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A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos

William Ward's account of the Hindu communities among whom he served as a Baptist missionary in Serampore in West Bengal was first published in 1811 and reprinted in this third edition in 1817. It was an extremely influential work that shaped British views of the newly defined entity of 'Hinduism' in the early nineteenth century. Ward and his fellow missionaries promoted social reforms and education, establishing the Serampore Mission Press in 1800 and Serampore College in 1818. Ward devoted twenty years to compiling his study of Hindu literature, history, mythology and religion, which was eventually published in four volumes. It provided richly detailed information, and was regarded as authoritative for the next fifty years. It is therefore still an important source for researchers in areas including Indian history, British colonialism, Orientalism and religious studies. Volume 4 describes the Bengali language and provides translations from Hindu Vedas, sacred books and philosophical writings. Ward compares these texts with the philosophical systems of other ancient cultures, notably Greece, in the hope of gaining support for both the serious study of Sanskrit literature in Europe and the improvement of the educational system in colonial South Asia itself.

A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos

Including a Minute Description of their Manners and Customs, and Translations from their Principal Works

Volume 4: The Philosophical Systems of the Hindoos

William Ward

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paolo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108008242

This edition first published 1820
This digitally printed version 2009

ISBN 978-1-108-00824-2 Paperback

A VIEW

OF THE

HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND MYTHOLOGY

OF

THE HINDOOS.

VOL. III.

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Page	Line
22,	7, *after* body *instead of a period place a* ;
25,	1, that the nine others.
51,	*dele the blank line in the midst of the quotation, and add the article* a *in the last line of the page before* yogēē.
90,	18, *after* seen *place a comma.*
183,	27, *before* sŭtwŭ *insert* the.
216,	9, *read,* body of light.
294,	*last line, for* them *read* it.
311,	11, *for* profit *read* profits.
319,	26, *for* Lunga *read* Lunka.
320,	21, *for* son's *read* sun's.
341,	2, *for* dozes *read* doses.
359,	18, *for* other *read* others.
367,	15, *for* goorŭ *read* gooroo.
429,	*note, line* 2, *for* living *read* lived.
450,	11, *for* our *read* the.
461,	29, *for* at *read* in.
476,	15, *for* dialect *read* dialects.
477,	21, *for* Mŭsŭra *read* Mŭnŭsa.
483,	place Chap. III.
484,	22, dele [f]

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

ON THE

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

OF

THE HINDOOS.

THE Hindoos attribute many of their ancient writings to the gods; but for the origin of the védŭ, they go still higher, and declare it to have been from everlasting. When we look into the védŭ itself, however, we there find the names of the authors; and that all the books composing what is called the védŭ have had an earthly origin.

The period when the most eminent of the Hindoo philosophers[a] flourished, is still involved in much obscurity; but, the apparent agreement, in many striking particulars, between the Hindoo and the Greek systems of philosophy, not only suggests the idea of some union in their origin, but strongly pleads for their belonging to one age, notwithstanding the unfathomable antiquity claimed by the Hindoos; and, after the reader shall

[a] These persons were called Moonees, from mŭnŭ, to know; and often, Gnanēē, or, The Wise: thus even in the very names by which their learned men were designated, we find the closest union between the Greek and Hindoo Philosophy. "What is now called philosophy, was," says Brucker, "in the infancy of human society, called Wisdom: the title of Wise Men was, at that time, frequently conferred upon persons who had little claim to such a distinction."

have compared the two systems, the author is persuaded he will not consider the conjecture as improbable, that Pythagoras and others did really visit India, or, that Goutŭmŭ and Pythagoras were contemporaries, or nearly so. If this be admitted, it will follow, that the dŭrshŭnŭs were written about five hundred years before the Christian æra. The védŭs, we may suppose, were not written many years before the dŭrshŭnŭs, for Kopilŭ, the founder of the Sankhyŭ sect, was the grandson of Mŭnoo, *the preserver and promulgator of the first aphorisms of the védŭs;* Goutŭmŭ, the founder of the Noiyayikŭ sect, married the daughter of Brŭmha, the first male: and Kŭnadŭ and Pŭtŭnjŭlee, the founders of two other of these schools, belonged to the same, or nearly the same period. We are thus enabled to fix upon an epoch, in the most interesting period of Hindoo history, which is not only rendered probable by the accordance of two philosophical systems, but by all the chronological data to be gathered from the scattered fragments of history found in the pooranŭs.

The author, at one time, was disposed to form the following theory respecting the progress of the Hindoo literature: as the original védŭ is called by a name which implies that it was received by tradition,[b] and as the doctrines taught in the six schools of philosophy are believed to have been founded on the aphorisms (sōōtrŭs) received by tradition from Kopilŭ, Goutŭmŭ, Pŭtŭnjŭlee, Kŭnadŭ, Védŭ-vyasŭ, and Joiminee, he conjectured, that about the period of the rise of the Grecian philosophy, several wise men rose up among the Hindoos, who delivered certain dogmas, which were preserved during a certain unknown period as sacred traditions. For the most ancient of these dogmas no parent was found, and they were called the védŭ; the others became known by the names of the six sages above-mentioned. Down to this period, he supposed the védŭ and the dŭrshŭnŭs to have existed only in the sayings of these ancient sages; but that at length men arose, who

[b] See page 1.

adopted these aphorisms as first principles, established schools in which they were explained, and from whence were promulgated certain systems of philosophical opinion; from this time, these systems being committed to writing, disputations multiplied, till, amidst these confused speculations, it became impossible to fix any standard of opinion.—At length, a learned and most indefatigable man, Dwoipayŭnŭ, collected a heterogeneous[c] mass of materials, the opinions and effusions of different philosophers, and, having arranged them as well as such a chaos could be arranged, he called this compilation "the *védŭ*." According to this reasoning, the dŭrshŭnŭs are more ancient than the compilation by Védŭ-vasŭ, called the védŭ; but as the Hindoo learning was then in its wane, this compilation was soon venerated as "the self-evident word proceeding out of the mouth of Brŭmhŭ;" and it was declared to be a very high crime for these sacred writings to be even read in the ears of a shōōdrŭ.

We must not suppose, that Védŭ-vasŭ included in his compilation the works of all the philosophical sects: he contented himself with inserting extracts from the works of each school, and especially from the védantŭ. The durshŭnŭs and the smritees evidently form a body of writings distinct from the védŭs; though passages are to be found in the védŭs favouring every philosophical speculation professed among the Hindoos. The modern Hindoos believe, that the védŭ is the source of all the shastrŭs, just as an illiterate Englishman might suppose, that every part of English learning came from the Encyclopedia.

Their most distinguished writers appear to have been, Swayŭm bhoovŭ, or Mŭnoo, Kopilŭ, Goutŭmŭ, Pŭtŭnjŭlee, Kŭnadŭ, Védŭ-vasŭ, Joiminee, Narŭdŭ, Mŭrēēchee, Poolŭstyŭ,

[c] To perceive the propriety of this epithet, the reader need only examine Mr. Colebrooke's very learned Essay.

Poolŭhŭ, Vŭshisht'hŭ, Bhrigoo, Vrihŭspŭtee, Unjira, Utree, Prŭchéta, Dŭkshŭ, Shŭtatŭpŭ, Dévŭlŭ, Lomŭshŭ, Sŭmbŭrttŭ, Apŭstŭmbŭ, Boudhayŭnŭ, Pitamŭhŭ, Ujŭstyŭ, Kŭshyŭpŭ, Parŭskŭrŭ, Harēētŭ, Vishnoo, Katyayŭnŭ, Shŭnkhŭ, Likhitŭ, Ashwŭlayŭnŭ, Pŭrashŭrŭ, Gŭrgŭ, Kast'hoomee, Vishwamitrŭ, Jŭmŭdŭgnee, Poit'hēēnŭsee, Ushira, Prŭjapŭtee, Nareejŭnghŭ, Chŭvŭnŭ, Bhargŭvŭ, Rishyŭshringŭ, Shatyayŭnŭ, Moitrayŭnēēyŭ, Shoonŭ-shéphŭ, Yŭgnŭ-parshwŭ, Karshnajinee, Voijŭvapŭ, Lokakshee, Gargyŭ, Soomŭntoo, Jatookŭrnŭ, Yayanŭ, Vaghrŭ-padŭ, and Vaghrŭ-kŭrnŭ. Of all these the author has given some biographical sketches in the following pages.

These were the most ancient of their philosophers; and the names of some of them are found in the védŭs; others were the founders of their different schools of philosophy, and others the avowed authors of their sacred and civil laws. The latest period to which these accounts can be supposed to reach, is the commencement of the kŭlee yoogŭ; after this a number of celebrated metaphysicians, poets, and philologists appeared at the courts of the Hindoo monarchs, and threw a lustre on the periods in which they lived.

Had not the author been afraid of wearying the patience of his readers, he might have given accounts of many other Hindoo writers, such as Krŭtoo, one of the seven sages, and author of certain formulas used at sacrifices; Yŭmŭ, author of one of the smritees; Pŭrŭshooramŭ, the son of Jŭmŭdŭgnee, author of a work on the use of the bow, and who likewise avenged his father's death by the destruction of the 1,000-armed Ŭrjoonŭ; Vishwŭshrŭva, the father of Koovérŭ, Ravŭnŭ, and other giants, who wrote rules for the periodical ceremonies called vrŭtŭ; Yogee-yagnŭ-vŭlkyŭ, author of a law treatise; Shandilyŭ, Bhŭrŭdwajŭ, Vatsyŭ, and others, authors of certain genealogies, and formulas relating to bramhinical ceremonies Ŭt'hŭrvŭ, and Ŭndhŭ-moonee; Dévŭlŭ, author of a law trea-

tise; Shŭnŭkŭ, Shŭnŭndŭ, and Sŭnatŭnŭ; Asooree, a smritee writer; Voorhoo, author of a piece on the sankhyŭ philosophy; Markŭndéyŭ, a pooranŭ writer; Doorvasa, a most irascible sage, author of a work similar to the smritees, and of an oopŭ-pooranŭ; Ooshŭna; Galŭvŭ, author of remarks on altars for sacrifices, &c.; Moudgŭlya, writer of a work on the different casts, and their duties; Javalee, Jŭnhoo, and Sandēēpŭnee; Ushtavŭkrŭ, the writer of a sŭnghita; Gobhilŭ, author of some aphorisms relative to certain ceremonies in the védŭ; Shŭrŭbhŭngŭ, the writer of precepts on the duties of different classes of men; Bhagooree, a smritee writer, as well as the author of a grammar; Médhŭsŭ, who wrote on Bhŭgŭvŭtēē, as the representative of matter; Richēēkŭ, and Kŭnwŭ; Dwoitŭ, author of a smritee called Dwoitŭ-nirnŭyŭ; Tritŭ, Narayŭnŭ, Savŭrnŭ, Shŭnŭtkoomarŭ, Ghritŭkoushikŭ, Koushikŭ, Ourbŭ, Vrŭdnŭ, Vaghrŭbhōōtee, Jŭrŭtkaroo, Dheumyŭ, Sootēēkŭ, Doorbŭlŭ, Akhŭndŭlŭ, Nŭrŭ, Mrikŭndoo, Vŭnjoolŭ, Mandŭvyŭ, Ŭrdhŭshira, Oordŭ-padŭ, Ŭmboobhojēē, Voishŭmpayŭnŭ, Dwidŭshŭ, Soubhŭree, and Balikilwŭ.

Most of the Hindoo works on grammar[d] and ethics, as well as their poems, appear more modern than the védŭs, the dŭrshŭnŭs, and smritees. We shall conclude these remarks by noticing, very briefly, the most distinguished of the Hindoo learned men in the lower departments of literature.

Paninee, the celebrated grammarian, might have been placed among the Hindoo sages; but I have not been able to discover the period in which he flourished. The Mŭhéshŭ grammar, now extinct, is almost the only one mentioned as more ancient than Paninee's. Sŭrvvŭ-bŭrmacharyŭ was the author of the Kŭlapŭ, a grammar enlarged by Doorgŭ-sing-

[d] A friend suggests, perhaps grammar may have been coeval with the védŭ, being one of the ŭngŭs, or appendant sciences.

hŭ, and now used in many parts of India. Krŭmŭdéshwŭrŭ wrote the Sŭngkshiptŭ-sarŭ, another well known grammar; and Joomŭrŭ another, distinguished by his name. We might add Vopŭ-dévŭ, the author of the Moogdhŭbodhŭ, and many others, for the Hindoos can boast many very able philologists.

At the head of the Hindoo poets must be placed Valmēēkŭ, the author of the Ramayŭnŭ, written during the life of Ramŭ; and, after him, Vanŭ-bhŭttŭ, the author of the Kadŭmbŭrēē, a celebrated descriptive poem; and Jŭyŭ-dévŭ, who wrote the Gēētŭ-Govindŭ, in praise of Krishnŭ. At the court of Vikrŭmadityŭ, we find many poets: Kalēē-dasŭ, author of the Rŭghoo-vŭngshŭ, of the Koomarŭ-sŭmbhŭvŭ, in praise of Shivŭ, of the Ŭbhignanŭ-shŭkoontŭlŭ, in honour of Dooshmŭntŭ, a king, of the Nŭlodŭyŭ, in praise of king Nŭlŭ, of the Ritoo-sŭngharŭ, on the seasons, of the Vikrŭmorvŭshēē, an amorous poem, and of similar works under the names Malŭvikagnimitrŭ, and Méghŭ-dōōtŭ;[e]—Bhŭvŭ-bhōōtee wrote the Malŭtee-madhŭvŭ, a poem of the same description, and the Vēērŭ-chŭritrŭ, and the Oottŭrŭ-chŭritrŭ, poems in honour of Ramŭ;—Ghŭtŭkŭrpŭrŭ wrote a poem in a most eccentric form, on the rainy season, and challenged all the Hindoo poets to write one of equal merit. Kalēē-dasŭ accepted the challenge, and wrote his Nŭlodŭyŭ;—Soobŭndhoo wrote the Vasŭvŭ-dŭtta, on the amours of a king's son;—Maghŭ, a king, wrote on the destruction of Shishoo-palŭ, &c.—Bharŭvee wrote the Kiratarjoonēēyŭ, on the wars of the Pandŭvŭs;—Shrēēhŭrshŭ wrote the Noishŭdhŭ, on the adventures of Nŭlŭ, a king;—Bhŭrtree-Hŭree wrote the Bhŭttee, on the exploits of Ramŭ, and the Shŭtŭkŭ, one of the best poems in the language;—Mooraree-Mishrŭ wrote the Ŭnŭrghyŭ-raghŭvŭ, in praise of Ramŭ;—Pŭkshŭdhŭrŭ-mishrŭ wrote the Prŭsŭnnŭ-raghŭvŭ, a similar poem;—Bhanoo-

[e] Translated by H. H. Wilson, Esq.

dŭttŭ-mishrŭ wrote the Rŭsŭ-mŭnjŭrēē, an amorous poem; Krishnŭ-mishrŭ wrote the Prŭbodhŭ-chŭndrodŭyŭ, a philosophical poem;—Ŭmŭroo wrote the Ŭmŭrŭ-shŭtŭkŭ, a love song;—Kŭvirajŭ wrote the Raghŭvŭ-panduvēēyŭ, on Ramŭ, Yoodhist'hirŭ, &c.

The Hindoos have had many writers on ethics also: among the most celebrated were Mŭrmmŭt'hŭ-bhŭttŭ, who wrote the Kavyŭ-prŭkashŭ; and Vishwŭ-nat'hŭ-kŭvirajŭ, who wrote the Sahityŭ-dŭrpŭnŭ.

Their astronomical writers have not been few: Sōōryŭ wrote the Sōōryŭ-siddhantŭ; Bhaskŭracharyŭ, the Siddhantŭ-shiromŭnee, and the Lēēlavŭtēē; Vŭnŭmalēē-mishrŭ, the Sarŭ-mŭnjŭrēē; Vŭrahacharyŭ, the Vŭrahŭ-sŭnghita; Govinda-nŭndŭ, the Shooddhee-dēēpika, Pŭdmŭ-navŭ, the Bhōōvŭnu-dēēpŭkŭ; Narayŭnŭ-shŭrma, the Shantikŭ-tŭtwantŭ; Bhŭttotpŭlŭ, the Horashŭt-pŭnchashika; Ramŭ-doivŭgnŭ, the Moohōōrtŭ-chintamŭnee; Vŭshisht'hŭ wrote a sŭnghita known by his own name, and so did Mŭkŭrŭndŭ; Shrēē-pŭtee, the Rŭtnŭ-mala; Shŭtanŭndŭ, the Bhaswŭtēē; Rŭghoonŭndŭnŭ, the Yotishŭ-tŭttwŭ, and Kévŭlŭ-ramŭ, the Gŭnitŭ-rajŭ.

Although the author regrets the want of more ample materials, he is happy that he has been able to give in this volume accounts of *fifty-nine* writers who assisted either in the védŭs, the dŭrshŭnŭs, or the law books.—It is a painful circumstance, that no copious *Biographical Accounts* of men of so high an order amongst the sages of antiquity should be obtainable. How interested do we feel in the early, domestic, and closing histories, as well as in the scholastic disputes, of Socrates, Plato, and the other eminent Greek philosophers; and yet histories of the Indian sages equally interesting might doubtless have been compiled. We are not yet certain that they were not; but as it appears that the Hindoos

never had a civil historian, it is too probable that they never had a philosophical one. If this be the case, these philosophers perished in the forests and groves where they studied and instructed their disciples, without one of these disciples possessing either sentiment, ambition, or gratitude enough to perpetuate the memory of his master.—In this dearth of biographical materials, the author has collected what he was able, but he hopes much more may be published by persons of greater leisure: he is persuaded that more enlarged notices of these sages may be found amidst the immense stores of Hindoo literature, though he fears they will scarcely supply a volume like the first part of Brucker's Historia Critica Philosophiæ.

It is true, the lives of men so secluded from the world could not have supplied many materials for history; but there must have been various interesting occurrences, even in the forests or convents where they resided, and in their occasional intercourse with each other, and with the kings, their patrons, which would have given a peculiar interest to such memoirs: but here, as in their political history, we meet with nothing that can throw light on the periods in which they lived, nor on those learned disputations in which we know they were engaged.[f]

We are however under great obligations to these historians, for pointing out so clearly the subjects which engaged the enquiries of these philosophers—that is, the *divine nature*, the *evidences of truth*, the *origin of things*, the *nature of the different forms of matter*, and the *methods of obtaining re-union to the soul of the world*. It will not escape the recollection of the reader, that these were the very subjects so constantly discussed in the Grecian schools; and he will no doubt be still

[f] These disputes, as described by the pouranic writers, were equally violent with those of the dialectic philosophers, and were maintained by "idle quibbles, jejune reasonings, and imposing sophisms," like those of the Greeks.

more struck with these coincidences, when he has read these Introductory Remarks, and has gone over the notes at the bottom of the succeeding pages. These subjects of enquiry, it must be confessed, lay at the foundation of all that was interesting to them in those dark ages, but by the Hindoo ascetics they were discussed in a manner so metaphysical, that only minds equally abstracted with theirs could be interested in them; and this was very much the case with some of the Greeks, especially on points which related to the divine nature, and the origin of the universe.[g]

A modern writer has given the following concise summary of the Greek philosophy, as taught by its most celebrated sages, and the author here inserts it, to assist his readers in a comparison of the two systems.

"Like Socrates, Plato believed in the unity of the Supreme Being, without beginning or end, but asserted at the same time the eternity of matter. He taught, that the elements being mixed together in chaos, were, by the will of God, separated, reduced into order, and that thus the world was formed; that God infused into matter a portion of his divine spirit, which animates and moves it; and that he committed the care of this world, and the creation of mankind, to beings who are constantly subject to his will. It was further his opinion, that mankind have two souls, of separate and different natures, the one corruptible, the other immortal; that the latter is a portion of the divine spirit, resides in the brain, and is the source of reason; that the former, the mortal soul, is divided into two portions, one of which, residing in the heart, produces passion and desires; the other, between the diaphragm and navel, governs the animal functions of life; that

[g] "Nature and its origin was the highest object of study of the Pythagorean schools." The author is indebted to Dr. Enfield's Abridgment of Brucker for this and most of the notes in this chapter.

the mortal soul ceases to exist with the life of the body, but that the divine soul, no longer clogged by its union with matter, continues its existence, either in a state of happiness or of punishment. That the souls of the virtuous, of those whose actions are guided by their reason, return after death into the source from whence they flowed; while the souls of those who submitted to the government of the passions, after being for a certain time confined to a place destined for their reception, are sent back to earth, to animate other bodies.

"Aristotle has by some been charged with atheism, but I am at a loss upon what grounds, as a firm belief in the existence of a Supreme Being is clearly asserted by him, and not any where contradicted. He taught, that the universe and motion are eternal, having for ever existed, and being without end; and although this world may have undergone, and be still subject to, convulsions arising from extraordinary causes, yet motion, being regular in its operation, brings back the elements into their proper relative situations, and preserves the whole; that even these convulsions have their source in nature: that the idea of a *chaos*, or the existence of the elements without form or order, is contrary to her laws, which we every where see established, and which, constantly guiding the principle of motion, must from eternity have produced, and to eternity preserve, the present harmony of the world. In every thing, we are able to discover a train of *motive* principles, an uninterrupted chain of causes and effects: and that as nothing can happen without a cause, the word *accident* is an unmeaning expression, employed in speaking of effects, of whose causes we are ignorant. That in following this chain we are led up to the primitive cause, the Supreme Being, the universal soul, who, as the will moves the body, moves the whole system of the universe. Upon these principles, it was natural for him to suppose the souls of mankind to be portions or emanations of the divine spirit, which at death quit the body, and, like a drop of water falling into the ocean, are ab-

sorbed in the divinity. Though he therefore taught the immortality of human souls, yet, as he did not suppose them to exist individually, he consequently denied a future state of rewards and punishments. 'Of all things,' says he, 'the most terrible is death, after which, we have neither to hope for good, nor to dread evil.'

"Zeno, of Cyprus, taught, that throughout nature there are two eternal qualities: the one active, the other passive. That the former is a pure and subtle æther, the divine spirit, and that the latter is in itself entirely inert, until united with the active principle; that the divine spirit, acting upon matter, produced fire, air, water, and earth; or separated the elements from each other; that it cannot, however, be said, that God created the world by a voluntary determination, but by the effect of established principles, which have ever existed and will for ever continue. Yet, as the divine Spirit is the efficient principle, the world could neither have been formed nor preserved without him, all nature being moved and conducted by him, while nothing can move or affect him. Matter may be divided, measured, calculated, and formed into innumerable shapes; but the divine spirit is indivisible, infinite, unchangeable, and omnipresent. He supposed the universe, comprehending matter and space, to be without bounds; but that the world is confined to certain limits, and is suspended in infinite space; that the seeds of things existed in the primitive elements, and that by means of the efficient principle they were brought forward and animated; that mankind come into the world without any innate ideas, the mind being like a smooth surface, upon which the objects of nature are gradually engraven by means of the senses; that the soul of man, being a portion of the universal soul, returns, after death, to its first source, where it will remain until the destruction of the world, a period at which the elements, being once more confounded, will again be restored to their present state of order and harmony."

The reader who shall carefully peruse these remarks, and compare them with the opinions of the Hindoo ascetics, hereafter given, cannot fail of being astonished at the amazing agreement between the schools of Greece and India.

The nature of the *Divine existence*, however deeply examined by the Hindoo sages, appeared to them so incomprehensible, that some of them gave up the subject in despair. Kopilŭ says: 'The most excellent spirit is known only to himself. The nature and existence of God are inscrutable; he has nothing to do with creatures, nor they with him: we know nothing of God but by inference.'[h] The expressions of others on this subject appear to be very little better than the language of despair: Harēētŭ says, 'God and all the inferior deities exist only in the formulas of the védŭ, and have no bodily shape.'[i] Chŭvŭnŭ affirms, 'Sound alone is god.'[k] Joiminee says the same, 'God is simple sound; the power of liberation lies in the sound God, God.'[l] Ashwŭlayŭnŭ declares, 'God is not a being separate from his name.'[m] Damascius, in his book of Principles, says, 'According to certain Egyptian writings, there is one principle of all things, praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and that thrice repeated: which unknown darkness is a description of that supreme deity which is incomprehensible.'[n] 'I am all that hath been, is, and shall be; and my veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered.'[o]

Indeed three out of the six philosophical sects are charged with undermining the proofs of a separate and intelligent first cause—the Sankhyŭ, the Voishéshikŭ, and the Mēēmangsa; and though the founders, in some instances, write as though they meant to defend the orthodox opinions, it is quite clear, that while they admitted an isolated deity, they asserted that the world was eternal, and that material forms sprang out of an energy in some way confined exclusively to matter. In page

[h] Page 4. [i] Page 35. [k] Page 47. [l] Page 286. [m] Page 39.
[n] Cudworth. [o] Inscription upon the Egyptian temple at Sais.

192, the reader will find not less than nine *atheistical* propositions mentioned and combated, and in pages 252 and 259 five similar propositions. Thus Kopilŭ unblushingly denies to God the creation of the world: he says, 'The universe is the work of nature as possessed of the three qualities: nature is capable of the work of creation, for behold the spider producing the web from its own bowels; see the fall of inanimate bodies, and the production of milk in the udder of the cow'.[p] 'If when you say, that matter is inactive, you mean that it is destitute of motion, you will contradict the védŭ and smritees, for they declare that matter possesses motion [agitation;] therefore when we say, that matter is inert, our meaning must be confined to this idea, that it does not tend to any object, and is free from consciousness of its own existence.'[q] 'Nature is the root or the origin of the universe, since every thing proceeds from it, or is to be traced to it.'[r] 'There is in nature an uncreated seed, from which all beings spring.'[s] 'Nature or chaos is the mother of the universe.'[t] 'Nature is the source of all, and of actions too.'[u]—The Egyptians, it would appear, held the idea that the Supreme Being was something perfectly distinct from the Creator; Jamblicus says, 'According to the Egyptians, before all entities and principles there is one God, who is immoveable, always remaining in the solitariness of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible nor any thing else complicated with him.'[x] Anaximander, Anaximenes and Hippo acknowledged no other substance besides body, and resolved all things into the motions, passions, and affections of it.'[y] And this agrees with the opinions of some of the Hindoo atheists, 'that the body was to be identified with spirit.'—Cudworth describes four forms of atheism as prevailing among the Greeks: 1. 'The Democritic, which derives all things from dead and stupid matter in the way of atoms and figures;—

[p] Page 2. [q] Page 136. [r] Kopilŭ, p. 3. [s] Soomŭntoo, p. 52.
[t] Vyaghrŭ-padŭ, p. 53. [u] Pŭtŭnjŭlee, p. 219. [x] Cudworth.
[y] Cudworth.

2. the Hylozoic or Stratonical, which attributes to all matter, as such, a certain living and energetic nature; but deprived of all animality, sense, and consciousness:—the Anaximandrian, which with the Democritic fetches all things from dead and stupid matter, but in the way of forms and qualities generable and corruptible; 4. the Stoical atheism, which supposes one plastic and methodical but senseless nature to preside over the whole corporeal universe.'[2]—The same writer remarks, that 'Hesiod and Homer were both suspected by Plato and Aristotle for atheistic theogonists.'—'The greatest defect in the system of Epicurus is, that it attempts to account for all the appearances of nature, even those which respect animated and intelligent beings, upon the simple principles of matter and motion, without introducing the agency of a Supreme Intelligence.'—Strato's opinions were, 'that there is inherent in nature a principle of motion, or force, without intelligence, which is the only cause of the production and dissolution of bodies.'—'What Heraclitus says concerning fate, as an intelligent and rational principle in nature, the cause of motion, and consequently of production and dissolution, must be understood, not of a substance or being distinct from the primary fire, but of the intrinsic power of this first principle, the necessary energy by which all things are produced.'—'The stoical system teaches, that the efficient cause is pure ether, or fire, which comprehends all the vital principles by which individual beings are necessarily produced'—'Democritus either entirely rejected the nature of deity, or allowed him no share in the creation or government of the world.'—'He admitted no other soul of the world than one similar to that which he allowed to man, a blind force, resulting from the combination of certain subtle atoms, of a round form, which produce fire.'—'Epicurus ascribed every appearance in nature to a fortuitous collision and combination of atoms.'[3]—One sect of Hindoo atheists actually attributed the rise of things to nonentity or vacuum,

[2] Cudworth. [3] Enfield.

thus contradicting Plato and Epicurus, whose axiom was, 'from nothing can nothing proceed.'—Goutŭmŭ very pointedly combats this idea of the world proceeding from nature: 'If it be said, that nature is to be identified with things themselves, then you make the cause and the effect the same; or if you mean that nature is something separate from things, then what have you obtained, for this which you call nature must be competent to the work of creation, &c. and this is what we call God.'

Having thus exhibited the nature and similarity of the Hindoo, Greek and Egyptian systems on this subject, let us next compare the ideas of these different schools relative to the *Divine Nature.*

The Védantēēs speak of God, unconnected with creation, as a being perfectly abstracted, dwelling in a state of profound repose, similar to deep sleep, in which the person has no mental intercourse with the world, p. 185. In a passage already quoted, we find the Egyptians entertained a similar idea, that 'God always remains in the solitariness of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible in him.'[b] Epicurus 'considers the condition of the gods as wholly separate from the world, and enjoying no other felicity than that which arises from inactive tranquility.'[c]

Another idea much inculcated among all the ancient philosophers was, that God was the soul of the world. 'He is the soul of all creatures.'[d] 'Horus Apollo, an Egyptian, affirmed, that God was a spirit that pervaded the whole world, and that nothing at all consisted without God.'[e] Agreeing with this also are these lines of Virgil:

'Know first that heaven and earth's compacted frame,
And flowing waters, and the starry flame,

[b] Cudworth. [c] Enfield. [d] Védŭ-Vasŭ, p. 181. [e] Cudworth.

And both the radiant lights—one common soul
Inspires, and feeds, and animates the whole.'—*Cudworth.*

'Anaxagoras and Plato affirmed that God, passing through, pervaded all things:' 'Epictetus and Antoninus also asserted, that as soon as the soul is released from the body, it returns to the soul of the world.'

Some philosophers taught, that although God pervaded all things, he remained untouched by visible objects: 'Spirit has no intercourse with visible objects: the intercourse is that of intellect.'[f] 'Whether clothed or unclothed, since I resemble the purity of a mirror, of ether, and of simple knowledge, I [spirit] am the same. The errors of the understanding, seen in visible things, are no more in the discoverer or lord, than the faults of things made visible are in the sun.'[g] 'Spirit is distinct both from matter and from the works formed from matter, for spirit is immutable.' 'The vital spirit, through its vicinity to the world as sovereign, influences inanimate things as the loadstone the needle.' 'When the universe falls upon spirit [as a shadow upon a wall], it becomes visible: spirit is said to be empty like space.'[h] The idea which is evidently meant to be inculcated here is, that spirit is the mere manifester, and that it has nothing to do either with the creation or the government of the world. Aristotle taught, that 'God observes nothing; he cares for nothing beyond himself.' —Cudworth says, 'Jamblicus tells us, that the Egyptian hieroglyphic for material and corporeal things, was mud or floating water; but they pictured God as sitting upon the lote tree, above the watery mud, which signifies the transcendant eminency of the deity above matter, and its intellectual empire over the world.'

In direct contradiction to this was the doctrine inculcated principally in the Védantŭ school, that God was matter as well

[f] Pŭtŭnjŭlee, p. 221. [g] Kŭpilŭ, p. 166. [h] Kŭpilŭ, p. 129, 158, 160.

as life: 'Brŭmhŭ is the cause of all things, as well as the things themselves. If it be not allowed that he is the clay as well as the potter, it will follow, that he was indebted to some other for the clay.'[i] 'We have now made it manifest,' says Cudworth, 'that, according to the ancient Egyptian theology, from which the Greek and European systems were derived, there was one intellectual deity, one mind or wisdom, which, as it produced all things from itself, so does it contain and comprehend the whole, and is itself, in a manner, all things.' Seneca says, 'What is God? He is all that you see; and all that you do not see; and he alone is all things, he containing his own work, not only without, but also within.'[k] 'Chrysippus maintained the world itself to be God, and that God is the power of fate.'

Bearing a near affinity to this idea was another, that the whole material universe is as it were the clothing or body of the deity, while the vital part is the soul. God in this state is called the Viratŭ-poorooshŭ. For a particular description of this universal body and soul, see page 81. Cudworth says, 'The pagans did not worship the several parts of the world as really so many true and proper gods, but only as parts and members of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal, or whole animated world, taken altogether as one thing.' 'Man, according to the stoics, is an image of the world.'[l]

A number of the Hindoo philosophers declared that God was visible. One says, 'God is to be seen by the yogēē.'[m] 'The visible form of God is light.'[n] 'God is not without form, but none of the five elements contribute to his form.'[o] 'God

[i] Védŭ-Vasŭ, page 183. [k] How closely does this agree with the fragment of Orpheus, 'God from all eternity contained within himself the unformed principles of the material world, which consisted of a compound creation, the active power directing the passivé.' [l] Enfield. [m] Pŭtŭnjŭlee, page 10. [n] Kŭnadŭ, page 11. [o] Bhrigoo, page 23.

is possessed of form.'[p] Kŭpilŭ objects to this doctrine, 'When the védŭ speaks of spirit as being visible, it merely means, that it is perceived by the understanding only: for the understanding cannot make spirit known; it can only make known its own operations; nor is there any reason why another should make known God: he is made known, and makes himself known,' page 130.

By other sages the Great Spirit and the spirit in man are identified as one: 'I and all other living creatures, like the vacuum, are one.' 'The yogēē worships atmŭ (self), viewing himself equally in all beings, and all equally in himself.'[q] 'Brŭmhŭ and individuated spirit are one.' 'That which, pervading all the members of the body, is the cause of life or motion, is called individuated spirit; and that which, pervading the whole universe, gives life and motion to all, is Brŭmhŭ.'[r] There is no difference between the incarcerated and the perfectly abstracted spirit; the body is mere illusion.'[s] 'There is no difference between spirit and the soul.'[t] 'If a person well understands spirit, (he knows himself to be) that spirit.'[u] 'This is the voice of the védŭ and the smritees, Spirit know thyself.'[x] These philosophers maintained also that spirit does not receive the consequences of actions: Kŭpilŭ says, 'spirit receives pleasure and pain as a wall the shadow, but that which enjoys or suffers is the understanding.'

Respecting the unity of God, Kŭpilŭ thus speaks, 'The védŭ and smritees teach us, that spirit is one when we apply to it discriminating wisdom, and many when united to matter.'[y] The Hindoo sages had evidently no idea of a trinity in the one God; and it is unreasonable to expect that so deep

[p] Kŭshyŭpŭ, page 35; Ashwŭlayŭnŭ, page 40; Vishwamitrŭ, page 42; Jŭmŭdŭgnee, page 43; Poit'hēēnŭsee, page 44; Prŭjapŭtee, page 45; Narēējŭnghŭ, page 46; Karshnajinee, page 49; Lokakshee, page 51; Jatookŭrnŭ, page 52. [q] Kŭpilŭ, page 164. [r] Védŭ-Vyasŭ, page 180. [s] Védŭ-Vyasŭ, page 192. [t] Kŭpilŭ, page 4. [u] Kŭpilŭ, page 122. [x] Kŭpilŭ, page 125. [y] Page 147.

a mystery, peculiar to divine revelation, should be discovered by them: the only semblance of this doctrine is found in the three created gods, Brŭmha, Vishnoo and Shivŭ, and to these three gŏds are assigned the affairs of the whole universe, as comprised in the work of creation, preservation, and destruction. These form the Supreme Government, and all the other gods are the subordinate officers of government, judges, magistrates, constables, &c.

The opinions of all these sages respecting God may be thus summed up:—Kŭpilŭ admits a deity, but declares that he is wholly separate from all terrene affairs; and is in fact 'the unknown God;' that the soul in a state of liberation is God; that nature is the source of every thing.—Pŭtŭnjŭlee maintains exactly the same opinions.—Joiminee acknowledges a God distinct from the soul; that this God is subject to actions, and that, while in this state of subjection, he communicates a power to actions to produce and govern all things.—Védŭ-Vasŭ speaks of God as sometimes perfectly abstracted, and, according to the Egyptian idea, 'remaining in the solitude of his own unity;' and at other periods as uniting to himself matter, in which union he is considered as the animal soul. The energy necessary to the work of creation he considers as distinct from Brŭmhŭ,[z] but dependent upon him.—Goutŭmŭ and Kŭnadŭ speak of God as distinct from the soul; as an almighty Being; creating the universe by his command, using atoms. They consider the soul as separate from the Great Spirit, and as absorbed in it at the period of liberation.—The Satwŭtŭs and the Pouranics speak of God as essentially clothed with body: the former taught, that God, in the energy of joy, gave birth to the world proceeding from himself: that human souls are separate from the divinity.—The Pouranics believe, that Vishnoo, full of the quality of truth, is God; and that he, taking the form of Brŭmha, as possessing

[z] Plato's idea was, that there were two eternal and independent causes of all things, God and matter.