

Cambridge University Press

978-1-108-00966-9 - Aristotle: Rhetoric, Volume 2

Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

[More information](#)

## ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

## ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β.

Ι Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι

Bekker  
P. 137  
quart  
editio  
1831  
P. 5.  
octav  
editio  
1873

## CHAP. I.

In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the *ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*. The treatment of it is cursory; and we are referred *backwards* to the analysis of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. 9<sup>1</sup>, for further details of the topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and the speaker may be made to assume the required character of *φρόνησις*, *ἀρετή* and *εὐνοία*; and *forwards* to the chapter on *φιλία* and *μῖσος* (II 4), in the treatise on the *πάθη*, where the indications of these affections are enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by *ῥήσις* *speech*) the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispensable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be convinced by a speaker who sets them against him.

On the order of the subjects of the work in general, and the connexion of the contents of this Chapter, I refer as before to the Introduction [p. 245].

§ I. *ἐκ τίνων...ταῦτ' ἐστίν*] This is a confusion of two constructions: the grammar requires either *ἐκ τίνων εἴρηται* (or something similar), or else *ἐξ ὧν ταῦτ' ἐστί*. The *ποῖαι* in the second clause shews that the first of the two was the one predominant in the writer's mind, which is carelessly varied at the end.

*δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις*] These two are in fact the same. The current popular opinions are converted by the artist into premisses of rhetorical enthymemes. They are united again, c. 18 § 2, comp. Topic. A 10, 104 a 12, *εἰσὶ δὲ προτάσεις διαλεκτικαὶ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ὅμοια...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τὰς εὐρημένας*. And c. 14, init. *τὰς μὲν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτέων...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσίν*.

‘Now the sources from which we must derive our arguments in

<sup>1</sup> The connexion of this chapter with the subject of the Rhetorical *ἦθος* is marked at the opening of the chapter itself: *συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κάκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποῖαί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις: ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν*.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-108-00966-9 - Aristotle: Rhetoric, Volume 2

Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

[More information](#)

2

## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β Ι §§ 1, 2.

πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτ' ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον 2 εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλάς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὄρᾱν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιὸν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευά-

exhorting and dissuading, in panegyric and censure, in accusation and defence, and the sort of opinions and premisses that are serviceable for (rhetorical) proof in them, are these: for these are the materials and sources of our enthymemes, specially, so to say, in each kind of speeches'; i. e. using a special treatment according to the kind of speech on which we are engaged. If the text is right here, *ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων*—Bekker retains it unaltered, and Spengel<sup>1</sup> accepts it in his last edition, though he formerly proposed *εἴπομεν*—this must be the translation of it. *ὡς εἰπεῖν* 'so to speak', (*ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὡς τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι*, Plat. Phaedr. 230 B, et sim.).

§ 2. The commencement of this section is repeated and dwelt upon at the beginning of c. 18, where, after the parenthetical account of the *πάθη* and the six special *ἕθη*, a break occurs, the subsequent contents of the work are enumerated in their order, and the logical part of Rhetoric resumed.

On the extension of the signification of *κρίνειν, κρίσις, κριτής*, to include decisions or *judgments* of all kinds, moral, political, (as in deciding upon a course of policy to be pursued), literary, (criticism, in matters of taste, works of art, written compositions, and such like), as well as the ordinary application of it to the judicial decisions of the judges in a court of law, compare I I. 7, p. 10, and Introd. p. 137, note 1.

*ἀποδεικτικός*] 'demonstrative', improperly applied to *rhetorical* proof. See note on I I. 11, p. 19.

*τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν*] (or the audience in general) Quint. v 12. 9, *probationes quas patheticas vocant, ductas ex affectibus*. There is a sort of *ζεύγμα* in the application of *κατασκευάζειν* to *αὐτὸν ποιὸν τινα*, and again to *τὸν κριτὴν*. In both cases it means 'to establish' or 'constitute', but is applied in two slightly different senses; in the first it is to make himself out to be, to establish a certain character in and by the speech, and in the other to establish a certain feeling or disposition in the minds of the judges.

<sup>1</sup> In his treatise on the Rhetoric in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 39, note, he translates the passage thus: *wie man jedes genus der reden für sich behandeln soll*: understanding *ὡς εἰπεῖν*, if I do not mistake him, in the sense of *ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν* (?) 'according as we have to speak', which seems to me to be hardly allowable. *ὡς εἰπεῖν* can, I think, in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, have no other sense than that which I have attributed to it. See, for illustrations of *ὡς* thus used with an infinitive, Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 545.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-108-00966-9 - Aristotle: Rhetoric, Volume 2

Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

[More information](#)

## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β Ι §§ 3, 4.

3

3 ζειν· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τὸ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν πως αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ  
4 αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλὰς ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ διακείσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ

§ 3. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν κ.τ.λ.] Comp. I 2. 4, 5. Quint. IV 5. 6, *interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est, sed omnino tractatio: affectibus perturbandus et ab intentione auferendus auditor. Non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet.* This goes beyond Aristotle: Quintilian however is speaking rather of the πάθος, of the τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα κατασκευάζειν, than of the ἦθος. He sets the πάθος above the ἦθος in point of its importance and value to the orator as a means of persuasion; Aristotle, admitting this in forensic speaking, takes the opposite view in the deliberative kind; § 4<sup>1</sup>. But compare I 2. 4, where a decided preference for the ἦθος is expressed.

‘For the assumption of a certain character by the speaker himself, and the supposition (of the audience) that he is disposed in a particular way (has certain feelings towards themselves), makes a great difference in respect of the persuasive effect of the speech, first and foremost in counselling or deliberation, and next in legal proceedings (ἦθος); and besides this, whether they (the audience) are themselves in some particular disposition (feeling, frame of mind) (towards him) (πάθος)’.

ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς] ‘consultations’. Plat. Gorg. 455 A, ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι...συμβολὴ ἦ.

§ 4. τὸ δὲ διακείσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας] Comp. I 2. 4, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν...οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες...πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φάμεν πραγματεῦσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογούντας, who wrote only for the use of pleaders in the courts of justice, I 1. 9, 10.

οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Orat. II 42. 178, *nikil est enim in dicendo maius quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe*

<sup>1</sup> The reason of this is, that when a man has to recommend or dissuade a certain course of action, his character and the opinion entertained of it must give great weight to his advice: and it is not in the law-court, but in public life, in quelling the seditious riot, that Virgil’s *vir pietate gravis ac meritis* (in the famous simile, Aen. I. 149) exhibits his ‘authority’: whereas in a court of justice, where facts are in question, the speaker’s assumed character has either no weight at all, or in a far less degree.

μισούσιν, οὐδ' ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ<sup>P. 137<sup>b</sup></sup>  
 τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἕτερα· τῷ μὲν  
 γὰρ φιλοῦντι, περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ οὐκ ἀδι-  
 κεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι· τούναντίον·<sup>P. 55</sup>  
 καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, εἰάν ἢ τὸ

*aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus.* And on this importance of εὐνοια, that is, the conciliation of it in the audience by making your own good will apparent in the speech, compare Demosth. de Cor. § 277, p. 318, *κακείνο δ' εἶ οἶδ', ὅτι τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα—ἔστω γάρ· καίτοι ἔγωγ' ὀρῶ τῆς πᾶν λεγόντων δυνάμεως τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὸ πλείστον μέρος κυρίου ὄντας· ὡς γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς ἀποδέξησθε καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔχητ' εὐνοίας, οὕτως ὁ λέγων ἔδοξε φρονεῖν κ.τ.λ.*

*τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα...τὸ μέγεθος ἕτερα]* ('either *altogether* different', different in *kind*; 'or in magnitude and amount', different in *degree*.) This clause (to τούναντίον) is explanatory of the effect of the πάθη upon the audience, (not of the ἦθος,) as appears from the example chosen, φιλία and μίσος being πάθη, II 4: and it belongs especially, though not exclusively—for in such cases as the *public* speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines it might be usefully, and in fact was, employed—to *forensic* practice; the result being in this case either complete acquittal from a charge (οὐκ ἀδικεῖν) or a lenient construction of it, and a mitigation of the penalty (ἢ μικρὰ ἀδικεῖν). The next (after τούναντίον) refers principally to the *deliberative* branch of Rhetoric, as is shewn by the future *time*—the *time* of the deliberative speaker is the *future*, I 3.2—τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι; and accordingly for the use of speakers in this branch the emotions appealed to must be different and adapted to a different purpose. The two which will be most serviceable to the public speaker are desire (ἐπιθυμία) and hope (ἐλπίς): those who are under the excitement of such feelings will be more likely to assent to the course of policy proposed, and so ensure the success of the speaker who recommends. It is singular however that neither of these is found in the list of πάθη which follows: ἐπιθυμία occurs amongst them in Eth. Nic. II 4; and hope may possibly be included under θάρσος, as the opposite of φόβος, in the analysis of τὸ θαρρᾶλεον and θάρσος, Rhet. II 5. 16, to the end. This is partially confirmed by II 5. 16; after telling us that *confidence* is the opposite of *fear*, he adds *ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ἐλπίς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγυὸς ὄντων*, as if 'the hope of near approaching safety' were convertible with, or the ground of, confidence, and therefore a πάθος opposed to φόβος. In the same way εὐνοια, in the three 'ethical' virtues to be exhibited in the speech, is included in φιλία.

'And to one who feels a desire for anything, or is in a sanguine frame of mind, the future result (announced by the speaker), if it be pleasant, appears to be both certain and good; whilst to any one who has no (such) feeling, or is in a bad humour, the contrary (is true, is the case).'

## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β Ι §§ 5, 6.

5

ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνε-  
ται, τῷ δ' ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τούναντίον.

5 τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας  
τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δι' ἃ πιστεύ-  
ομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις  
καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία· διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέ-  
γουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ  
6 τούτων τι· ἢ γὰρ δι' ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζου-  
σιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δο-

§ 5. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία] On Whately's com-  
parison (*Rhetoric*, c. 2) of these three qualities as constituting the ethical  
character of the speech, with the character of Pericles, as drawn by him-  
self, in Thuc. II 60, see Introd. p. 246, note 1. The explanation of them,  
and the reason of their selection, are there given. φρόνησις is the *intel-*  
*lectual* virtue of 'practical wisdom', essential above all to a statesman;  
ἀρετὴ is *moral* virtue, of character and conduct; εὐνοία is required in the  
speaker himself (or rather in his *speech*) as part of the ἦθος, and in the  
audience as a πάθος. In the *Politics* VIII (V) 9, init. the correspondence  
is exact, and the three same qualities or virtues are selected as the  
special qualifications of the statesman: τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλ-  
λοντας ἄρξειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν  
πολιτείαν (this is something rather different from the εὐνοία of the *Rhe-*  
*toric*: but the *purpose* of Rhetoric and of Politics is different), ἔπειτα  
δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς (this is 'ability', corresponding to  
φρόνησις in Rhet. and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in  
Thucyd.), τρίτον δ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν  
πολιτείαν. It seems not unlikely that Arist. may have borrowed this  
from Thuc., altering however and perhaps improving the classification  
and the expression, and adapting it to his immediate purpose in the  
*Politics* and the *Rhetoric*.

διαψεύδονται] '(the speakers) make mistakes, or false statements',  
whether intentionally or unintentionally; ψεύδεσθαι can bear either sense.  
In the *Nic. Eth.* where it occurs several times, VI 3, 1139 b 18, ib. c. 6,  
1140 b 4, c. 13, 1144 a 35, IX 3, 1165 b 8, and in the ordinary usage of  
other authors, it appears to be always 'to be deceived', implying an  
unintentional error, accordingly here also the mistakes and false state-  
ments must be represented as unintentional, so far as the word is con-  
cerned; though the alternative διὰ μοχθηρίαν—the second case, when  
ἀρετὴ is lacking—shews that it is also possible to make them inten-  
tionally and with intent to deceive. The fact is that here again is a sort  
of ζεύγμα, and διαψεύδεσθαι (as interpreted by the ordinary usage of it)  
will only apply properly to the first of the three cases; in the other two it  
requires some modification. The concluding observation, διόπερ ἐνδέ-  
χεται... γινώσκοντας, 'it is possible to do this with one's eyes open', looks  
as if it was meant to supply this.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-108-00966-9 - Aristotle: Rhetoric, Volume 2

Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

[More information](#)

6

## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β Ι §§ 6—8.

κοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσὶν  
 ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐνοιοί, διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα  
 συμβουλευεῖν γιγνώσκοντας. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν.  
 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν εἶναι  
 7 τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις πιστόν. ὅθεν μὲν τοίνυν φρόνιμοι  
 καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διη-  
 ρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ κὰν ἕτερόν τις  
 κὰν ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δ' εὐνοίας  
 8 καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον νῦν. ἔστι  
 δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς

§ 6. διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν] i. e. from corrupt motives do not state their real opinions. Whately's parallel from Thucydides, above referred to, though not precisely corresponding to the three virtues of the speech here described, is yet sufficiently close to serve as a commentary on this passage of Aristotle; and as portraying, in terse and vigorous language, the character of an upright and independent statesman, such as were rare at Athens, it is sufficiently striking in itself, to deserve quotation on its own account. *καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτ' ἀνδρὶ ὀργίξεσθε*, says Pericles, *ὅς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἦσσαν εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα φιλοπόλις* (Aristotle's *εὐνοία*) *τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων*. (This illustrates the *μοχθηρία*, the *malus animus*, of the other, which consists in suppressing your convictions or making false statements from corrupt or interested motives.) *ὁ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη· ὁ τ' ἔχων ἀμφοτέρα, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύνουσι, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράξοι· πρόσστος δὲ καὶ τοῦδε, χρήμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ξύμματα τοῦτου ἐνὸς ἂν πωλοῖτο*, Thuc. II 60.

§ 7. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διηρημένων] 'from the analysis of the virtues', in I 9. *περὶ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας*, in II 4.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] *κατασκευάζειν* here again has the same double sense and application as before, § 2. It is to make *oneself* out, make to appear, in the speech; and to put others in such and such a frame of mind. Both of these can be done, he says, by the use of the same topics, namely those of I 9. The topics there applied to panegyric under the epideictic branch, can be here transferred to the representation of the speaker's own character in and by his speech.

§ 8. *τὰ πάθη*] Of the various senses and applications of *πάθος*, and also of its special signification in Aristotle's ethical system, an account is given in the Introduction, p. 133 seq.; together with a comparison of the two lists here and in the Nic. Ethics. These two it will be seen differ materially. I have further referred (p. 246, note 1, on the summary of this chapter) to Mr Bain's work *On the Emotions and the Will* for a complete and scientific explanation of the actual facts of those which are also included in Aristotle's lists, either here or in the Nic. Eth., viz. anger, resentment, righteous indignation, terror and confidence or courage, love and hatred.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-108-00966-9 - Aristotle: Rhetoric, Volume 2

Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

[More information](#)

## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β 1 § 9.

7

τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργή  
 ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις  
 9 ἐναντία. δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία·  
 λέγω δ' οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς, πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι  
 εἰσὶ, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ  
 γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἧ τὰ δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ  
 μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἶη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ

What is here said of them, that they are characterised, as parts of our moral nature, by being always attended by pleasure and pain—one or both, as anger—is found likewise in Eth. N. II 4, sub init. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θράσος (so written here; more correctly θάρσος, II 5. 16,) φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πάθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονή ἢ λύπη. In Eth. Eudem. II 2, 1220 b 12, it is said of them, λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ ἐπιθυμίαν, (this is of course not intended for a complete list: αἰδῶς and ἐπιθυμία come from the Nic. Eth., the former from the end of Book IV., where it appears with νέμεις as an appendage to the list of virtues; it is found likewise in the Rhet. II 6, under the name αἰσχύνῃ. ἐπιθυμία is absent in the Rhetoric), ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (this is a modification of Aristotle's statement) ἢ αἰσθητικῇ (this also is an addition) ἡδονή ἢ λύπη καθ' αὐτά. In Magn. Mor. A 7, 8, there is a summary account, borrowed directly from Aristotle, of the three elementary divisions of man's moral nature, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις. Of the first we find, πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὀργή φόβος μῖσος πάθος ζῆλος ἔλεος, τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷς εἴωθε παρακολουθεῖν λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, I 186 a 12, which is afterwards thus modified, c. 8, I 186 a 34, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἦτοι λυπαί εἰσιν ἢ ἡδοναί, ἧ οὐκ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς. These πάθη proper are therefore distinguished from other πάθη, feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites, hunger and thirst (which are also attended by pleasure and pain), not by pleasure and pain in general, as seems to be implied in the above statements, but by the particular kinds of pleasures and pains that severally accompany them; bodily in the one case, mental and moral in the other. So that the appetites belong to the body or material, the 'emotions', as they are now called, to the mind and the moral, immaterial, part of man; and feeling (the general term) and emotion (the special term) are thus distinguished: all emotions are feelings, all feelings are not emotions.

μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι] (differ by change) 'are brought over to a different state of mind or feeling'. πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις 'in respect of their decisions', of *all* kinds; but especially judicial decisions and those of national assemblies on questions of policy or expediency.

§ 9. For rhetorical purposes we must divide the examination of each πάθος into three parts; the nature of them, what the disposition is in one who feels the emotion; the ordinary objects, against whom the emotion is directed (as the ordinary objects of anger); and the ordinary conditions, the occasions and circumstances which give rise to them. Without the knowledge of all three in each case, it is impossible to excite in the mind of anyone the feeling or emotion required.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρη-  
μένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τού-  
των ποιήσωμεν καὶ διελώμεν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον.

Ι ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινο-<sup>CHAP. II</sup>

διαγράφειν, *de-scribere, de-lineare*, to *describe*, lit. draw in detail, with all the divisions (διά) marked: comp. διάγραμμα, of a mathematical *diagram*: applied to a descriptive analysis of a subject.

On this part of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the treatise on the πάθη, Bacon has the following remarks, *de Augm. Scient.* VII 3, Vol. I. p. 736, ed. Ellis et Spedding: 'Et hic rursus subiit nova admiratio, Aristotelem, qui tot libros de Ethicis conscripsit, Affectus ut membrum Ethicae principale in illis non tractasse; in Rhetoricis autem ubi tractandi interveniunt secundario (quatenus scilicet oratione cieri aut commoveri possint) locum illis reperisse; (in quo tamen loco, de iis, quantum tam paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disseruit)'. I quote this with the more pleasure, as one of the few fair statements of Aristotle's merits to be found in Bacon's writings.

#### CHAP. II.

§ 1. ἔστω δὴ] said of a *provisional* definition, suitable for rhetorical purposes, but without scientific exactness. Comp. I 5. 3, and note, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3. On rhetorical definitions, see *Intrød.* p. 13.

ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης—μὴ προσήκοντος] This definition of anger occurs likewise in the *Topics*, Θ 156 a 30, ἡ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις εἶναι τιμωρίας διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, as an average specimen of a *dialectical* definition; whence no doubt it was imported into the Rhetoric. Another definition similar to this is again spoken of as popular and dialectical, and opposed to a true 'physical' definition, *de Anima* I, 403 a 29, διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὀρίσαιντο φυσικὴς τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιληψέως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ; the latter is the 'appropriate' form of definition. And Plutarch, *de Virt. Mor.* p. 442 B, speaks of ὄρεξις ἀντιληψέως in terms which seem to imply that Aristotle had himself employed as his own definition. This, says Seneca, *de Ira*, I 3. 3, very nearly corresponded with his own, (*cupiditas iniuriae ulciscendae* I 2. 4.) *ait enim* (Arist.) *iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi*; which appears to be a translation of ὄρεξις ἀντιληψέως. A passage of the *Eth. Nic.* VII 7, 1149 a 30, will illustrate some points of the definition of the Rhetoric. ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυσήτητα... ὀργὴ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἤδὴ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὀργὴ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. Here two elements of anger are distinguished. And the pain lies in the struggle which the θυμὸς undergoes, whilst the pleasure is caused by the satisfaction of the ἐπιθυμία, the *appetite* or *desire* of satisfaction or compensation for the injury inflicted, which is the object of the τιμωρία. Victorius quotes the Stoic definition of anger, τιμωρίας ἐπιθυμία τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἡδικηκέναι οὐ προσήκοντως, which is derived probably from this of Aristotle.



Cambridge University Press

978-1-108-00966-9 - Aristotle: Rhetoric, Volume 2

Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

[More information](#)

## ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β 2 § 1.

9

μένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν

ὄρεξις as a general term denotes a class of ὀρέξεις, instinctive and impulsive faculties of the soul or immaterial part, intellectual as well as moral, the ultimate origin of all action in the human subject. Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Metaph.* I p. 185, laments the want of any corresponding word in modern psychology, and proposes to supply it by the term 'conative' faculties. The ὄρεξις, so far as it is described at all, is noticed in de Anima II 3, sub init., and afterwards more at length in III 9 and 10; compare also Eth. N. VI 2. The first of these passages enumerates the ascending stages or forms of life which characterise and distinguish the ascending orders of plants and animals. The first, τὸ θρεπτικόν, the life or principle of growth and nutrition, is the lowest form, and is characteristic of plants, which have no other. The second stage in the development of life is τὸ αἰσθητικόν, with which τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, the ultimate origin of motion in the living animal, is inseparably connected; (sensation implies impulse) both of them being instinctive and both together constituting animal as distinguished from plant. But the lowest animals have no power of motion; consequently the next stage in the upward course is τὸ κινητικόν, local motion, or locomotion in space, κατὰ τόπον. The last, which is peculiar to humanity, is τὸ διανοητικόν, the intellectual element, divided into νοῦς and διάνοια. The ὀρεκτικόν is here divided, 414 b 2, into three classes of faculties, ἐπιθυμία (the appetites, or sensual desires)<sup>1</sup>, θυμός (the passions, anger, love, hatred, and all the more violent and impetuous emotions, the angry passions especially—the word is as old as Homer, a relic of antiquity, and as a psychological term very vague and indistinct), and lastly βούλησις, which seems here to include 'will' as well as 'wish'. The will is more directly implied, though never disengaged and distinctly expressed, in the προαίρεσις, the moral faculty of deliberate purpose: this consists of an intellectual, and also of an impulsive element, the spontaneous origin of moral action which it is the office of the intellectual part to direct aright; the προαίρεσις accordingly is ὄρεξις βουλευτική, Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 24, or again, ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, ib. b 4. These two elements in combination, (the προαίρεσις), are the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, ib. a 32, of which the ὄρεξις (and so de Anima III 9. 2, 3, ἐν δὴ τὸ κινεῖν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν,) is the

<sup>1</sup> This reference of ἐπιθυμία to the class of ὀρέξεις indicates, as Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. c. 3 (ap. Heitz, *Verlor. Schrift. Arist.* p. 171), has pointed out, a change in the Aristotelian psychology, from the Platonic tripartite division of the human nature, intellectual and moral, which he originally held—ὡς δὴ ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν, i. e. in the lost dialogue περὶ δικαιοσύνης, according to Heitz: the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν are actually distinguished, Topic. B 7, 113 a 36—b 3, and Δ 5, 126 a 8—13, where we have the three, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, τὸ λογιστικόν (in both passages τὸ θυμοειδές is assigned as *the seat of ἀρχή*); and the division is certainly implied in Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1327 b 36, seq., where the author is criticising the Republic to the views expressed in the de Anima, in which the Platonic division is criticised, condemned, and rejected. Plutarch, l. c., p. 442 B, after the statement above quoted, continues, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδές τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένευεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τιμὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιληπῆσθαι.

Cambridge University Press

978-1-108-00966-9 - Aristotle: Rhetoric, Volume 2

Edited by Edward Meredith Cope and John Edwin Sandys

Excerpt

[More information](#)

10

## PHTOPIKHΣ B 2 § 1.

original moving agent: and this, though not expressly so called, is in fact the will. In de Anima III cc. 9, 10, are repeated the statements of II 3, with the addition of further details. Of the three component elements of ὄρεξις, the second, θυμός, is omitted: and the five stages of life of the former passage still remaining five, the intellectual is now divided into two, τὸ νοητικόν, and τὸ βουλευτικόν (the speculative and practical reason), and the κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον has disappeared. How this division of the ψυχῆ, soul or life, is to be reconciled with that of the Ethics II 4, into πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, Aristotle has not told us, and no one I believe has yet discovered. Of the three sets of ὀρέξεις above mentioned ὀργή must belong to the θυμός.

μετὰ λύπης] all the πάθη being attended by pleasure or pain; or sometimes both, as ὀργή. Note on c. 1. 8.

φαινομένης and φαινομένην] are both emphatic; not merely 'apparent' and unreal, but 'manifest, conspicuous, evident'. φαινομένη τιμωρία, 'a punishment of which the effect can be perceived', (comp. II 3. 16, and note; II 4. 31, αἰσθεσθαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.) and διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, 'due to a manifest slight'; a slight which is so manifest that it cannot escape observation; and therefore because it has been noticed by everybody, requires the more exemplary punishment in the way of compensation. It is because anger is an impulse towards this punishment or vengeance that can be seen, and accompanied with pain until this impulse is quieted by satisfaction, that we are told in I 11. 9, 'that no one is angry with one who appears to be beyond the reach of his vengeance, or with those who are very far superior to him in power'.

With φαινομένης, for φανεράς, comp. I 7. 31 (note), 8. 6; 9. 32; II 10. 1; II. 1; III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, compared with II 23. 30, where the same phrase occurs with φανερά ἐῖναι for φαίνεσθαι. Topic. H 3, 153 a 31, ὁποῖον ἂν μάλιστα φανῆ ὁ ἐναντίος ὀρισμός. Eth. Nic. III 7, 1113 b 19, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν κ.τ.λ. Parv. Nat. de Long. Vit. c. 5, sub init. φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως. Compare also, alike for the sense and the expression, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 28, ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία ἢ ὀργὴ ἐστίν: and Top. B 2, 109 b 36, the parallel case of envy, εἰ γὰρ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένη εὐπραγίᾳ τῶν ἐπικεικῶν αὐτοῦ. Plato Phaedo 84 C, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, (as plainly appeared in his face and gesture). Eth. Eudem. III 1, 1229 b 12 (quoted in note on II 5. 1), is a good instance.

ὀλιγωρίαν] 'slight esteem or regard', 'slight'. The cause of anger is stated so nearly in the same terms in Rhet. ad Alex. 34 (35). 11, ὀργὴν δὲ (ἐμποιήσομεν), ἔαν ἐπιδεικνύωμεν παρὰ τὸ προσήκον ὀλιγωρημένους ἢ ἡδικημένους, ἢ τῶν φίλων ἐκείνων, ἢ αὐτοῦς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν αὐτοί, that one might almost suppose that the two explanations are derived from some common source, perhaps a definition of anger current in the earlier treatises on Rhetoric, Thrasymachus' ἔλεοι (Rhet. III 1. 7, Plat. Phaedr. 267 C), and the like.

A valuable commentary on this explanation of the cause of anger, the coincidence between the two being manifestly accidental, is to be found in Prof. Bain's work on *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 166, ch. ix. § 3, on the 'irascible emotion'. "These two facts both pertain," he says, "to the nature of true anger, the discomposure of mind from the circumstance of