaps
 glosed over the villainy to their own consciences. They no
 doubt believed it impossible that Portugal could maintain its
 independence against Spain, and looked upon the revolution
 as a mere temporary event, from which it was their business
 to derive all the advantages they could while it lasted.

Barlaeus.
 p. 202.

Embassy of
Vilhena to
Recife.

The Brazilians were not prepared for this treachery. The
 three Governors, who after the deposition of the Viceroy had
 been invested with the command at Bahia, sent Pedro Correa
 da Gama, and Vilhena the Jesuit, to Recife, to make arrange-
 ments for a friendly intercourse between the two Powers, till
 things should be ultimately adjusted by their respective Go-
 vernments in Europe. Vilhena had private business to trans-
 act in Pernambuco. His brethren of the Company had
 charged him to secure the plate which they had buried before
 their flight, and Mathias and Duarte de Albuquerque had in

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like manner commissioned him to recover their hidden treasures, and the property which they had disposed of in trusty hands. For himself, the Jesuit is accused of having carried on a gainful and dishonourable trade. He had brought out with him from Portugal many letters from the King with blank directions, to be distributed according to his discretion among the persons of most influence and character in Brazil; the letters announced the restoration of the legitimate family to these persons as men whose worth was well known, and whose loyalty was relied on by the Government; the possession of such letters therefore became a mark of honour, and would be a pledge of future favour from the Court; they would at least serve as valid testimonials for those who should solicit preferment. Vilhena made them matters of private contract, boasting of his own power at Lisbon, and enriched himself by the sale. The end however was singularly unfortunate for himself; he sailed from Brazil in a caravel and reached Madeira, but trembling for the wealth which he carried with him in a vessel so little capable of defence, he took his passage from thence in a large Levant ship bound for Lisbon. The caravel arrived safely; the Levanter was taken by an Algerine pirate, and Vilhena ended his days in the most wretched of all slaveries.

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Valeroso Lucideno. p. 113.

These Deputies ordered Paulo da Cunha and Henrique Diaz, who were still ravaging the country in defiance of all the Dutch force, to withdraw their troops into the Portugueze Captaincies; and the order being now given in good faith, was obeyed. Nassau had set a price of five hundred florins upon Paulo da Cunha's head, a measure which produced no other effect than that of making Paulo offer two thousand cruzados for Nassau's. Such however was the apparent alteration of affairs in consequence of the Braganzan revolution, that Paulo was now invited with the Commissioners to Nassau's table; the conversation turned upon

Paulo de Cunha and Henrique Diaz recalled from Pernambuco. Barleus. p. 201.

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CHAP. what had passed while they were enemies, and the Dutch
XIX. Governor, in the freedom of convivial intercourse, complained
1641. to his guest of the great price which he had offered for his life.
 Paulo replied that the cause of complaint lay rather on his part than on the Count's; it could not be thought that the head of a Prince ought to be valued at less than two thousand cruzados to a poor soldier, but when a Prince wished to purchase that of a brave man, five hundred florins was too little to offer for it.

Ericcyra.
 1. p. 495.

The Dutch surprize Seregipe.

Barlaus.
 201.
East Lus.
 5. § 20.

Zriceyra.
 1. 197.

East. Lus.
 5. § 20

Barlaus.
 203.

During their stay at Recife the Commissioners saw sufficient reason to distrust the sincerity of Nassau's professions, and on their return they warned the Governors, that the Dutch were deceiving them. The Governors, as they would fain have believed the suspicion groundless, acted as if it were so; but it was soon verified. Mauritz, in obedience to his instructions, prepared to extend his conquests on all sides; and in consequence of the recall of the marauding parties, he ventured to increase his disposable force by withdrawing the greater part of his garrisons, relying upon the supineness of the three Governors, and the credulity with which they confided in his good faith. His first attempt was toward the North, upon St. Christovam, the capital of Seregipe. The inhabitants, who had returned there since the siege of St. Salvador, were surprized by a squadron of four sail, which entered the port carrying a flag of truce: . . . an act of superfluous treachery, for the place could not have been maintained if it had been fairly attacked. The assailants landed without opposition; they fortified themselves, and then began to search for mines, expecting to find silver. But they had little success in this, and indeed little opportunity for it, for this act of aggression roused the Governors, and they sent Camaram with his native troops to encamp within sight of the town, and prevent the Dutch from venturing beyond their works. The first and second time that any of them went out to seek provi-

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sions, he was instructed to take every thing from them, and warn them that on a third attempt their lives would be the forfeiture. These orders he obeyed so well that the conquerors were imprisoned within the town which they had so dishonourably won, and reduced to depend for subsistence upon what they received by sea.

CHAP.
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 1641.

Cast. Lus.
 5. 24.
Ericcyra,
 1. 495.

Bahia had lost a great part of its force in consequence of the Revolution. There were in its garrison seven hundred Spanish and Neapolitan troops; the Portuguese were too honourable to make men prisoners who had so long been their fellow soldiers; they gave them a good ship capable of holding them all, and victualled for a voyage to Spanish America, but would not allow them to lay in provisions for a longer course, well knowing that if they sailed to Spain they would immediately be employed against Portugal. After these troops had past Cape St. Augustine, they carried away their main mast in a gale, and put into Paraiba to repair, where they endeavoured to procure stores enough to serve them till they should reach Europe. Here however they found themselves in worse hands than in those of the Portuguese. The Dutch seized them, which was easily done as they were without arms, and compelled them to work at the fortifications, while it was deliberated in what manner to dispose of them, some being of opinion that the surest and shortest method was to hang them out of the way. At length it was determined to send the men to some of the Spanish settlements, where for want of officers to keep them together, they would be likely to disperse. The officers were detained in Pernambuco, till after some months of solicitation they were allowed to return home by way of Holland.

*Spanish and
 Neapolitan
 troops sent
 from Bahia.*

Valereso Lus-
cideno, p.
 115.

In ridding themselves of these internal enemies, the Portuguese suffered a grievous diminution of a force which had never been equal to the danger for which it was required; and in this

*Expedition
 of the Dutch
 against An-
 gola.*

CHAP. state of weakness the Government was roused from its dreams
 XIX. of security by tidings of invasion on all sides, and perceived
 1641. when it was too late the important service which Paulo da
 Cunha and Henrique Diaz had rendered by occupying the inva-
 ders' attention. Jol and Hinderson had been dispatched with
 two thousand regular troops and two hundred Indians against
 S. Paulo de Loanda, the capital of Angola, and the most impor-
 tant of the Portugueze possessions in Africa. Information had
 been given to the Governor Pedro Cesar de Menezes, by his na-
 tive spies, that the King of Congo had sent agents to Pernam-
 buco to invite the Dutch to this attempt: whatever credit he
 might attach to the intelligence, he had no means either of pro-
 viding against the danger, or of resisting it: some of his troops
 were in the interior, engaged in war with the negro chiefs; and
 others had lately deserted in a galleon, disgusted with their
 station in a pestilential country, where death was daily sweep-
 ing away their companions. When the approach of the inva-
 ders was known, he could muster only two hundred troops and
 one hundred and fifty armed inhabitants. The Bishop, an old
 man of exemplary virtue and great resolution, brought out
 the clergy and all his household, and carried a harquebuss him-
 self, notwithstanding his advanced age. When the fleet came in
 sight, Pedro Cesar thought they would sail up towards the city,
 and he ordered the officers of the crown to sink two vessels for
 the purpose of blocking the channel. They objected that the
 public finances could not afford to pay the owners of these ves-
 sels for the loss; upon which one of the inhabitants, by name
 Antonio Ribeiro Pinto, exclaimed, that if the proposed measure
 was expedient for the defence of the city, it must be done, and
 if the Treasury could not indemnify the owners, he would. This
 Portugueze opened all his stores, and offered all that he pos-
 sessed to the public service. The Dutch however did not at-

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tempt the channel : they blockaded it to prevent any of their booty from escaping by sea ; then put out their boats, and landed under cover of two ships, which were skilfully anchored between the two forts of Cassondama, and Penedo, or the Rock, the guns of these forts not being of sufficient calibre to command the pass. Pedro Cesar could not reach this part of the shore in time to oppose their landing, and with his inferior force it would have been hopeless to attack them afterwards. He retreated to the fort of Santa Cruz, declaring, that since it was his ill fortune to lose the city for want of troops to defend it, he would at least die at his post, and show that there had been no want of courage on his part. But then the Bishop and the People interfered, and required him to maintain the country for the service of God and the King, and their remonstrances prevailed upon him to abandon the intention of sacrificing his life to a false point of honour. They hastened into the city, loaded themselves and their slaves with ammunition, as the thing most needful for men in their circumstances, buried the church plate, and secured as many of their most valuable effects as the urgency of the occasion would allow ; and so busily were they employed in these arrangements, that when they were about to leave the town, there remained but one avenue which the enemy had not occupied. By this it was two hours after midnight ; the settlement was in too rude a state to have good roads, even immediately near the principal city ; they were bewildered, and in endeavouring to regain the path must have fallen into the hands of the invader, if they had not found a negress who was employed in making charcoal in the woods ; she directed them on their way to the river Bengo, where the Jesuits had a farm, and where there were large plantations of maize. The Angolan war now assumed the same character as that of Brazil ; a superior enemy possessed the capital, and the Portugueze kept up their

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CHAP. desultory hostilities in the country; but their inferiority was
 XIX. greater here, and they were driven successively from one post
 1641. to another, till finally they retreated to their fort of Massangano,
 abandoning about thirty leagues of territory to the invaders; while the natives willingly exchanged their old yoke for one of which they had never yet felt the weight.

Historia de Angola. MS.

Effects of the loss of Loanda upon Brazil.

Historia de Angola. MS.

Sim. de Vas. Vida de Almeida. 6. l. § 1.

Berlinus. 207.

The capture of Loanda happened on St. Bartholomew's day, a Saint who is famous in Catholic mythology for his exploits against the Devil: as the Saint had not interfered in their defence, the Angolan Portuguese believed that their sins had brought down this chastisement, and that Satan had been let loose against them. The Brazilians were equally astonished and dismayed at this unexpected stroke: their whole supply of negroes came from Angola; and they not only lost the direct profits of this execrable trade, but they looked for the loss of every thing in consequence, the whole business of their sugar works being performed by slaves; so compleatly were they dependent upon the labour of this injured and unhappy race, that their ruin appeared inevitable, now that the supply was in the hands of the Dutch. Nassau was of opinion that the Government of Angola ought to be appended to that of Brazil: it was just, he urged, that he who had planned and directed this important conquest, should govern the territory which he had won; and it was expedient, because of the importance of the Slave Trade to these American possessions, and because from Brazil Angola could most easily be supplied. The Company thought otherwise, and on better grounds. Portugal, they said, had always made Angola a distinct government. Brazil still required provisions from Holland, how then could it provide for these new possessions? its own affairs were sufficient fully to occupy its rulers. The simplest method of proceeding was, that ships should sail direct from Holland to Loanda, carry out stores