

CONTENTS OF VOLUME VII.

CHAPTER I.

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL FROM THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER 1854, TO THE
MIDDLE OF THE ENSUING FEBRUARY.

I.

	PAGE
The Allies now committed to what might prove a long siege,	1
The predicament in which they had placed themselves,	2
The duress they suffered,	2
The bearing of this duress upon their power as combatants,	3
The task of defence now weighing upon their energies,	3
And defence under hard conditions,	4
No idea of raising the siege could be well or even prudently har- boured,	4

II.

The double task now pressing upon the Allies,	5
Their defensive works,	5

III.

The designs of the French, though postponed, still pointing to the Flagstaff Bastion,	6
Checked in carrying forward their approaches,	6
They resort to mining,	6
Extension towards their left of siege-work carried on by the French,	7
The part taken at this time by the English in the work of the siege,	7
The great strain put on their fortitude,	8

IV.

One of the advantages conferred on the enemy by giving him time,	9
Totleben's means of drawing advantage from time,	9

vi CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

	PAGE
As compared with the means which the Allied Engineers could command,	10
Totleben's defences,	11
His more strictly defensive measures,	11
By his strictly defensive measures did he make the fortress secure?	12
His opinion,	12

V.

Totleben's measures for averting attack,	13
His aggressive batteries,	14
His rifle-pits,	14
His lodgments,	15
His aggressive countermines,	16
Petty sorties,	17
The strain they put on the guards of the trenches,	17
Novel contrivance resorted to by the Russians when attacking the French in these sorties,	17
Indignation of the French army,	18
Generous concession to its feeling by Osten-Sacken,	18
The sorties always sooner or later repressed with due vigour,	18
The French guards of the trenches compared with the English,	18
The enemy encountering our guards of the trenches,	19
Without discovering their extreme numerical weakness,	19
Departure of Prince Napoleon,	20

VI.

Natural reluctance of the French to alter their main plan of siege,	21
Burgoyne's insistence upon the expediency of assailing the Malakoff,	21
The French at first adverse to his counsels,	22
But afterwards more willingly listening to them,	23
Acceptance of Burgoyne's opinion in a Conference of Three,	23
Step tending in an opposite direction immediately taken by Canrobert,	24
His official letter to Lord Raglan,	24
Lord Raglan's way of dealing with it,	24
The French ultimately reverting to the decision of the 'Three,'	26
And on certain conditions agreeing to assail the Malakoff front,	27
The gravity of the dangers thus averted,	27
The envoy sent by Lord Raglan to the French headquarters,	28
Long delay,	29
1st and 2d February. Modified plan put forward by the French,	30
And approved by Lord Raglan,	30
But now known to have masked another design,	31

CONTENTS. vii

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

VII.

	PAGE
Import of the change of plan as first understood by the French,	31

VIII.

The French mining operations,	32
Totleben's skill and power in the science of mining,	33
His countermines,	33
Progress of the mining and countermining operations,	33
Their result,	35

IX.

The peremptory part of the besieger's design now shifting from the Flagstaff Bastion to the Malakoff,	35
--	----

X.

Dispositions consequent upon Canrobert's resolve to operate against the Malakoff,	36
The Allies commencing works destined to aid a meditated attack on the Mamelon,	37

XI.

Various movements and changes,	38
On the part of the Russians,	38
On the part of the French,	39
Their reconnaissances,	39
The treatment experienced by Forey,	39
The French breastplates,	41
On the part of the English,	41
Field-telegraph,	41
Railway,	41
Command of fleet,	41

XII.

Result of the conflict from the 6th of November 1854 to the middle of February 1855,	41
---	----

XIII.

Questions raised by scientific critics,	43
---	----

viii CONTENTS.

CHAPTER II.

EUPATORIA.

I.

	PAGE
Condition of things in Eupatoria and its neighbourhood, . . .	45

II.

Assembly of the force under Baron Wrangel,	46
Its task,	46
Danger threatening the enemy's communications,	46
Arrival of some Turkish battalions, and soon of Omar Pasha in person, at Eupatoria,	47
Question calling for Mentschikoff's decision,	47
His measures,	47
Mentschikoff's resolve to have Eupatoria attacked,	48
By forces withdrawn from Baron Wrangel,	49
And placed under General Khrouleff,	49

III.

The defences and resources of Eupatoria,	49
The forces under General Khrouleff now charged to attack Eupatoria,	51
Their preparations,	51
Their plan in its earlier stages,	52

IV.

The engagement of the 17th of February,	52
The enemy's acquiescence in this repulse,	57

CHAPTER III.

THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.

The Czar's feelings after his discomfiture before Eupatoria,	58
His illness,	58
Subsequent rumours,	58
Power of grief over the body,	58
Official account of the Czar's malady,	59
This consistent with the belief that it was brought about by grief,	59
Sequence of facts,	59
Death of the Czar,	59
The personal contention thus brought to end,	59
The fate of Nicholas,	60
Justice administered to a highly placed criminal,	61

CONTENTS. ix

CHAPTER IV.

SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL FROM THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY 1855
TO THE SECOND WEEK OF APRIL.

- I.

	PAGE
Morning of the 22d of February,	63
Sight observed by the French,	63
Totleben's inferences from what the Allies had been visibly doing,	64
His counteracting plans,	65
His Selinghinsk Redoubt,	65

II.

French night attack on the Selinghinsk Redoubt,	67
False report of this fight made to Canrobert,	71
Truce for burying the dead,	71

III.

Reason of the French for not renewing the attack,	72
The Volhynia Redoubt,	72
Continued acquiescence of the French,	72
Import and effect of these counter-works on Mount Inkerman, .	72
Decisions of the French on finding themselves thus confronted .	73

IV.

Council assembled, but with little prospect of advantage, . . .	73
Council of the 4th of March,	74
Adjourned Conference sitting on the 6th of March,	76
8th March. Canrobert renewing his endeavours to obtain Turkish reinforcements,	77
Completion and armament of the two White Redoubts,	77

V.

Arrival of the young Grand-Dukes Nicholas and Michael,	77
The Mamelon,	78
Advice of Bizot to Canrobert,	78
Declined,	78
Night of the 10th of March, Todleben establishing a Work on the Mamelon,	78
Sight greeting the French on the morning of the 11th,	79
The Kamtchatka Lunette,	79
Deliberations of the French in face of this new apparition, . . .	79
Their resolve not to assault the new work,	79
But to proceed against it by 'approaches,'	79
21st March. Todleben's completion and armament of his Kamt- chatka Lunette,	80

X CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IV.—*continued.*

VI.

	PAGE
Mortifying and perplexing effect of Todleben's counter-works,	81
Canrobert's reason for declining to seize the Mamelon,	81
The vast scope of his objection,	81
Its dangerous tendency,	82
Niel's comment on the objection,	82
Canrobert's determination to abstain from assaulting the embryo Lunette,	83
Representation on this subject imparted by Lord Raglan to Canrobert,	83

VII.

The gloomy apprehensions of Canrobert imparted to Lord Raglan,	84
Lord Raglan's comment,	84
And its tendency to relieve his despondency,	84
Lord Raglan's power of repressing despondency,	85
Did this change Canrobert's tone?	85
Allusion to recent disclosures,	85

VIII.

Vigorous advance of the French 'approaches' against the new Lunette,	86
Anxiety of the enemy to check them,	86
His sorties, 22d of March,	86
His great sortie against the French,	87
The sorties effected against the English siege-works,	89
Colonel Kelly's dispositions,	90
Zavalichine's flank movement,	92
Boudistcheff's attack,	92
Charge by Vicars with 70 or 80 men of the 97th,	93
Vicars joined by Kelly and Gordon,	93
Defeat of the column,	93
Defeat of Zavalichine's column,	94
Sound of firing towards the more western part of the Woronzoff Ridge,	95
Colonel Kelly taking his measures,	95
But wounded and taken prisoner,	96
The attack under Astapoff,	97
Means of resistance collected,	97
Fight at the Mortar Battery,	98
Defeat and flight of the Russian column,	98
Bérulleff's surprise of our advanced siege-works in the Left Attack,	99
Part of the invading force checked by some men of the 21st Fusi- liers under Carlton,	99

CONTENTS. xi

CHAPTER IV.—*continued.*

	PAGE
And ultimately retreating before it,	100
Russian troops for a while in the two advanced batteries,	100
But routed by the men of our working-parties,	100
Comments on the great sortie effected against the French,	102

IX.

Great extension given by Todleben to his counter-approaches,	104
The design of the 1st of January now so far frustrated as to be almost in abeyance,	105

X.

The siege operations maintained against the town front,	105
And by the English against the Redan and its neighbours,	106

XI.

Continuance and final success of General Canrobert's efforts to draw reinforcements from the Turkish army at Eupatoria,	106
Arrival of Omar Pasha in person with a large force of Turks,	107

XII.

Sinking of more Russian ships,	107
Death of Nicholas imparted to the Sebastopol garrison,	107
Change of Russian commanders,	108
Prince M. Gortchakoff,	108
What made this a supremely fortunate choice?	108
Admiral Istomine killed,	109
Departure of Sir John Burgoyne,	109

XIII.

Preparations for a great cannonade,	112
Allusion to recent disclosures,	112

CHAPTER V.

THE SECRET TERMS OF THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO GENERAL NIEL.

The French Emperor beginning in secret to interfere with the siege,	114
General Niel,	115
His opinions on the subject of the war in the Crimea,	115

xii CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V.—*continued.*

	PAGE
The desire of the French Emperor,	116
The 'mission' of General Niel,	116
Niel's position at the French Headquarters,	116
His plan,	117
The plan in general conformity with the wish of the French Emperor ; and approved by Canrobert,	119
Niel's task,	120
The army of Canrobert kept secretly under restraint,	120
The Emperor's plan put in course of execution,	120
Concealment of the plan from the English,	121
And of its 'separate article' from Canrobert,	121
Impressions caused by the prospect of the Emperor's going to the Crimea,	121
The concealment from Lord Raglan maintained with continued success,	123
Greatness of the difference between the plan concerted with Lord Raglan by Canrobert, and the one framed by Niel,	125
The all but inevitable consequence of imparting the Emperor's plan to Canrobert,	126
Disloyalty of the concealment practised against the English,	127
Way in which the Imperial will was brought to bear on Canrobert,	127
No apparent reluctance on the part of Canrobert to be guided by his Emperor's wish,	128
Lengthened and baneful incumbency of the Emperor's plan,	128
Explanations that might be appropriately given by Marshal Canrobert,	129
The bare facts,	129
The light thrown by this chapter on Canrobert's successive 'abstentions,'	129

CHAPTER VI.

THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.

I.

Expectations formed by those who were uninitiated in the secret of Niel's Mission,	130
--	-----

II.

Preparation for the April cannonade,	132
Counter-preparations by the Russians,	133
Conditions placing the Russians at a disadvantage,	133

CONTENTS. xiii

CHAPTER VI.—*continued.*

III.	
	PAGE
Opening and continuation of the April bombardment, . . .	135
Continuance and general effect of the bombardment, . . .	136
Over both the Town front, and the eastern part of the Faubourg, .	136
But not over the intermediate batteries directly confronted by the English,	138
IV.	
What kept within limits the battering-power of the English, . .	138
Incompleteness of some of the English preparatives, . . .	139
The Left Attack,	139
The arming of its two advanced batteries delayed,	140
The angry impatience thus caused,	141
Its apparent effect,	142
A coincidence,	142
Order given to Captain Oldershaw,	142
And executed the same night,	143
12th April. The advanced No. VII. completed, and its guns be- fore sunset engaged with the enemy,	143
Decision said to have been based on observation of this encounter,	144
V.	
The two advanced batteries of our Left Attack,	144
The 'advanced No. VII.,'	144
The enemy's accustomed way of dealing with an advanced battery,	145
Great, yet insufficient strength of its parapet,	147
The ways of a cannon-ball when obstructed, without being stopped,	147
The 'advanced No. VIII.,'	150
VI.	
The order directing Captain Oldershaw to engage the 'advanced No. 'VII. battery' on the 13th of April,	150
Captain Oldershaw,	150
Entering the battery,	152
Its state,	152
Sir Gerald Graham,	152
His account of what the battery confronted,	153
The fight,	154
The losses sustained in Oldershaw's battery,	166
General Dacres,	167
His words to Oldershaw,	167
An order given out by mistake,	168
And the touching incident to which it gave rise,	169

CHAPTER VI.—*continued.*

	PAGE
VII.	
Ground for laying full stress on the fight of the 13th of April,	170
Sir Gerald Graham,	171
His judgment of Oldershaw's fight,	171
VIII.	
Both the advanced Nos. VII. and VIII. batteries got ready for fighting on the morning of the 14th,	172
Engagement of the No. VII. battery under Captain Henry on morning of the 14th of April,	172
Simultaneous engagement of the No. VIII. battery, under Captain Walcott, on the morning of the 14th,	174
The engagements in the Nos. VII. and VIII. batteries on the 14th continued by the reliefs until dark,	177
IX.	
What put limits on the bombardment,	178
Consumption of siege-gun ammunition,	178
Losses of men sustained by the Allies in the artillery conflict,	178
Large proportion of the losses sustained by our sailors,	178
Their ways whilst manning a battery,	179
X.	
The defenders of Sebastopol,	180
Their Easter festivities mingling with the fights in the batteries,	180
The fortitude they needed for their task,	180
Their want of ammunition,	180
The sacrifices they had to make in order to be ready to meet assaults,	181
The heroism of their defence at this time,	181
Supplies of ammunition and reinforcements,	183
The tasks which the defence of Sebastopol at this time involved,	183
The two White Redoubts crushed and silenced, and not repaired,	184
But still not assaulted by the French,	185
The Malakoff covered by counter-approaches, and not therefore strongly assailed,	185
The Kamtchatka Lunette brought to ruin,	185
Not, however, assaulted by the French,	186
But still 'approached' by their sap,	186
Complete failure of the English batteries against the Great Redan,	186
The Town Front,	186
The Russians imagining the French to be resolute, and determined to seize the Flagstaff Bastion,	187
Havoc sustained by the Flagstaff Bastion and its auxiliaries on the first day,	187

CONTENTS. XV

CHAPTER VI.—*continued.*

	PAGE
So, on the second day,	188
So, on the third day,	188
So, on the fourth day,	189
So, on the fifth day,	189
So, on the sixth day,	189
State of Flagstaff Bastion,	189
The great effort made to repair it,	189
Peril of the Bastion on the seventh day,	189
On the eighth day,	190
On the ninth day,	190
On the tenth day,	190
Desperate state of Bastion,	190
Cessation of the general bombardment,	191
Flag of truce. Compliments exchanged between French and Russian officers,	191
‘Siege of Troy,’	191
Continuation of the bombardment directed against the Flagstaff Bastion and its auxiliaries,	191
Their peril on the 21st of April,	192

XI.

Question whether the bombardment opened paths for assault,	192
Answered by the facts, and by the authoritative opinion of General Todleben,	192
The bombardment achieved its set purpose,	194
But, not being followed up, it resulted in harm to the Allies,	195
Todleben’s inquiry,	195
The clue,	195

CHAPTER VII.

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL (WITH EXCLUSION OF THE APRIL BOMBARD-
MENT, ALREADY NARRATED) FROM THE 9TH OF APRIL TO THE
MIDDLE OF MAY.

I.

Bizot mortally wounded,	196
And succeeded after an interval by Niel,	198
The French opening ground by mines in front of the Flagstaff Bastion, And there forming a 4th Parallel,	199
The tendency of this successful exploit to embarrass Canrobert and Niel,	200
Todleben’s encroachments in front of the Central Bastion,	201

xvi CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VII.—*continued.*

	PAGE
Canrobert's unwillingness to resist them,	201
This, however, overcome,	202
Pélissier,	202
Not brooking the encroachments against his own front,	202
The anomaly thence resulting,	203
Fights for the Cimetière Lodgments,	203
Resulting, after some days, in the definitive success of the French,	204
Totleben's project for a new work of counter-approach,	204
The fighting for lodgments constructed in furtherance of the project,	204
The Sousdal Counter-guard,	205
Brilliant attack by the French on the Sousdal Counter-guard,	206
And capture of the Work,	206
Resulting in the complete success of the French,	207
Losses sustained in the night combat of the 1st of May,	207
Canrobert apologising for this victorious exploit,	208
The Sousdal Counter-guard converted into a French Work,	208
And held fast,	208
The fighting for lodgments in front of 'Gordon's Attack,'	208
Egerton's achievement,	209
His death,	210
His fame,	210
The praises bestowed by Lord Raglan on the troops taking part in this combat,	211
The losses it caused our people,	211
The night sorties during this period,	211
A reconnaissance by Omar Pasha,	212
Why recorded,	213
Submarine telegraph connecting the Chersonese with Varna,	213
Its counterbalancing mischiefs,	213
The Eupatoria cable,	213
The accession of 15,000 Sardinian troops under General de la Marmora,	213

CHAPTER VIII.

TROUBLED COUNSELS OF THE FRENCH.

I.

Tendency of a successful bombardment to derange the working of Niel's 'mission,'	216
Canrobert ignoring the success of the bombardment,	217

II.

Conference of 14th April,	218
Disposition on the part of the French, except Pélissier, to stop the bombardment,	218

CONTENTS. xvii

CHAPTER VIII.—*continued.*

	PAGE
But successfully combated by Lord Raglan and Lyons,	218
A slight relaxation of the fetters imposed on Canrobert by Niel's ‘mission,’	218
The miserable instruction given to Canrobert by his Emperor,	220
Canrobert’s state of mind,	220
The conduct and bearing of Niel,	220
His letter of the 16th of April to the Minister of War,	221
No termination of the secrecy which had shrouded Niel’s ‘mission,’	222
16th April. Agreement made between Canrobert and Lord Raglan,	222
But abandoned three days afterwards by Canrobert,	223
17th April. Letter from Niel to the Emperor,	223

III.

Ebullition of warlike impatience on the part of the French army,	224
Canrobert either sharing the feeling or hurried along by it,	224
Niel,	224
23d April. The French ostensibly ready to assault,	225
Preliminary conference,	226
Evening of the 23d,	226
Agreement between Canrobert and Lord Raglan for a general assault of Sebastopol,	226
Lord Raglan’s impression,	226

IV.

General Canrobert’s apparently uneasy state,	227
His letter next day (24th April) to the Emperor,	227
Niel writing to the Emperor at the same time,	227
The Emperor’s account of the two letters,	227
Morning of 25th. Canrobert resolved to put off the assault,	228
The interview between Niel and Lord Raglan,	228
Course taken by Lord Raglan,	229
25th April. Canrobert’s letter putting off the attack,	230
Lord Raglan’s observation on the French change of counsel,	230
Circumstances under which the letter to Bruat was put forward,	231
Weight due to the letter of the 7th of April,	232

V.

The previous concealment from Canrobert,	232
--	-----

VI.

Uncertainty as to the duration of the postponement,	234
Canrobert’s idea of its scope,	234
The old fetters refastened upon him,	235

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IX.

THE NOW ACTIVELY PERTURBING INTERFERENCE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON
IN THE WAR FOR SEBASTOPOL.

I.

	PAGE
The hitherto paralysing interference of the French Emperor,	236
Now changed into actively perturbing dictation,	236
His visit to England,	236
The Council of War at Windsor Castle,	237
The Emperor's resolve to join his army,	237
His agreement with our Government upon preliminary questions,	237

II.

The Emperor's proposals,	238
Acceptance by our Government of the preliminary arrangements,	239
As recorded at Buckingham Palace,	239

III.

The Emperor's plan of campaign,	239
His plan as regarded the '1st army of operation,'	239
That not objected to by our Government,	240
The Emperor's plan as regarded the '2d army of operation,'	240
Opinion formed by our Government of that last part of the plan,	241
General purport of the entire plan,	241

IV.

The Emperor abandoning his intention of going out to the Crimea,	242
His letter of instruction to Canrobert,	242

y.

3d of May. The Generals in the Crimea acquainted with the imperial plan,	245
The joy of Lord Panmure,	246

VI.

The frail basis on which it all rested, . . . 247

CONTENTS. xix

CHAPTER X.

THE INTERPOSITION OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR CONTINUING AND
BRINGING ABOUT THE RECALL OF A JOINT EXPEDITION.

I.	PAGE
Project for opening a passage into the Sea of Azof,	249
The Straits of Kertch,	249
II.	
The enemy's endeavours to guard them,	250
The Peninsula of Kertch,	251
Baron Wrangel there in command,	251
His forces,	251
The task set before him,	251
His dispositions,	252
III.	
The eagerness of the English to have the attack set on foot,	254
General Canrobert's assent to it,	254
His subsequent doubts and objections,	254
Lord Raglan's masterly answer to him,	255
Canrobert deferring to Lord Raglan,	256
IV.	
Sailing of the expedition on the 3d of May,	256
V.	
The Submarine Cable,	257
VI.	
Telegrams from Paris,	259
Night of the 3d of May,	259
Canrobert's visit to Lord Raglan with a new telegram,	259
Discussion between the two commanders,	260
Its result,	261
2.15 A.M. Arrival of aide-de-camp with yet another telegram,	261
And letter from Canrobert declaring himself,	262
Compelled to recall Admiral Bruat,	262
Reception of this by Lord Raglan,	262
VII.	
Venturesome course taken by Lord Raglan,	263
The latitude he gave to Sir George Brown,	265

XX	CONTENTS.	
	CHAPTER X.— <i>continued.</i>	
		PAGE
	VIII.	265
	IX.	
Return of the expedition,		268
Feelings excited by its recall,		269
On board the flotilla,		269
In Constantinople,		270
On the fleets and the troops,		271
Canrobert's account of the recall,		272
The justice due to him,		273
	X.	
Letter from the French Emperor,		274
In explanation of the course he had taken,		274
Comment on the letter,		275
	CHAPTER XI.	
	THE EMPEROR'S DICTATION RESISTED, THE COLLAPSE OF HIS PLAN, AND THE RESIGNATION OF CANROBERT.	
	I.	
Canrobert and Niel proposing consideration of the Emperor's plan,		277
Course taken by Lord Raglan,		278
His opinion of the plan,		278
And of what would be the right course,		279
	II.	
Pélissier's letter of the 5th of May,		279
Wholesome bearing of the letter upon the counsels of the Allies,		281
Corollary resulting from the letter in its bearing upon the Past,		281
Pélissier's growing ascendant,		282
Contrast,		283
Effect of the letter,		283
	III.	
Expositions of the Emperor's plan now before the Commanders,		283
The duties it assigned to Canrobert and Pélissier,		283
12th May. The three allied Commanders in Conference,		284

CONTENTS. xxi

CHAPTER XI.—*continued.*

	PAGE
14th May, renewed Conference. Lord Raglan prevailing,	284
Agreement as to plan of field operations,	285
But no further,	285
Canrobert peremptorily refusing to guard the English trenches,	285
Omar Pasha also refusing,	286
The consequences of these refusals,	286
Lord Raglan's mortification,	286
Rejection of plan,	286
An anomaly,	287
Canrobert's idea that the English army might be split into two,	287
The Emperor's plan exposed to contact with realities,	288
With what result,	288
Statement by Canrobert that he was going to take the field,	289
Duration of the harm done by General Niel's 'mission,'	289

IV.

General Canrobert's first endeavour to rid himself of the command,	290
16th April. His second endeavour,	291
His resignation tendered,	291
Strange interposition of Niel,	291
Canrobert's command given up and transferred to Péliissier,	292
Assigned causes of Canrobert's resignation,	292
The merit of Canrobert's self-sacrifice,	294
The lesson apparently taught him by Péliissier's letter,	294
Feeling of the French army towards Canrobert,	295
The 'morale' of the French army under Canrobert,	295
Opinions of Canrobert expressed by men in authority,	297
Effect of recent disclosures on Canrobert's reputation,	299

CHAPTER XII.

THE RELATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA WITH THE BELLIGERENTS.—
 THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA.—THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS.
 —THEIR REJECTION ENTAILING A CHANGE OF AUSTRIA'S POLICY.

I.

The union of Austria and Prussia with the Western Powers,	301
Its anomalous character,	302
Its efficacy for the first proposed object,	303
Tendency of this too speedy success,	304
The danger increased by another cause,	304
The defection of Prussia,	305
The loyal course taken by Austria,	307

xxii CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XII.—*continued.*

II.	PAGE
Step taken by Austria which made a beginning of her mediation,	309
Course taken at first by the Czar Nicholas,	309
And afterwards,	309
His acceptance of the Four Conditions,	309
Treaty of the 2d of December 1854,	310
Preliminary negotiations for the Conference,	310
Exclusion of Prussia from the Conferences,	311
Question as to the effect of Nicholas's death on the prospects of peace,	312
III.	
The Peace Negotiations at Vienna,	313
Lord John Russell,	313
Prince Alexander Gortchakoff,	316
M. Drouyn de Lhuys,	317
Debates in the Conference,	317
Compared with the mere adduced 'reasons,' the actual stress of the 'motives,'	322
Failure of the Peace negotiations carried on between the belligerents,	327
IV.	
The Austrian proposals,	328
Allusions to a subsequent attack on Lord John Russell,	328
The Third of the three Austrian plans,	330
The dead-lock in front of Sebastopol,	332
The need that there was for effecting a new move against Russia,	334
The lever to be found at Vienna,	334
Neglect of this by the Rulers in Paris and London,	335
But not by De Lhuys and Lord John,	335
The tendency and value of the measure,	336
De Lhuys,	337
Lord John Russell,	337
Reception of this plan by Lord Palmerston's Cabinet,	338
And by the French Emperor,	338
Pronounced difference in the counsels of the Western Powers,	339
The French Emperor and Lord Cowley,	339
Marshal Vaillant,	340
His words,	341
Their sudden effect,	341
Resignation of De Lhuys,	342
Unaccepted resignations of Lord John Russell,	342

CONTENTS. xxiii

CHAPTER XII.—*continued.*

	PAGE
Unanimity after the 5th of May of the English Cabinet,	342
The Governments of France and England once more in substantial accord,	343
Opening for the new policy suggested by Vaillant,	343
The soundness of Vaillant's conclusion,	343
The course of duty prescribed to D. de Lhuys and Lord John,	344
What they did,	345
Vote of the House of Commons,	347
The Conference kept formally open until the 4th of June,	347
And then closed,	347

V.

Change brought about by the rejection of the Austrian proposals, . . .	348
Austria set free to change her course,	348
The course she rightly took,	348

APPENDIX.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I.

1. Outnumbered by tens of thousands,	351
2. On General Bosquet's front,	351
3. Only by hundreds,	351
4. Of the Flagstaff Bastion,	352
5. Minor pieces of ordnance,	352
6. Only 290 men,	352
7. At the object kept always in sight,	352
8. Against the Malakoff front,	353
9. Happily able to accept the condition imposed,	353
10. Till the latter part of the month,	354
11. Words described as 'Instructions,'	354
12. Other mortal then living,	354
13. Spreading system of countermines,	354
14. Unleashed a camouffet,	354
15. The intervening Mamelon,	355
16. Did the work,	355
17. Destroying the Inkerman Bridge,	355

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.

1. With their blows,	355
2. Lost their way in the darkness,	356

xxiv CONTENTS.

APPENDIX—continued.

	PAGE
3. Had been victoriously achieved,	356
4. Without a simultaneous advance on the Malakoff front,	356
5. Not again to attempt to drive the enemy from their new works,	356
6. For which he was yearning,	357
7. With grossly inadequate means,	357
8. Were 'postulates' rather than facts,	357

NOTES TO CHAPTER V.

1. 14th February 1855,	358
2. Begun and continued,	359
3. Lasting success,	359
4. By 'approaches,'	359
5. To Vaillant, 8th February 1855,	360

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

1. Grave affair,	360
2. See Appendix, Note (2),	361
3. Enthusiasm,	362
4. Camel,	363
5. Battery,	363
6. 'To retire,'	363
7. To Oldershaw,	364
8. Came to an end,	364
9. Strength of only three men,	365
10. Any less formal document,	365
11. Under him,	366
12. To make the truth known,	366
13. Engaged under them,	368
14. The fire of the two 'advanced batteries,'	369
15. Defence of Sebastopol,	369

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.

1. Might not after all be unwise,	370
2. Somewhat unscrupulous,	371
3. Always thoroughly cordial,	371

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.

1. To be attempted,	371
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CONTENTS. xxv

APPENDIX—*continued*.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.

	PAGE
1. This part of the plan,	372
2. Take effect by surprise,	372
3. Or otherwise into the sea,	373
4. To avert the catastrophe,	373

NOTES TO CHAPTER X.

1. Into full play,	374
2. Could not divine,	374
3. In their rear,	374

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI.

1. Campaigning Plan,	375
2. To act in the field,	375
3. The hopes he had entertained of being attacked by the enemy on the reopening of the bombardment,	375