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Introduction: The power of names

The story of the adoption of the name "Vietnam" for the slender country along the east coast of mainland Southeast Asia reveals the give-and-take nature of that country's relationship with Chinese states. It begins in the winter of 1802, when the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796–1820) of the Qing dynasty received an unusual request. Nguyen Phuc Anh had recently ascended the throne of the newly established Nguyen dynasty of Vietnam as the Gia Long emperor (r. 1802–1820). As was customary, Nguyen Phuc Anh contacted the Qing court to inform it of the changes and receive formal recognition for the new state and emperor. Instead of seeking to be recognized by the traditional name Annan (Vietnamese: An Nam), however, Nguyen Phuc Anh asked that his country instead be called Nan Yue. Annan, literally the "Settled South," was a name imposed on the region during the Tang dynasty (618–907). Nan Yue, or in its Vietnamese pronunciation, Nam Viet, was the name of a much older kingdom, and means literally "Southern Yue/Viet." The Jiaqing emperor declined the request.

He had good reason. Nan Yue was a grand name with meaningful connotations. The ancient Nan Yue kingdom had spanned the borders of present-day China and Vietnam two millennia previously, encompassing what is now Guangdong and Guangxi provinces in China, as well as the Red River Delta region of northern Vietnam. Under the leadership of King Zhao Tuo (r. 203–137 BCE), the Nan Yue kingdom formed during the fall of the Qin dynasty, in 206 BCE. Although the territory nominally accepted the suzerainty of the Han dynasty in 196 BCE, it was only with a Han military campaign in 111 BCE that it became an official administrative colony.

It is fairly clear why Zhao Tuo had chosen Nan Yue as the name of his state in 204 BCE. Nan, "South," indicates Nan Yue's location south of the Han empire. Yue was an ancient eastern state situated on the coast of China, near present-day Shanghai and Hangzhou. The state of Yue was conquered and destroyed by the state of Chu in 333 BCE. The scattered Yue elites fled south and exerted control over inhabitants of southern

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coastal regions, through Fujian, eastern Guangdong, and quite likely as far south as Vietnam. Northerners called these groups Bai Yue, "the Hundred Yue." The term name Yue came to be applied by northerners to inhabitants of a large swathe of territory, comprising mainly present-day Guangdong, Guangxi, and northern Vietnam.[1] Zhao Tuo's choice of Nan Yue gave a sense of the location and demographic identity of his state.

In 1802, Nguyen Phuc Anh's reasons for selecting the name Nan Yue were threatening to the Jiaqing emperor of the Qing. According to the Nguyen annals, "the Qing emperor at first thought that 'Nan Yue' was similar to Guangdong and Guangxi provinces [*dongxi Yue*] and would not allow it."[2] The Jiaqing emperor's words are recorded in the Qing annals:

> These two characters they wish to be bestowed, "Nan Yue," absolutely will not do. The name "Nan Yue" is extremely broad. Examining prior histories shows that it includes the area that is now Guangdong and Guangxi. Nguyen Phuc Anh is a little Yi [foreigner] from a marginal area. Even if he possesses all of Annan, the country is still nothing more than the ancient territory of Jiaozhi [northern Vietnam]. How can he suddenly start calling it "Nan Yue"? How do we know that he does not want to build himself up to the outer Yi, and has for that reason requested to change the name of the country?[3]

By requesting the name Nan Yue, the Nguyen dynasty thus appeared to be equating itself with a powerful historic dynasty that resisted northern rule, *and* appeared to be asserting territorial claim over the Qing dynasty's southernmost provinces, Guangdong and Guangxi. Nguyen Phuc Anh was not only overstepping his position. By altering his country's relationship with the "outer Yi" – neighboring states and native chieftaincies (*tusi*) authorized to control marginal localities – he was potentially threatening the stability of the Sino-Viet borderlands.

The Jiaqing emperor must have thought the request for a change of name presumptuous and outlandish. He was familiar with "Jiaozhi" and "Annan," small states that historically occupied the Red River Delta, and thought those names more appropriate for the new state despite its larger size. Moreover, the Jiaqing emperor went on to express his fear that the name change was a way to test the water. If the Qing government was too

[1] See Erica Brindley, "Representations and Uses of Yue Identity along the Southern Frontier of the Han, ~200–11 BCE," *Early China*, Vol. 33–34 (2010–2011): 5–7; Erica Brindley, "Barbarians or Not? Ethnicity and Changing Conceptions of the Ancient Yue (Viet) Peoples (~400–50 BC)," *Asia Major*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2003): 10–15; Keith W. Taylor, *The Birth of Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 42.

[2] Wen-Tang Shiu and Chi-Yi Hsieh, eds., *Dai Nan Shilu Qing-Yue Guanxi* (Taibei: Zhongyanyuan Dongnanya quyu yanjiu jihua, 2000), 37. Hereafter cited as DNTL.

[3] *Qing Shilu Yuenan Miandian Taiguo Laowo Shiliao* (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), 282. Hereafter cited as QSL. This and all subsequent translations are mine, unless noted otherwise.

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compliant and granted the name, there was no telling what Nguyen Phuc Anh would do next. When the alarmed emperor denied the request, he ordered Qing officials stationed at the Sino-Viet border to tighten security.[4]

Nguyen Phuc Anh did not back down. He insisted on using the name Nan Yue and, according to Nguyen annals, "sent three additional letters explaining and saying if [the Qing] does not allow it we would not accept investiture."[5] That is to say, unless the Qing government recognized their use of "Nan Yue," the Nguyen dynasty would cut off formal diplomatic ties with them. A subsequent Nguyen communication with the Qing court "detailed the circumstances of the founding of the country from beginning to end,"[6] explaining that the Nguyen state was larger than any previous Vietnamese state, stretching from its traditional border with China far into the south to incorporate the Mekong River Delta, formerly territory of the Champa kingdom. According to Nguyen Phuc Anh, this new state needed a name to reflect its enlarged circumstances while affirming its connection to the past. Simply using antiquated names such as Annan or Jiaozhi, names that moreover had been imposed by northern states, would not do.

In the words of the Qing annals, the Jiaqing emperor was impressed by the earnestness, sincerity, and deference of the subsequent Vietnamese requests. Perhaps he was worn down by their persistence. He remained unwilling to accede to the name Nan Yue, but realized he had to find some compromise. His solution was to rearrange the order of the words, to Yue Nan (VN: Viet Nam), or as we know it in English transliteration, Vietnam. As he explained, "We have taken the character 'Yue/Viet' and moved it to the front to show that it retains its historic territory. We put the character 'Nan/Nam' at the end, to express its newly bestowed status as a tributary state. It shows that the country is south of the Hundred Yue and of what used to be called Nan Yue. It will not cause confusion."[7]

Nguyen Phuc Anh accepted this compromise. The Vietnamese annals accentuate the positive connotations of the name:

> The Qing emperor feared losing our friendship, and then thought Viet Nam should be the name of our country ... The Qing emperor decided to move the character "Viet" to the front, to show that our country extended the old territory and extended the glory of the past. He placed the character "Nam" at the end to show that our country extends southward and has a new mandate. The name is proper and great and its meaning auspicious. It is different from Liangyue [Guangdong and Guangxi].[8]

[4] QSL, 282. [5] DNTL, 37. [6] QSL, 283. [7] QSL, 283.
[8] DNTL, 37–38. A shorter account is recorded in Bửu-Cầm, ed., *Bang Giao Khâm-Định Đại-Nam Hội-Điển Sự-Lệ* (Saigon: Phủ Quốc-Vụ-Khanh Đặc Trách Văn-Hóa), 14–17.

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In fact, the Qing continued to refer to the Nguyen state as Annan, and Gia Long's son and successor, the Minh Mang emperor, changed the name of the country to Dai Nam Quoc ("Great Southern Country") in 1839.[9] "Viet Nam," the result of a vexed exchange between the Nguyen and Qing monarchs, would come to stick only in the twentieth century,[10] giving its name to the current Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. When we speak of "Vietnam" or "Vietnamese" history, we are using the artful rearrangement first suggested by the Jiaqing emperor.

In his influential book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson cites the twentieth-century Vietnamese embrace of a name "scornfully invented by a nineteenth century Manchu dynast," the Jiaqing emperor, as a prime example of both the selective forgetfulness and imaginative power of nationalism.[11] He has a point. Anderson's work shows that the Vietnamese people, like those of other nations, construct their national past through their writings and commemorations. They forget and remember, fashion and reframe. But Anderson still fits the story into a nationalist box, presuming Vietnamese powerlessness in the face of aggressive northern intervention. Anderson's brief account likewise selectively forgets several important aspects of the story, aspects that highlight the threat Dai Viet (tenth- to nineteenth-century Vietnam) posed to the "Chinese world order."[12] "Vietnam" was not merely a hated name thrust upon an unwilling Vietnamese population by a contemptuous northern dynast. It was a compromise that resulted from bilateral negotiations. It replaced Annan, a name imposed by the Tang empire on the newly reconquered "settled south." It was a positive term whose two components, "Viet" and "Nam," had long been used as autonyms within the southern country and had accrued deep local significance.

In fact, Nguyen Phuc Anh imagined his community and invented tradition in a way that transgressed borders and challenged the Chinese world order.[13]

[9] Alexander Barton Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Nguyễn and Ch'ing Civil Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 121.

[10] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983), 144. Indeed, Patricia Pelley argues that the term took on its present inclusive meaning only in 1979, when Vietnam's fifty-four ethnic minority groups were inventoried by the state. Patricia Pelley, *Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 9.

[11] Anderson, 144. His understanding of the issue is based on a short passage in Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model*, 120–121. See also Liam Kelley, *Beyond the Bronze Pillars* (Honolulu, HI: Hawai'i University Press, 2005), 114–115.

[12] The phrase is drawn from John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[13] For invented traditions, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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He did so by claiming a rebellious "Chinese" state, Nan Yue, as his state's antecedent. Nguyen Phuc Anh and the Jiaqing emperor were engaged in a struggle about how to remember and understand the past and its connections to the present. The struggle was not a Qing victory, as Anderson intimates, but a draw.

This closer look at the adoption of the name "Vietnam" reveals two recurring themes in the history of Sino-Viet relations. Although the story of the adoption of the name is from the nineteenth century, these themes apply to the subject of this book, China's relations with Dai Viet from the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries, during the Yuan (1272–1368) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties. The first and most obvious theme is the close relations between the two countries and their concomitant need to cooperate. The Gia Long emperor did not unilaterally declare the name of his state; he negotiated it with the Qing government. The Jiaqing emperor did not unilaterally refuse; he worked to find a compromise that would satisfy the Nguyen dynasty and preserve the relationship of the two states. The name, like many other outcomes in the history of Sino-Viet relations, was the result of negotiation and compromise.

Second, the two countries had conflicting understandings of history and of the transmission of culture. This led to contrasting assumptions about ownership of the past, and thus to differences in self-representation. Chinese cultural and political influence on Dai Viet is well known. The tensions and anxieties engendered within *China* by Dai Viet's claims to this influence, what I call classical culture, have not yet been sufficiently recognized by scholars. Premodern Vietnamese students, like their Chinese counterparts, were initiated into the world of classical culture through education. Classical culture was based on the canon of texts in literary Sinitic ("classical Chinese"), including works of philosophy and history, that informed education throughout East Asia. This canon includes but is not limited to the Four Books and Five Classics selected by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and subsequently made the basis of the civil service examinations in both countries. These texts are commonly subsumed in English under the label "Chinese classics," a phrase that misleadingly suggests that their importance is contained within the borders of the Chinese state or limited to people of Chinese descent. This was not the case.

In addition to a shared heritage of classical culture, the governments of Dai Viet and late imperial China shared a language of diplomacy. Communicating in literary Sinitic, both sides readily adopted hierarchical language: Dai Viet was a "tributary state" of China, and offered "tribute" on a triennial basis. But this commensurability masks a fundamental difference in worldview. For Chinese subjects, China was the Central

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Country (*Zhongguo*) and Dai Viet a land of Yi people located beyond the pale of civilization. In stark contrast, for Vietnamese subjects, Dai Viet was the Southern Country (*Nanguo*/*Nam Quoc*), forming a binary with the Northern Country (China).

Vietnamese elites engaged in a southern kind of self-representation,[14] positing themselves and their country as inheritors and preservers of the classical culture that they shared with what they called the Northern Country, while still rooted in their southern land. While seeming to confirm the centrality of China by sharing classical "Chinese" culture, Vietnamese governments and elites were actually decentering the Chinese world by positing a cultural hub beyond the borders of the Chinese state. In turn, Chinese observers were made profoundly uncomfortable by the intimation of a center of classical culture outside of the Central Country. During the Ming dynasty, as we shall see, it was a threat to the Ming's very ideological coherence.

Nguyen Phuc Anh's use of the name Nan Yue is a case in point for disagreement over ownership of the past. By calling his state Nan Yue, Nguyen Phuc Anh placed Vietnamese history on the same ancient territorial foundation as northern states such as the Qing. He claimed for Dai Viet the affiliation with a historical dynasty, Nan Yue; China viewed Nan Yue both as a rogue state occupying Chinese lands and as a historically Chinese state.

Scholars have long recognized the North's cultural and institutional influence on Vietnam.[15] Few, if any, have examined the way China understood its influence. As the story of the adoption of the name Viet Nam shows, the appeals by Vietnamese to a shared past and use of imperial rhetoric – obvious instances of Chinese influence on its southern neighbor – alarmed and threatened Chinese governments. The classical culture that Vietnamese elites claimed as part of their history and culture, Chinese elites saw as their exclusive possession. In the episode of the Jiaqing emperor's rejection of the name Nan Yue, the Qing state actively prevented Dai Viet from drawing on a shared past. The Jiaqing emperor made a point to exclude Nguyen Phuc Anh from the world of classical

[14] This is not dissimilar from what Stephen Greenblatt argues in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning, from More to Shakespeare* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, reprinted 2005). Greenblatt observes that "in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process": 2. Although his argument concerns individuals, the idea of self-fashioning can be applied as well to state making in Dai Viet in the same period, as Vietnamese elites deployed the language and symbols of classical culture to embody "a cultural system of meanings": 3.

[15] For an excellent recent study, specifically on the topic of Vietnamese envoy poetry, see Liam Kelley, *Beyond the Bronze Pillars*.

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culture as "a little Yi from a marginal area." For Jiaqing, Vietnam's history developed on a track distinct from that of northern states. This divergence in Vietnamese and Chinese understanding of the world order has long been present in Sino-Viet relations, but was rarely brought as explicitly to the fore as in the dispute over the name Nan Yue.

In addition to these two themes, this book will develop a third theme, one that is not well represented in the story of the 1802 naming dispute. Historical research on Sino-Viet relations often focuses on Chinese aggression and Vietnamese resistance. Less well understood are the internal debates and divisions underlying decisions about foreign relations in both countries.[16] In the case of the adoption of the name Vietnam, debate is elided by the official histories, in which both emperors appear as autocrats acting with little input from their officials. This was most likely not the case. As we shall see, in China during the Ming, heated debate preceded every decision regarding Dai Viet, and often slowed the wheels of government to a near standstill. Officialdom was divided over whether to treat Dai Viet as a lost colony in need of support or as a barbarian kingdom of little concern to the Ming state. Within Dai Viet, regionalism and civil war split the country for the better part of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, sparking crises of loyalty for the civil and military leaders forced to choose sides.

This book is arranged in seven chronological chapters, stretching over three centuries from the late thirteenth through the late sixteenth centuries. Each chapter takes up the three themes elaborated above: negotiation and cooperation; differing underlying assumptions about shared culture; and internal debates and division. Rather than give a narrative overview of Sino-Viet history in this period, I have used the lives, letters, and poetry of individual scholars, officials, and emperors to guide us through particular moments when the cultural, historical, and political borders of the two countries were negotiated. These writers were themselves border-crossers, whether literally or figuratively, as in the case of emperors who, from within the palace, turned their attention to distant

[16] There are exceptions. Keith W. Taylor and John K. Whitmore's recent research has transformed our understanding of Vietnamese history by drawing out regional conflict and "surface orientations." Cheng Wing-sheung's overview of Ming relations with Vietnam recognizes the role of debate within the Ming. See especially Keith Taylor, "Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Binary Histories of Nation and Region," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Nov. 1998): 949–978; Keith W. Taylor, *A History of the Vietnamese* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); John K. Whitmore, "The Fate of the Ngô: Montane/Littoral Division in 15th to 16th Century Dai Viet," *Asia Major*, Vol. 27, Part 2 (Nov. 2014); Cheng Wing-sheung, *Zhengzhan yu qishou: Ming dai Zhong-Yue Guanxi Yanjiu* (Tainan: Guoli Chenggong Daxue Chubanzu, 1998).

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matters. All were caught up in the conflicts that periodically erupted between and within the two states. In their surviving writings, poetry emerges as an essential tool of self-representation.

Chapter 1, "A Brief History of Annan," provides an overview of the long history of Sino-Viet relations before the Ming. It does so by adopting the perspective of an exiled Vietnamese scholar, Le Tac (c. 1260s–c. 1340s). Le Tac, an official of Dai Viet's Tran dynasty, faced a crisis of loyalty during the turmoil of the Mongol invasion of Dai Viet in 1285, and ultimately surrendered to the Mongol Yuan dynasty. As a subject of the northern state, he wrote one of the earliest histories of Dai Viet, presenting it as an integral and historical part of the northern empire. He affirmed again and again Dai Viet's connections to the classical past, fitting it neatly into an existing historical hierarchy that privileged only Chinese states. In this way, he imagined a place for Dai Viet that is difficult to reconcile with modern national histories and has therefore largely been ignored. By using his book, and in particular his narrative historical poem, as an entry point into the history of Sino-Viet relations, we can see more clearly the blurred and overlapping political and cultural boundaries of China and Vietnam in the premodern period.

The second chapter, "A Record of the Dreams of an Old Southerner," tells the story of another prominent Vietnamese exile, Ho Nguyen Trung, a prince of the short-lived Ho dynasty of Vietnam who had a long career as an official of the Ming dynasty. Ho Nguyen Trung's life was profoundly affected by the contradictory policy toward Dai Viet of the first and third Ming emperors. One made interference in Vietnamese affairs illegal, whereas the other deposed the Ho dynasty and occupied Dai Viet for twenty years. These contradictory precedents formed the basis of later debates over the direction of Ming policy toward Dai Viet, providing justification for both intervention and renunciation. Like Le Tac, Ho Nguyen Trung wrote Dai Viet into the northern canon, using poetry and the tales of virtuous elites to appeal to Chinese conventions.

The subject of Chapter 3, "The Northern Emperor and the Southern Emperor," is the Ming emperor Zhu Houcong's troubling encounter with his southern counterpart, Mac Dang Dung. Mac established his own dynasty in 1527, but civil war with his Le dynasty opponents stretched on for decades. This Vietnamese conflict caused a crisis in the Ming court, as Ming officials debated whether or not to intervene. As the Ming court learned more about the Mac dynasty, it grew increasingly anxious over Mac Dang Dung's use of imperial rhetoric. The two countries' shared political cosmology paradoxically complicated diplomacy, challenging the Ming's monopoly on symbols of power. Zhu Houcong was alarmed by Mac's appropriation of classical tools of political

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legitimation, such as its claim to the Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*). Ming officials responded by drawing a clear cultural and political boundary between Ming China and its former colony.

Lin Xiyuan (c. 1480–1550), a Ming official stationed in the Sino-Viet borderlands, guides us through Chapter 4, "An Official at Odds with the State." Lin was perhaps the most ardent proponent of war, which he saw as an opportunity to annex Vietnamese territory. Lin drew upon the local history of his district as well as the history of China's past empires to argue that Dai Viet was an intrinsic part of the Chinese empire. Lin's story shows that Ming control of the southern borderlands was nominal at best, even as great nostalgia for Chinese control of the Red River Delta persisted into the late Ming. Although Lin's activities brought him demotion and disgrace, he was successful in brokering an annexation of Dai Viet territory for the Ming state.

Chapter 5, "The Fearsome Panther," tells the story of the surrender of the Mac Dang Dung to representatives of the Ming from a variety of perspectives. Although this event has long been understood as a humiliating defeat, it differs little from other ceremonies that marked the renewal of diplomatic relations between Chinese and Vietnamese states. By privileging the perspective of a relatively minor participant, the Ming official Jiang Yigui who, in contrast to Lin Xiyuan, worked hard to avert war, we see instead a relatively friendly meeting of Mac Dang Dung and Ming officials. By comparing Mac sources and Vietnamese and Chinese officials' histories, private writings, and visual sources, we can see how each side made use of the event to increase their own political capital.

Chapter 6, "Ruler and Minister," recounts the regional conflict that raged in Dai Viet throughout the second half of the sixteenth century. The southern Le regime fought the Dong Kinh- (present-day Hanoi) based Mac for dominance over all of Dai Viet. The Trinh lords, who would dominate northern Vietnamese politics until the late eighteenth century, emerged from these conflicts under the leadership of Trinh Kiem (1503–1570) and his son Trinh Tung (1550–1623). Although these decades of war devastated the countryside and claimed tens of thousands of lives, they have received relatively little scholarly attention. Vietnamese ministers were faced with a crisis of loyalty as they sought to navigate the political upheavals of the times. Ultimately, the Mac were expelled from Dong Kinh by the resurgent Le dynasty in 1592 and forced to flee to the northern border. The events of these decades are essential for understanding the fate of the Mac and the future course of Sino-Viet relations.

Chapter 7, "The Sparrow and the Bamboo," picks up the story in 1597, when the newly established Le dynasty sent the envoy Phung Khac Khoan to Beijing to restore diplomatic relations. As in the later case of

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Nguyen Phuc Anh, the Le dynasty desired Ming recognition and approval at the foundation of their state. Phung Khac Khoan's poetry and his friendship with a Korean envoy show southern self-representation at work, as Phung Khac Khoan fought to achieve recognition for his state as an heir to classical culture and peer of Korea. A later Vietnamese account of his embassy refashioned his story to demonstrate Vietnamese cultural superiority over China. Through the evolution of Phung Khac Khoan's story, we can see the emergence of a more assertive national identity in Dai Viet.

My goal is not to write Vietnamese history using Chinese sources, or Chinese history from a Vietnamese perspective. Rather, I have tried to write a Sino-Vietnamese history – one that takes up the sources, perspectives, and concerns of scholars and officials of both countries simultaneously. My goal has been to break out of the confines of the nationalist meta-narratives of history that have traditionally limited historical research on these two countries. During the three centuries covered in this study, as Nguyen Phuc Anh's explanatory letters to the Qing court already indicated, Dai Viet was transformed by violent conflict and expansion. From the time of Le Tac to the time of Phung Khac Khoan, Dai Viet asserted regional control and affirmed its independence, even as its government structure came increasingly to resemble that of northern states. At the same time, Chinese states came to abandon the fantasy of recolonizing northern Vietnam and reclaiming the southern border of the expansive Tang empire. In the process, Chinese scholars chose to ignore the similarities between Dai Viet and their country and coined or revived tropes describing the country and its people as barbaric and fundamentally different.

The profusion of names for Vietnam, ancient and modern, causes difficulty for the historian. Vietnamese and Chinese records use different terms to refer to themselves and each other, reflecting disputes over history and culture. I have mainly attempted to transliterate the terms various authors used.

The country name "Vietnam," as we have seen, is relatively recent and not an appropriate term for the Southern Country before 1803. I have chosen to use the most common term of the several used to refer to Vietnam by Vietnamese authors between the tenth and nineteenth centuries: Dai Viet (Great Yue/Viet). When writing about Chinese-authored texts, I have followed their use of the name "Annan." Just as Annan was an unpopular term in Vietnam, Chinese writers would have hesitated to use the preface "Great" to describe a country other than China. I use "Vietnam" to refer to the modern country, the ancient Red River plain and its environs, and the historiographical construct. To reflect the

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