Introduction

In 1797, approximately seven years after Kant published the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, the Grand Prix de Rome in history painting was awarded to Louis-André-Gabriel Bouchet for illustrating the death of Cato of Utica (95–46 BCE).[1] Cato the Younger, or Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis, was renowned in the eighteenth century for having stabbed and killed himself upon learning that the Republic was lost to Caesar. As inspection of the painting reveals, Bouchet presents us with a defiant Cato, full of scorn and unafraid of death. He looks like a man who is free, and who knows it.

In 1764, Kant describes Cato as an exemplar of enthusiasm. Like Bouchet, Kant characterizes Cato as a symbol of freedom. Enthusiasm (*Enthusiasm* or *Enthusiasmus*, not *Schwärmerei*), the pre-Critical theory maintains, is the passion of the sublime. Enthusiasm takes principles that are good in themselves, such as freedom, to an excessive degree. Kant even goes so far as to say that without enthusiasm nothing great can be achieved. At the same time, Kant condemns Cato's suicide as taking a good principle, freedom, and applying it in the wrong way. Of course, it is precisely the features of Cato's suicide itself that so forcefully demonstrate Cato's freedom. Cato defiantly shows that he is free even to take his own life and thus to rise above his sensible interests, above all the interest in self-preservation. His demonstration of freedom is partially what, for Kant, makes Cato's act a demonstration of sublime enthusiasm.

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), Kant modifies his earlier views regarding enthusiasm. Kant no longer claims that enthusiasm is necessary for *achieving* something great. Instead, he holds that

[1] Pierre Bouillon and Pierre-Narcisse Guérin also depicted Cato and won the prize in the first competition to be held since the contest was discontinued during the Revolution. Unlike the paintings of the other two winners, Bouchet's *The Death of Cato of Utica* depicts a defiant yet serene Cato. Philippe Grunchec, *The Grand Prix de Rome: Paintings from the École des Beaux-Arts, 1797–1863* (Washington, DC: International Exhibitions Foundation, 1984), p. 43.

enthusiasm is only sublime from an aesthetic point of view, or aesthetically sublime, because it shows the superiority of the mind to sensibility and sensible interests (*KU* 5:272). Enthusiasm reveals human freedom, but, as aesthetic, it does not help us to achieve any ends – at least not directly. A spectator's aesthetically sublime enthusiasm thus differs from Cato's agent-oriented enthusiasm.

In 1796, Kant returns to the concept of enthusiasm in a short essay, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" published in *The Conflict of the Faculties* in 1798.[2] Thus, Kant was thinking and writing about enthusiasm at approximately the same time that the Grand Prix de Rome was awarded to Bouchet. As in the pre-Critical theory, the enthusiasm described in "An Old Question" concerns the fate of a republic, namely, the first French Republic. However, Kant's account of enthusiasm in "An Old Question" differs substantially from the pre-Critical account. Enthusiasm is now (as in the third *Critique*) what a spectator feels, an aesthetic response, not what drives an agent to achieve a goal or end. Enthusiasm is a sign of human progress and the moral character of humanity, not a necessary condition for achieving morally good (or otherwise great) acts. Finally, in "An Old Question" Kant describes enthusiasm in terms of the sublime, calling it a "grandeur of soul" (*SF* 7:86). He seems to hint at the connections between enthusiasm and the sublime that he made in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

This book examines Kant's views regarding the sublime, enthusiasm, and freedom. I am particularly interested in how the sublime can reveal human freedom and in how enthusiasm can be considered to be a form of the sublime in the Critical sense, since Kant's texts imply that it can be so conceived. Although in the first chapter I discuss the views that Kant held in the mid 1760s, the book focuses largely on Kant's Critical account. I do not attempt to fill in what happened in Kant's development between the middle of the 1760s and the writings of the 1790s. This task would require me to go beyond my present knowledge of Kant as well as necessitate more pages than can be contained in this book.

[2] "An Old Question" was apparently written in 1795, but it was published in 1798 in *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Kant's interest in enthusiasm for the ends of the French Revolution thus apparently carried on into 1798, even if a sober and even pessimistic assessment of the likely outcome of the Revolution probably dates from 1795. See *Conflict*, Editor's introduction, pp. 235–6. Other versions of what was to become "An Old Question" can be found in 15:650–1; 19:604–12; 22:619–24; 23:455–8; and in a text (the "Krakauer Fragment") called "Ein Reinschriftsfragment zu Kants *Streit der Fakultäten*," ed. K. Weyand and G. Lehmann, in *Kant-Studien*, 51 (1959–60): 3–13. On these texts, see Peter Fenves, *A Peculiar Fate: Metaphysics and World-History in Kant* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 171 n.1.

To put it another way, the present work examines how, according to Kant, pure aesthetic judgments of the sublime might contribute indirectly to the realization of the ends of morality in the natural order.[3] I use the word "indirect" advisedly: an aesthetic judgment of the sublime cannot directly actualize morality by making a moral will efficacious in the world. Moreover, the role played by the sublime is not identical to that played by the feeling of beauty. Nevertheless, in its own way, the experience of the sublime can, for Kant, reveal human freedom. By having phenomenological and structural affinities with the moral feeling of respect, the sublime can prepare us for moral agency. The sublime mental state, enthusiasm, is especially worthy of consideration when examining the indirect contribution of aesthetic experience to morality.

Enthusiasm is worth discussing in this context for several reasons. Kant describes enthusiasm as "the idea of the good with affect" (*KU* 5:272). Accordingly, this kind of enthusiasm reveals that the subject has an idea of the good. This in turn implies that he or she is free, or has the capacity for morality. Moreover, by giving us a strong affective response to the morally good, enthusiasm may be able to help us recognize the morally good. Under the throes of affect, we can see, or more precisely feel, the good for what it is. Finally, Kant interprets enthusiasm, which he stresses is an empirical phenomenon, or an occurrence (*Begebenheit*) that unfolds within the natural order, as a morally encouraging sign. He sees it as evidence of a moral predisposition or capacity for morality, a moral tendency (*Tendenz*). For these reasons, it seems that we should take a closer look at the role of the sublime in general, and at the "aesthetically sublime" experience of enthusiasm in particular (*KU* 5:272). Doing so might help us better understand a central concern of the third *Critique*, the so-called transition problem concerning the realization of morality in the natural order.

Before we turn to the transition problem, however, a few clarifications are in order. First, it is worth pausing for a moment to distinguish what I call *aesthetic* enthusiasm from *practical* enthusiasm. The latter necessarily involves an interested determination of an agent's will. Although Kant does not use the term, something that corresponds to what I am calling practical enthusiasm can be found in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Kant there describes an enlivening of the will that causes an "enthusiasm of good intentions" (*ApH* 7:254; cf. 314). Such enthusiasm, he says, must be attributed to the faculty of desire rather than to sensibility.

[3] Paul Guyer, in *The Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 20, examines this issue and has influenced the present interpretation.

By contrast, aesthetic enthusiasm has an aesthetic orientation; that is, it is merely a feeling that is not based on a previous intention or desire. Practical enthusiasm is "interested" in a sense in which aesthetic enthusiasm is not. It directly leads to or involves action by an agent. Aesthetic enthusiasm, by contrast, is disinterested. It is in the practical, interested sense of enthusiasm that, in the *Vorarbeit zu den Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik*, Kant states, "I am an enthusiastic defender of common sense" ("Ich bin ein enthusiastischer Vertheidiger des gesunden Menschenverstandes") (23:59). If Kant is defending something, he is taking a practical stance and is interested. A spectator is not defending anything at all.

Second, it must be emphasized that enthusiasm (practical or aesthetic) is not the same as fanaticism. Kant uses fanaticism (*Fanaticismus*, *Schwärmerei*) to refer to raving with reason and to the tendency to take oneself to have access to the supersensible realm.[4] He does not use enthusiasm (*Enthusiasm*, *Enthusiasmus*) in this context. While even enthusiasm is morally ambiguous, fanaticism is significantly more undesirable than enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is the affective response to the good, but fanaticism has little or nothing to do with the good. Fanaticism is a delusion of being able to see something beyond all bounds of sensibility (*KU* 5:275). Unfortunately, in English language editions of Kant's work *Schwärmerei* is translated in many different ways, sometimes even inconsistently within the same text. *Schwärmerei* is rendered as "fanaticism,"[5] "visionary rapture,"[6] "zealotry,"[7] and, perhaps worst of all, "enthusiasm."[8] *Enthusiasm* and *Enthusiasmus*, unsurprisingly, are

[4] On Martin Luther's term *Schwärmer*, see Martin Brecht, *Martin Luther: Shaping and Defining the Reformation 1521–1532*, trans. James Schaaf (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), pp. 137–95; and John S. Oyer, *Lutheran Reformers against Anabaptists* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), chapter 1. For a sense of enthusiasm that approximates Kantian *Schwärmerei*, see John Locke's *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, Chapter XIX (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 697–706; Earl of Shaftesbury, "A Letter concerning Enthusiasm," in *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 4–28.

[5] *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. Mary Gregor and Robert Anchor, in *Religion and Rational Theology* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 107.

[6] *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Mathews (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 156.

[7] See Kant, *Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss and trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, 1990). Nisbet explains that he translates *Schwärmerei* with "zealotry" because he finds "fanaticism" unsatisfactory; see pp. 284–5. Peter Fenves mentions this point in his introduction to *Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. x.

[8] See *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, p. 407; *Religion and Rational Theology*, p. 499; *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 647; and *The Conflict of the Faculties*, p. 145.

translated as "enthusiasm." I will consistently refer to *Schwärmerei* as fanaticism and to *Enthusiasm* as enthusiasm.[9]

Confusion, or at least a lack of clarity, regarding the two concepts is widespread not only in translations of Kant's work, but also in the secondary literature. Several studies do not properly distinguish *Schwärmerei* from *Enthusiasmus*.[10] Moreover, enthusiasm is sometimes referred to as a kind of *sympathy*. One commentator, for instance, writes: "Kant not only defended the French Revolution as a sign of moral progress but attributed this advance to the 'moral character of humanity' as demonstrated by the public response of disinterested sympathy."[11] While this view characterizes the feeling correctly as disinterested, in my view it is more accurate to call this feeling enthusiasm, not sympathy. As we shall see, Kant himself does so in "An Old Question." Moreover, recognizing that it is enthusiasm allows us to make connections with the characterization of enthusiasm that is found in the third *Critique*. The quotation is also representative of a common but mistaken view that the sign of

[9] Fenves, in *Raising the Tone*, introduction, p. xi, correctly distinguishes *Schwärmerei* from *Enthusiasmus*. Fenves translates *Schwärmerei* with "exaltation," but, since exaltation is used in connection with *Enthusiasm* (*SF* 7:87), the term is misleading. Fenves himself refers to the enthusiasm in "An Old Question" as "exaltation"; Fenves, *A Peculiar Fate*, p. 266. On the term "Exaltation," see *SF* 7:99; and *On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy* 7:398. Fenves notes that exaltation "is doubtless too positive, too closely connected with an uplifting emotion," to do justice to *Schwärmerei*, though he believes that it "nevertheless retains a note of danger" (*Raising the Tone*, p. xii). He correctly notes that although enthusiasm was used by Shaftesbury as a term of abuse, it has a "far nobler heritage" than *Schwärmerei*, since Platonic enthusiasm was associated with divine inspiration (*Raising the Tone*, p. xi).

[10] E.g., John Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* (University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 33–4 (though Zammito, in *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* [University of Chicago Press, 2002], p. 193 correctly distinguishes the *Schwärmer* from the enthusiast); and Gregory R. Johnson, "The Tree of Melancholy: Kant on Philosophy and Enthusiasm," in *Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 43–61. Johnson argues that Kant's attitude toward *Schwärmerei* is better described as an "ambivalent fascination rather than unalloyed hostility" (p. 43). If *Enthusiasm(us)* is less unwholesome than *Schwärmerei*, and *Schwärmerei* itself is ambiguous and not wholly undesirable, certainly *Enthusiasm(us)* has some desirable features. In section 5.3 I argue that *Enthusiasm(us)* is ambiguous for Kant, but this study focuses on its positive and beneficial features (above all, the fact that it reveals freedom). Johnson's thesis about *Schwärmerei* suggests that this focus is justified, but he accentuates the positive in *Schwärmerei* more than does Fenves, who writes: "Kant, like other German writers of the eighteenth century, never tired of trying to distinguish a thoroughly repugnant *Schwärmerei* from an *Enthusiasmus* without which 'nothing great in the world could take place' "; see *Raising the Tone*, p. xi. Unlike Fenves, I do not view *Schwärmerei* as a form of enthusiasm. See *A Peculiar Fate*, p. 243. Jane Kneller, in *Kant and the Power of Imagination* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 13, 55 n.34, 109–15, conceives of the enthusiast as a fantast, visionary, or fanatic (which in my view is better associated with *Schwärmerei*) and connects enthusiasm with metaphysical speculation and imaginings.

[11] See Sharon Anderson-Gold, *Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 2–3.

moral progress is the French Revolution,[12] when in fact the morally encouraging sign is the onlookers' enthusiasm and expressions thereof. Fortunately, several commentators have noticed that the moral sign is the spectator's affective state and the expressions of or judgments about this state.[13]

Enthusiasm is an empirical event, a phenomenon. It functions for Kant as "an intimation, a historical sign," a *signum* of a moral tendency in humanity (*SF* 7:84). It is a given occurrence (*Begebenheit*) that takes place within the natural order (*SF* 7:85). Thus, enthusiasm should be distinguished from the alleged otherworldly intuitions of the pious fanatic (*fromme Schwärmer*) (*SF* 7:81).[14]

But how does this signing and intimating relate to nature and to freedom, that is, how does it help us understand the transition problem? The transition problem requires some explanation. In the Second Introduction of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (Section II), Kant raises the problem of the transition or passage (*Übergang*) from our way of thinking about nature to that of freedom (*KU* 5:176). In nature, all events or occurrences are determined in time by preexisting states of the world in accordance with empirical causal laws or necessary rules (*KrV* A189/B232; A532–4/B560–2).

Freedom, for its part, can be understood in several ways.[15] *Transcendental* freedom is the faculty or power of beginning a state from itself (*vom selbst*). It is a spontaneity that can start to act from itself without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal connection (*KrV* A533/B561). *Practical* freedom is the independence of the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of sensibility, a faculty of determining oneself from oneself (*KrV* A533/B561). Practical freedom has both negative and positive senses. The negative sense refers to the independence of necessitation by sensible impulses (*G* 4:446). The positive sense points to one's ability to adopt norms, including *a priori* maxims or subjective rules of

[12] E.g., Rudolf Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies* (Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 20.

[13] E.g., Howard Williams, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 209; Jane Kneller, *Kant and the Power of Imagination*, p. 108; Peter Fenves, *Late Kant: Towards another Law of the Earth* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), p. 125.

[14] The translation by Mary Gregor and Robert Anchor misleadingly renders *fromme Schwärmer* as "pious enthusiast"; see *Religion and Rational Theology*, p. 299.

[15] My understanding of these senses is influenced by Allen W. Wood and Henry Allison. See Allen W. Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 172; and Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 25–6.

action, and so to determine oneself in accordance with laws that one legislates for oneself (*G* 4:447; *KpV* 5:33).

Perhaps rather cryptically, Kant addresses the transition problem in Section IX of the third *Critique*:

> The effect in accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end, which (or its appearance in the sensible world) should exist, for which the condition of its possibility in nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible being, that is, as a human being) is presupposed. That which presupposes this *a priori* and without regard to the practical, namely, the power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible the transition [*Übergang*] from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness in accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the latter, in the concept of a **purposiveness** of nature; for thereby is the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in accord with its laws, cognized . . . And thus the power of judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that of the concept of freedom. (*KU* 5:196)

Although recent commentators have shown a renewed interest in the transition problem, few have noticed that Kant wrestled with a version of the problem in the marginal notes known as the *Remarks* (*Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen"*), written between 1764 and 1766. I examine these remarks to the *Observations* in the first chapter. One of these notes reads:

> The question is whether, in order to move [*bewegen*] my affects [*Affecten*] or those of others, I should take my standpoint [*Stützungspunkt*] outside of the world or within it. I answer: I find it [my standpoint] in the state of nature, that is, the state of freedom. (*Rem* 20:56; 46)[16]

Kant here seems to identify the state of nature with the state of freedom. This identification is puzzling since elsewhere in the remarks Kant distinguishes and opposes nature and freedom, as we shall see. Freedom, conceived as harmony or agreement with nature, is not the only sense of freedom found in the notes. Kant there characterizes freedom in several

[16] A complete edition of *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen"* presently remains unpublished in English. The quoted passages from the *Remarks* are my own translations, and are cited from the Akademie Ausgabe and the Meiner edition, respectively, as follows: (*Rem* 20:2; 3) refers to the second page of the twentieth volume of the Akademie Ausgabe and to the third page of the richly annotated Meiner edition, i.e., *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen,"* ed. Maria Rischmüller (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991). While I recognize that the collection of remarks does not constitute a genuine Kantian "work," sometimes it may be necessary to capitalize and italicize the name "*Remarks*" as if it were a work rather than Kant's notes in his own copy of the *Observations*.

distinct ways, including a metaphysical sense in which one overcomes nature. In the first chapter, I will clarify the other senses of freedom that are found in the notes.

The transition problem is not just the problem of filling in a gap (*Lücke*) in the Critical system, although the First Introduction does emphasize this function (*FI* 20:244).[17] As the Second Introduction underscores, the problem also concerns actually throwing a bridge (*Brücke*) across the immense gulf or chasm (*Kluft*) that separates freedom from nature, the supersensible from appearances, or what ought to happen from what actually happens (*KU* 5:195, 175).[18] In the present work, the problem of the transition is conceived primarily in the practical and non-systematic sense. The transition has to do with promoting in the natural order the ends of freedom as dictated by the moral law. It deals with the influence of the concept of freedom on nature. The transition concerns how the "supersensible in the subject" can determine "the sensible," or the natural realm, not with regard to the *cognition* of nature but with regard to the *consequences* in nature (*KU* 5:195). These consequences are produced by the idea of freedom "and the practical rules that it contains" (*KU* 5:195).

In particular, I am interested in what aesthetic experience, especially the sublime, can offer to help make this passage actual. A crucial step in the transition is the preparation of the mind for moral feeling:

> The power of judgment's concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs among the concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition, although the aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art) that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The spontaneity in the play of the faculties of cognition, the

[17] Henry Allison, following Klaus Düsing, interprets the basis of the transition in the Second Introduction as moral, rather than systematic, and I follow them. See Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 204; and Klaus Düsing, *Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff* (Bonn: H. Bouvier Verlag, 1968), pp. 108–15.

[18] Kant mentions the transition problem in four other places in the Critical period: in the Transcendental Dialectic in the first *Critique*, *KrV* A339/B386; in the Preface to the second *Critique*, *KpV* 5:7; at the conclusion of "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788), *GTP* 8:182–3; and, finally, in section XI of the First Introduction to the third *Critique*, *FI* 20:241 and *FI* 20:246. For a discussion of these, see Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, pp. 197–201. At *FI* 20:246 Kant says that not "judgments of taste" alone but "aesthetic judgments," including therefore judgments of the sublime, refer sensible intuitions to an idea of nature. In the Second Introduction, too, Kant refers to "aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art)," which, along with the references to the feelings of pleasure and *displeasure*, suggests that the sublime should be thought of as contributing to the transition (*KU* 5:197). Allison refers to this passage as a discussion of the "function of taste with respect to the *Übergang*" (p. 213), and in my view he downplays the role of the sublime in the *Übergang*.

agreement of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept [purposiveness of nature] suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with the concept of freedom in its consequences, in that the latter at the same time promotes the receptivity of the mind for the moral feeling. (*KU* 5:197)

Although Kant is apparently referring to the beautiful here, there is no good reason to deny that the sublime can in some way contribute to the transition to freedom. By virtue of an affinity between the structures of the sublime and the moral feeling (among other ways), the experience of the sublime can prepare the mind for moral feeling (section 3.3). Moreover, the sublime, like the beautiful, involves spontaneity. In the case of the sublime, the spontaneity is on the part of the faculties of reason and even (to an extent) the imagination, which is stimulated by reason and feels a kind of exhilaration and extension in trying to complete reason's demand for totality. The interrelation and coordination of these two faculties of cognition, though disharmonious at first, are "harmonious even in their contrast" and produce a subjective purposiveness that satisfies reason (*KU* 5:258).[19]

Kant's commentators have recently demonstrated a renewed interest in the role of aesthetic experience in morality[20] and, conversely, of morality's role in aesthetic experience.[21] Paul Guyer, for instance, argues that there are four conditions for us to act morally.[22]

1. We must *understand the moral law* and what it requires of us.
2. We must believe that we are in fact *free to choose* to do what is required of us rather than to do what all our other motives, which can be subsumed under the rubric of self-love, might suggest to us.
3. We must believe that the objective or ends that morality imposes upon us can *actually be achieved*.

[19] Kant's table of higher faculties in the Second Introduction characterizes reason as one of three faculties of *cognition* (*KU* 5:198). In the First Introduction Kant characterizes reason as the faculty of *desire* (*FI* 5:245–6).

[20] E.g., Guyer, *Values of Beauty*; Scott Roulier, *Kantian Virtue* (University of Rochester Press, 2004); Patrick Frierson, *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kneller, *Kant and the Power of Imagination*; Robert Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2000); Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*; and Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment* (University of Chicago Press, 1999).

[21] See Guyer, *Values of Beauty*, p. 190; and Berys Gaut, *Art, Emotion, and Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2007). Gaut offers a defense of ethicism in the critical evaluation of works of art and an overview of the contemporary debate between moralists, immoralists, and autonomists.

[22] See Guyer, *Values of Beauty*, pp. 201–2.

4. We must have an *adequate motivation* for our attempt to do what morality requires of us in lieu of the mere desirability of particular goals it might happen to license or even impose in particular circumstances.

Guyer then describes how beauty and sublimity can contribute to the fulfillment of each of the four conditions of the possibility of morality.[23]

1. The sensuous presentation of moral ideas, above all through *aesthetic ideas* in the case of works of artistic genius, offers a sensuous presentation of the moral law itself, as well as of other thought connected with the very idea of morality.
2. The *feeling of our freedom* to choose to live up to the demands of morality in spite of all threats of nature that we experience in the dynamical sublime, as well as the tendency to interpret the beautiful as a symbol of the morally good, are ways in which the freedom of will that we can intellectually infer from our consciousness of the moral law becomes palpable to us as sensory creatures.
3. The hint from the experience of beauty that nature is amenable to the realization of our objectives is *sensible evidence* for that which is otherwise only a postulate of pure practical reason, namely, the consistency of the laws of nature and the law of freedom. Both the experience of natural beauty and the experience of the purposiveness of organisms (the latter being less important for the aims of the present book) offer us what we experience as evidence rather than a mere postulate that the system of morality can be realized in nature. This gives rise to an "intellectual" interest or "morally based"[24] interest in beauty.[25]
4. The experience of beauty *prepares us* to love disinterestedly and that of the sublime to esteem even contrary to our own interest, and aesthetic

[23] Guyer, *Values of Beauty*, pp. 203–4.

[24] Kant uses "intellectual" interest as synonymous with "morally based" interest, although these are distinct concepts in ordinary English and I find the latter more suited to Kant's purposes. "Intellectual" interest brings to mind what one is interested in from an intellectual point of view, as in scholarship or research. I prefer "morally based," since in English it seems to be a stretch to use "intellectual" as Kant does, namely, to designate a concern that the world should support our efforts to be moral or a satisfaction that it is already so constituted.

[25] Bart Raymaekers argues that the unity of nature and freedom is realized through our aesthetic experience, but adds that a teleological reflection on nature, an analysis of the internal finality within the organism, is also required for the link between nature and freedom. See Bart Raymaekers, "The Importance of Freedom in the Architectonic of the Critique of Judgment," in *Kants Ästhetik/Kant's Aesthetics/L'esthétique de Kant*, ed. Herman Parret (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 84–92.