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Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

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## ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ.

Ι Ἐπειδὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἐν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύ-

CHAP. I.  
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## CHAP. I.

In the Introduction, pp. 276—370, I have already given a complete paraphrase of the contents of this book, exhibiting the main divisions and general principles of arrangement and the connexion of its several parts: and have added, in five appendices, dissertations on some special points which seemed to require a more detailed treatment than they could conveniently receive in mere notes. Referring to this for information on all such general matters, I may confine myself in the commentary to special details of language, allusion, and such like particulars. This book, by the extreme brevity of expression which characterises it, leaving even more than usual to the reader's ingenuity to supply, by the consequent difficulty of translation, and the obscurity of many of the allusions, offers at least as many impediments and stumblingblocks to the embarrassed commentator as either of the two preceding; and it is to be feared that the explanation and illustration are not likely to be much shorter than before, in spite of what has been already done in the Introduction.

With the end of Book II we finish the treatment of what (according to the Latin division) is termed *inventio*, the invention and supply of all the various kinds of arguments, which the orator has to invent, or find for himself; and we now proceed to the analysis of (1) λέξις, *elocutio*, verbal style, including ὑπόκρισις, delivery, *pronuntiatio* and *actio*, (Aristotle omits the latter, at all events in the treatment of it, confining ὑπόκρισις to the mode of speaking, declamation, § 4): and (2) τάξις, the order and disposition, together with the ordinary topics, of the several divisions of the speech. The first is examined in the first twelve chapters, the second from the thirteenth to the end. These three general divisions of the art are expressed by Cicero, Orator § 43, *tria videnda sunt oratori, quid dicat (πίστεις), quo quidque loco (τάξις), et quomodo (λέξις)*.

§ 1 commences with a partial repetition of the concluding summary of the preceding chapter. The three modes of proof are enumerated, *πίστεις, ἦθος, πάθος*: (1) the direct logical proof, by argument; (2) the con-

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## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ Ι §§ Ι—3.

τερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστευων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν εἰσί, καὶ ταῦτα ποῖα, καὶ διὰ τί τοσαῦτα μόνα· ἢ γὰρ τῷ αὐτοῖ τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι πείθονται πάντες. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι· ἔστι 2 γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δὲ τόποι. περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἄ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι 3 ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη

veying a favourable impression by the exhibition of character *in and by the speech*; and (3), working on the feelings of the audience, so as to bring them to that state of mind which is favourable to the orator's purpose; to excite an angry or a calm temper, love or hatred, envy, jealousy, righteous indignation, and so on, according to circumstances and the immediate occasion.

'The enthymemes too have been stated, whence they are to be supplied; for of enthymemes there are special (*εἶδη*) as well as common topics (*τόποι*)'. See the quotation from Spengel's *Study of Ancient Rhetoric* prefixed to II 23.

§ 2. 'The next subject to be treated of is style' (the manner of expressing oneself; including not only the language, but the manner of *delivery*; both in voice, declamation, the pronunciation, tone, rhythm, &c.; and—here Aristotle stops, and the Latin rhetoricians add—*action*, the appropriate gesticulation, management of the hands and the body in general, and especially the features): 'for it is not sufficient to know *what* to say, it is necessary also to know *how* to say it; and this contributes greatly to the impression conveyed of a certain *character* in the speech'. The tone of voice, the expression of the features, the gestures employed, the kind of language used, quite independently of the arguments, will materially assist the impression of moral (or any particular) character which the orator wishes to assume, on the minds of the audience. The *ἦθος* of III 16. 8 is part of this, the moral character imparted by the choice of language, of terms, tone and expression, significant of moral purpose, *προαίρεσις*.

§ 3. 'Now first of all, inquiry was naturally directed to that which is first in the natural order, the sources from which things themselves derive their plausibility or power of persuasion' (i. e. what are the sources of rhetorical proof of facts themselves; which of course is the basis of the entire art or practice, and therefore 'first in the order of nature'); 'and secondly, the due setting out (disposal) of these by the language;

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## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 1 § 3.

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κατὰ φύσιν, ὃ περ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι· τρίτον δὲ τούτων, ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὐπω δ' ἐπικεχειρήται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπό-

and thirdly (τούτων, of such things as these, the divisions of Rhetoric), what has the greatest force (or influence, *is especially effective* as a means of persuasion), but has not yet been attempted (regularly, systematically, as an art, no serious attempt has yet been made upon it), that which relates to *delivery*'.

§ 3. πρῶτου ἐζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν] A similar phraseology occurs at the beginning of the Poetics, I 1, ult. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. Antl de Soph. El. init. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. Victorius.

διάθεσθαι] denotes the 'disposal' or 'disposition', i. e. the investing of the speech with a certain character, putting it in a certain state, by the use of language: as the ἀκροαταί of a speech are said διατίθεσθαι πως, to be brought into such and such a disposition or state of feeling by it: a common use of the verb. It does not mean here distribution, ordering, arrangement, which is not the special office of the graces and proprieties of language or style. There is another sense in which this verb is used by later writers, as Polybius, Dionysius, Diodorus, with λόγους and the like, *disponere, in publicum proferere, in medium proferre, to dispose or set out* (διά), as wares in a market for sale, *étaler*; which may possibly be the meaning here, though, I think, it would be less appropriate. Victorius renders it *explanare*. διάθεσις, in Longinus quoted below, seems to correspond to διατίθεσθαι here in the sense in which I have explained it.

ἐπικεχειρήται] is a striking instance of that abnormal formation of the passive, which I have explained and illustrated in Appendix B on I 12. 22 [Vol. I. p. 297].

ὑπόκρισις, 'acting', properly includes, besides declamation, the management of the voice, to which Aristotle, as already mentioned, here confines it, § 4, that of the features, arms, hands, and the entire body: and so it is treated by the Latin rhetoricians, Cicero, Quintilian, &c. Longinus, *Ars Rhet.*, (apud Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* I 310,) has a chapter upon it, following another περὶ λέξεως. His description of it is, *μίμησις τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐκάστῳ παρισταμένων ἡθῶν καὶ παθῶν καὶ διαθέσεις σώματός τε καὶ τόνου φωνῆς πρόσφορος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι. δύναται δὲ μέγιστον εἰς πίστιν κ.τ.λ.* Dionysius, *de admirabili vi dicendi* in Demosthene, c. 22, p. 1023 (Reiske), says of the great orator, *κοσμοῦντος ἅπαντα καὶ χρηματίζοντος (σχηματίζοντος, Sylburg) τῇ πρεπούσῃ ὑποκρίσει ἧς δεινότητος ἀσκητῆς ἐγένετο, ὡς ἅπαντες τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν λόγων, κ.τ.λ.* See Quint. XI 3. 5, on the effect of *pronuntiatio*, 'delivery, declamation', where he says that even an indifferent speech set off by the vigour and grace of action will have more weight or effect than the very best without it: in § 6 he quotes the opinion of Demosthenes, who assigned successively the first, second, and third place to declamation (*pronuntiatio*), and so on till his questioner stopped. In § 7 he quotes Aeschines' saying to the

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## PHΤΟΠΙΚΗΣ Γ 1 § 3.

κρισιν. καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψωδίαν ὀψὲ  
παρήλθεν· ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγωδίας οἱ ποι- p. 111.

Rhodians, who were admiring the *de Corona* as he recited it to them, *Quid si ipsum audissetis? et M. Cicero unam in dicendo actionem dominari putat.* Cic. de Or. III 56. 213, from which the whole passage of Quintilian is taken. Also Brutus, LXVI 234, Lentulus' opinion. XXXVIII 141, 142. XLIII 168 (Spalding ad loc. Quint.). On Demosthenes' dictum, Bacon, *Essays*, Of Boldnesse, init., has this remark: A strange thing that that part of an Oratour which is but superficial, and rather the vertue of a Player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts of Invention, Elocution, and the rest; nay almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plaine. There is in humane Nature generally more of the foole then of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men's mindes is taken are most potent.

'(And this is not at all surprising) because in fact it was not till late that it made its way into the tragic art and rhapsody; for the poets at first (in the earliest stages of the drama) used to act their tragedies themselves' (and therefore, as there was no profession of acting or professional actors, it was not likely that an art of acting should be constructed; the poets acted, as they wrote, as well as they could by the light of nature, without any rules of art).

*ῥαψωδία.* On *ῥαψωδοί* and *ῥαψωδεῖν*, see Plat. Ion, 530 B, et seq., Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. 4 § 3. Heyne, *Excursus II ad Il.* Ω, § 3; Vol. VIII. p. 792. F. A. Wolf, *Proleg. ad Hom.*, p. 99 seq. Nitzsch, *Quaest. Hom.* IV. p. 13 seq.

*ὀψὲ παρήλθεν*] *infra* § 5, *ὀψὲ προήλθεν*; Poet. IV 17, τὸ μέγεθος (τῆς τραγωδίας)...ὀψὲ ἀπεσεμνύθη, also v 3.

*ὑπεκρίνοντο αὐτοὶ*] Plut. Sol. XXIX (Victorius), ὁ Σόλων ἐθέασατο τὸν Θέσπιν αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς. Liv. VII 2, *Livius—idem scilicet, id quod omnes tum erant, suorum carminum actor.* Victorius thinks that this statement is confirmed by Hor. A. P. 277, *quae canerent agerentque peruncti faecibus ora*, which means that 'the poets themselves had their faces smeared'. Donaldson, *Theatre of the Greeks*, Ed. vii. p. 59, n. 10.

'It is plain then that there is something of this kind in Rhetoric also as well as in poetry' (declamation may be studied and practised for the purposes of Rhetoric, as well as for those of acting in tragedy and comedy or of rhapsodical recitation): 'which, in fact, (i.e. the 'poetical' declamation), has been dealt with (treated artistically, see note on I I. 3), besides others, by Glaucon of Teos in particular'.

This tautological repetition of *καί, καί* *περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, καί* *περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν*, is not unfrequent in Aristotle. Compare Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη—οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. Ib. 1253 a 31, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθέν—οὕτω καὶ χωρισθέν.

Glaucon of Teos, an Ionian city on the coast of Asia Minor, is most probably the same as a Glaucon mentioned by Ion, Plat. Ion 530 D (so Stallbaum's note ad loc.), as following his own profession as a rhapsodist, which seems suitable enough for one who writes on the art of tragic declamation, especially as acting and rhapsodizing are actually coupled

## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ Ι §§ 3, 4.

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ηται τὸ πρῶτον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν  
 ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν· ὁ περ  
 ἕτεροί τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήσιος.  
 4 ἐστι δὲ αὐτῆ<sup>1</sup> μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτῆ δεῖ χρῆσθαι  
 πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλη καὶ πότε  
 μικρὰ καὶ πότε μέση, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξεῖα  
 καὶ βαρεῖα καὶ μέση, καὶ ῥυθμοῖς τίσιν πρὸς ἕκαστον.  
 τρία γὰρ ἐστι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ  
<sup>1</sup> αὐτῆ

together by Aristotle in the preceding sentence. I should be disposed also to identify with him of Teos, the Glaucôn quoted in *Poet.* xxv 23 —seemingly as a poetical critic, which is also a kindred pursuit. See in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* the *third* article on Glaucôn.

Tyrwhitt ad loc. *Poet.* seems in favour of the supposition that the three Glaucôn's are one. A Glaucôn who wrote a work on γλῶσσαι (sic), *Athen.* xi 480 F, was at all events not far removed from the same studies. Schneider, ad *Xen. Conv.* iii 6.

§ 4. ἐστι δ' αὐτῆ] So all MSS and Edd., except Buhle, who reads αὐτῆ. This surely must be right: αὐτῆ seems to have no meaning here. Victorius retaining αὐτῆ translates 'haec'.

'This (declamation, ἰπόκρισις) resides in the voice, in the mode of employing it, that is, for (the expression of) any emotion; that is to say, sometimes loud, sometimes low, sometimes intermediate (between the two, middling, neither the one nor the other); and in the mode of employing the accents (or tones of voice), that is to say acute, grave, middle' (circumflex, from the combination of the two others, Λ = ~), 'and certain measures (times) in respect of each. For there are three things that are the subjects of such enquiries, magnitude (intensity, volume of sound), tune, time'.

οἷον] is here in both cases *videlicet*, 'that is to say', a direct specification of certain definite things; not, as usual, 'for instance', as an example or specimen, which supposes *other* things of the same kind, besides those expressly mentioned. Thus οἷον here does not mean that the three kinds of sounds and accents mentioned are mere *examples* of a much larger class, but they *specify* the exact number of kinds which are intended to be distinguished in either case. This is common in Aristotle. Instances are, few out of many, *Pol.* i 6, sub fin., δούλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμφυλον...μέρος. c. 7 sub fin. ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ...οἷον ἡ δικαία. c. 8, 1256 a 36, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας κ.τ.λ. c. 13, 1260 a 6, οἷον τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. II 5, 1264 a 26, οἷον φρούρους. Ib. c. 6, 1265 a 35, οἷον, 'I mean to say.' *De Sens.* c. 5, 443 a 10, τὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷον πῦρ ἀρῆ ὕδωρ γῆ. *Plat. Gorg.* 502 D. [Cf. *supra* II 19. 26.]

On the modulation of the voice in the expression of the various emotions, see *Cic. de Or.* III. cc. 57, 58, §§ 215—219, where it is illustrated at length.

On the accents, and μέγεθος, ἀρμονία, ῥυθμός, and their application to Rhetoric, see Introduction, Appendix C to Book III, p. 379 seq.

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ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 1 §§ 4, 5.

μέγεθος ἀρμονία ῥυθμός. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μείζον δύνανται ἦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν 5 πολιτειῶν. οὕτω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὄψ' ἐπροῆλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνομενον. ἀλλ' ὄλης P. 1404.

'Now one might almost say (it is pretty nearly true to say) that these are the men that gain all the prizes in (*lit.* out of, as the *produce* or profit derived from, got out of them,) the contests (dramatic and rhapsodical), and as in these the actors have more power, influence, effect (over the audiences, and those who adjudge the prizes), than the poets nowādays, so likewise (has acting or declamation) in civil and social contests (the contests of the law-courts, and public assembly—comp. III 12. 2) by reason of the defects (the *vicious*, depraved character) of our constitutions' (as that of Athens, where I, Aristotle, am now writing).

The vice or defect, which permits these irregular and extraneous appeals to the feelings, and the influence which 'acting' thereby acquires, are attributed here to the *constitution*—comp. I 1. 4, where 'well-governed states', *εὐνομούμεναι πόλεις*, states which are under good laws and institutions, are said to forbid them: if that of Athens were sound and healthy and right, *ὑγής, ὀρθή*, opposed to *μοχθηρά*, 'they would not be allowed *there*'. In the next section, 5, the defect is attributed to the *audience*: in the one case the institutions themselves are in fault, in the other the tempers and disposition of the hearers, whose taste and judgment are so depraved that they *require* the stimulus of these distorting (*διαστρέφοντα*, I 1. 5) emotions.

On the influence of *acting* in producing emotion, and thereby persuasion, see by all means Cicero's description, *de Or.* III 56 § 213, seq., which furnishes an excellent illustration of what is here said. Note particularly the case of Gracchus, § 214. After a quotation from his speech Cicero adds, *quae sic ab illo esse acta constabat oculis voce gestu, inimici ut lacrimas tenere non possent*. And *Orat. c. XVII, est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia, quum constet e voce et motu*, § 55 and the rest.

§ 5. 'But no art has been as yet composed of it; for in fact it was not till late that that of composition made any advance: and it (*ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ*) is thought low and vulgar' (in the sense of popular and unsubstantial, directed to show, not substance) 'and rightly so considered' (or, 'when considered aright'; so Victorius. But the other is the more *natural* interpretation of *ὑπολαμβάνειν*; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius 'Si vere *iudicare* volumus': 'consider' in the two renderings has *different* senses).

*φορτικός*, see note on II 21. 15, opposed to *χαριείς* in the sense of mental refinement and cultivation, *Molestos et illepidos, quos Graeci μοχθηροὺς καὶ φορτικούς dicent*; Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Attici* 18. 4

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## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 1 § 5.

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οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιον μηδὲν πλείω ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὡς μήτε λυπεῖν μήτε εὐφραίνειν. δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τὰλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδείξαι περίεργα ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὁμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ (Gaisford). See Twining on Poet. note 263, pp. 540—544, where a number of examples illustrative of its various applications are collected. φορτικῶς, ἐπαχθῶς, ἐπιπλάστως (Suidas). The last of these two equivalents helps to explain a distinction in Eth. Eudem. I 4. 2, of arts φορτικά, περὶ χρηματισμόν (engaged in money-making, mercenary), βάνανσοι (mechanical), which is subsequently explained, λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον. This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: and ἐπιπλάστως 'beplastered' seems to correspond to this. And this same signification is plainly conveyed by the word here in the Rhetoric, which is immediately followed by ἀλλ' ὄλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας, i. e. not only ὑποκριτικῆ, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικόν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind, want of mental cultivation in persons: and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial, and in this point of view too low and vulgar to be entertained by a man of science or philosopher. It has precisely the same meaning in Pol. I 11, 1258 b 35. See Eaton ad loc.

'But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific, (directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ εἶναι: I 7. 36—37, see note,) we must bestow the requisite (τῆν) pains and attention upon it, not that it is right (to do so), but as necessary (for success in *persuading*): for, as to strict justice, *that* implies, (requires, *subaudi* ἐστί,) looking for no more in the delivery of the speech than (to speak it) in a manner which will give neither offence nor delight: for fairness requires that the case be fought on the facts alone, and therefore everything else outside the direct proof (of them) is superfluous: but still, as has been already said, they have vast influence by reason of the vice or defects (depraved taste and judgment) of the hearer'. Quint. II 17. 27 seq. *Imperiti enim iudicant, et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sunt, ne errent. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientum conciones, atque omne concilium, nihil invidia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes: perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus, et prope in sola delectatione ponatur. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt.* §§ 28, 29.

οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος] If it be supposed (with Vater) that ὡς is omitted in this clause, comp. c. 3 § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἠδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ' ὡς ἐδέσματι.



6 ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὁμῶς ἔχει  
 τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει  
 γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν· οὐ μέντοι  
 τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ  
 πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδά-  
 7 σκει. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ ταῦτὸ ποιήσῃ τῇ

§ 6. 'Now (attention to) style (mode of speaking) is nevertheless in some slight degree necessary (has some slight portion of necessity) in every kind (department) of instruction: for it makes *some* difference in the clearness of an explanation whether we speak in one way or another; not however so much (as is generally supposed), but all this is mere fancy (*φαντασία* 'the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality, note on I II. 6), and addressed to (for the sake of, to gratify) the hearer: for no one teaches geometry in this way'. These tricks and graces of style, declamation and acting, have no power of instruction, and therefore are never addressed to any *student*; but only to a popular audience like that of the orator, which requires to be flattered or have its ears tickled (as Plato says in the *Gorgias* [463 C, *κολακείας μῦριον τὴν ῥητορικῆν*, and 502 E, *ὥσπερ παισὶ...χαρίζεσθαι*); to be amused and conciliated, as well as instructed and convinced

§ 7. 'Now *that* (the art which applies *ὑποκριτικὴ* to Rhetoric), whenever it reaches us (arrives), will produce the same effects as the art of acting (i. e. the application of it to dramatic poetry, § 3): some indeed have already to a trifling extent made the attempt to treat of it, as Thrasymachus in his *ἔλεοι*; in fact, a capacity for acting is a natural gift' (part of that general love of imitation which is the foundation of all the imitative or fine arts, *Poet. c. 1*) 'and less subject to rules of art' (more, or somewhat, spontaneous, *αὐτοσχεδιαστικὴ*, extemporaneous, *Poet. IV 14*, of tragedy in its earliest stage), 'but when applied to language (declamation) it (the practice of it) may be reduced to an art. And therefore those who have the faculty (of *ὑποκριτικὴ κατὰ λέξιν*) obtain prizes in *their* turn' (again, *πάλιν*; of which *τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν* is an explanation, *Victorius*), 'as do also rhetoricians in respect of (by) their acting or declamation: for written speeches (in the *ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος*) owe more of their effect to the style and language than to the thought or intellectual part'; *διάνοιαν* (*Rhet. II 26. 5*, *Poet. XIX 2*) meaning here the logical part of Rhetoric, the direct and indirect arguments.

Thrasymachus and his *ἔλεοι* are described by Plato, *Phaedr.* 267 C, *τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογῶφιν ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέαι τεχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τῷ Σαλκηθονίου σθένος. ὀργίσαι τε αὐ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὀθενδὴ κράτιστος.*

On Thrasymachus see *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. IX Vol. III p. 268 seq., on the *ἔλεοι* 274, Spengel, *Artium Scriptores* [pp. 95—97, and Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I esp. p. 244, also K. F. Hermann's *Disputatio de Thrasymacho Chalcedonio sophista*,



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## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 1 §§ 7, 8.

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ὑποκριτικῆ, ἐγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις· καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἄθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μείζον ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

8 ἦρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινήσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέ- p. 112.

φυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν,

Gottingen, 1848, pp. 15, and Mayor's note on Juv. VII 204, *facituit multos vanae sterilisque cathedrae, sicut Tharsymachi probat exitus*. Quint. III 3. 4, *Nec audiendi quidam...qui tres modo primas esse partes volunt, quoniam memoria atque actio natura non arte contingant...licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit* (sc. ἀτεχνότερον εἶναι), where Quintilian must be referring to the present passage, though he is misled by the words οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις, into supposing that the sentence, καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, is a quotation from Thrasymachus.]

οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. III 12. 5, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνὶ κριτῇ κ.τ.λ. at the end of the section.

§ 8. 'Now the origin of this was due, as is natural, to the poets: for not only are all names imitations (copies of *things*, which they are supposed to represent), but there was also the voice ready for use, the most imitative of all our members; and so it was (in virtue of the same imitative faculty, Victorius) that the arts were composed, that of rhapsodizing and of acting and of course (γε, to be sure) others'.

κινεῖν, in the sense of *originating* anything, 'to stir, set in motion', is found in Plut. Solon. 95 B, ἀρχομένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Θέσπιν ἤδη τὴν τραγῳδίαν κινεῖν<sup>1</sup> (Victorius). Sext. Empir., adv. Math. VII 6, quotes Aristotle as having said that Empedocles πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεινηκέαι: and Quintilian, III 1. 8, doubtless also with reference to Aristotle, repeats this, *primus post eos...movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur*. Sext. Empir. again, p. 546, Bekk. adv. Math. X. πρὸς ἠθικούς § 2, of Socrates' 'origination' of the study of Moral Philosophy, ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν δόξας κεινηκέαι. See Spalding ad loc. Quint., who quotes Athen. XIV 629 C, ὅθεν ἐκινήθησαν αἱ καλούμεναι πνύρίχαι. *Movere* eodem sensu apud Quint. III 6. 10, 103, IV 1. 29.

ὀνόματα μιμήματα] This is the Platonic theory, Cratyl. 423 A seq.

<sup>1</sup> Welcker, *Nachtrag*, p. 239, note 175, accuses Bentley of a 'wonderful blunder' in the interpretation of κινεῖν in this passage, in saying, viz., that it signifies 'the first beginning of tragedy'—which it most undoubtedly does—and understands it himself of 'disturbing, altering', as κινεῖν νόμους (and the proverb μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριον, "let well alone," *quieta non movere*, "let sleeping dogs lie"). He says that Bentley's rendering is *längst widerlegt*. [Bentley, *On Phalaris*, I pp. 284. 386, ed. Dyce, pp. 262. 309, ed. Wagner.]

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## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ' Ι §§ 8, 9.

ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν  
μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἢ τε  
9 ραψῳδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ

The conclusion is, 423 B, ὄνομα ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῆς ἐκείνου, ὃ μιμεῖται καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ, ὃ ἂν μιμῆται. “Olympiodorus ad Philebum Platonis tradit Democritum nomina vocales imagines rerum appellare consuevisse, ὅτι ἀγάλματα φωνήεντα καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τῶν θεῶν, ὡς Δημόκριτος.” Victorius. Aristotle himself, de Interpretatione, sub init. 16 a 3, calls words τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, and afterwards, line 7, ὁμοιώματα, signs or representatives, and copies, of *mental* affections, i. e. impressions, a theory quite different from that of Plato, which is here adopted. On the terms applied by Aristotle to express the nature of words, see Waitz, on Organon 16 a 4. Of the four employed, he says, σύμβολον is a subjective σημεῖον, and ὁμοίωμα an objective μίμημα. On imitation and the natural love of it, the origin and foundation of all the fine arts, see the first three chapters of the Poetics. In c. 4, init. imitation or mimicry is described as natural to man from infancy, and *characteristic* of humanity. [Dionysius Halic. *de comp. verb.* p. 94 (quoted in Farrar’s *Chapters on Language*, chap. XI), μεγάλη τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις, ἢ ποιοῦσα μιμητικούς ἡμᾶς καὶ θετικούς τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα.]

τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κ.τ.λ.] This is introduced to account for the poets having been the first who devoted themselves to the study of style or language, in this sense. Words being the copies of things, the poets, whose object is imitation, addicted themselves to the study of them, in order to be able better to represent the things of which they were images. Victorius.

αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν] Some of the writers on rhapsodizing, with which was naturally combined the criticism of Homer, are mentioned in Plat. Ion. 530 C, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotus of Thasos (Xenoph. Conv. III 6), and Glaucon, probably of Teos, mentioned above, § 3.

§ 9. ‘And as the reputation which the poets acquired in spite of the simplicity of what they said (the silliness of the thoughts expressed) was thought (by those who imitated them) to be due to their language, it was for this reason that the language (of prose) first took a poetical colour, as that of Gorgias. And still, even at this day, the mass of the uneducated think the discourses of speakers of this kind mighty fine. Such however is not the fact, but the language of prose and poetry is distinct’.

To the same effect Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 3, (v. 457, Reiske). Lysias’ predecessors were not of his opinion about style—his was the ἀφελῆς λόγος, the ‘smooth and simple’ style—ἀλλ’ οἱ βουλόμενοι κόσμον τινα προσεῖναι τοῖς ὅλοις ἐξήλλαττον ἰδιώτην, καὶ κατέφυγον εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν μεταβολαῖς τε πολλαῖς χρώμενοι καὶ ὑπερβολαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τροπικαῖς ἰδέαις, ὀνομάτων τε γλωττηματικῶν καὶ ξένων χρήσει, καὶ τῶν οὐκ εἰωθῶτων σχηματισμῶν τῇ διαλλαγῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ καινολογίᾳ καταπληττόμενοι τὸν ἰδιώτην, κ.τ.λ. This was the new style introduced by Gorgias and his followers Polus and Licymnius (Alcidamas, &c.). Hermogenes, περὶ