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978-1-108-02516-4 - The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Volume 2

Edited by John Gurwood

Excerpt

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THE
OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

INDIA.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 28th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to forward a letter, with its enclosures, which I have received from Mr. Gilmour, the staff surgeon with this division of the army; which I will thank you to lay before the Hon. the Governor in Council, with my request that he will give orders that the wine, therein reported to be lost, may be replaced; and that, in future, when medical stores are sent from Bombay, they may be more carefully packed. I beg that you will inform the Hon. the Governor in Council, that I have found it difficult to procure money at Poonah for bills on Bombay, drawn at 30 days' sight; and that, as I cannot carry on the war without money, I have again drawn bills on him at 8 and 15 days' sight.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 28th Oct. 1803.

My letters of the 24th and 25th, the last of which, with the postscript, was sent to you in triplicate, will have apprised you of my return to this quarter, and of the cause of this movement. It is unpleasant that we can-

G. O.

Camp at Binkenholey, 27th Oct. 1803.

Orders have been given that all payments at the pay office, till further orders, may be made, one fourth in rupees, one fourth in Porto Novo pagodas, and one half in other gold coins of a superior description.

In future, when bills are granted at the pay office, one fourth of the sum tendered must be in rupees, and one half in a gold coin of a better description than Porto Novo pagodas.

Heads of departments are requested to pay particular attention to the money transactions of their conicopoly and writers, and to see that they pay the brinjaries and other grain dealers in the coins which, and according to the proportions in which, they are received at the pay office.

It is requested that all large payments, such as to bullock owners, &c., and in general all payments of cash, may be made upon this principle, by which much inconvenience and loss will be avoided.

VOL. I. INDIA; or Vol. II. if bound separately.

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not take all the advantage I could wish of our success; but the fact is, that offensive operations are not expected from us in this quarter; and, although I am willing, and have undertaken them already, I must take care not to risk, by attempting too much, that for which I am sent here, and the failure of the service expected from me: viz., the defence of the Nizam's and Peshwah's territories. Besides, I have to tell you, between ourselves, that matters are not as they should be at ———; and they cannot well be worse than they are at ———: it is, therefore, peculiarly incumbent on me to act with caution.

I think that, in a day or two, I shall drive off Ragojee Bhoonslah. I shall give you notice of every thing that passes; and as soon as ever I make it certain that he is out of the country, you may begin your march towards Gawilghur. We may eventually invade Hindustan, but I think that, before we do that, we ought to secure our right flank by taking Gawilghur, and, if possible, forcing Ragojee to a peace. I wrote to Rajah Mohiput Ram to desire him to take possession of the talooks depending on Burhampoor and Asseerghur, in the name of the Soubah of the Deccan. I shall be near Aurungabad to-morrow. Your Buswunt rice was to be on the Godavery on the 25th. I shall forward it on to Adjuntee, to which place you might send for it.

To Ballojee Koonger.

30th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter [its contents recapitulated], and Col. Stevenson has transmitted to me a Persian letter, in which you have informed him that Mahomed Meer Khan was about to be sent on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see Meer Khan. I will receive him in a manner suitable to his rank, and I will pay every attention to what he may have to communicate.

To Mahomed Meer Khan.

30th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter, and Mirza Wahed Beg has communicated to me what you desired he should, and Col. Stevenson has sent me different letters which you have written to him, and one which Ballojee Koonger has written to him in the Persian language, by which I learn that you are coming here on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see you, and will receive you with the honors due to your rank and character, and I shall pay every attention to what you may have to communicate.

Mirza Wahed Beg will inform you of the arrangement which I have made for a guard to meet you. I enclosed a letter to the officers in the service of the Company, and their allies, to desire that you may be suffered to pass in security to my camp. You will hear at Adjuntee at what place you may find my camp.

G. O.

Camp at Chicuiltana, 29th Oct. 1803.

If the drum beats for marching to-morrow, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers will see that their musket ammunition is marched on the flank of their corps; and that heads of departments, and others, will see that the departments and baggage are laden and sent off early.

A guard of 1 havildar, 1 naig, and 12 sepoy, from the corps on the right of the line, to march to the rear immediately, to bring up a tumbrel which broke down, and was left without a guard on the road.

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To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 31st Oct. 1803.

1. I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 19th inst., with its enclosure, being the copy of one from Messrs. Forbes and Co., and Messrs. Bruce, Faucett, and Co.

2. As far as I am concerned in the property captured at Baroach, I am of opinion that the proposition of those gentlemen is very reasonable, and that it ought to be complied with.

3. In respect to the letter from those gentlemen, it might probably have been as well to have omitted all the injurious expressions and reflections which it contains.

4. I have not by me at present any papers or documents to which I can refer, and I write solely from memory. But, as well as I can recollect, His Majesty has reserved to himself the disposal of the property in all forts captured in India, in the operations against which his troops may be employed with those of the Company, excepting military stores, half of which are by charter granted to the Company.

5. His Majesty has been graciously pleased, from time to time, to grant this property to the troops employed in the capture of the fort in which it might be found, and occasionally the supreme British authority in India has taken upon itself to anticipate his Majesty's intention, and to give the property to the troops; and this is the claim which the troops have to prize property.

6. The question respecting the property belonging to British merchants found at Baroach is, whether it is included in that reserved by His Majesty in his Royal charter. Those concerned in the capture, I conclude, think it is; the merchants think it is not. But surely there is no occasion for interference, or acrimony of expression, or reflection, in urging the claim of either party.

7. Whatever may be the fate of the property hereafter, it is certain that, if it had not been for the gallantry of the troops who took Baroach, it would never have come into the hands of the British merchants; and it might be as well, possibly, to refrain from accusing of injustice and unjustifiable measures those to whom such benefits are to be attributed, only because they state their doubts respecting the real ownership of the property, which, according to the writers of the same paper that contains these accusations, is a question involving points of a peculiar and delicate nature.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Naundair Barry, 31st Oct. 1803.

I have marched every day since the 25th, and arrived here this morning. I was tantalized all the morning with the sight of the enemy's camp, pitched at the distance of 20 miles. But when I arrived within 6 or 7 miles of them, they went off in a southerly direction. They have hitherto done no mischief, excepting to the small villages. Your rice is safe at Goondy. It arrived there yesterday.

I do not know how long I shall be detained on this expedition against Ragojee Bhoonslah. You must, therefore, continue your watch upon Scindiah's motions. I still think that Ragojee will move off to the east. Mirza Wahed Beg went off this morning. He wishes to have an order

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upon Surat for 400 rupees, which I have promised to give him, if he will lodge the money in Capt. Johnson's hands, and order Capt. Johnson to receive it. I should not be surprised if Scindiah also were to come this way.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Naundair Barry, 31st Oct. 1803.

As soon as I was certain that Asseerghur was in our hands, I determined to march to the southward, to give a check to Ragojee Bhoonslah, leaving Col. Stevenson to watch Scindiah.

This is my second halt from the bottom of the Ferdapoor ghaut; the distance is, I believe, nearly 100 miles. Ragojee Bhoonslah's camp was in my sight from a hill at the distance of 20 miles all this morning, but he went off when I arrived within 7 miles of him. It is said that he has escaped along the Godavery. I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th. He heard of it on that night. He marched 3 times, on the night before last and yesterday, and once this day. He has a vast quantity of baggage and a number of tents, and I do not despair of coming up with him. I have pushed him so hard already, that he has not had time to do much mischief, excepting to the small villages. A large convoy of Col. Stevenson's and mine, 14,000 bullocks, is safe on the Godavery, within reach of me, and Ragojee dares not go near it. Amrut Rao has not joined him, but is at Toka. The alarm in Ragojee's camp is very great.

There is no occasion for Col. Colman sending the detachment to protect the tappall.

To Lieut. Col. Munro.

Camp at Cheesekair, 1st Nov. 1803.

As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th Oct., in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts.

Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to Gen. Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Col. Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Col. Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th Sept. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary; 1st, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; 2ndly, because it was to be apprehended, that, if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward, while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or, probably, avoided altogether. Col. Stevenson and I were never more than 12 miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than 8 miles.

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As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous that, without an army, their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being Natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about 6 or 8 miles from Bokerdun.

I directed my march so as to be within 12 or 14 miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than 5 or 6 miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground: at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprised Col. Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately, or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that, if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning; and, at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp in which they should know it was: I therefore determined upon the attack immediately. It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullets, and the people who were employed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on; but some were, and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the piquets which were on the right of the first line. When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out of shot from that village: instead of that, he led directly upon it: the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies.

Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the necessity of in-

troducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which that corps lost many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made. However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the piquets on that day against Assye.

After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

Col. Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about 8 miles from me to the westward, at 8 in the morning of the 24th.

The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about 12 miles from the field of battle, 12 from the Adjuntee ghaut, and 8 from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Col. Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off and never stopped till they got down the ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Col. Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men.

I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad: I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt to raise the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, and descended the Adjuntee ghaut, and stopped Scindiah.

Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st Oct.; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army.

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I ascended the ghaut on the 25th, and have marched 120 miles since, in 8 days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar 2 days, in the course of which he has marched 5 times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If this is the case, I shall soon begin an offensive operation there. But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov. 1803.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th Oct., and I am glad to find that you are returning to the westward. Your position thereabouts strengthens every thing in this quarter.

I enclose a copy of my last letter to the Adj. Gen., which will show how matters here stand.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 2nd Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th Oct. The enclosed letter to his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward after perusal, will show you the state of our military operations in this quarter.

2. In addition to that letter, I have to inform you that I have brought Capt. — to trial before a General Court Martial, for disobedience of orders, in omitting to march from Dharore on the 21st Oct., according to the orders he had received, by which the risk to which the convoy was exposed would have been avoided, and my movements against the enemy would not have been cramped by the necessity of taking care of it.

3. The officer in charge of the treasure is at Dharore, and I shall send a detachment to-morrow to bring him in.

4. I cannot express to you how much I am distressed, and how much the public cause suffers by the total want of means of defence in this country. In order to save it this last time, I have been obliged to march 120 miles, and to pass through the Adjuntee and Chowka ghauts in 8 days; and when I arrived, all the amildars were in treaty with the enemy to pay contributions. Notwithstanding that I had announced my intention of marching in this direction, desiring that they would defend themselves, and threatening them, if they should make any accommodation with the enemy, those who received the notice paid no attention to it, and, at all events, did not communicate it to their neighbours.

G. O.

Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests Capt. Baynes to accept his thanks for the able disposition which he made of the troops under his command to defend the convoy of which he had charge, when it was attacked by vastly superior numbers of the enemy on the 31st Oct.; and that Capt. Baynes will communicate to the officers and troops under his command Major Gen. Wellesley's thanks for their steadiness upon that occasion.

This is another instance of what infantry, who preserve their order and reserve their fire, can do against numerous bodies of cavalry; and Major Gen. Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander in Chief and to Government his sense of the conduct of Capt. Baynes and of the officers and troops under his command in this action.

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5. As a proof of the ease with which the country could be defended, and our troops employed in the enemy's districts, I mention that a jemidar and 20 men, who had been posted at Rackisbaum in charge of boats, and whom I have detained there since the river has fallen, in order to give confidence to the grain dealers going to the southward to purchase grain, saved that town, although Ragojee Bhoonslah was encamped near it with his army: when he marched off, the jemidar sallied out, took an elephant, some horses, and threw the baggage into confusion. If the government of Hyderabad would have attended to your recommendation, this would have been the case with every village in the country.

6. In respect to the minister's letter, I have again to observe, that I have been particularly cautious not to suffer any grain to be consumed in this camp which is brought by the grain dealers attached to the Nizam's troops. It frequently happens that they come to this camp, and as regularly I send them off with an escort to that of the Nizam. Col. Stevenson informs me that he is equally cautious upon this subject.

7. I am fully aware that it is very desirable to carry the war into Berar, and I have no doubt but that, unless we do carry it there, we shall have no peace. But the question is, can the war be carried into Berar unless the Soubah of the Deccan defends his country? and he is, or his ministers, willing to submit to the loss, which must be incurred, by exposing it to invasions, undefended by a British army, in its present state.

8. If the war should be carried into Berar, I conceive that the Soubah will not be exonerated from the necessity of storing his forts with grain; and I certainly should think the expedition into that country a matter of some risk, if the only dependence of the subsistence of troops was the grain which they should find in the Rajah's territories.

9. Although the smaller forts are in the hands of the zemindars and others, it is to be supposed that there is some mode of obliging them to keep them in repair, to have garrisons in them, and to defend them. If something is not done on this subject, I must confine the operations of the troops to a strict defensive.

10. I conclude that the Soubah's mind will have been satisfied upon the subject of the division of the conquered territory, since that depending upon Burhampoor and Asseerghur has been delivered over to the officers of this government. But he has no occasion to complain respecting the territory depending upon Ahmednuggur, as the district of Jalnapoor, which was included in that territory, has been given over to him.

11. But this question respecting territory ought not now to be taken into consideration at all. Under the treaty the parties have agreed that they will adjust the rule of partition of all conquests, and that his Highness the Nizam shall be entitled to participate equally with the Company. But the meaning of the treaty is, that they may adjust the rule of partition of conquest after the war; and, therefore, putting out of the question all considerations of the Nizam's right to participate equally with the Company, connected with the non-performance of his engagements, it does not appear to me necessary to give any other answer to this part of the minister's letter, excepting to state the fact that the Soubah's servants have

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possession of Jalnapoor, which is part of Ahmednuggur, and of the districts depending on Burhampoor and Asseerghur, and that the question of participation in conquests is one to be considered at the conclusion of the war.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov. 1803.

After I had sent off my dispatch of the 24th Oct. to your Excellency, I received authentic accounts that the Rajah of Berar had passed through the hills which form the boundary of Candeish, and had moved towards the river Godavery. I therefore ascended the Adjuttee ghaut on the 25th, continued my march to the southward on the 26th, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th.

The Rajah had advanced gradually to the eastward, and was at Lucka-gaum, about 20 miles north from Puttun, when I arrived at Aurungabad; and between that night and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which time I was in his neighbourhood, he moved his camp 5 times.

On the 31st, he detached a body, consisting of 5000 horse, to endeavor to intercept a convoy consisting of 14,000 bullocks, which was going forward to join the troops on the frontier. The convoy was protected by 3 companies of the 2nd batt. of 3rd Madras Native infantry, with two 3-pounders, under Capt. Baynes, (which detachment, with 400 Mysore horse, has for some time been employed in conveying grain from the districts south of the Godavery to my camp,) and by a company from the subsidiary force, and 2 companies from the corps serving at Hyderabad, under the command of Capt. Seton.

They had marched from the Godavery on the morning of the 31st, and reached Umber, where they were attacked: they succeeded in beating off the enemy, and in securing the convoy, which arrived in safety in my camp yesterday, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers by which they were attacked.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the reports of this action, which I have received from Capt. Baynes; * upon which I have to observe, that it

* Capt. Baynes to the Dep. Adj. Gen.

Umber, 31st Oct. 1803.

I beg you will report to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, that I was attacked this day about 2 o'clock, P.M., by about 4000 or 5000 horse. They came on at first as if determined to charge, but receiving a few shot from our guns, they retired; and though they frequently came near us, as if to charge, and some of them within musket shot, they were always driven back.

Our loss is one European wounded, 2 sepoys wounded, and some Mysoreans killed and wounded, besides a few (perhaps 3) horses killed. The loss of the enemy is much greater, particularly in horses. I beg you to say to the General that I shall take post till I shall receive his instructions. I write this by moonlight, which will, I hope, apologize for haste. We were under arms till about sunset, at which time they were out of sight.

Capt. Baynes to the Dep. Adj. Gen.

Umber, 1st Nov. 1803.

I last night had the honor to inform you that I had repulsed a body of Bhoonslah's horse, and have now, for the information of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, to make you more fully informed of the circumstances.

I arrived with my convoy about 12 o'clock, and encamped near the town, with my right flank to it, and my rear protected by a hill. At 2 o'clock, P.M., the attack began, without more than 10 minutes' warning of their approach, by throwing
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affords another instance of what can be done by disciplined infantry, determined to do their duty, against very superior numbers of cavalry.

I beg leave also to take this opportunity to draw your Lordship's notice to the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit. This corps, which consists of 2000 men, have performed all the light troop duties of this division of the army since I was detached from the Toombuddra, in the month of March last. They have performed these duties with the utmost cheerfulness, and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this description. They have frequently been engaged with the enemy's light troops, have conducted themselves well, and have lost many men and horses. To the credit of the government of Mysore, I mention that they are paid as regularly as the British troops; and the consequence is, that it is possible to keep them in order and from plundering the country. It is to their example that I attribute the conduct of the Marhatta troops serving with this division of the army, and of which I have no reason to complain.

The Rajah of Berar has moved to the eastward, and I think he is going to his own territories. I have no doubt but that he would have been obliged to do so, even without my presence in these districts, if any one step had been taken by the government for their protection, or, I might add, if there existed any government in the country. It is now obvious that horse alone cannot make any impression on a country; and if there had been only a few peons in the villages, as has been frequently recommended to the government of Hyderabad by the Resident, the Rajah must have lost the whole of his baggage in the confused and precipitate flight which he has made since I have been in this neighbourhood.

The government of Hyderabad appear determined to do nothing in their own defence; and your Excellency will be surprised to learn that even the city of Aurungabad, in which so many of his Highness' relations, and the families of so many of his sirdars reside, is held by 500 men of the old French infantry, who, I have every reason to believe, are a part of the corps which, under the treaty, ought to be in the field. This conduct in the government of Hyderabad will, I much fear, put it out of my power to carry the war into Berar as I wish, unless the Rajah should retire towards Nagpur. I am convinced, however, that, until I am enabled to carry the war into that country, no progress will have been made towards procuring a peace. Dowlut Rao Scindiah moved to the eastward as soon as I ascended the Adjuntee ghaut, and he was at Eedalabad on the 29th Oct.

great numbers of rockets, and advancing upon our left: this obliged me to change my front by wheeling to the left; at the same time some of them were within musket shot. I then opened my guns, which stopped their approach: they at this time moved round, as if to gain the rear, where the brinjaries were. This movement obliged me to detach a party to cover them, and having previously posted a company on the hill in my rear, my line became very small: to prevent their knowing my exact strength, I drew up the Mysore horse in one line. They came on repeatedly as if to charge, but were always stopped by our guns. They continued to rocket us till dark, when they retired. I am sorry to add that 100 of the gram bullocks were carried off, and some brinjarry bullocks (perhaps 100) while at grass. I have the honor to enclose a list of killed and wounded.