

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER LX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF IPSUS TO THE DEATH OF PYRRHUS.

BY the event of the battle of Ipsus the allies, who had been united by their common enmity to Antigonus, were transformed into jealous rivals. Their struggle with him was no sooner decided, than the clashing interests of Ptolemy and Seleucus threatened an immediate rupture, which was averted indeed, but so as to leave neither party secure, and one of them deeply offended. It was clear that the possession of Syria must be a subject of perpetual contest between the two states. On the other hand, Lysimachus had reason to be satisfied — if it was in the nature of ambition to be so — with the rich acquisition which had fallen to his share: but he could feel no confidence in the moderation of his powerful neighbour, and might well suspect that Seleucus would endeavour to resume so important a concession on the first opportunity. In the eyes both of Lysimachus and Ptolemy, Seleucus had stepped into the place of Antigonus; and they soon gave public proof of the jealousy with which they regarded him, by a new alliance which they contracted with one another. Lysimachus, although he had so lately married Amastris, and had children by a former wife, an Odrysian princess — among whom the eldest Agathocles was a youth of great

promise — received the hand of Arsinoe, Ptolemy's daughter by Berenice. It seems that he would willingly have retained Amastris¹, whom he sincerely loved and esteemed; but she was too high-spirited to endure the presence of a rival, and retired to Heraclea, which she continued to govern during the minority of her sons with admirable ability. It was a sacrifice of the domestic affections to reasons of state, destined by a tragical retribution to prove fatal, not only to the happiness of Lysimachus, but to his throne and his life.

Seleucus, notwithstanding his superior power, could not be indifferent to this coalition, which was evidently formed against him. It was to be expected that he should endeavour to strengthen himself by a new alliance; but it must have excited general surprise that for this purpose his choice fell upon Demetrius, whose fortunes, as we see from the turn which his affairs had taken in Greece, most men considered as irretrievably ruined. Not so, however, Demetrius himself. He had already experienced and witnessed too many strange vicissitudes to be deeply dejected by his late reverse. He had seen his father a fugitive, seeking protection from Antipater, and, within a year after, in condition to contend for the dominion of Asia. Seleucus had fallen as low, before he rose to an equal height, and owed much less to others. Demetrius was not yet reduced to the situation of a suppliant: he still retained some fragments of his lost power, together with unabated confidence in himself, and seems to have been anxious to show that he had not given himself up to despair. Though he was too weak either to attempt to recover Athens, or to protect his interests in Peloponnesus, he ventured to assume the offensive against one of his most powerful adversaries. In the spring of 300, leaving Pyrrhus at the Isthmus, he made an expedition with his fleet to the Thracian Chersonesus, and ravaged the coast, which Lysimachus was unable to defend. The immediate object of this movement may have been to

¹ Memnon ap. Phot. p. 224. b.

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enrich the troops with plunder, and to keep up their spirits ; but Demetrius probably wished at the same time to draw attention on himself, to show that he still possessed means of annoying his enemies ; and he must have been aware that an attack on Lysimachus would give no offence to Seleucus.

Still it must have been with no less surprise than pleasure that he soon after received an embassy, by which Seleucus asked the hand of Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrius and Phila, for himself : though his heir-apparent, Antiochus, might have seemed a fitter consort for the blooming princess. Since it is evident that the object of the proposed alliance was to counteract that which had been formed between Ptolemy and Lysimachus, it might perhaps have been expected that he should rather have addressed himself to Cassander, whose power was far greater, and whose interest coincided with his own no less than that of Demetrius. But it is probable that Cassander was too closely connected with Lysimachus, even if negotiations had not already been set on foot for the marriages which took place not many years later, between Antipater, Cassander's second son, and Eurydice, the daughter of Lysimachus, and between Alexander, the youngest of the Macedonian princes, and Lysandra, Ptolemy's daughter by Eurydice. But moreover Seleucus may have thought Demetrius better able to secure his object, on account of his fleet, and his possession of Cyprus and the Phœnician towns, which he still occupied with his garrisons¹ ; while a man in such circumstances was likely to prove a more obsequious ally than the king of Macedonia. Demetrius joyfully accepted the brilliant offer, and sailed with his whole fleet, accompanied by his daughter, towards Syria. On his passage he landed — it is said merely to obtain the necessary supplies — at several places on the coast of Cilicia. But Pleistarchus, taking umbrage at this intrusion on his territory, retired to Macedonia, to complain to his brother of the league

¹ Diodorus, xxi. Eclog. i. p. 489. Plut. Dem. 32.

into which Seleucus was entering with the common enemy. Demetrius took advantage of his absence, to make himself master of Quinda, where he found 1200 talents still remaining; and having been joined by Phila, proceeded to Rhossus in Syria. There he was met by Seleucus, who first entertained him in his camp, and then, more fully to show their perfect mutual confidence, went on board his father-in-law's galley, as his guest.

These festivities were followed by many grave conferences on their common affairs; but their discussions and arrangements, of which it is probable very little was publicly known at the time, are now concealed from our curiosity by an impenetrable veil. The only point which we are able to discern with any degree of clearness is, that it was the object of Seleucus to avoid a rupture with the rival powers. For this purpose, while Phila was sent to pacify her brother, he brought about an alliance between Ptolemy and Demetrius, which was to be cemented by a match between Demetrius and Ptolemy's daughter, Ptolemais; and Pyrrhus, whose sister Deidamia followed her husband to Syria, but died not long after, was sent to the court of Alexandria, as a security for the execution of the treaty. But its terms — though they may have been more definite and important than Plutarch represents, are entirely unknown to us; and the modern conjectures on the subject are so uncertain as to be barely worth mentioning.¹ The part of the transaction most difficult to

¹ Droysen (*Hellen*, i. p. 559.) believes that Ptolemy acknowledged Demetrius as king of Cyprus, Cilicia, and Phœnicia. But how is it possible to suppose that Seleucus was a party to a treaty containing such an article? Equally improbable does it appear, that Demetrius joined in a general guaranty, that Seleucus should indemnify Ptolemy for the loss of Syria, without knowing in what the indemnity was to consist; for, according to Droysen (p. 544.), it was Cyprus that Seleucus intended to cede to Ptolemy. Flathe's conjecture (ii. p. 18.) that Demetrius was recognised as king of Greece, seems in substance very much more consistent with the interests and views — so far as they can be collected — both of Ptolemy and Seleucus: nor is it irreconcilable with the succours which Ptolemy sent to the Athenians, after the change that took place in the relations between Demetrius and Seleucus. Raleigh (*Hist. of the World*, iv. 5.) saw and expressed the state of the case very plainly. "Seleucus and Ptolemy could both of them have been contented better, that Demetrius, with help of their countenance, should seek his fortune somewhat farther off, than settle his estate under their noses."

comprehend is, that Seleucus should have promoted an alliance which manifestly tended to render Demetrius less dependent on him. But he may have thought that this danger was counterbalanced by the maintenance of peace, which he must have needed for the settlement of his new state, and by the prospect, that the connection into which Ptolemy now entered with Demetrius, would weaken that in which he stood with Lysimachus. For Ptolemy it was a clear gain, that he could not only hope to detach Demetrius from the interests of Seleucus, but was put in possession of a hostage, whose title to the kingdom of Epirus might be used as an instrument for acquiring influence over the affairs of Macedonia and Greece. We are told that Pyrrhus took pains to ingratiate himself with Ptolemy, and for that purpose assiduously paid his court to Berenice. Perhaps it might have been said with equal truth, that Ptolemy strove to win the young king's friendship by kindness, and singled him out to receive the hand of Antigone, Berenice's daughter by her former husband Philippus, not more on account of his merit, than to serve his own political views.

For an interval of two or three years after this treaty, we are no better informed as to the proceedings of the parties than as to their compacts or intentions.¹ So long it appears they continued in the same relations to one another. Demetrius, who, immediately after the treaty had occupied Cilicia, was permitted to retain undisturbed possession of it. Apparently, Ptolemy and Seleucus were engaged with their domestic affairs; and it seems to have been during this period that Cassander made an unsuccessful attempt to recover Corcyra, and was compelled to retire by the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles, with the loss of almost all the ships he had em-

¹ This interval is only collected from the history of Demochares, as it appears on the face of the decree concerning him at the end of the Vit. x. Orr. Plutarch (Demetr. 32. 33.) gives no hint of such an interval; and Mr. Clinton (F. H. B. C. 299.) follows him. But if the genuineness of the decree be admitted, which Mr. Clinton does not dispute, it seems an almost unavoidable inference — as will be afterwards seen — that his chronology is here erroneous.

ployed in the expedition.¹ Seleucus may have thought it expedient to temporise until he saw what measures Cassander would adopt on the complaint of Pleistarchus. But he certainly never intended to have Demetrius for a permanent neighbour, or to leave either Cilicia or the Phœnician ports in his hands. Perhaps he expected that Demetrius, conscious of his inability to contend with the master of the East, would resign them at the first summons. But, if so, when at length they came to an explanation on the subject, he found that he had deceived himself. He first attempted to induce Demetrius to accept a sum of money as a compensation for Cilicia. Demetrius declined the bargain. He then, in an angry tone, demanded Tyre and Sidon, as appertaining to his own dominions. Demetrius denied his title, and strengthened the garrisons of the towns; declaring, that, not if he had lost ten thousand fields like Ipsus, would he consent to pay at such a rate for his son-in-law. The conduct of Seleucus, it is said, was commonly regarded as ungenerous, and he did not deem it expedient immediately to enforce his claims by any warlike movements. But henceforth there was an open breach between him and his father-in-law.

Demetrius was not on this account the less ready to embark in a new enterprise, though it was one which drew him away from the only realm he possessed, while it was threatened by the ambition of at least one powerful neighbour. He still kept his eye fixed on Greece, and especially on Athens; and the state of affairs there seemed to him now to open a fairer prospect of retrieving his losses. Cassander also had been endeavouring to re-establish his authority there, but without success. After his failure in Corcyra, he had undertaken an expedition to Greece, had it seems made himself master of Phocis, at least of Elatea, and had invaded Attica. The power of Athens was not sufficient to repel him without

¹ So Droysen (i. p. 559. n. 12.) infers from the position of the fragment in Diodorus xxi. relating to this expedition, which indicates that it was subsequent to the battle of Ipsus.

assistance ; but she still possessed a man of considerable political and military talents, who was a zealous friend of liberty. Her general Olympiodorus sailed to Ætolia — the journey overland would, it seems, have been exposed to too many risks — and prevailed on the Ætolians to send succours to Athens. The arrival of these forces induced Cassander to withdraw his army from Attica¹: and not long after, it seems, Elatea revolted from him, and was enabled, by the aid of Olympiodorus, to hold out against his attacks.² He did not, however, abandon his designs on Athens, but conceived a hope that he might attain his end by an easier, though perhaps slower course. Lachares, the popular leader of the day, was an ambitious, greedy, and unprincipled adventurer, and was persuaded by Cassander to aspire to the station which had been occupied by Demetrius the Phalerian.³ He now became a secret adherent of the Macedonian interest, while he waited for an opportunity of espousing it more openly, and of rising through it to power. This juncture, when the Athenians were incensed against Cassander, and had still to apprehend a repetition of his attempt, seems to have been that which Demetrius considered so favourable to his hopes, that it encouraged him to make an expedition for the recovery of Athens.⁴

It was probably in the spring of 297, that he set sail with a formidable armament ; but off the coast of Attica he was overtaken by a storm, in which the greater part of his ships were wrecked, and many lives were lost. After this disaster he no longer ventured to present himself at the mouth of the Piræus, but sent orders for the equipment of a new fleet in the eastern ports, and in the meanwhile, having made some hostile demonstrations in Attica with little effect, marched into Peloponnesus, to

¹ Pausanias, i. 26. 3.

² Ibid. x. 18. 7., i. 26. 3.

³ Ibid. i. 25. 7.

⁴ Here our narrative cannot be reconciled with Plutarch, who clearly supposes (Dem. 33.) that Demetrius was induced to undertake his expedition against Athens by the intelligence that Lachares had seized the tyranny. As Lachares, after he became tyrant, made himself very odious, this was a natural conjecture for one who did not minutely examine the chronology of the events he related.

reduce the towns which had revolted from him. The only place named among those which he threatened is Messene, where his assaults were repulsed, and he received a dangerous wound. He recovered however in time to attack some other towns more successfully; and these operations probably occupied the remainder of the year. In the course of the following winter an event took place which made an important change in the face of affairs. Cassander was carried off by a disease, which popular tradition represented as a stroke of Divine vengeance for his atrocious crimes¹, but which is also described as an ordinary consumption²: he was succeeded by his eldest son Philip.

The return of Demetrius to Greece, and his hostilities in Attica, appear, as might be expected, to have changed the disposition of the Athenians with regard to Macedonia, and perhaps gave rise to new divisions among them. By a large party he was hated and feared more than Cassander. This party seems to have been headed by Demochares, who had probably returned from his exile, as soon as he heard of the battle of Ipsus. We find him displaying great activity in a war which was once no doubt well-known under the name of the Four Years' War; but for which it is now somewhat difficult to assign a place in history. It is however nearly certain that it belongs to this period³; and it may have included the contest with Cassander, as well as that which immediately followed with Demetrius, and thus have ended with the surrender of the city. We hear of no negotiations between the Athenians and Cassander after the re-appearance of Demetrius. But we

¹ Pausanias, ix. 7. 2. *ἐπελήφθη ὑδέρῳ, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ζῶντι ἐγένοντο εὐλαί.* Compare Acts xii. 23.

² Dexippus in Syncellus, p. 504. ed. Bonn. *φθινάδι νοσῶν διαλυθείς*, and Porphy. Euseb. Arm. i. p. 327.

³ So much has I think been satisfactorily shown by Droysen in an article on this war in the *Zeitschrift f. d. Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1836. But it is difficult to conceive that the war can have received a designation by which it was known at Athens, as Droysen supposes (i. p. 563.) with reference to its duration, so far as it concerned not Athens, but Demetrius. It seems preferable to make it begin with Cassander's attempts upon Athens in 298.

learn that Demochares was sent on an embassy to Ly-simachus, and obtained a subsidy of thirty talents from him : and that he carried a decree for an embassy to Ptolemy, who sent fifty talents ¹, and, it seems, promises of farther support. There is also some ground to believe that Demochares went on a like mission to Philip, Cassander's successor ; though the behaviour imputed to him on this occasion is utterly incredible. ² Philip's reign lasted only four months ; but, as he died at Elatea³, it may be inferred that he was engaged in the prosecution of his father's plans. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Antipater. It was perhaps about the same time, in the spring of 296, that Demetrius was preparing to lay siege to Athens. The city had been well provided with the means of defence under the direction of Demochares ; the walls had been repaired, and the arsenal amply stored with ammunition : and he did not cease to seek aid from without. He concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with the Bœotians, and headed an embassy to the young king, Antipater, from whom he received a subsidy of twenty talents.⁴ But the

¹ The Decree at the end of Vit. x. Orr. p. 92. ed. Westermann.

² Seneca (*De Ira*, iii. 23.) to illustrate Philip's patience under insults, relates that Demochares — Parrhesiastes ob nimiam et procacem linguam appellatus (compare Polybius, xii. 13.) — having been sent on an embassy to him, when the king asked what he could do to oblige the Athenians, answered, Hang yourself. The bystanders were indignant. Philip however dismissed this Thersites unhurt, bidding his colleagues tell the Athenians that men who said such things were more arrogant than those who patiently listened to them. Seneca evidently supposed Alexander's father to have been the hero of his story, which indeed suits his character : but then Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, cannot have been the ambassador. The story however might originally have been told of Demochares with reference to an embassy to Philip, Cassander's son. As to the fact — in the form in which Seneca relates it — it requires a peculiar bias — from which Droysen has shown himself on other occasions not wholly exempt — to believe that any Athenian ambassador was ever guilty of such outrageous and brutal folly. In the case of Demochares, not only would it be inconsistent with the judgment of Polybius (u. s.) on his character, and with the impression which the extracts from his memoirs preserved by Athenæus must make on an impartial reader ; but it is utterly incredible that a man who had committed so gross a breach of decency in his embassy to Philip, should have been sent a few months after in the same capacity to his successor, when the object was to implore succours. The silence of the Decree casts some suspicion on the fact of the embassy to Philip.

³ Dexippus, u. s.

⁴ The Decree (u. s.). Grauert (*An.* p. 349.) suspects that this may be the younger Antipater, who reigned for about six weeks in 279. But one does

subsistence of the Athenians still depended on continual supplies from abroad. Demetrius ravaged the country from Eleusis to Rhamnus, and proceeded to blockade the city by sea and land. He put to death the owner and master of a vessel laden with corn, which they attempted to bring into the harbour; and this severity deterred most private adventurers from such attempts. In the course of the summer an Egyptian fleet of 150 sail appeared in the Saronic gulf, and excited hopes of more effectual relief.¹ It was but a short gleam of sunshine. Soon after, Demetrius received reinforcements from Cyprus and Peloponnesus, which raised his fleet to 300 sail, and compelled the Egyptians to seek safety in flight.

Meanwhile, the city was agitated by the strife of parties, whose views or pretexts are now only matter for conjecture. We know however that it afforded Lachares an opportunity of executing his long-cherished design, and that he became absolute master of Athens. Demochares, who was not a man to truckle to the tyrant, was driven into exile.² The usurper was probably supported by a body of mercenaries: but he was still exposed to constant danger both from within and from without. Polyænus relates³, that Demetrius obtained arms for a thousand men from a party in Piræus, under the pretext that they were to be employed against Lachares. The story seems almost to imply, that Piræus was in the hands of this party, and that they

not see why the Athenians should either have sought or received a subsidy from him. Mr. Clinton (p. 380.) proposes to change the text.

¹ Droysen (*Zeitschrift f. A. u. s. w.*, 1836, n. 20.) conjectures that this was the same fleet which brought Pyrrhus back to Epirus.

² The Decree, u. s. *ἀνθ' ὧν ἐξέπισεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον*, which can hardly be applied to Demetrius, who was the professed restorer of democracy. But it appears unnecessary to press the meaning of *ἀνθ' ὧν*, as Droysen has done, referring it to the alliance with the Bœotians, and showing, with his usual ingenuity, how that treaty might have been made a ground of charge against Demochares by the Macedonian party. It may surely mean nothing more than that the patriotism of Demochares, of which he had given such signal proofs in his measures for the defence of the city, rendered him odious to the enemies of freedom, and was the cause of his banishment.

³ IV. 7. 5. But Polyænus does not say, as Droysen (i. p. 567.) seems to represent, that Demetrius became by these means master of Piræus, nor can this be safely inferred from Paus. i. 25. 8.