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LIVY
BOOK XXVII

Edited by

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PREFACE

THE text of this edition and the analysis which accompanies it have been printed from the plates of Mr Stephenson's edition of Book xxvii, previously published by the Cambridge University Press. Some alterations, however, have been introduced. In a few places a different reading has been adopted, some misprints have been corrected, and, though I have refrained from substituting *u* for *v* throughout, a number of slight spelling changes have been made. In the Notes on the Text appended to the Commentary the more important variant readings are noted and briefly discussed.

The edition to which I am chiefly indebted in the notes both for explanation and illustration is of course that of Weissenborn. I have also consulted Friedersdorff's commentary and have occasionally quoted a note from Mr Stephenson's edition. Many useful hints have been derived from the editors of other books of Livy in the Pitt Press Series, especially from Professor R. S. Conway, whose edition of Book ii seems to me a model of lucidity and freshness.

For textual questions Luchs' edition has been indispensable, and in addition to the critical notes in Madvig and Ussing's edition I have used Madvig's *Emendationes*.

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On points of constitutional and political history my chief guides have been Mommsen's *Roman History* and *Römisches Staatsrecht*. The last section of the Introduction gives a brief account of some of the problems connected with the Metaurus. Among the mass of literature that has been written on this campaign I am most deeply indebted to Mr B. W. Henderson's able articles in the *English Historical Review* and to Kromayer's monumental *Antike Schlachtfelder*. The discussion of Livy's sources and narrative in the previous section is based on Soltau's work on the sources of the third decade.

I have to thank my friend Mr W. H. Balgarnie of the Leys for most generous assistance in reading the proofs of the notes and introduction and for valuable suggestions on a number of points. I must also express my gratitude to the readers of the University Press whose lynx-eyed vigilance has saved me from many inconsistencies and not a few mistakes.

S. G. C.

BALLYNATRUUA, DERRY,
September 1913.

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INTRODUCTION

I. THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN 210 B.C.

§ 1. *Italy*

After Cannae the Italian allies of Rome over a large part of the South of Italy joined Hannibal, and the Carthaginians secured Apulia, Lucania, Bruttium and most of Samnium, and by winning Capua and a number of the neighbouring towns established themselves also in Campania. In the centre, however, Rome retained as allies most of the tribes—Marsi, Vestini, Picentines, Frentani, Sabines and others; and though the surrounding districts declared for Carthage, the chief towns in S. Italy, Brundisium, Tarentum, Beneventum, Venusia, Luceria, and others were held by Rome, and her garrisons secured also some of the Campanian cities. In the North, in spite of a severe defeat sustained by the praetor, L. Postumius Albinus, at the hands of the Gauls, Rome kept Etruria and Umbria.

The Italian campaigns of the next three years produced no material change in this position. Hannibal's most important success was the gain of Tarentum¹, followed by that of Metapontum, Heraclea, Thurii, and Locri. The Romans still held the citadel of Tarentum and Rhegium, but with these exceptions Hannibal had all the south coast. Campania, however, was the main seat of the war and in the following years the dogged persistence of Rome was rewarded. In 211 B.C. after a long siege Capua fell and Campania was lost to Hannibal. After his unavailing attempt to raise the siege by his famous march to Rome Hannibal retired south to Bruttium.

¹ 212 B.C. according to Polybius.

The consuls elected for 210 B.C. were M. Claudius Marcellus and M. Valerius Laevinus, who had been
 210 B.C. for several years commander of the fleet and army in Greece. The provinces assigned to them by the Senate were Italy with the war against Hannibal and Sicily with the command of the fleet. The lot gave Marcellus the latter, but owing to the entreaties of the Sicilians, who declared it were better that their island should be sunk in the sea or buried under Etna's fires than have Marcellus again its master¹, an exchange of provinces was brought about—*rapiente fato Marcellum ad Hannibalem*. Each consul had the usual two legions and, in addition to the troops in Spain, Sardinia, and Greece, Rome had armies in Apulia under Cn. Fulvius Centumalus (2 legions), in Capua under Q. Fulvius² Flaccus (1 legion), in Etruria under C. Calpurnius Piso (2 legions), in Cisalpine Gaul under C. Laetorius (2 legions), and at Rome (2 urban legions)³.

Of the military history of the early part of 210 B.C. we have a somewhat rambling account in cc. 37–40 of Book 26, preceding the lengthy section on Spain with which that book closes. The Roman garrison continued to hold out in the citadel of Tarentum though the fleet was defeated by the Tarentines. In Apulia Marcellus took the town of Salapia⁴. It is at this point that the narrative in Book 27 begins. A brief summary of that narrative so far as it relates to the war in Italy is appended.

¹ 26. 29 *obruī Aetnae ignibus aut mergi freto, satius illi insulae esse, quam velut dedi noxae inimico*.

² The frequent occurrence of the name *Fulvius* in the earlier chapters of Bk 27 is rather confusing. Distinguish (1) *Cn. Fulvius Centumalus* (cos. 211 B.C., slain in Apulia 210 B.C.); (2) *Q. Fulvius Flaccus* (cos. 212 B.C. and 209 B.C., dictator 210 B.C.); (3) *C. Fulvius Flaccus* (c. 8. 12); and (4) *Cn. Fulvius Flaccus* (praetor 212 B.C.), brothers of (2).

³ As evidence that after the fall of Capua Rome felt that the strain might be somewhat relaxed, we may note that the instructions to the consuls for the levy of soldiers definitely limit the number of legions to 21. (26. 28. 13 *neve eo anno plures quam una et viginti legiones Romanae essent*.)

⁴ See nn. on c. 1. 1 and c. 28. 6.

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210 B.C. Marcellus in Samnium. Cn. Fulvius defeated at Herdonea (c. 1). Marcellus goes to Lucania and fights an indecisive battle with Hannibal at Numistro (c. 2). Q. Fulvius Flaccus at Capua (c. 3).

209 B.C. Marcellus and Hannibal at Canusium; three battles (cc. 12–14). Fulvius in Lucania (c. 15. 1–3). Fabius invests and captures Tarentum (c. 15. 4–c. 16. 9). Hannibal arriving too late to save Tarentum retires to Metapontum (c. 16. 10 f.). Unrest in Etruria (c. 21. 6 f.).

208 B.C. Etruria still unsettled (c. 24). War in S. Italy: Crispinus at Locri; marches to join Marcellus in Apulia (c. 25. 11 f.). Marcellus slain and Crispinus wounded near Venusia (cc. 26–27). Hannibal foiled at Salapia, marches S. and raises siege of Locri (c. 28). Death of Crispinus (c. 35. 6).

207 B.C. News of Hasdrubal's crossing the Alps (c. 39). Plan of campaign (c. 40). Hannibal, repulsed in Calabria, retires to Bruttium (c. 40. 10 f.), thence proceeds N. to Lucania and is defeated by Nero at Grumentum. He gets past into Apulia and, followed by Nero, marches to Venusia, thence S. to Metapontum and again N. to Canusium (cc. 41–2). Nero marches N. with 7000 picked men and effects junction with Livius in Umbria (cc. 43, 45–6). Hasdrubal retreats and is defeated and slain by the two consuls at the Metaurus (cc. 47–49). Nero marches S. again and announces the defeat of Hasdrubal to Hannibal. Hannibal retires to Bruttium (cc. 50–51).

§ 2. *Events at Rome*

The history of home affairs in this book consists very largely of a dull catalogue of the yearly occurrence and expiation of prodigies, the celebration of games and the changes in officials civil and religious. Occasionally the chronicle is enlivened by a disputed election, when we get a glimpse of party wire-pulling and family intrigue. There are a few faint echoes of the social struggle that occupies so large a part of the early books, as for instance in c. 8 when a plebeian is elected *curio maximus*,

We are made to realise the closeness of the tie existing between Rome and her colonies throughout Italy, and at the same time the severity of the burden imposed by the war upon the resources of both, when in chapters 9 and 10 Livy describes the dealings of the consuls and Senate with the deputies of the 12 disaffected and the 18 loyal colonies, and immediately after tells us that Rome decided to use the gold reserve that had been kept *ad ultimos casus*¹.

In chapters 40 and 44 Livy gives an interesting picture of the anxiety at Rome before the Metaurus conflict, and at the close we have a vivid description of the reception in the city of the news of the victory².

§ 3. *Sicily*

Previous to 215 B.C. Sicily had been peaceful for a long period. The domain of Hiero of Syracuse, Rome's staunch ally, embraced a considerable strip of territory extending along the East coast. The rest of the island formed the Roman province.

On the death of Hiero, his grandson and successor, Hieronymus, gave up the Roman alliance, but he was murdered after a reign of a few months, and in the struggle of factions that ensued the Roman party in Syracuse for a time gained the ascendancy. However, with the break-up of Hiero's kingdom that took place after his death most of the other cities in it had followed the example of Syracuse in opposing Rome, and the cruel treatment of Leontini by Marcellus in 214 B.C. brought about a counter-revolution in Syracuse. This city was accordingly invested by Marcellus and after a long siege was taken and sacked in 212 B.C. Meanwhile the Carthaginians had sent a considerable armament to Sicily and had established themselves on the south coast, taking Agrigentum, which they made their centre of operations, and winning to their side a number of the inland towns. The Numidian horse under Muttines, a half-bred Carthaginian and a brilliant cavalry general, overran the Roman province.

¹ 209 B.C.

² cc. 50, 51.

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Marcellus left Sicily in 211 B.C. and the work of expelling the Carthaginians and reducing the island was completed by Laevinus in the following year. The story of the concluding campaign in 210 B.C. is told by Livy in Bk 26. c. 40. Through the treachery of Muttines, who had been superseded in the command of the cavalry owing to Hanno's jealousy, Laevinus took Agrigentum, and the other towns were stormed or surrendered and the whole island brought under Roman dominion. In the following years we hear little of Sicily. In Book 27, apart from the regular references¹ to the appointment of praetor or propraetor and the disposition of troops, Livy mentions descents by the Sicilian fleet on Africa in 210 B.C.² and 208 B.C.³, the return of Laevinus to Rome and his report of the subjugation of the province⁴, a decree for the despatch of a detachment of the fleet to Tarentum⁵, Laevinus' review of the island in 209 B.C. and its renewed prosperity⁶, and the despatch of reinforcements to Livius by the praetor C. Mamilius in 207 B.C.⁷

§ 4. *Spain*

The defeat and death of the two Scipios in 211 B.C. after six years campaigning in Spain had left the Carthaginians masters of the country S. of the Ebro, and the Romans held only a strip of coast extending N. from the mouth of that river to the Pyrenees. After the fall of Capua Claudius Nero was sent to Spain as propraetor and, if we may believe Livy's account, met with considerable success⁸. At all events he appears to have kept the Carthaginians at bay and held the Roman territory N. of the Ebro. When Nero's year of command came to an end M. Iunius Silanus was appointed as propraetor to succeed him. At the same time in view of the importance of the war the supreme command in Spain was given to an officer of higher rank and the choice fell upon a young man not yet

¹ c. 7. 12, 13, c. 8. 13, c. 22. 3, 9, c. 36. 11, 12.

² c. 5. 1, 8 f.

³ c. 29. 7, 8.

⁴ c. 5. 1-7 *se eam provinciam confecisse*.

⁵ c. 7. 15.

⁶ c. 8. 18, 19.

⁷ c. 38. 12.

⁸ See n. on c. 44. 9.

thirty, Publius Scipio, son of the Publius who had been slain in Spain some months before. Scipio and Silanus were given ample troops to reinforce the army in Spain and a considerable fleet with Scipio's friend, C. Laelius, in command. They established themselves at Tarraco, on the coast N. of the mouth of the Ebro. As soon as the season permitted, Scipio, leaving Silanus to hold the northern district, boldly crossed the Ebro and marching with great rapidity reached the Carthaginian capital, New Carthage. This town was of supreme importance to Carthage as her chief arsenal in Spain, and in it were detained a large number of important hostages from the Spanish tribes. Yet it was defended by a surprisingly small garrison and within a few hours of Scipio's first attack the walls were stormed, the citadel surrendered and the town given over to plunder¹.

Immense stores of grain and arms, 18 ships of war and a fleet of merchantmen fell into Scipio's hands. Among the prisoners were a number of important Carthaginians and also some 2000 skilled craftsmen. Laelius was despatched to Rome with the former, the latter Scipio employed in manufacturing arms. After a short time spent in this and in exercising his soldiers and sailors Scipio returned to Tarraco.

At this point the Spanish section of Book 26 closes. In Book 27. c. 7 we have an account of Laelius' arrival and reception in Rome and a reference to the various views about the date of the capture of New Carthage². In c. 17 the detailed account of Scipio's campaign is resumed³.

He marches S. from Tarraco and inflicts a severe defeat on Hasdrubal at Baecula⁴. Yet in spite of the victory Hasdrubal is allowed to slip past, cross the Pyrenees by the western passes and march towards Italy. Scipio returns to Tarraco and a conference of the Carthaginian leaders in Spain closes the section.

¹ Mommsen calls Scipio's exploit 'one of the boldest and most fortunate *coups de main* that are known in history.'

² See notes *ad loc.*

³ 209 B.C. according to Livy, 208 B.C. according to Polybius.

⁴ c. 17.

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In the succeeding chapters we have only brief references to Spain : the prorogation of the command of Scipio and Silanus for 208 B.C. and 207 B.C.¹, an order for the despatch of 50 ships from Spain to Sardinia², and the statement that according to some authorities Scipio sent reinforcements to Livius³.

§ 5. *Greece and the East*

Rome first intervened in Eastern affairs in 229 B.C. The Illyrian pirates had become troublesome and she repressed them. Ten years later she found it necessary to repeat the lesson.

After Cannae Philip V of Macedon made an alliance with Hannibal but he did not join in the struggle in Italy, and Rome was too much engrossed in that struggle to take a very active part in what is usually called the First Macedonian War (214 B.C.–205 B.C.). She maintained, however, a fleet in the Adriatic and kept a grip on Apollonia and Corcyra and thus controlled the route to Greece.

Beside Macedon the leading powers in Greece at this time were the two Leagues. The ancient Achaean League when reconstituted in the 3rd century consisted at first of ten cities in the north of the Peloponnese, the most important being Aegium, Dyme, and Patrae. Before long its power extended and it included Sicyon, Corinth, Megara, Argos and indeed almost all the cities in the south of Greece except Sparta. From 221 B.C. onwards it became weaker and was dominated by Macedon, and we find its *strategus* acting under Philip.

The chief rival of Macedon was now the Aetolian League which had become the leading power in South Central Greece. Originally a union of country districts in Aetolia with its centre at Thermum, it had spread far beyond the limits of that country. Peloponnesian states and islands were enrolled in it and even cities as far away as Lysimachea in Thrace.

In the Peloponnese Sparta maintained her independence and was the chief opponent of the Achaean League there. Her government had become a despotism and the ruler at this time

¹ c. 22. 7 and c. 36. 12.² c. 22. 7.³ c. 38. 11.

was Machanidas who made himself tyrant in 210 B.C. Some 20 years later, on the death of Nabis, the successor of Machanidas, Sparta passed into the power of the Achaean League¹.

Of the other states, Athens retained her independence but had sunk to an unimportant position. Boeotia also was powerless, and Euboea and Thessaly were completely under Macedonian domination. To the west of Thessaly lay the small but independent kingdom of Athamania².

At the date at which Book 27 begins Rome was in alliance with the Aetolians, Eleans, and Sparta against Philip and the Achaeans. An important power on the side of the allies was Rome's faithful friend, Attalus I, king of Pergamum³, who in 210 B.C. was honorary *strategus* of the Aetolian League. His rival, Prusias of Bithynia, was an ally of Philip⁴.

In Book 27 Livy has an excursus of four chapters on affairs in Greece⁵. It deals with the struggle between Philip and the Aetolians and we hear occasionally of the activity of the Roman armament under Sulpicius Galba⁶.

II. LIVY'S SOURCES AND THE NARRATIVE OF BOOK 27

For writing the history of the Second Punic War Livy had at his disposal very ample materials. In the first place a mass of public and private documents were within his reach. He might consult such important original sources as the *annales maximi*, a brief record of each year's events kept by the *pontifex maximus*, the *libri lintei* containing lists of magistrates written on linen and preserved in the temple of Juno Moneta, and the registers and commentaries of various officials—censors,

¹ See n. on c. 31. 10.

² Mentioned by Livy c. 30. 4 and very frequently in the later books.

³ c. 29. 10.

⁴ c. 30. 16.

⁵ c. 29. 9–c. 33. 5.

⁶ c. 30. 2 1000 troops on the Aetolian side, c. 30. 11 fleet at Naupactus, c. 31. 1 repulsed by P. near Corinth, c. 32. 2 at Elis with Aetolians and Eleans, c. 33. 4, 5 at Aegium.

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pontiffs, augurs. There were extant tablets of stone and bronze recording laws and treaties, and a multitude of other inscriptions, both public and private, in temples and other public buildings, on tombs, on family busts and on all manner of movable objects. In the family archives too were kept genealogical lists and funeral orations recording the deeds and offices of ancestors. Livy, however, was not a scientific historian in the modern sense, and it is highly unlikely that he investigated or consulted any of these original sources. There is positive evidence in more than one place in his writings that in general he quite neglected archaeological evidence. In an interesting passage at the beginning of the Sixth Book, where he is speaking of the difficulty of writing the early history of Rome¹ owing to the loss of documents when the city was burnt by the Gauls in 390 B.C., he declares that literary records are *una custodia fidelis memoriae rerum*.

In the second place Livy was preceded by a long series of writers of annals, who drew their materials from some or all of the sources of evidence enumerated above. It is probable, however, that Livy did not go directly to the works of the earliest of these annalists, but contented himself with consulting them at second hand in the writings of their successors. For the history of the last quarter of the 3rd century B.C. this neglect is the more remarkable, since Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus both lived in this period. The latter, praetor in 210 B.C. and frequently mentioned in Book 27, wrote an account of the Second Punic War, in which he himself took part. Livy refers to this contemporary account in Book 21², but, as we have said, he does not appear to have used it at first hand.

Before writing the history of a particular year or incident Livy probably read through several accounts given by the later annalists and possibly made excerpts from them. When writing his ordinary practice apparently was to follow closely one particular author at a time, but he seldom mentions the name of

¹ *res vetustate nimia obscuras*.

² 38. 3 *L. Cincius Alimentus, qui captum se ab Hannibale scribit, maxime auctor me moveret, nisi confunderet numerum etc.*

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this author. Not infrequently he adds further details on the authority of other writers. Where he finds conflicting accounts he often records the fact without expressing an opinion himself. Occasionally he gives reasons for preferring one or the other; sometimes he counts heads and follows the majority; more than once he gives a combination of contradictory accounts. Book 27 illustrates his practice quite well. Thus we find c. 1. 13 *cum alibi...alibi inveniam*, c. 7. 5 *contuli multis auctoribus*, c. 27. 12, 13 *variant auctores...Coelius edit*, c. 33. 6 *alii...alii...tradunt*, c. 38. 12 *auctores sunt*.

As Livy is our leading authority for the events with which Book 27 deals the question of the trustworthiness of his narrative is one of great importance. The investigations of Dr Soltau¹ have made it probable that for the campaigns of the Hannibalic War Livy used as his main sources Coelius Antipater and Claudius Quadrigarius, and for events in Rome in the same period Calpurnius Piso and Valerius Antias.

L. Coelius Antipater, mentioned by Livy in 27. 27. 13 and frequently in the 3rd decade, lived in the time of the Gracchi and wrote *annales* in which he seems to have made careful use of earlier writers. That he consulted the funeral oration pronounced on Marcellus by his son is clear from the passage in c. 27 just cited.

Q. Claudius Quadrigarius wrote in the time of Sulla. He seems to have modelled his style on the Greek historians and represented the rhetorical school of history to which Cicero is attached². In the descriptions of battles he appears to have romanced freely, and to have coloured his narrative for family reasons, seeking in particular to magnify the exploits of the Claudii and the Cornelii Scipiones³. Thus in cc. 41–2 and cc. 46–50, which give an account of Claudius Nero's success against Hannibal in the S. and his famous march N. to join Livius, Soltau thinks that Livy is following Claudius Quadrigarius

¹ *Livius' Geschichtswerk und Livius' Quellen in der III Dekade.*

² *opus unum oratorium maxime.*

³ Soltau speaks of his history as 'das romanhafte Geschichtswerk dieses Rhetors.'

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directly. Again it has been conjectured that the story of Marcellus' campaigns in cc. 1-2 and cc. 12-14 comes from the same source.

In the latter of these passages we have an account of three battles between Hannibal and Marcellus in 209 B.C. Grave doubt has been cast upon the truth of this narrative, and there are certainly elements in the story which make it look like the invention of a partisan annalist. After an indecisive fight on the first day, Marcellus is defeated on the second, but on the third wins a great victory. No less than 8000 of the enemy are slain, while barely half that number fall on the Roman side. But Marcellus was entirely unable to follow up his success and remained inactive at Venusia for the rest of the season, and the reason given by Livy (*prohibuit multitudo sauciorum*) is dismissed by modern critics as inconsistent with the account of the battle. Again in c. 20. 9 f. we find Marcellus in bad repute at Rome *superquam quod primo male pugnaverat, quia vagante per Italiam Hannibale media aestate Venusiam in tecta milites abduxisset*. It is urged that a defeat followed by a brilliant victory could hardly be a cause of loss of reputation and that the failure of the attack on Marcellus was due to the strong family interest he possessed in Rome and not to his achievements against Hannibal in the field¹.

Another section in which the influence of Claudius Quadrigarius has been plausibly assumed is the Spanish extract (cc. 17-20²). The central portion of this section gives an account of the battle of Baecula in which Hasdrubal sustains a severe defeat at the hands of the Romans. Here again, though this time Livy's account is supported by Polybius, modern critics have contended that the victory of Scipio is a myth started by Scipio and Laelius and passed on to Polybius. "That Scipio," it is argued, "after inflicting such a defeat on Hasdrubal should, with all the means of information he had at his command, allow the defeated general to leave Spain unmolested, and that the latter should arrive in Italy with what Livy himself calls *ingens*

¹ Polybius declares that up to Zama Hannibal was undefeated (16. 5 τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνου ἀήττητος ὦν).

² See n. on c. 7. 5.

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exercitus, is simply incredible¹. It seems pretty clear at all events that we have not got the whole truth from Livy; whether the account he gives contains a large amount of falsehood is not so certain.

Of the two annalists whom Soltau sets down as Livy's authorities for the events at Rome in these years, L. Calpurnius Piso wrote about the time of the Gracchi, and it appears from the surviving fragments and from other indications that his *annales* were a dry record reflecting the style of the yearly records compiled by the pontifex maximus. Valerius Antias is not mentioned in Book 27 but is very frequently referred to by Livy. Like Quadrigarius he wrote in the time of Sulla. His *annales* also seem to have been based on the pontifical year-book, but he amplified and embellished the narrative of Piso. In the third and later decades Livy used this historian with caution, as he realised his untrustworthy character, especially in the matter of numbers². Thus among the sections dealing with the city chronicles Soltau thinks that the account of the prodigies in c. 4 and of the priestly changes and games at the end of c. 6 are from Piso, while the dispute about the dictatorship in cc. 5–6 is based on Antias. Again he would derive the account of Livius in c. 34 from the fuller history of Antias and assign to Piso the notes on the armies and on prodigies in the following chapters.

For the history of events outside Italy, Livy had a trustworthy authority in the Greek historian Polybius³. It was formerly held that throughout the third decade Livy took straight from Polybius the numerous sections dealing with Sicilian, Greek, Spanish and African events, but it appears likely that the direct use of the Greek historian does not begin

¹ Stephenson.

² cp. 26. 49. 3 *adeo nullus mentiendi modus est*, 30. 19. 11 *impudenter ficta*, 33. 10. 8 *si Valerio qui credat omnium rerum immodice numerum augenti*.

³ cp. 33. 10. 10 where L., after mentioning several Roman writers, says *Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum*.

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till Book 26¹. These *excursus* were evidently inserted by Livy in his narrative after the composition of the books in which they occur. More than once they are misplaced. The *excursus* on affairs in Greece in cc. 29–33 may be taken as an illustration. That Livy is using Polybius is betrayed by the fact that he puts the Greek events a year too late. The practice of the Greek historian is to equate the Roman official year with the Olympiad beginning half a year earlier. For instance, 216 B.C. is made equivalent to Ol. 140. 4, which began August 217 B.C., and Greek events of 141. 1 (= 216 B.C.–215 B.C.) are put parallel with Roman of 215 B.C. Now in c. 30. 17 Livy puts the Nemean Games of 209 B.C. under 208 B.C., and in c. 35. 3 the Olympian Games of 208 B.C. are assigned to 207 B.C.² Furthermore, the first events mentioned in this *excursus* belong to 210 B.C. and this points to the fact that the section is a later insertion, stuck in between the mention of the illness of Crispinus and his naming of a dictator just before his death.

III. THE CAMPAIGN OF THE METAURUS

§ 1. *The Carthaginian plan of campaign*

In spite of the victories which Livy attributes to Marcellus and the thousands he would have us believe Hannibal lost in the various battles, the general impression that one gets of the campaigns of 210 B.C.–207 B.C. from reading the first 35 chapters of Book 27 may be summed up in Livy's phrase *res nunc secundae nunc adversae*³. With the arrival of Hasdrubal in Italy we feel that the war has entered upon a new phase.

The campaigns of the past years must have made it clear to Hannibal that little more was to be gained in S. Italy. In Central Italy, as we have seen, the influence of Rome had been undisputed, and Hannibal had proved unable to loosen her hold on

¹ See also n. on c. 7. 5.

² cp. 28. 7. 14.

³ c. 3. 8, cp. c. 40. 3 *adversa secundis pensando rem ad id tempus extractam esse*.

these districts. His one chance now was to make a supreme attempt on Central Italy, and the unrest in Etruria¹, and the state of feeling shown two years before in a number of the Latin colonies in the central district², seemed to offer a prospect of success if the war were carried further north. To make this attempt was apparently what Hannibal planned in 207 B.C. He and Hasdrubal were to meet in Umbria, where a successful junction might enable them to strike a paralysing blow at Rome by winning over the districts that had been her chief resource.

Although Livy passes lightly over the serious mistake made by P. Scipio in allowing Hasdrubal to leave Spain, he at once emphasises the importance of the campaign of 207 B.C.³, and in the concluding chapters of the book makes it clear that the Metaurus is indeed the turning-point of the struggle.

At various points in the narrative we hear of the progress of Hasdrubal. In c. 19 he is marching towards the Pyrenees; in c. 36. 1 news arrives from Massilia in the winter of 208 B.C. that he has passed into Gaul and would cross the Alps in the following spring. Then comes Porcius' despatch⁴ from Cisalpine Gaul that the crossing is taking place.

The passage proved swift and easy and Hasdrubal was at Placentia earlier than either Hannibal or the Romans anticipated. He wasted some time in a vain attempt to take this town before proceeding on his march towards Umbria. In the South Hannibal after the engagement with Nero at Grumentum marched into Apulia and waited at Canusium ready to march north when he should receive Hasdrubal's despatch announcing his progress and the point of meeting.

§ 2. *The distribution of the Roman troops*

In 207 B.C. there were, according to Livy⁵, 15 legions in Italy. Of these 7 were in the South—2 under Nero, 2 under Fulvius Flaccus in Lucania, 2 under Claudius Flaccus at Tarentum and

¹ c. 21. 6, c. 24.

² c. 9.

³ c. 35. 5 *periculosissimus annus*, c. 40.

⁴ c. 39. 1.

⁵ See c. 35. 10 f., 36. 12 f.

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210 B.C.	no. of legions	209 B.C.	no. of legions
Italy: cos. army (1) Marcellus	2 ¹		
Lucania and Bruttii:		cos. army (2) Q. Fulvius Flaccus [c. 7 9]	2
Apulia: Cn. Fulvius Centumalus	2	(Venusia) Marcellus [c. 7 11]	2
Tarentum:		cos. army (1) Fabius [c. 7 9]	2
Capua: Q. Fulvius Flaccus	1 ²	T. Quinctius Crispinus [c. 7 10]	1
Etruria: C. Calpurnius Piso	2 ³	C. Calpurnius Piso [c. 7 10]	2
Gallia: C. Laetorius	2 ⁴	L. Veturius Philo [c. 7 8]	2
Rome: urban legions (<i>novae</i>)	2	[c. 8 11] (<i>novae</i>)	2
Sicily: cos. army (2) } fleet } Laevinus	2	Laevinus (fleet, <i>Cannenses</i> and remains of Apulian army) [c. 7 12]	2
praetor L. Cincius	2	Cincius	2
Sardinia: P. Manlius Vulso	2	C. Aurunculeius [c. 7 14]	2
Spain: Scipio and Silanus	4	Scipio and Silanus [c. 7 17]	4
21			21
Greece: P. Sulpicius Galba (fleet)	1	P. Sulpicius Galba [c. 7 15] (fleet)	1

⁶ moved to Rome [c. 43 8].

⁴ 212 B.C. urban, 211 B.C. Apulia, 210 B.C.—203 B.C. Gallia.

LEGIONS 210 B.C.—207 B.C.

208 B.C.	no. of legions	207 B.C.	no. of legions
cos. army (1) T. Quinctius Crispinus [c. 22 2, c. 25 6]	2	cos. army (1) Claudius Nero	2
cos. army (2) Marcellus	2	Bruttii: Q. Fulvius Flaccus	2
[c. 22 2, c. 25 10]		[c. 35 12, 13]	
Q. Claudius Flamen [c. 22 3]	2	Q. Claudius Flamen [c. 36 13]	2
Q. Fulvius Flaccus [c. 22 3]	1	C. Hostilius Tubulus [c. 35 14]	1 ⁶
C. Hostilius Tubulus [c. 22 4]	2 (a)	C. Terentius Varro	2
L. Veturius Philo [c. 22 5]	2 (b)	cos. army (2) M. Livius	2
[c. 22 10]	2 ⁵ (c)	L. Porcius Licinus	2
Laevinus (fleet) [c. 22 9]		[c. 35 12] (<i>novae</i>)	2 ⁷
Sex. Iulius Caesar	2	C. Mamilius [c. 36 12]	2
[c. 22 9] (<i>Cannenses</i>)		A. Hostilius Cato [c. 36 12]	2
C. Aurunculeius	2	Scipio and Silanus	4
(fleet) [c. 22 6]		[c. 36 12]	2 ³
Scipio and Silanus [c. 22 7]	4	P. Sulpicius Galba	1
[c. 22 11]	21	[c. 22 10] (fleet)	
P. Sulpicius Galba	1	(fleet)	

213 B.C.—211 B.C. Campania.

³ 211 B.C. urban.

⁵ C. Terentius Varro leads 1 urban legion to Arretium [c. 24 6 f.].
 to Narnia [c. 43 9].

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1 under Hostilius Tubulus at Capua. In the North there were 6 legions—2 under Livius, 2 under Porcius in Cisalpine Gaul and 2 in Etruria under Terentius Varro—and in addition 2 urban legions available at Rome.

Thus if we take the regular strength of a legion including the allies to have been at this period about 10,000¹, there should have been some 80,000 men for the defence of the north against Hasdrubal. In c. 43. 11 Livy tells us that Nero selected from his army 6000 foot and 1000 horse when he started north to join Livius. That he should have undertaken the march with this force when there were already so many soldiers in the north, and that the transference of so comparatively small a part of the southern armies should have created such a sensation at Rome and should have produced the decisive result related by Livy in the succeeding chapters, is at first sight very puzzling. It leads us to consider the whole question of the strength of the Roman armies during the campaigns of these years. The first point to be noted is that in spite of the regular mention by Livy of a large number of legions in Italy each year, we hear little or nothing about the activity of many of these legions, and the actual campaigning seems to have been confined to the two consular armies or at most to three armies. It has been actually held² that these elaborate accounts of the armies given by Livy are a fiction of the annalists, and that in the years following Cannae there were never more than two consular armies of two legions each in Italy.

A much more plausible theory³ is that while the field armies each year were of full strength the other so-called legions were really only small bodies of garrison troops. But a glance at the table on the opposite page giving the history of the individual legions reveals a serious objection to this solution of the difficulty. It appears that the legions which were on this 'garrison duty' in one year might become one of the consular armies of the following year. Thus we see that the legions raised in 211 B.C., which were in Etruria in 210 B.C., formed Fabius' army at Tarentum in

¹ Say 4400 citizens and 6000 socii.

² Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung Italiens im Altertum*.

³ Delbrück's.

209 B.C. Again in 210 B.C. the army of Marcellus was the same that had done 'garrison duty' in Cisalpine Gaul from 214 B.C. to 211 B.C. It seems, however, quite certain that the legions other than the field armies were regularly weaker. In cases where a number of years had elapsed since enrolment, the numbers must have been considerably less, and the vacancies would not be filled up, as those in the consular armies frequently were, by a levy *in supplementum*. Furthermore the inactivity of legions stationed in districts like Etruria or Cisalpine Gaul might in large measure be explained by the fact that owing to the state of these districts the troops had to be split up into small bodies to garrison different points.

Returning to the case of 207 B.C., we find the weakness of the northern legions emphasised by Livy. In c. 38. 7 he says *Livius cunctabatur parum fidens suarum provinciarum exercitiis*. Livius contrasts the armies of the north with the *consulares egregii exercitus* at the disposal of Nero. Varro's legions had been enrolled in 210 B.C. and had remained in Etruria for three years. Porcius' army was the urban legions of 212 B.C. After a year in Apulia in 211 B.C., they had been in Gaul continuously and they remained there till 203 B.C.

It becomes clear therefore how important and welcome Nero's 7000 picked men¹ would be as an addition to the reinforcements that Livius could hope for from the armies in Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul.

§ 3. Nero's march

In recent times there has been a great deal of controversy about the famous march of Nero and a number of German and Italian scholars have rejected the whole tale as an invention of the annalists. Polybius' account of the events preceding the battle of the Metaurus is lost, but in his account of the battle we have no mention of the march back to Canusium which took place immediately after. There is no reason, however, to suppose that Polybius did not, like Livy, mention it after his

¹ Augmented too by numbers of veterans who joined them on the march.

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description of the arrival of the news of the victory in Rome, the point at which the fragment we possess stops. In addition to Livy's narrative we have several brief accounts of the march in later writers. The only real difficulty about the story as we have it in Livy is the pace at which the journey was performed. The other arguments advanced against the probability of it have been shown to be valueless¹.

The distance from Canusium to Sena Gallica is 230 miles, and from Canusium to the Metaurus 241 miles. Livy tells us² that Nero started on the return march the night after the battle and marching *citatiore quam inde venerat agmine* reached his camp at Canusium on the sixth day. If we select from among the various sites suggested for the battle the one nearest Canusium³ the distance is 245 miles, i.e. the rate of marching was 41 miles a day. Again if we suppose that the march north to Sena Gallica occupied a day more than the return march, the pace would be 33 miles a day for seven consecutive days. This is generally regarded as incredible and it is certainly far in advance of anything recorded of modern armies. Fifteen to twenty miles a day seems to be the limit for continuous marching. Nor is it altogether satisfactory to suppose that Livy has exaggerated simply in the matter of the time occupied, for every day that we add makes it more difficult to understand Hannibal's continued inaction at Canusium. It must, however, be remembered that all the conditions of the march were the most favourable possible. The soldiers were picked men⁴ and they were entirely unencumbered by baggage. They had a straight and level road and were cheered and encouraged all along the route. Food was everywhere provided and horses and vehicles put at the disposal of the weary⁵. Under these exceptional circumstances the feat may well have been accomplished.

¹ See especially B. W. Henderson in *Eng. Hist. Rev.* 1898, p. 427 f.

² c. 50. 1. In the other accounts of the march no indication of the time occupied is given.

³ S. Angelo.

⁴ c. 43. 11 *de toto exercitu civium sociorumque quod roboris erat delegit*.

⁵ c. 43. 10.

§ 4. *The movements preceding the battle*

Many attempts have been made to identify the actual scene of the battle of the Metaurus. These may be divided into two main classes. The first class includes those who think that the battle took place on the left bank (i.e. on the N. side) of the Metaurus, and that Hasdrubal's march to the river previous to the fight was not a retreat north but a movement S.W. and an attempt to get round the Roman forces, strike the *via Flaminia* and proceed S. to join Hannibal¹. According to the other view the battle was on the right bank (on the S. side) of the river, the first position was in the neighbourhood of Sena Gallica, S. of the Metaurus, and the march of Hasdrubal was a retreat to the north.

The traditional account is certainly in favour of the second theory and it is the one accepted by most modern historians. Livy's description (cc. 46-49) is our main source². According to his narrative Livius was encamped near Sena with Hasdrubal less than half a mile distant. A river flowed close to the camps, probably between them. The praetor L. Porcius Licinus and his army had been engaged in harassing the march of Hasdrubal³ and were now encamped alongside Livius. Nero joined his colleague in the night and at the council of war on the next day the Roman generals resolved on battle. Hasdrubal having recognised the addition to the enemies' forces, refused to fight

¹ cp. his dispatch c. 43. 8 *cum in Umbria se occursurum Hasdrubal fratri scribat*. It should be noted that Narnia is not mentioned, and the fact that Nero urged the dispatch of the urban legions to Narnia is not a sufficient ground for assuming that the projected meeting-point of the two Carthaginian generals was in W. Umbria or that Hasdrubal meant to take the *via Flaminia*. On the contrary it is urged that Nero's taking the coast road implies that the information at his disposal did not lead him to think that Hasdrubal would choose the *via Flaminia* in preference to the coast road.

² There is also a fragment of Polybius (II. 1-3) describing the battle, and we have brief accounts in later writers.

³ c. 46. 6.