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978-1-107-61661-5 - Mind & Matter
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MIND & MATTER

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THE FIRST OF TWO VOLUMES
BASED ON THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
IN 1919 AND 1921

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1931

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-61661-5 - Mind & Matter
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[More information](#)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107616615

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First published 1931
First paperback edition 2011

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-107-61661-5 Paperback

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P R E F A C E

Philosophy has two parts, answering roughly to Kant's *Analytic* and *Dialectic*. The first consists in an analysis of ordinary Experience in order to find a coherent account of the principles involved in it. The second is concerned with the ultimate nature of the all-inclusive Universe of Being. It considers whether the Universe, besides being all-inclusive, is properly regarded as a self-complete unity, rather than as an endless series or aggregate. If it is a unity, the question arises as to the nature of the unity, and this leads to the problem of the distinction and relation of the world of becoming and finite existence to eternal Being.

These two lines of inquiry are not sharply separable. Each, when thoroughly followed up, passes into the other. It is possible to start with either of them. Spinoza, for instance, begins with a comprehensive theory of the nature of the Universe and proceeds to use this as a guiding clue to the analysis of ordinary experience. Mr Alexander, in his great work *Space, Time and Deity*, to a large extent follows the Spinozistic plan. I prefer the Kantian procedure as more congenial to myself and as better suited to the requirements of the present time. In this book I confine myself to an examination of certain aspects of ordinary experience—those involved in the knowledge of the physical world, of the self and of minds other than our own. I reserve the express treatment of more ultimate problems for a future work to be entitled *God and Nature*. I reserve for this work what I have to say on Ethical and Religious Experience, which have already been so admirably treated in the Gifford Lectures of Professor Sorley and Professor Taylor.

I feel keenly that my debt direct and indirect to writers of the present day is very inadequately represented by my

references in the text and in footnotes. It is certainly not measured by the degree of my agreement with them. That I owe very much to the late Professor Ward is obvious. My debt is at least as great where I cannot follow him as where I can. For the rest, I may say that in many places I should not have written as I have written if I had not been acquainted with the work of Mr Bertrand Russell, Mr Alexander, Mr Broad, Professor Moore and the late Mr W. E. Johnson.

I have to acknowledge with deep gratitude the services rendered me by my wife and my son, Mr A. K. Stout. My wife patiently carried out the tedious task of making a typed copy of my difficult handwriting. My son, besides making many helpful and acute suggestions, compiled the Index and saw the whole book through the press.

G. F. STOUT

CRAIGARD,
ST ANDREWS
March, 1931