

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### CHAPTER I.

#### INTRODUCTION.

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 1. Definition of Cosmology . . . . .                          | 1    |
| 2. Hegel's attitude to Cosmology . . . . .                    | 2    |
| 3. The main principles illustrated in these Studies . . . . . | 3    |

### CHAPTER II.

#### HUMAN IMMORTALITY.

##### A.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| 4. The problem of this Chapter . . . . .  | 4 |
| 5. Hegel's own attitude towards Immortality . . . . .   | 5 |
| 6. Apparently best explained by his indifference . . . . .  | 5 |
| 7. The answer must depend on the Absolute Idea . . . . .  | 7 |
| 8. Two questions arise. Are we among the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute? Is each of these differentiations eternal? . . . . . | 7 |

##### B.

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 9. As to the first of these questions,—firstly, What is the nature of the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute? . . . . . | 8  |
| 10. Let us start from Hegel's category of Life . . . . .  | 9  |
| 11. The unity in this category is in the individuals—but not in each separately . . . . .   | 10 |
| 12. Nor in the aggregate of them . . . . .  | 10 |
| 13. Nor in their mutual determination . . . . .   | 11 |
| 14. The unity must be <i>for</i> each of its differentiations. Thus we get the category of Cognition . . . . .                    | 13 |
| 15. This gives us the relation we require . . . . .   | 14 |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 16. We cannot imagine any example of the category of Cognition, except the concrete state of cognition. Dangers of this . . .  | 15   |
| 17. The validity of the transition to Cognition . . . . .  | 15   |
| 18. Summary of the argument up to this point . . . . .   | 17   |
| 19. Comparison with Lotze . . . . .  | 17   |
| 20. Transition to the Absolute Idea . . . . .  | 18   |
| 21. Nature of the Absolute Idea . . . . .  | 19   |
| 22. But, though the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute are now proved to resemble selves, it is possible they may not be selves, or may not include our selves . . . . .         | 19   |
| 23. We must now endeavour to prove that our selves have characteristics which they could not have unless they were fundamental differentiations of the Absolute . . . . .                  | 20   |
| 24. No line can be drawn to separate the Self and the Not-Self . . . . .   | 21   |
| 25. The usual solution that the Self contains images of an external Not-Self is untenable . . . . .  | 21   |
| 26. On the other hand, the Self has no content which is not also Not-Self . . . . .  | 22   |
| 27. The nature of the Self is thus highly paradoxical . . . . .  | 23   |
| 28. It need not therefore be false, but, if not, its paradoxes must be shown to be transcended contradictions . . . . .  | 23   |
| 29. In a system like Hegel's it cannot be taken as false . . . . .   | 25   |
| 30. And no demonstration that its paradoxes are transcended contradictions can be found, except on the hypothesis that the Self is a fundamental differentiation of the Absolute . . . . . | 25   |
| <b>C.</b>  |      |
| 31. We now turn to the second question stated in Section 8. Are the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute eternal? . . . . .  | 26   |
| 32. Can the selves change? They are reproductions of the Absolute . . . . .  | 27   |
| 33. Neither of the two elements of the Absolute can change . . . . .   | 27   |
| 34. Even if the selves could change, they could not perish . . . . .   | 29   |
| 35. For the Absolute does not stand to its manifestations in the same relation as finite things to their manifestations . . . . .  | 30   |
| 36. Change is only possible when reality is viewed under categories having something of the nature of Essence in them . . . . .  | 32   |
| 37. To maintain that the Individuals could change while the Absolute remains the same implies that we have not transcended the category of Matter and Form . . . . .                       | 33   |
| 38. Our selves, no doubt, are not given as changeless, or as in perfect harmony with the universe . . . . .  | 34   |
| 39. But it is as difficult for Idealism to deny, as to affirm, the perfection and changelessness of the Self . . . . .   | 34   |
| 40. Selves can be viewed under the Absolute Idea . . . . .   | 36   |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ix

## D.

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 41. Personal Identity lies in Identity of Substance . . . . .  | 36   |
| 42. Further explanation of this . . . . .  | 37   |
| 43. The theory that Personal Identity lies in Memory . . . . .   | 39   |
| 44. The theory that Personal Identity lies in continuity of character . . . . .  | 40   |
| 45. Mr Bradley's objection that the Self is not a sufficiently adequate representation of the Absolute to be Immortal . . . . .  | 40   |
| 46. This objection considered . . . . .  | 41   |
| 47. His objection that our desire for Immortality is no argument for Immortality . . . . .                                       | 43   |
| 48. His objection that Immortality might not give us that for which we desire it . . . . .                                       | 43   |
| 49. Lotze's opinion that we have no evidence of Immortality . . . . .  | 45   |
| 50. But with Lotze the unity of the Absolute is more fundamental than its plurality . . . . .                                    | 45   |
| 51. And it is this, in which he differs from Hegel, that is decisive for his view on Immortality . . . . .                       | 47   |
| 52. Lotze's objection to the pre-existence of the Self. Pre-existence is indeed a probable conclusion from Immortality . . . . . | 47   |
| 53. But why should pre-existence be regarded as unsatisfactory? . . . . .  | 48   |
| 54. Lives not connected by memory would be rather fragmentary. But all life in time is fragmentary . . . . .                     | 49   |
| 55. And the nature of each life would be a free development from that of the life before . . . . .                               | 50   |
| 56. Nor would the change be equivalent to the annihilation of one self and creation of another . . . . .                         | 50   |
| 57. And, in particular, the personal relations of each life would spring out of those of the life before . . . . .               | 52   |
| 58. And may, in many cases, be held to be actually the same relations . . . . .  | 53   |
| 59. Indeed, nothing is really lost by the loss of memory . . . . .   | 54   |
| 60. Although it is inevitable that it should appear to us that something is lost . . . . .                                       | 54   |

## CHAPTER III.

## THE PERSONALITY OF THE ABSOLUTE.

## A.

|  |    |
|--|----|
| 61. Hegel's definition of God makes God's existence a truism. The important question is whether God is a person . . . . .  | 56 |
| 62. Hegel's God is more conveniently referred to as the Absolute . . . . .   | 58 |
| 63. Hegel regards the Absolute as a spiritual unity. And spirit as personal. But it does not follow that he thought the Absolute to be a Person. Nor do I believe that he did think so . . . . . | 58 |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 64. It is not necessary that the individuals should be <i>for</i> the unity .  | 59   |
| 65. Indeed it is impossible—in the sense in which the unity is <i>for</i> the individuals . . . . .  | 60   |
| 66. This view cannot properly be condemned as atomistic . . . . .  | 61   |
| <b>B.</b>  |      |
| 67. It does not, however, necessarily follow from this that the Absolute is not a Self . . . . .   | 63   |
| 68. Lotze's arguments for the personality of the Absolute . . . . .  | 64   |
| 69. In his contention that the Ego is independent of the Non-Ego we may agree in a certain sense . . . . .   | 66   |
| 70. But not in the sense in which it would allow of an Infinite Person . . . . .   | 67   |
| 71. And the possibility that the Absolute should be a Person becomes trivial . . . . .   | 69   |
| 72. And it would be a Personality entirely unlike ours . . . . .   | 69   |
| 73. Lotze's asserted immediate certainty that the greatest must exist  | 70   |
| 74. If this be taken as strictly immediate it is only of interest for Lotze's biography . . . . .  | 71   |
| 75. If it be taken as a conclusion admitting of proof, it has no probability unless the truth of Idealism has been demonstrated                                    | 72   |
| 76. Even in that case, we cannot infer that what men have always desired is a fundamental demand of spirit . . . . .   | 72   |
| 77. Nor have all men desired the existence of a personal God . . . . .   | 74   |
| 78. And no attempt has been made to prove <i>à priori</i> that a personal God is a fundamental demand of spirit. . . . .   | 74   |
| 79. Lotze's theory that the differences between the Infinite and the Finite are such as to make the Infinite the only real Person .                                | 75   |
| 80. This theory considered. Unities of System and Unities of Centre . . . . .  | 76   |
| 81. An Individual is not hindered from being self-determined by the existence of outside reality to which he is in relation . . . . .                              | 78   |
| 82. The same continued . . . . .   | 79   |
| 83. Nor, if he were, would it follow that the Infinite was a Person .  | 80   |
| 84. We have only dealt with those of Lotze's arguments which would be applicable to Hegel's Absolute . . . . .   | 81   |
| <b>C.</b>  |      |
| 85. The individual unity in consciousness . . . . .  | 81   |
| 86. Such a unity is not found in the Absolute. And it is this unity which gives the direct sense of Self which forms the positive essence of Personality . . . . . | 82   |
| 87. Thus even the valueless possibility of Personality mentioned in Section 71 can no longer be predicated of the Absolute . . . . .                               | 84   |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

xi

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 88. The impossibility of this becomes more obvious when we reflect that the differentiations of the Absolute are themselves Persons . . . . .                       | 84   |
| 89. The Absolute could be called a Person if we extended the meaning of the term to cover all spiritual unities. But this would be wasteful and confusing . . . . . | 85   |
| 90. It is unmeaning to enquire whether the Absolute is higher or lower than a Person . . . . .  | 87   |
| <b>D.</b>   |      |
| 91. Would the denial of Personality to the Absolute affect our morality? There is no logical justification for its doing so .                                       | 88   |
| 92. We have not sufficient evidence to determine whether it would do so in fact . . . . .   | 89   |
| 93. But what evidence is available seems against the supposition.   | 90   |
| 94. We have even less light on the value of the effect that such a denial would have upon our emotions . . . . .  | 91   |
| 95. At any rate, the belief in a personal Absolute is nearly as far removed from the historical belief in God as is the belief in an impersonal Absolute . . . . .  | 92   |
| 96. It is better not to call an impersonal Absolute by the name of God . . . . .  | 93   |

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE SUPREME GOOD AND THE MORAL CRITERION.

**A.**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 97. The nature of Supreme Reality. This is not, as such, the Supreme Good . . . . .   | 95 |
| 98. In point of fact, however, the Supreme Reality, according to Hegel, is also the Supreme Good . . . . .                                      | 96 |
| 99. This Supreme Good is not purely hedonistic . . . . .  | 96 |
| 100. The Moral Criterion need not be identical with the Supreme Good . . . . .  | 96 |
| 101. The necessity of a Moral Criterion . . . . .   | 97 |
| 102. We must judge our actions according to their relatively immediate consequences, as their ultimate consequences are unknown to us . . . . . | 98 |

**B.**

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 103. The idea of Perfection will not serve as a Moral Criterion | 99  |
| 104. The same continued . . . . .                               | 100 |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 105. The same continued . . . . .  | 101  |
| 106. Examples of the ambiguity of the idea of Perfection as a Moral Criterion . . . . .  | 102  |
| 107. The attempt to use it as a Moral Criterion leads to sophistry . . . . .   | 104  |
| 108. Again, the idea of Perfection is useless when the question is quantitative. Examples of this . . . . .  | 104  |
| 109. And an Ethical system is bound to provide the principles upon which such questions can be answered . . . . .  | 105  |
| 110. Nor would the principle of "my station and its duties" be available as a Moral Criterion . . . . .  | 106  |
| <b>C.</b>  |      |
| 111. On the other hand the calculation of Pleasures and Pains does seem to give us an applicable criterion, whether it is a correct one or not . . . . . | 108  |
| 112. We do know the difference between Pleasures and Pains . . . . .   | 108  |
| 113. The objection that Pleasure is an abstraction . . . . .   | 109  |
| 114. The objection that Pleasures vanish in the act of enjoyment . . . . .   | 109  |
| 115. The objection that Pleasures are intensive quantities, and so cannot be added together . . . . .  | 110  |
| 116. But we are continually adding them, in cases where no one would suppose that the results were completely unmeaning . . . . .                        | 111  |
| 117. And such additions have some place in morality, on any system of Ethics . . . . .   | 112  |
| 118. And every system of Ethics, which requires a Criterion at all, has either Pleasure or Perfection, in some form, as that Criterion . . . . .         | 112  |
| 119. Now Perfection as a Criterion also requires the addition of intensive quantities . . . . .  | 113  |
| 120. Examples of this . . . . .  | 114  |
| 121. Thus Ethics of every sort seem to stand or fall with the possibility of the addition of intensive quantities . . . . .                              | 115  |
| 122. And there seems, on consideration, no reason why they should not be added . . . . .   | 116  |
| 123. This is not affected by the impossibility of very precise measurements . . . . .  | 117  |
| <b>D.</b>  |      |
| 124. How far, then, is Pleasure a <i>correct</i> Criterion? The Good may be analyzed into Development and Harmony . . . . .                              | 118  |
| 125. Of Harmony the hedonic Criterion is a trustworthy test, but this is not always the case with Development . . . . .                                  | 119  |
| 126. Although, in the long run, the greatest Development and the greatest Happiness are inseparable . . . . .  | 120  |

TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 127. Examples of this . . . . .   | 121  |
| 128. When Harmony and Development lead in different directions, the conflict is not between Pleasure and Perfection, but between two elements of Perfection . . . . . | 122  |
| 129. The solution of the difficulty adopted by Common Sense . . . . .   | 123  |
| 130. But neither this nor any other is satisfactory . . . . .   | 123  |
| 131. Summary of results. There are some cases in which we have no Criterion to trust . . . . .  | 123  |
| 132. This does not introduce so much practical uncertainty as might be supposed . . . . .   | 125  |
| 133. Some uncertainty, no doubt, it produces. But it does not deny that there is an objective Right, though we cannot know it . . . . .                               | 126  |
| 134. And everyone must admit that we <i>do</i> not always know the Right. The difference is not great . . . . .   | 126  |
| 135. Nor is the attainment of the Good ultimately dependent on our action . . . . .   | 127  |
| 136. No doubt such a view brings out the fact that Virtue is not an ultimate conception. But this is an advantage . . . . .   | 127  |

CHAPTER V

PUNISHMENT.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 137. Definition of Punishment . . . . .  | 129 |
| 138. Theories justifying Punishment . . . . .  | 130 |
| 139. The vindictive theory has fallen out of favour . . . . .  | 131 |
| 140. What is Hegel's theory? It has been supposed to be the vindictive theory, but this is incorrect . . . . .   | 132 |
| 141. Hegel's theory is that Punishment, as such, may cause Repentance . . . . .  | 133 |
| 142. The objection that all Punishment is essentially degrading . . . . .  | 134 |
| 143. But can Punishment, as such, produce Repentance? . . . . .  | 135 |
| 144. It can do so, if inflicted by an authority which the culprit recognizes as embodying the moral law . . . . .  | 136 |
| 145. But is such a recognition compatible with a violation of the law? Yes. (a) The recognition may not have sufficient strength to enable us to resist temptation . . . . . | 137 |
| 146. (b) Or we may fail to see that the law applies to a particular case . . . . .   | 138 |
| 147. (c) Or we may not know that the authority had forbidden the act in question . . . . .   | 138 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 148. But would Punishment be just in these last two cases?<br>There is no reason that it should not be just . . . .   | 139  |
| 149. (d) Or our recognition of the authority, previous to the<br>Punishment, may have been too vague to determine our<br>action . . . . .   | 141  |
| 150. Thus Punishment produces Repentance by emphasising the<br>element of Disgrace . . . . .  | 142  |
| 151. Disgrace must be distinguished from Degradation . . . .  | 143  |
| 152. It is not advisable to trust exclusively to the Disgrace in-<br>volved in the fault . . . . .  | 144  |
| 153. It is rarely that the Punishments of a modern State can<br>produce Repentance. The main object of such Punish-<br>ment should be deterrent . . . . .   | 144  |
| 154. And most offences against such a State are either (a) com-<br>mitted deliberately from a sense of duty . . . . .   | 145  |
| 155. Or (b) committed by persons in whom the sense of right<br>is, in the matter in question, hopelessly dormant . . . .  | 146  |
| 156. And, in the remaining cases, the modern citizen does not<br>conceive the State as the embodiment of the moral law. . . .   | 146  |
| 157. Hegel's mistake lay in supposing that Punishment could<br>have the effect he treats of, when inflicted by the Criminal<br>Law of a modern State. This came from his putting the<br>State too high, and the Conscience of the Individual too<br>low . . . . . | 147  |
| 158. He forgets that a State which could be the moral authority<br>for its citizens could only have existed in antiquity . . . .  | 148  |
| 159. And that, before the higher unity of the future can be<br>attained, the State, as such, will have ceased to exist . . .  | 149  |
| 160. But although Hegel's theory has no validity in Jurisprudence,<br>it is of great importance for Education . . . . .   | 150  |

## CHAPTER VI.

## SIN.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 161. Statement of Hegel's doctrine of Sin . . . . .  | 151 |
| 162. The proof cannot be <i>à priori</i> , nor can it amount to demon-<br>stration . . . . . | 152 |
| 163. Quotations from the <i>Philosophy of Religion</i> . . . . .                             | 153 |
| 164. Innocence is good. And yet it implies the absence of<br>goodness . . . . .              | 155 |
| 165. The relation of Innocence to Virtue . . . . .   | 156 |
| 166. They are the Thesis and Synthesis of a triad . . . . .                                  | 157 |
| 167. Of which Sin is the Antithesis . . . . .  | 158 |



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

xv

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 168. But this explanation of Sin presupposes the existence of Evil  | 159  |
| 169. The subordinate triad of Sin. It may be presumed analogous to the triad of Sin, Punishment, and Repentance in the <i>Philosophy of Law</i> . . . . . | 160  |
| 170. But Retribution and Amendment will be here more appropriate terms . . . . .  | 160  |
| 171. Why Retribution must follow on Sin . . . . .   | 161  |
| 172. And Amendment on Retribution . . . . .   | 162  |
| 173. The analogy of Retribution to Punishment . . . . .   | 164  |
| 174. The transition to Virtue from Innocence and Sin . . . . .  | 165  |
| 175. The transition to Virtue from Amendment . . . . .  | 165  |
| 176. The process from Innocence to Virtue may be repeated more than once in each man . . . . .  | 166  |
| 177. Virtue can be increased otherwise than by Sin and Amendment . . . . .  | 167  |
| 178. But Innocence necessarily leads, through Sin, Retribution, and Amendment, to Virtue . . . . .  | 168  |
| 179. Yet, in fact, some members of this process are often seen, in individual cases, without being followed by the later ones . . . . .                   | 168  |
| 180. Hegel may have regarded the process as only a tendency in the individual, though an actual fact in the race . . . . .                                | 169  |
| 181. Or he may have regarded the process as completed for each individual in a subsequent life . . . . .  | 169  |
| 182. Summary . . . . .  | 170  |
| 183. Comparison with two other theories of Sin . . . . .  | 171  |
| 184. Moral evil and moral good are not so fundamentally opposed for Hegel as for many philosophers . . . . .  | 171  |
| 185. But his theory affords no logical justification for immoral action . . . . .   | 172  |
| 186. Nor is it likely, as a matter of fact, to lead to such action . . . . .  | 173  |
| 187. The theory certainly does not lend itself to the deification of Virtue . . . . .   | 174  |
| 188. An application to the principles of Education . . . . .  | 174  |

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY AS AN ORGANISM.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 189. Statement of Hegel's position . . . . .  | 177 |
| 190. The same continued . . . . .   | 178 |
| 191. Professor Mackenzie's position . . . . .   | 179 |
| 192. The intrinsic relations of parts to the whole, as proved by Professor Mackenzie, only implies mutual determination . . . . . | 180 |

| xvi  | TABLE OF CONTENTS   | PAGE |
|------|---|------|
| 193. | And need involve no higher category than Absolute Mechanism . . . . .   | 182  |
| 194. | Although the end of Society is human well-being, it does not follow that it lies within Society . . . . .           | 183  |
| 195. | Illustrations of this . . . . .   | 184  |
| 196. | A definition of Organic Unity proposed . . . . .  | 185  |
| 197. | Is Society the end of man? The ideal Society of heaven is, but not our present Society on earth . . . . .           | 187  |
| 198. | Nor <i>ought</i> our present Society to be our end . . . . .  | 188  |
| 199. | For, in progressing through it, our relation to it is often negative . . . . .                                      | 189  |
| 200. | Arguments in support of this statement . . . . .  | 190  |
| 201. | The same continued . . . . .  | 192  |
| 202. | Statement of results reached . . . . .  | 192  |
| 203. | Earthly Society does not always improve or deteriorate in proportion as its unity increases or diminishes . . . . . | 193  |
| 204. | Philosophy can afford us no guidance in acting on Society . . . . .   | 195  |
| 205. | Nor is it to be expected that it should do so . . . . .   | 196  |

## CHAPTER VIII.

### HEGELIANISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

|           |  |     |
|-----------|--|-----|
| 206.      | Introductory . . . . .   | 197 |
| 207.      | The definition of Christianity . . . . .   | 198 |
| 208.      | Division of the subject . . . . .  | 198 |
| <b>A.</b> |  |     |
| 209.      | Statement of Hegel's views on the Trinity and Personality of God. The Primary and Secondary Triads . . . . . | 199 |
| 210.      | He identifies the distinctions of the Secondary Triad with those of the Trinity . . . . .                    | 201 |
| 211.      | But the Secondary Triad forms part of a dialectic process . . . . .  | 202 |
| 212.      | And therefore the Synthesis expresses its whole reality . . . . .  | 204 |
| 213.      | This would not lead to the ordinary doctrine of the Trinity . . . . .  | 204 |
| 214.      | The Personality of God. Hegel's statement of the Primary Triad . . . . .                                     | 205 |
| 215.      | This is again a dialectic process . . . . .  | 207 |
| 216.      | And, therefore, if God is really Personal, it must be in the Kingdom of the Spirit . . . . .                 | 208 |
| 217.      | God in the Kingdom of the Spirit is a Community . . . . .  | 209 |
| 218.      | And so can scarcely be a Person—especially as it is bound together by Love . . . . .                         | 210 |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 219. Hegel's use of the word Love . . . . .   | 211  |
| 220. Its relation to Friendship . . . . .   | 212  |
| 221. And to Particularity . . . . .   | 212  |
| 222. Hegel's views on the Personality of God have been obscured<br>by his use of the word God . . . . .                                 | 213  |
| 223. And by mistakes as to the nature of the Pantheism which<br>he rejects . . . . .  | 213  |
| 224. And by supposing that Spirit cannot be Personal unless<br>God is a Person . . . . .  | 214  |
| <b>B.</b>   |      |
| 225. Hegel's doctrine of Incarnation . . . . .  | 215  |
| 226. Its similarities to the Christian doctrine . . . . .   | 216  |
| 227. But, for Hegel, God is incarnate in everything finite . . . . .  | 217  |
| 228. And all the reality of everything finite is only its Incarnation<br>of God . . . . .   | 218  |
| 229. As to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation three ques-<br>tions arise, of which the first has been considered above . . . . . | 218  |
| 230. Hegel's demonstration for the necessity of the Incarnation<br>being typified in a particular man . . . . .                         | 219  |
| 231. Why the typification in <i>several</i> men would be unsatisfactory . . . . .   | 220  |
| 232. For Hegel this typification is a necessity to be regretted . . . . .   | 221  |
| 233. Why Jesus should be taken as the type—not because of<br>his personal perfection . . . . .  | 222  |
| 234. Nor of the excellence of his moral teaching . . . . .  | 222  |
| 235. But because he bears witness to the metaphysical truth of<br>the Unity of God and Man . . . . .                                    | 223  |
| 236. But the Unity is asserted merely immediately . . . . .   | 224  |
| 237. And the Unity asserted is itself immediate, and therefore<br>only one side of the truth . . . . .                                  | 225  |
| 238. Why the type must be found in a teacher whose assertion<br>of the Unity was immediate . . . . .                                    | 226  |
| 239. And why it must be found in a teacher who asserted an<br>immediate Unity . . . . .   | 226  |
| 240. In what sense the position of Jesus was determined by the<br>choice of the Church . . . . .  | 228  |
| 241. Hegel's view of Jesus is, at all events, not the usual Chris-<br>tian view . . . . .   | 229  |
| <b>C.</b>   |      |
| 242. Hegel's statement of the doctrine of Original Sin . . . . .  | 230  |
| 243. The consequences of this doctrine, as held by Hegel . . . . .  | 232  |
| 244. This doctrine may be true, and may be Christian, but it<br>is by no means specially Christian . . . . .                            | 233  |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 245. And he regards Sin as, at any rate, superior to Innocence . . . . .   | 234  |
| 246. As is seen in his treatment of the Fall . . . . .   | 234  |
| 247. Hegel's statement of the doctrine of Grace . . . . .  | 236  |
| 248. This doctrine, again, is not specially Christian . . . . .  | 237  |
| 249. Hegel would seem to attribute the doctrine of Grace to<br>Jesus, and that of Original Sin to his successors . . . . . | 238  |
| 250. As to morality—its commands and prohibitions are much<br>the same for Hegel as for Christianity . . . . .             | 239  |
| 251. But he differs from Christianity in the comparatively slight<br>importance he gives, (a) to Sin . . . . .             | 239  |
| 252. (b) to Conscience . . . . .   | 240  |
| 253. (c) to Immortality . . . . .  | 241  |
| 254. (d) to Purity of Motive . . . . .   | 242  |
| 255. (e) And, indeed, to morality as a whole . . . . .   | 242  |
| 256. (f) Moreover, the ideas of humility and contrition for sin<br>have for Hegel only a relative validity . . . . .       | 243  |

## D.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 257. Summary of results . . . . .   | 245 |
| 258. Why did Hegel attempt to connect with Christianity a<br>system so unlike the ordinary doctrines of Christians? . . . . .                                 | 245 |
| 259. It cannot have been from cowardice, or from a regard for<br>the interests of the non-philosophical public . . . . .                                      | 245 |
| 260. Nor can it be attributed to a sympathy for the life and<br>character of Jesus . . . . .  | 246 |
| 261. The explanation is to be found in his definition of Religion<br>as something which cannot give absolute truth . . . . .                                  | 247 |
| 262. His meaning will be that no Religion can ever give a closer<br>approach to absolute truth than is given by Christianity . . . . .                        | 248 |
| 263. And, if Hegel's philosophy is true, it must be admitted that<br>no Religion <i>has</i> approximated to the truth as closely as<br>Christianity . . . . . | 249 |
| 264. Historical confirmation of this view . . . . .   | 250 |

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE FURTHER DETERMINATION OF THE ABSOLUTE.

## A.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 265. An Idealist philosophy has three stages . . . . .     | 252 |
| 266. The practical importance of the third stage . . . . . | 253 |
| 267. The subject of the present chapter . . . . .          | 254 |
| 268. The nature of perfected Knowledge . . . . .           | 255 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS xix

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 269. In which the question "Why is the Universe as a whole what it is?" is the only one which remains, and is illegitimate . . . . . | 257  |
| 270. The nature of perfected Volition . . . . .  | 258  |
| 271. The significance of a life which enjoyed this perfection would be summed up in Love . . . . .                                   | 260  |
| 272. And in nothing else . . . . .   | 261  |
| 273. The apparently unreasoning nature of Love. . . . .  | 262  |

**B.**

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 274. Love is not only the highest reality in the universe, but the sole reality . . . . .   | 262 |
| 275. For (a) the duality between Knowledge and Volition cannot be maintained in the Absolute . . . . .  | 263 |
| 276. The distinction between Knowledge and Volition is not in their relation to action . . . . .  | 263 |
| 277. Nor in the activity or passivity of the mind . . . . .   | 264 |
| 278. But is that, in a case of imperfect harmony, we condemn, in Knowledge our ideas, in Volition the facts . . . . .   | 265 |
| 279. The same continued . . . . .   | 266 |
| 280. This distinction could find no place in perfection . . . . .   | 267 |
| 281. An objection considered. . . . .   | 268 |
| 282. The perfected state of Spirit could not be mere Feeling. There only remains Emotion . . . . .  | 269 |
| 283. The only form of Emotion which could fill this place would be Love . . . . .   | 270 |
| 284. And Love does transcend the opposition between Knowledge and Volition . . . . .  | 270 |
| 285. A second line of argument leads to the same conclusion: for (b) both Knowledge and Volition postulate an ideal which they can never reach, as long as they remain Knowledge and Volition . . . . . | 271 |
| 286. The element of the Not-Self is essential to Knowledge and Volition. But it is incompatible with their perfection . . . . .   | 272 |
| 287. In Knowledge this element shows itself in apparent opposition to the Self . . . . .  | 273 |
| 288. And this is the reason that we cannot get rid of the illegitimate question "Why is the Universe as a whole what it is?" . . . . .  | 273 |
| 289. The possibility of knowing that Knowledge is inadequate . . . . .  | 274 |
| 290. Again, Volition requires that all Experience shall be a Means to the End of the person who wills . . . . .   | 274 |
| 291. The element of the Not-Self prevents this . . . . .  | 276 |
| 292. And this gives an appearance of contingency to all satisfaction of Volition . . . . .  | 276 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 293. In a perfected state of Spirit, we must be able to regard the Not-Self as we regard the Self . . . . .                 | 277  |
| 294. The Not-Self of each of us is some other Selves . . . . .  | 278  |
| 295. In Love we regard the person loved in the same way as we regard ourselves . . . . .                                    | 278  |
| 296. Reasons for believing this . . . . .   | 278  |
| 297. The same continued . . . . .   | 279  |
| 298. And thus Love supplies the defects of Knowledge and Volition . . . . .   | 280  |
| 299. A third line of argument leads to the same conclusion : for (c) each Individual must have an unique nature of its own. | 281  |
| 300. Explanation of this . . . . .  | 282  |
| 301. This nature cannot be found in Knowledge or Volition . . . . .   | 284  |
| 302. But may be found in Love . . . . .   | 285  |
| 303. Thus three lines of argument lead to the same conclusion . . . . .   | 285  |

## C.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 304. The objection that Love is not at present self-subsistent . . . . .                         | 285 |
| 305. Love, if perfect, would be inconsistent with sense-presentation . . . . .                   | 286 |
| 306. And with time . . . . .   | 287 |
| 307. The objection that Love does not always at present vary directly with development . . . . . | 288 |
| 308. This Love cannot be Love of God . . . . .   | 289 |
| 309. And still less of mankind . . . . .   | 290 |
| 310. Its nature . . . . .  | 290 |
| 311. Its extent . . . . .  | 291 |
| 312. The mystical character of our conclusion . . . . .  | 292 |