

THE KANTIAN SUBLIME AND THE REVELATION OF FREEDOM

In this book Robert R. Clewis shows how certain crucial concepts in Kant's aesthetics and practical philosophy – the sublime, enthusiasm, freedom, empirical and intellectual interests, the idea of a republic – fit together and deepen our understanding of Kant's philosophy. He examines the ways in which different kinds of sublimity reveal freedom and indirectly contribute to morality, and discusses how Kant's account of natural sublimity suggests that we have an indirect duty with regard to nature. Unlike many other studies of these themes, this book examines both the pre-Critical *Observations* and the remarks that Kant wrote in his copy of the *Observations*. Finally, Clewis takes seriously Kant's claim that enthusiasm is aesthetically sublime, and shows how this clarifies Kant's views of the French Revolution. His book will appeal to all who are interested in Kant's philosophy.

ROBERT R. CLEWIS is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Gwynedd-Mercy College.





THE KANTIAN SUBLIME AND THE REVELATION OF FREEDOM

ROBERT R. CLEWIS





CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107559264

© Robert R. Clewis 2009

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2009 First paperback edition 2015

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Clewis, Robert R., 1977–

The Kantian sublime and the revelation of freedom / Robert R. Clewis.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-521-51668-6 (hardback)
1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804. I. Title.
B2798.C66 2009

193-dc22 2008052571

ISBN 978-0-521-51668-6 Hardback ISBN 978-1-107-55926-4 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.



per Elisa



Conversely, even that which we call sublime in nature outside us or even within ourselves (e.g., certain affects) is represented only as a power of the mind to soar above **certain** obstacles of sensibility by means of moral principles, and thereby to become interesting.

I should like to dwell a little on the last point. The idea of the good with affect is called **enthusiasm**. This state of mind seems to be sublime, so much so that it is commonly maintained that without it nothing great can be accomplished. Now, however, every affect is blind, either in the choice of its end, or, even if this end is given by reason, in its implementation; for it is that movement of the mind that makes it incapable of engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to determine itself in accordance with them. Thus it cannot in any way merit a satisfaction of reason. Nevertheless, enthusiasm is aesthetically sublime, because it is a stretching of the powers through ideas, which give the mind a momentum that acts far more powerfully and persistently than the impetus given by sensory representations. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft* 5:272)

The color of the sublime is red. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft 5:302)



Contents

Preface and acknowledgments			<i>page</i> ix
$A\ell$	brevi	ations and notes on Kant's texts	xi
In	trodu	ction	I
I	The	Observations and the Remarks	32
	I.I	The Observations	33
	1.2	Three forms of the sublime, and the grotesque	34
	1.3	Virtue	37
	1.4	The Remarks: history and background	42
	1.5	Four senses of freedom	45
	1.6	Enthusiasm: the passion of the sublime	50
	1.7	Conclusion	52
2	The	judgment of the sublime	56
	2.1	Preliminary issues	58
	2.2	The mathematical and the dynamical sublime	64
	2.3	A third kind: the moral sublime	84
	2.4	Dependent and free sublimity	96
	2.5	The monstrous and the colossal	108
	2.6	Sublimity elicited by art	116
3	Moral feeling and the sublime		126
	3.I	The moral feeling of respect	127
	3.2	Sublimity as presupposing freedom	135
	3.3	Sublimity as supporting morality	139
4	Various senses of interest and disinterestedness		146
	4.I	Interest	146
	4.2	First-order and second-order interests	151
	4.3	Empirical and morally based interests	154
	4.4	Conclusion	167



viii	Contents		
5	Aesthetic enthusiasm	169	
	5.1 Enthusiasm in the corpus 5.2 Affect	170	
		176	
	5.3 Enthusiasm as morally ambiguous 5.4 Enthusiasm as an aesthetic feeling of sublimity	178 18:	
	5.4 Enthusiasm as an aesthetic feeling of sublimity 5.5 "Without enthusiasm nothing great can be accomplished"	192	
	5.6 Conclusion: Kantian enthusiasm and the revelation of freedom	196	
6	Enthusiasm for the idea of a republic	200	
	6.1 The charge against Kant	20	
	6.2 Means and ends	204	
	6.3 Freedom and the idea of a republic	209	
	6.4 The consistency of Kant's position	208	
7	Conclusion		
	7.1 Summary	219	
	7.2 Sublimity's basis in freedom	219	
	7.3 The transition to freedom	226	
Ap	pendix 1: On the Remarks	228	
	Appendix 2: Some features of the feelings discussed in this book		
Appendix 3: Classification of what elicits sublimity			
Bibliography			
Index			



Preface and acknowledgments

I would like to thank SAGE Publications for allowing me to use in chapter 6 some of the material found in "Kant's Consistency regarding the Regime Change in France," *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 32(4) (2006): 443–60.

It is my pleasure to acknowledge the many people who have contributed to the writing and completion of this book. I sincerely regret that there is space to mention only a few of the individuals who have influenced this project.

Susan Shell and Richard Kearney read early drafts of selected chapters and offered invaluable advice throughout its various stages. This book could not have been written without Susan Shell, who first shaped my understanding of Kant's *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen."* Richard Kearney selflessly offered his advice and assistance from the beginning of my work on the project, and his comments on an early chapter on enthusiasm encouraged me to expand the chapter into this book.

Henry E. Allison constructively influenced my Kant interpretation when I was a graduate student in Boston. I would like to thank him for his honest criticisms and encouragement. As an assistant professor in the Philadelphia area, I have benefited from auditing graduate philosophy courses given by Paul Guyer and by Noël Carroll. Paul Guyer's writings have informed my way of conceiving of sublimity as a feeling of freedom, and I would like to thank him for speaking with me about my project and for sharing his knowledge of eighteenth-century aesthetics. Noël Carroll has helped me think more critically about Kant's notions of interest and disinterestedness, and has enabled me to read Kant with contemporary aesthetic issues in the background.

Numerous institutions and foundations have generously supported this project. Krzysztof Michalski and the staff at the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen have been incredibly kind to me ever



Preface and acknowledgments

since my stay there in 2003. Norbert Fischer and Hermann Schnackertz welcomed me to the Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt in 2001–2. Otfried Höffe kindly hosted me as a visiting scholar at the Universität Tübingen in 2002. I would like to thank Manfred Frank for welcoming me to his reading group during that time.

The Bradley Foundation, Katholische Universität Eichstätt Stiftung, the Boston College Philosophy Department, and the Ernest Fortin Foundation provided some funding in the early stages of the manuscript, and the Bosch Foundation generously provided financial assistance in the summer of 2006.

For their insights and assistance, I thank Patrick Byrne, Richard Cobb-Stevens, Alfredo Ferrarin, Jean-Luc Marion, Rob Miner, David Rasmussen, William J. Richardson, Eileen Sweeney, and Jacques Taminiaux; as well as Ralph Kennedy, Win-chiat Lee, Charles Lewis, Josefine Nauckhoff, Byron Wells, and Ralph Wood. I would like to thank the Wake Forest University philosophy department for inviting me to present and discuss an early version of chapter 4.

I am grateful to my friends and colleagues at Gwynedd-Mercy College, PA, for their support as I researched this book. Michael Clinton kept me honest about taking Kant too seriously, and Donald Duclow pushed me to evaluate the entire Kantian project. The staff at Lourdes Library was very helpful in preparing the manuscript.

This project has benefited in various ways from discussions with Andrew Bickford, Jim Boettcher, Jason Broverman, Corey Dyck, Christine Gottstein-Strobl, David Kim, Claudia Neudecker, Brian Treanor, Andrew Valins, and Joseph Westfall.

I am indebted to Hilary Gaskin, Tom O'Reilly, and Gillian Dadd at Cambridge University Press, and to the Press's anonymous readers, for their encouragement, advice, and help in the production of this book. I would like to thank Kate Mertes for preparing the index.

I would like to express gratitude to those individuals who read parts or drafts of the manuscript. Reidar Maliks read a draft of chapter 6, and Peter Lamarque graciously commented on an early version of chapter 5. Uygar Abaci and Dan Heider read a late draft of the manuscript. I am indebted to the reviewers of parts or drafts of this manuscript. Needless to say, all of the errors and infelicities that remain are entirely my own.

I am especially thankful to have received the support of my wonderful family. I gratefully dedicate this book to my wife, Elisa.



Abbreviations and notes on Kant's texts

Except for the references to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, references to Kant are to the volume:page number of *Kants gesammelte Schriften (KGS)*, published by the Deutsche (formerly Königlich Preußische) Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902—). The references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the A and B pagination of the first and second editions, respectively. References to the *Remarks* are to the volume:page number of the *KGS* followed by the page number in the Rischmüller edition (*Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*," ed. Marie Rischmüller [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991]). Translations from the *Remarks* are my own, as are translations from works for which no English translation is listed below. References to the *Observations* are to the volume:page number of the *KGS* followed by the page in the Goldthwait translation from which I quote (*Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, trans. John Goldthwait [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960]).

The abbreviations below are used to cite Kant's texts; any texts not abbreviated below are cited only by the *KGS* volume:page number. English translations that are used in citations are listed below. It should be noted, however, that I have occasionally modified these translations. Translations that were consulted but not cited from can be found in the bibliography. Finally, it should be pointed out that bold font is used throughout this book to reproduce Kant's original emphasis.

AM	Anthropologie Mrongovius
AP	Anthropologie Parow
АрН	Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Anthropology from
-	a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Victor Lyle Dowdell. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978
FI	Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft. Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge University Press, 2000



xii	Abbreviations and notes on Kant's texts
G	Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, in Practical
GTP	Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1996 Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie
IAG	Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher
	Absicht. Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
	Intent, trans. Ted Humphrey, in Perpetual Peace and Other
	Essays. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983
ID	De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis
	[Inaugural Dissertation]
JL	Jäsche Logik. Jäsche Logic, trans. J. M. Young, in Lectures on
17. 17	Logic. Cambridge University Press, 1992
КpV	Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor, in Practical Philosophy. Cambridge
	University Press, 1999
KrV	Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul
	Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge University Press, 1997
KU	Kritik der Urteilskraft. Critique of the Power of Judgment,
	trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge University
	Press, 2000
M	Menschenkunde
MA	Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte
MS	Die Metaphysik der Sitten. The Metaphysics of Morals, trans.
	Mary Gregor, in <i>Practical Philosophy</i> . Cambridge University Press, 1999
Obs	Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen.
003	Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime,
	trans. John Goldthwait. Berkeley: University of California
	Press, 1960
PP	Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Toward
	Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, trans. Mary Gregor,
DDII	in <i>Practical Philosophy</i> . Cambridge University Press, 1996
PPH	Praktische Philosophie Herder
R	Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft.
	Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. George di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge
	University Press, 1996
Refl	Reflexionen
Rem	Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des
	Schönen und Erhabenen"



Abbreviations and notes on Kant's texts xiii SF Der Streit der Fakultäten. The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary Gregor and Robert Anchor, in Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge University Press, 1996 TP Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice, trans. Mary Gregor, in Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1996 VK Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes