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A REVISED TEXT
WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY AND
A COLLATION OF NUMEROUS MSS.

BY

THE LATE

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PREFACE

WHEN on the death of the late Professor Dougan his papers were examined it was found that the second volume of his edition of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, upon which he had been engaged up to the last, was in a very incomplete condition. He had left a fair copy of the explanatory notes upon Book III and the first 34 paragraphs of Book IV, and there were several notebooks containing his collations of various MSS. His widow (now Mrs Bor), to whom he entrusted the task of seeing that the book should be completed, and his executor, Mr William Dougan, handed these over to the present editor with the request that he should finish the work. The editor has accordingly printed as it stood that portion of the commentary which had been finished before Professor Dougan's death, adding only a few notes of his own enclosed in square brackets, and has himself written the commentary upon the remainder of Book IV and the whole of Book V, together with the *Introduction* containing a detailed analysis of the three books and a discussion of the question of Cicero's sources. Deciding to keep the critical notes uniform with those of the first volume, he used Professor Dougan's collations as far as they went, but collated himself for this volume the following MSS, E 1 E 2 R 1 R 6 R 7 R 10 R 16 R 17 V and P.

To the list (vol. I, p. ix) of editions consulted should be added for this volume that of L. W. Hasper (Gotha, 1883–5) (Ha.).

The editor desires to record his sincere thanks to the Syndics of the Press for their kindness in undertaking the publication of this volume and for their great patience in the long delay that has occurred in the completion of the work. He must also thank the readers of the press for the care and skill which detected errors that but for them might have passed unnoticed; and his friend Professor R. K. McElderry for his kindness in reading the proofs of the text and commentary.

R. M. H.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY
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BOOK III

On relieving annoyance

THOUGH we possess a mind as well as a body, it is a strange thing that while the science of medicine exists for the benefit of the latter and is in high esteem, the corresponding science, philosophy, is either neglected or disliked—because, perhaps, while the mind appreciates a bodily disorder, the body has no sense of mental disorder and a diseased mind is unaware of its own condition. Nature who might have ordered otherwise has so designed our constitutions that the sparks or seeds of virtue which, if cultivated, ensure health of mind are easily destroyed. The process of destruction begins almost at birth under the influence of nurses, parents, teachers, literature and public opinion which teach us to mistake the false for the true, and to aim at material rather than moral success: we aim in consequence at the false rather than at the true glory, the counterpart of virtue, seduced by popular opinion rather than in reliance upon the judgment of the wise. Blinded by these false notions men are involuntarily the instruments of disaster to others as well as to themselves. Must we not try to find some remedy for this unhealthy state of mind, which is far more serious than any bodily disorder? Anxiety and lust are, for instance, worse than disease; and surely the human mind which has invented a cure for diseases can discover, and has discovered, a cure for the mind more reliable even than the science of medicine; this cure is to be found in philosophy, and it is surely important enough to be taken seriously. The general question has already been discussed in the *Hortensius*; here Cicero will only reproduce the aspect of the matter discussed upon this particular occasion, as following up the discussion of the two preceding days he and his friends discussed upon the third day the truth of a general proposition laid down by one of their number, §§ 1–7.

The proposition was: *The wise man is subject to annoyance.* Cicero contends in reply that as *aegritudo* is only one of several disorders of the mind, the mind which is subject to one may be subject to all and

become so thoroughly unhealthy as to be practically *insane*, a word which taken literally means "in an unhealthy state," which (according to philosophers) a mind under such conditions undoubtedly is—Latin brings this point out better than Greek. A mind under the sway of passion is out of its own control, though here two states of mind must be distinguished: one, temporary, called *furor* or μελαγχολία, to which even wise men are subject, and the other (*insania* or μανία), a state inconsistent with true wisdom, §§ 7–11.

The position to be combatted is one that appeals to human nature on its tender side; and there is much to be said for Crantor's view that total absence of feeling can only be secured at the cost of brutality of mind and torpor of body. And yet Cicero fears that this view merely humours our weakness. We must remove this emotion; yet so deep-rooted is it that an ineradicable minimum will probably be left. And we must deal with the other emotions, too, but with this one first, §§ 12, 13.

A. Cicero now proceeds to put forward compressed Stoic arguments in syllogistic form to prove that the wise man is not affected by annoyance, §§ 14–21.

(*a*) Fear and annoyance are concerned with the same objects: the man who is liable to the one is also liable to the other: the wise man is not liable to fear, therefore he is not liable to annoyance, § 14.

(*b*) The wise man is too high-spirited to regard human concerns and being so must be superior to annoyance, § 15.

(*c*) The mind which is annoyed, like the eye which is inflamed, cannot do its work. The mind of the wise man is always equal to its work: therefore it is always free from annoyance.

(*d*) The wise man is self-controlled (σώφρων), and therefore calm, and therefore free from annoyance, c. 8, §§ 16–18.

(*e*) If the wise man were liable to annoyance he would also be liable to anger, §§ 18, 19.

(*f*) The wise man cannot fall into a state of envy or compassion; but the former is annoyance at the good fortune, and the latter annoyance at the evil fortune, of another; therefore the wise man cannot fall into annoyance, §§ 20, 21.

B. These fine-drawn arguments must be considerably expanded, but still principally according to Stoic views, for the Peripatetic theory of the mean as applied to emotions does not recommend itself to Cicero, § 22.

The original question: "Is the wise man affected by annoyance?" (except for the passage in the end of § 25 '*id enim sit propositum, quando-*

quidem eam tu uideri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo') is now tacitly dropped (cf. § 80 '*sed nescio quo pacto ab eo quod erat a te propositum aberrauit oratio, tu enim de sapiente quaesieras...*'), and Cicero divides his main subject into two parts, the setting forth of the cause of annoyance and the discovery of its cure, § 23.

I. The cause of annoyance, §§ 24–75.

1. The relation of *aegritudo* to the other emotions, and its definition:—

The whole cause of the irrational emotions is a false opinion. Every *perturbatio* is '*animi motus uel rationis expers uel rationem aspernans uel rationi non oboediens.*' Irrational emotions are related thus, §§ 24, 25:—

Perturbationes ex opinione	*boni*	*praesentis,*	*laetitia,*	ἡδονή
		absentis,	*cupiditas,*	ἐπιθυμία
	mali	*praesentis,*	*aegritudo*	λύπη
		absentis,	*metus,*	φόβος.

We must remove all these, and *aegritudo* now. *Aegritudo* is defined as '*opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum uideatur esse angi, id autem est ut is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere.*'

2. Analysis of the nature of *aegritudo*:—

It is—

(*a*) *opinio magni mali praesentis*, §§ 28–61.

The Epicureans held that this opinion was inevitably produced by every present great evil, the Cyrenaics only where such evil was unexpected. Cicero admits that the unexpected character of an evil tends to intensify the resulting annoyance, § 28.

Hence ills that have been anticipated by reflexion fall upon a man less heavily. Illustrations from the Telamon (?) of Ennius, from the Theseus of Euripides, from Anaxagoras, from the Phormio of Terence, §§ 28–30.

Cicero accepts from the Cyrenaics this principle of *praemeditatio* as a weapon against annoyance but sees in its effect a proof that annoyance is due to opinion, not, as they held, to inevitable necessity, § 31.

Of the Cyrenaics in more detail anon: the view of the Epicureans must first be dealt with. They held that where a man thinks himself to be in evil he must necessarily be in annoyance, even though the evil has been foreseen or is long-established. They even condemned the practice of anticipatory reflexion upon evils, which may or may not occur, as a gratuitous undertaking of additional annoyance, § 32.

There were, according to them, two means for the abatement of annoyance: (*a*) to call off the attention from the source of trouble; (*b*) to divert it to some pleasant thought such as might be supplied by memory or anticipation, § 33.

But they are wrong to reject *praemeditatio rerum futurarum* and their remedy, which consists in diverting the attention from the cause of annoyance, is useless, § 34.

Praemeditatio secures a double advantage: (*a*) by meditating upon the circumstances amid which we live a man performs the true duty of a philosopher; (*b*) when misfortunes confront a man he has a threefold consolation: (α) he has long anticipated the possibility of the occurrence; (β) he knows that the incidents of the human lot must be borne with resignation; (γ) he knows that there is no evil where there is no moral blame.

And who are the Epicureans to bid us ignore the annoyance at the very moment when it pierces us and yet deny us all healing influence from time? And, by the way, what are these good things to which they would call off our attention? § 35.

Here Cicero loses the thread of his subject in a tirade against the views of Epicurus, §§ 36–51.

Pythagoras or Socrates or Plato might well rouse a man who was thus succumbing to annoyance; they might bid him consider the four cardinal virtues in turn, but Epicurus bids us think of pleasures, and those pleasures the pleasures of sense. Epicureans need not deny it: the assertion is proved out of the mouth of their cleverest man, Zeno of Sidon, §§ 36–8, and from the work of Epicurus himself on the chief good, §§ 41–42.

A fine life they prescribe and fine reflexions they would provide for the solace of a Thyestes or an Aeetes or a Telamon or a captive Andromache in distress, §§ 39, 40, 43–46.

Some may seek to defend Epicurus. It is true that he has uttered many noble sentiments, but his statement of the chief good is only too plain, c. 20, § 46.

It need not be urged that he places the essential cause of happiness in repose of mind. He contradicts himself, and he fails to distinguish between pleasure and absence of pain, and he separates pleasure from the chief good, § 47.

But it may be urged that he often praises virtue. What of that? C. Gracchus praised economy with regard to the public money. But look to his acts, which the story of Piso Frugi serves to illustrate. So Epicurus may assert that virtuous living is essential to happy living; he may deny that fortune has any power over the wise man; he may award

the preference to frugal fare; he may assert that the wise man is at all times happy—all these utterances are inconsistent with his doctrine with regard to pleasure, §§ 48, 49.

Epicureans complain that this is to attack Epicurus in the spirit of a partisan. A very likely story! This is no exciting question and yet even exciting questions such as questions of war can be argued without acrimony, as the case of Cato and Lentulus shows, §§ 50, 51.

To return to the view of the Cyrenaics: they hold that where annoyance arises the occurrence which causes it is unexpected. This is an important point: and Chrysippus also holds that the blow is heavier where it is unexpected. But this is due to two causes: (*a*) the suddenness of the occurrence prevents us from rightly measuring its true dimensions: (*b*) the annoyance is increased by a feeling of self-accusation due to the idea that the occurrence might have been foreseen, § 52.

That this explanation is correct is shown by the case of enslaved captives: though their evils continue unchanged their annoyance is not only abated but in many instances removed by lapse of time. Examples are furnished by Carthaginians, Macedonians, Corinthians, § 53.

When Carthage was destroyed Clitomachus thought it necessary to console his fellow-countrymen with a book which we have read. Had he delayed the sending of it for a number of years there would have been no wounds to heal, § 54.

Accordingly it is not because they are unexpected that misfortunes loom large upon us but because they have newly occurred; *quia recentia sunt maiora uidentur, non quia repentina*, § 55.

There are two ways in which we may ascertain the real dimensions of a seeming evil (or a seeming good)—We may examine its real nature, take e.g. the case of poverty; or we may illustrate it from the behaviour of individual men, e.g. Socrates, Diogenes, Caecilius' philosopher in a mean cloak, Fabricius: such instances, when placed before us, gradually bring us to a perception of the true dimensions of the supposed evil (or good). And previous reflexion upon possible future evils brings about the same result as is produced by lapse of time: the true dimensions of the supposed evil are better seen, §§ 56–59.

Antiochus writes that Carneades used to blame Chrysippus for quoting from Euripides in illustration of the inevitability of pain and woe, asserting that such sentiments could only bring consolation to spiteful persons. But Cicero thinks otherwise, holding that the inevitability of the human lot forbids us to fight with the deity and that the citation of examples is calculated not to delight the spiteful but to bring people to resolve to endure what they find that many have endured, §§ 59–60.

Annoyance is a terrible thing, compare Chrysippus' derivation of the

word λύπη, but it will be rooted out now that its cause is set forth. This cause is nothing else than *opinio et iudicium magni praesentis et urgentis mali*, § 61.

(*b*) *aegritudo* is intensified where to the idea of a great present evil is added the idea that it is our duty to be annoyed at what has occurred, §§ 62–74.

To this idea are due disgusting modes of displaying grief, tearing the cheeks, plucking out the hair; to the same idea is due the blame bestowed by others upon those who fail to display the expected measure of grief, e.g. the blame which Aeschines cast upon Demosthenes.

Owing to the same idea some, when in grief, rush to the desert; some become dumb, others rabid, hence the legends of Niobe and Hecuba; others, like the nurse in Ennius, tell their sorrows to the desert air, §§ 62, 63. And all act in these various ways because they think it is their duty to grieve. That this is so is shown by the fact that, if those in mourning forget their grief for a moment, they blame themselves for doing so and purposely recall their grief, and if children, in time of mourning, do not display the proper air of gloom their elders take measures to produce it artificially. Notice, too, the word '*decreui*' in the play of Terence, a plain indication that grief is an evil voluntarily, and not inevitably, incurred. This fact explains why people can abstain from grief where the circumstances forbid it, e.g. where men are daily falling in numbers on the battle-field. It also explains why those who witnessed the murder of Pompey were able to make good their flight to Tyre before their grief burst forth, §§ 64–66. And just because grief is a voluntary matter nothing is more effective in bringing about its abandonment than the persuasion that it does no good. And, because grief is a voluntary matter and they have found that it does no good, men, who have suffered much, endure their woes with more patience, § 67.

The voluntary character of annoyance is further shown by the fact that though the greatest philosophers recognise that they are in a most evil state, since they are *insipientes*, inasmuch as they have not yet attained to perfect wisdom, they nevertheless do not lament because in their case there is no idea that it is a matter of duty to lament. The greatest philosophers, e.g. Aristotle and Theophrastus, have admitted that there was much that they did not know, §§ 68, 69.

Again where a man thinks it unmanly to mourn he proves able to abstain from mourning, §§ 70 *fin.*, 71 *init.*

Even those who deny that any man would voluntarily give way to grief, and maintain that it is unavoidable, admit that men go further than is necessary in giving way to it, in other words they admit that a portion of it is voluntarily incurred, § 71 *fin.*

But there are motives which actually cause men voluntarily to incur grief:—

(α) the conception of an evil as of such magnitude that we *must* grieve;

(β) the idea that our mourning is acceptable to the dead;

(γ) the idea that the gods are pleased at our self-abasement beneath their stroke.

The inconsistency of these popular views is apparent from the fact that men are praised for meeting their own death calmly though they are blamed for taking that of another in the same way, for it is nonsense to suppose that anyone could love another more than himself, §§ 72, 73 *init.*

Objections are untenable: if some are not influenced by consolatory addresses this, so far from proving that their grief is not a matter of will, serves only to show that they have made up their minds to grieve. If some are too illogical to apply to their own case the good advice they give to others in distress (e.g. Oileus, § 71) they are not more inconsistent than misers who blame the avaricious or than ambitious men who condemn ambition. It is will that operates in all cases. Thus where grief seems healed by time it is really by reflexion, for which time has given opportunity, and not by time, that the cure is wrought. The Peripatetic theory of the mean cannot apply. For if grief is a matter of inevitable necessity why do they employ consolation? If, on the other hand, it is incurred by an act of will, why not root it out entirely? Cicero sums up the result of the enquiry as far as this point in the words '*satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, in qua opinione illud insit ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat*,' §§ 73, 74.

(*c*) Lastly Cicero says that Zeno rightly adds to the definition of *aegritudo* the qualification that it be *recens*, this word not being limited to a strictly temporal meaning but applying so long as the belief in the evil retains fresh vigour and force. The grief of Artemisia, for instance, remained *recens* in this sense until she died through its effect, § 75.

II. The remedial treatment of annoyance, §§ 75–79 end.

Different remedies are put forward by different philosophers. Some combine all these remedies, since some are affected by one, some by another; this is the method adopted in Cicero's own *Consolatio* where he tried every possible remedy; still, as Prometheus says in Aeschylus, one must wait for a suitable opportunity for administering the proper treatment.

In administering consolation one will show that the evil is non-existent or very small; that it is incident to the human lot; that grieving

over it is of no avail. Cleanthes' remedy which consisted in pointing out that there was no evil where there was no disgrace is not a practical one. His statement is not even always true; it was not true, for instance, when Alcibiades grieved because he did not possess virtue, §§ 77, 78.

To point out to a sufferer that his misfortune is a common one does not bring conviction in every case. The truest remedy, but one not easy to apply while the annoyance is at its height, is that of Chrysippus, which consists in convincing the sufferer that his grief is due to his own volition, and to an idea that it is demanded by duty. We must vary our mode of treatment according to the person treated, § 79.

Epilogue. The discussion has digressed from the original question which was "Is the wise man affected by annoyance?" Instead of dealing with that question we have discovered that the evil which is involved in annoyance results not from inevitable and necessary causes but from an act of will and erroneous opinion, § 80. Moreover we have dealt chiefly with one form of annoyance, grief for the dead (*luctus*), this being the severest of all its subdivisions, but the same treatment applies to all the rest, §§ 81–4.

BOOK IV

On the remaining irrational emotions

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B. Refutation of the Peripatetic defence of the emotions, §§ 34–57.

C. The treatment of the emotions, §§ 58–81.

Epilogue, §§ 82–4.

Introduction, §§ 1–7.

Our ancestors made early progress in constitutional development and in the military art, § 1; and Cicero sees reason for thinking that they had also acquired some knowledge of philosophy. His reasons are the following:—

(*a*) It is not likely that the early Romans were deaf to the doctrines of Pythagoras taught in Magna Graecia and widely celebrated, § 2.

(*b*) The fiction that Numa was a Pythagorean seems to indicate an early Roman admiration for the Pythagoreans.

(*c*) The Pythagoreans and the early Romans alike are said to have sung to instrumental accompaniment and the poem of Appius Caecus seems to show Pythagorean influence, §§ 2–4.

Though the Romans have been philosophic from of old, no Roman philosopher can be named before the age of Laelius and Scipio. When these were young men the embassy of Diogenes, Carneades (and Critolaus) was sent to Rome in 155 B.C., § 5.

The philosophy of the schools founded by Plato and Aristotle is hardly as yet represented in Latin literature, but the Epicurean writings of Amafinius have had much influence, § 6.

The theme for discussion, §§ 8–10.

The question for the day's discussion is "Is the wise man free from all irrational emotions?" Annoyance was disposed of the previous day; fear is so closely connected with annoyance that the same decision applies to each. Exultant joy and desire remain to be considered, § 8.

The Stoics give much attention to the classification and definition of the several emotions. The Peripatetics disregard this department and attend rather to the remedial treatment of the emotions. Cicero will deal with classification and division first, §§ 9, 10.

A. Stoic division and definitions of the emotions, §§ 11–33.

(*a*) *Perturbatio* and its genera and their subdivisions defined, §§ 11–22.

Zeno defines *perturbatio* as '*auersa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio.*' There are four main divisions (cf. iii 11, 24 and table on p. xxxi), viz. desire and joy, annoyance and fear, § 11.

All *perturbationes* are due to a mental decision and to the forming of a mere opinion, § 14. The forming of such an opinion is a weak act of assent, § 15. *Constantia* is opposed to *perturbatio*, being a movement of the soul in accordance with reason (εὐπάθεια). The *constantia* opposed to desire is reasonable wish (*uoluntas*, βούλησις): to unrestrained mirth (*laetitia gestiens*) is opposed joy (*gaudium*, χαρά, εὔλογος ἔπαρσις), a tranquil movement; to fear (*metus*) is opposed prudence (*cautio*, εὐλάβεια); annoyance (*aegritudo*) has no *constantia* opposed to it, §§ 12–15.

Each separate *perturbatio* has its subdivisions, § 16.

Definitions of the several subdivisions of each *perturbatio*, §§ 17–21. The source of all irrational emotions is want of self-control (*intemperantia*, ἀκράτεια), § 22.

(*b*) Stoic comparison between diseases of the mind and diseases of the body, §§ 23–32.

Disordered states of the mind arise from the disturbing effect of emotions just as similar states of the body arise from corruption of blood, or redundancy of phlegm or bile.

From *perturbationes* spring diseased cravings (*morbi*) and vicious habits (*aegrotationes*, ἀῤῥωστήματα), and, as errors of an opposite kind, diseased aversions (*offensiones*). The Stoics, and especially Chrysippus, push this parallel between diseases of the body and those of the mind too far, § 23.

These *morbi*, *aegrotationes* and *offensiones* are illustrated in detail, §§ 24–7.

Further parallelism between the health of the body and that of the mind, §§ 27–8.

And, as in the body we find diseases, chronic ailing states and deformity, we find corresponding evils in the mind. Definition of *uitiositas*, §§ 28, 29.

And there is the same parallelism between good conditions of the mind and those of the body as there is in the case of evil conditions, §§ 30, 31.

They differ in this that the mind while sound cannot be assailed by disease but the body can, c. 14, § 31.

How the clever differ from the dull as regards the irrational emotions. *Morbi* and *aegrotationes* are more difficult to uproot than *uitia animorum*, § 32.

(*c*) Transition to the second division of the subject, § 33.

B. Refutation of the Peripatetic defence of the emotions, §§ 34–57.

Virtue being a settled and laudable state of the mind, giving rise to good desires and actions, and its opposite *uitiositas*, which the Greeks call κακία, giving rise to irrational and disturbing desires, the only method of getting rid of these evil results is to be found in virtue, § 34.

Nothing can be more wretched and revolting than the sight of a man who is the slave of an emotion, for instance, of fear (like Tantalus): and foolish men are always such; emotions like desire and exultation are just as foolish; the only person who is free from them all is the wise man, §§ 35, 36.

The wise man free from these disturbing emotions is certainly happy. How can he be mistaken in his judgment of the importance of any event who has studied the constitution of things and is on guard against surprise? His keen vision sees that the only home of peace is a quiet mind, free from disturbing emotion, while a mind ill at ease loses its health, §§ 37, 38.

How then can the Peripatetics adopt the effeminate view that a certain limited amount of emotion is necessary to man? The emotions are all contrary to reason, and nothing that is so can be tolerated.

Besides no limit is possible. One may under a single misfortune give way to emotion, and if misfortune be repeated the emotion will increase till it passes all bounds, §§ 39, 40. To try to set a limit to what is in itself a *uitium* is to try to stop oneself in mid air after leaping from a cliff; a mind once upon the downward track will go on; the disease will increase; without reason the mind has no strength; it is no protection against vice to be moderately vicious, §§ 41, 42.

Besides the Peripatetics declare the emotions to possess a certain utility; (*a*) anger, for instance, whets the courage of warriors and inspires orators; a man who cannot be angry is no man; (*b*) Themistocles was roused to energy by jealousy of Miltiades; (*c*) even philosophers have a *greed* for knowledge; (*d*) annoyance has its moral uses when men are annoyed at their own faults—and so they argue about (*e*) pity, envy, fear and all the rest, of which they approve in moderation, §§ 41–46.

Cicero is not going to join in the bout of sparring between the Peripatetics and the Stoics, the only question being for an impartial enquirer "What is the true definition of *perturbatio?*" Can a better than that of Zeno be found, "an unnatural movement of the mind away from right reason"? Cicero now takes the Peripatetics up point by point: (*a*) *Anger*: to say that a man cannot be brave unless he is angry is to degrade a brave man to the level of the gladiator in Lucilius. Was not Ajax joyful instead of angry when he challenged Hector, as is apparent from their colloquy before their duel? The bravery of Torquatus, Marcellus, Africanus, Hercules borrowed nothing from anger. Bravery is the deliberate judgment of the mind that death and pain are to be despised and endured: anger is a kind of madness, as much akin to valour as is drunkenness. The definitions of bravery given by Sphaerus and Chrysippus support this view (the Stoics are right when they say that all but the wise are mad). Again, anger can hardly be said to be of use in domestic life. It is true that an orator or a poet may simulate anger, but that is a different thing; (*b*) *Greed*: to say that philosophers are *greedy* for knowledge is an abuse of language; (*c*) *Annoyance*: the moral uses of annoyance have nothing to do with a wise man; (*d*) *Pity*, *jealousy* and the rest are similarly useless; a wise man should help, not pity, and there is little utility in envy and jealousy, §§ 47–56.

If a man has any of these vices even to a slight degree he is so far to be blamed, and cannot be called a wise man; the only safe remedy is not to prune but to eradicate, § 57.

C. The treatment of the emotions, §§ 58–81.

Cicero is not sure that the friend who laid down the general proposition of § 8 may not, under the guise of an abstract discussion,

be anxious for some personal guidance; and happily nature has provided a remedy for moral as well as bodily disorders, § 58.

There are many methods of dealing with mental disturbance: one may either argue the general question whether one ought ever to allow his mind to be disturbed, or the particular question whether the patient has in a given instance any adequate reason for disturbing his mind: the former is the better course, as it can be applied to all cases. One may then show (*a*) that the object of fear or annoyance is not an evil or the object of desire and delight not a good; or (*b*) that a state of mental disturbance is in itself vicious, unnatural and unnecessary. Even those who will not yield to argument (*a*) may still be persuaded to moderate their emotions, and it must be admitted with regard to (*b*) that it is not always successful or of general utility. Different arguments must of course be used with those whose annoyance proceeds from consciousness of a lack of virtue and desire to obtain it: but the view that emotion (whatever be our view as to the value of the exciting cause) is inconsistent with the grave and serious character of a philosopher ought to be admitted universally, §§ 59–61.

In dealing with *libido* or desire, even for virtue, one ought to deal not with the value of the object desired, but dwell upon the effects which this emotion produces in the mind; *aegritudo* or annoyance can be cured by a consideration of the universal lot, though this point has been dealt with in the previous book and in the *Consolatio*. Fear (an uneasy emotion with regard to the future as annoyance is with regard to the present) may be dispelled by the consideration (*a*) of its debasing effect upon the character; (*b*) of the harmless nature of the chief objects of fear, pain and death, which have been dealt with in Books I and II, §§ 62–64.

Cicero now passes to the emotions caused by supposed goods, i.e. *delight* and *desire*. Here again the preferable method is to show, not that the supposed goods are not real goods but that these emotions, even if the objects of them be granted to be good, must not be carried to excess (immoderate laughter ex. gr. is offensive) and are as vicious in their own way as their opposites, §§ 65–67.

A special case of the emotion of delight is the passion of *love*, the most unworthy of all emotions. The poets praise it and attribute it to the gods, and even philosophers have been found to patronize it: the former even have praised unnatural vice. Stoic philosophers speak of a kind of love which is a mere overture for friendship inspired by the sight of beauty; if there be such an emotion it is harmless and calls for no cure; but the passion as ordinarily conceived is more akin to madness and is so represented by the poets, §§ 68–74.

Here the proper course is either to show (*a*) the trivial character of the pleasure aimed at, or (*b*) to inspire the lover with other interests, or (*c*) to get rid of one passion by means of another, or (*d*) to show that the passion is really insane and disgusting, and in any case a voluntary and not a necessary affection, §§ 75, 76.

Anger is still more clearly a form of insanity; here the patient is to be treated by the withdrawal of the object of his anger, or by being induced to defer its satisfaction, as Archytas voluntarily did, §§ 77, 78. How absurd then is the view that anger is either natural or useful! If the former, all men would be equally angry, and no one need ever repent of its results as did Alexander: like other emotions it is purely voluntary and proceeds from a false estimate of the value of objects; like other emotions it may be cured, and it is true of it as of the others that some men are naturally prone to it, and if it be not checked in time it becomes incurable, §§ 79–81.

EPILOGUE. The four days' discussion has shown that next to the knowledge of final good and ill there is nothing more useful than the discussion of such subjects. It has been shown (*a*) that death, and (*b*) that pain are to be despised and endured, (*c*) that annoyance, and (*d*) that all emotions are evil and can be cured. Annoyance is perhaps worse than the others and so has been treated in a separate book; but they are all effects of wrong judgment and can be cured, nor while they remain uncured can we be really happy or of sound mind, §§ 82–4.

BOOK V

Virtue is sufficient for a happy life.

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The proposition true from the standpoint of all philosophers, §§ 83–118.

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Introduction, §§ 1–11.

The consideration of the fifth day's subject, the self-sufficiency of virtue to ensure happiness, must end the discussions; this thesis, though difficult to prove, is the most important message of philosophy; the desire to secure happiness gave rise to philosophical speculation, and

if happiness is to be secured by philosophy, who would not be a philosopher? If virtue cannot secure happiness amid the accidents of fortune we must despair, as Cicero confesses he sometimes does himself, of ever attaining it. Our bodies are so subject to disease and pain that one sometimes fears the mind must necessarily be subject to a similar fortune; this fear proceeds from a distrust of the power of virtue, which can raise us above all accidents of life and fate, by giving us true views of the world, §§ 1–4.

Philosophy alone can correct our mistaken views and ensure our happiness. Cicero breaks into an impassioned apostrophe of the philosophy which has created society, literature and civilization; whose precepts make a moment of time more precious than immortality; which has destroyed the fear of death. But in spite of such services to man, it is not merely neglected but despised and its history forgotten.

Though the word philosophy is new, the subjects it deals with are old: the Seven Wise Men, Lycurgus and others were philosophers in fact though not in name, the name being coined by Pythagoras who considered the contemplation of nature the most liberal pursuit, and the knowledge of it the most precious possession: he advanced the study of science and applied it in the public and private life of Magna Graecia. Until Socrates philosophers studied merely geometry, arithmetic, physics, astronomy; Socrates was the first to study moral science; his dialectical skill and intellectual power can be seen in the dialogues of Plato; he was the real founder of the Academic method, of which Carneades was the most celebrated exponent, to which Cicero will adhere in this discussion—the method of suspension of judgment and refusal to dogmatize, §§ 7–11.

The theme for discussion, §§ 12–14.

The proposition is laid down by one of the company that virtue is not sufficient to ensure a life of happiness. From this Cicero strongly dissents; he asserts that virtue is sufficient to ensure a life of goodness, rectitude, and honour and that such a life is a happy life. His opponent retorts that a man may live such a life and yet be unhappy, if for example he is subjected to torture. Cicero refuses to believe that happiness will not unite itself to the company of the virtues even though they be in the hands of the torturer. The reply of his opponent is a refusal to be put off with Stoic figures of speech; he demands that leaving abstractions aside Cicero should deal with the facts of life and with the dictates of common sense which declares that pain and happiness are incompatible. This Cicero promises to do though denying the right of his opponent to prescribe the method of proof to be adopted, §§ 12–14.

Proof of the Proposition that Virtue is Sufficient for a Happy Life, §§ 15–82.

A. The proof in syllogistic form, §§ 15–20.

If the results arrived at in the discussions of the precedings days are valid (as they admittedly are) then the matter is easily disposed of; for, (1) men who are under the influence of such emotions as fear, annoyance, lust, etc. are unhappy; (2) men who are subject to none of these are tranquil and therefore happy; (3) this tranquillity is produced by virtue; therefore virtue is in itself sufficient to produce happiness, §§ 15–17; Cicero's opponent admits the premiss that freedom from emotion and passion produces happiness, while he also grants that the further premiss that the wise man is free from emotion and passion has been proved on the preceding days, and it seems as if there were no more to be said, § 17.

But Cicero admits that a proof by axioms, after the style of geometers and Stoics, is unsatisfactory in a philosophical discussion which requires and is conceded, even by the Stoics, a broader treatment. Besides, the conclusion is too important to be dismissed so briefly; happiness, which even Xerxes with all his power and wealth could not secure, must be put beyond the reach of doubt, §§ 18–20.

B. Detailed consideration of various arguments, §§ 21–82.

Cicero's opponent here declares himself ready to admit the logical validity of the two positions (*a*) The only good is what is *honestum*, therefore virtue produces happiness, and (*b*) A happy life consists in virtue, therefore virtue is the only good; but he objects that other philosophers, such as Aristus and Antiochus, hold the existence of other goods than virtue. Cicero's reply is that the question of the agreement with their own premisses displayed in the conclusions of others must be discussed elsewhere; he has discussed the matter with the philosophers named; his own position was, and is, that if bodily infirmities and misfortune be evil, then since the wise man can be subject to such things, and no man can be happy surrounded by evils, it is possible for the wise man not to be happy. Antiochus holds that while such things are evils yet happiness (like most words of the kind) is a relative term, and that a man may be happy, even though he is subject to some evils. Since Cicero will not go into the question at this stage he contents himself with saying that he cannot conceive degrees of happiness, nor can he see how, if of the three kinds of evils (bodily, external and moral) a man is subject to the first two, he can be described even as relatively happy, §§ 21–23. Theophrastus, he proceeds (still labouring the digression), felt the difficulty; admitting the existence

of external and bodily evils, he could not take a very lofty tone; he is blamed for this, but he has at least the merit of consistency; he is universally blamed also for his view that fortune, not philosophy, is the mistress of human life; but here again he is quite consistent. Why should we imitate the inconsistencies of Epicurus who holds both that pleasure is the only good, and that abstemiousness is praiseworthy; that pleasure is happiness and yet that no one can be happy who does not live virtuously; that pain is the greatest, nay the only evil, and yet that fortune has little to do with the wise man? Metrodorus too defies fortune in language which might become Zeno or Aristo but is inconsistent in the mouth of a follower of Epicurus, §§ 24–27. Uneducated persons are taken in by the language of these men but a trained mind detects their inconsistency. Cicero's own position (the good are always happy) is, however, free from this reproach; by the good (or the wise) he means those equipped with all virtue; by happiness he means the full possession of all good and the exclusion of all evil; it is necessary then to deny the existence of any good except goodness, or virtue; pain, poverty, slavery may befall the wise man, but as they are not evils they cannot interfere with his happiness. Philosophers like Aristotle and others who hold misfortunes to be evils are then inconsistent when they say that the wise man is always happy. If they wish to deserve the honourable name of philosophers they should despise misfortune and seek happiness within; but they must not adopt at once the language of the crowd and of philosophy; this is to be as inconsistent as Epicurus who speaks as if he did not understand his own theories, §§ 28–31.

Cicero's opponent here interjects that, though all this is plausible, it is entirely inconsistent with the statement in the Fourth Book of the *De Finibus* that Zeno differs from the Peripatetics only in terminology; if this be so why should they not be allowed to use the same language in regard to virtue in its relation to happiness? Cicero protests strongly against an Academic being tied down to previous statements, and points out that in any case he is at present only concerned with the mere question of logical validity. If Brutus (for instance) wishes as a Peripatetic to hold that the wise man is always happy that is his own affair; and Cicero only differs from him in holding that the wise man is always *absolutely* happy, §§ 32–34 init.

Besides, if Zeno be a parvenu in philosophy, one can go back to Plato for the truth of the Stoic position: Plato makes Socrates in the *Gorgias* identify happiness with virtue and in the *Epitaphios* he lays stress upon the self-dependence of the wise man and his superiority to external fortune or misfortune. It is entirely upon the authority of Plato that Cicero will rely, §§ 34–36.

Where then must we search for our premisses? Clearly in nature, which aims in everything at self-development and perfection. This is true not only of the vegetable, but specially of the animal, world; every species remains true to its own natural development; and much more of man, whose principle of development is the divine principle of reason, whose cultivation brings enlightenment and whose perfection is virtue: and since to be perfect is to be happy, then all virtuous men are happy. So far the Peripatetics go: but Cicero goes farther and holds this happiness to be absolute, since happiness which cannot be depended upon to continue is not happiness at all, and if there be such goods as bodily and external goods (upon which no one can depend) real happiness is unattainable; the happiness which such goods confer is like the merchant's fortune tied to his rigging—nothing that may be lost can confer happiness. True happiness is at once indefectible and complete, just like courage (ex. gr.) which fears, not little, but nothing. Such happiness is impossible if there be any good but virtue, the only possession which confers confidence and independence; the virtuous man is like the Lacedemonian state which no threat could terrify nor death dismay—such fortitude combined with self-control is of the essence of virtue, §§ 37–42.

If it be true, as it is, that fancied goods and fancied evils produce mental disturbance at variance with reason, must not the man who is free from these be happy? The wise man who is always free from them is therefore always happy. Further every good gives pleasure; what gives pleasure is to be well spoken of, and what is to be well spoken of is glorious and so praiseworthy, that is to say virtuous or *honestum*, and therefore 'the good' is identical with virtue: but no one would call an external good *honestum*, such a 'good' therefore is not 'the good.' Must not a man in possession of all possible external goods be wretched if he is unjust, intemperate or cowardly; how then can such things which cannot confer happiness be called good? A happy life must be homogeneous, it cannot admit of anything but what is good. The good is an object of desire, and therefore of approbation, and of worth and deserving of praise; nothing but virtue is such, §§ 43–45.

We must abandon this view if other things are to be called good: if riches, birth, popularity, beauty are goods, philosophers are no better than the crowd. The Stoics call such things 'objects of preference' (*producta*, *praecipua*) but not 'goods' and not capable of producing happiness: even the Peripatetics admit they do not confer absolute happiness, the only happiness we are concerned with. A man is what he feels; what a man says, he is; his life is as his doctrines; a good man's feelings are praiseworthy, so is his life and therefore his life, being

praiseworthy, is virtuous. A good man's life then is happy. What else has all that has been said been intended to prove? How can a man be good whose feelings and acts do not proceed from what is praiseworthy? What can be praiseworthy but virtue? Virtue therefore ensures happiness, §§ 46–48.

We may reach the same conclusion by another line of reasoning. In a wretched life (or in one that is neither happy nor wretched) there is nothing praiseworthy, nothing to be well spoken of. There must be some kind of life in which there is something of this kind; a happy life is such, for there is nothing to be well spoken of but happiness; but unless a virtuous life be a happy one there is something better than happiness (virtue of course being better)—an absurd conclusion: and if vice produces misery why should its opposite not produce the opposite? Is not this the real teaching of Critolaus' illustration of the balance? Why, if he admits virtue to be so superior to everything else, does he not admit its power to confer absolute happiness? Annoyance produces fear and servility of mind—the opposite of the freedom conferred by virtue; if virtue produces a good, i.e. a brave and lofty, life it must produce a happy life, free from regret, abundant, unhampered and (unlike the life of the foolish man) contented, §§ 49–54.

Was not Laelius, who was virtuous and wise, happier than Cinna, though the latter was consul four times and Laelius only once? There are of course men who would prefer to be Cinna; but can a man like Cinna, stained with the murder of Octavius, Crassus, Caesar and others, be called happy? He was wretched, not merely because he was a murderer, but because he had the heart of a murderer. Was Marius not happier when he shared his glory with Catulus than when, without a rival, he gave orders to murder him? Of the two Catulus was happier even in death than the man who stained his glory and his last days with crime, §§ 54–56.

Dionysius of Syracuse, though temperate and energetic, was malicious and unjust and, so, miserable; in spite of his birth, high position and crowds of favourites he practically lived in a prison owing to his suspicion of everyone, even of his two wives; a boy who made a harmless jest was executed on suspicion of having meant more than he said. The episode of Damocles showed what value Dionysius set upon his own happiness: yet so deeply was he involved in evil that he could not extricate himself even if he wished. True friendship was denied him; his artistic and musical, even his literary, talent could find no satisfaction; he had to pass his life in the company of barbarians and ruffians, §§ 57–63.

To compare the life of a Plato or an Archytas with his would be absurd. Archimedes, the mathematician of Syracuse, is a better parallel.

Even the site of Archimedes' grave had been forgotten until Cicero discovered it when he was a quaestor at Syracuse; yet what cultivated man would not prefer his life to that of Dionysius?—the one exercised his mind and reason in scientific investigation, the other in murder. What wealth or power can compare with the life of a philosopher, who enjoys the exercise of the best part of his nature, and is happy because he is virtuous? §§ 64–67. But more cogent arguments can be advanced: let us call up in imagination the character of the man distinguished for virtue, intellect and mental energy, full of zeal for knowledge of nature, of the laws of conduct and of thought: can we imagine any greater pleasure than such a person derives from the study and contemplation of nature as seen in the heavens, in the facts of biology or physics? He is led on from these to the realization of the truth of the Delphic maxim, "Know thyself," and to imitation of the gods who are the upholders of the order of the universe. What peace and joy, what independence of mind and feeling, are the result! He understands what virtue is and how to live virtuously and happily; his trained mind is incapable of yielding to false appearances. If he should engage in public life, his knowledge and justice benefit the community; he enjoys the blessings of friendship. What life can be happier? Is not such virtue identical with happiness? §§ 68–72.

If Epicurus, who places all pleasure in sensation, can claim that the wise man under the most cruel torments will smile at them with contempt, what is to be said of the really wise man who is armed against bodily pain by the virtues of firmness and fortitude, and has not to depend in his pain merely upon the memory of past pleasures? If Epicurus can take up this position why may not the Peripatetics? For even granting their doctrine of the existence of other goods than virtue, provided these others are allowed to be inferior to virtue, the virtuous man should be supremely happy. Is pain to affright a philosopher, who, as we have seen, is superior to the fear of death and other disturbing feelings? Even youths in Sparta treat it with contempt; Indian sages are superior to heat and cold; widows in India are not afraid to be burned along with a dead husband; the superstitious Egyptian would endure any torture rather than injure one of his sacred animals; even brutes despise cold and hunger and will die for their young; ambition and love lead men to endure anything, §§ 73–79.

The fact is that happiness and virtue are inseparable, and even pain and torture cannot effect their divorce: the virtuous man has nothing to regret, his every action is noble and right, he is proof against the surprises of fortune, he is stable and independent. Nothing can confer greater happiness than this. The Stoics define the final good

as a life in harmony with nature; such a life is the duty of the wise man and is possible for him, and therefore happiness is within his reach. Nothing more can be said about happiness than this, §§ 80–82 *init.*

Cicero's opponent grants the validity of the argument so far; but he would like Cicero to develope a statement made during his argument (in § 75) that even the Peripatetics should admit that the wise man was supremely happy; he is not sure that this would be consistent with their main position, § 82.

The proposition true from the standpoint of all philosophers, §§ 83–118.

Cicero promises, availing himself of the liberty accorded him as a member of the New Academy, leaving the Stoic view aside (which, as has been sufficiently demonstrated, supports his conclusion), to prove the consistency of his thesis with the doctrine of the good held by rival schools, §§ 83, 84 *init.*

The philosophic schools may be divided into two classes, according as they regard the chief good as (*a*) simple, or (*b*) composite: (*a*) to the first class belong the Stoics (whose chief good is virtue), the Epicureans (pleasure), the school of Hieronymus (absence of pain), the school of Carneades (enjoyment of *naturae prima bona*); (*b*) to the second class belong the Peripatetics and Old Academy (who divide the good into *bona animi*, *bona corporis* and *bona externa*); the followers of Dinomachus and Callipho (pleasure and virtue); the followers of Diodorus (virtue and absence of pain). The schools of Aristo, Pyrrho and Erillus are out of date, §§ 84, 85.

These are now taken one by one: (α) The Peripatetics, who assert that the *animi bona* are immeasurably superior to the other two, can assent to the view expounded by Cicero, by regarding the absence of the *bona corporis* and *bona externa* as negligible or by understanding "happy" to mean "happy *multo maiore ex parte*." (β) The followers of Callipho and Diodorus can speak of virtue as producing happiness because they admit virtue to be immeasurably preferable to pleasure and absence of pain. (γ) The Epicureans and the followers of Hieronymus and Carneades will be harder put to it, yet even they will admit that the mind being judge for itself of what is good and bad can rise superior to mere appearances, §§ 85–88.

If the truth of our position can be proved even from the premisses of Epicurus it must be admitted to be consistent with the premisses of all the others. Now Epicurus proclaims his indifference to death (for as it means annihilation it need not concern us) and to pain (which can be relieved either by recollections of past pleasure or by the thought that severe pain cannot last, while pain which lasts cannot be severe). No philosopher takes up a nobler position in regard to these two sources

of unhappiness. What about poverty? Epicurus is an adherent of the simple life; and indeed a man who keeps far from him the passions which money is required to gratify has no need of money. Anacharsis the Scythian might be an example to Greek and Roman philosophers in this respect; and all might imitate with advantage the contempt for wealth that was displayed by Socrates, Xenocrates and Diogenes, §§88–92.

Epicurus' division of the desires into (*a*) those natural and necessary, (*b*) those natural and unnecessary, (*c*) those neither natural nor necessary, while not very scientific, is useful: for (*a*) the first class are satisfied with next to nothing, (*b*) the second class are more or less a matter of indifference, and (*c*) the third class should not be satisfied at all. On these points the Epicureans point out that ex. gr. the passion of love, which falls under the second class, can be gratified easily and easily done without; and Epicurus' doctrine of the wisdom of enduring pain in the hope of securing greater future pleasure, and of the function of the mind in deciding what pleasure is, makes it possible for the wise man to be perpetually happy, at any rate with the help of recollection and anticipation, §§ 93–96.

This has its bearing upon the gratification of appetite; hunger and thirst make anything sweet; exercise produces a healthy appetite, the gratification of which gives pleasure even though the food be coarse, as we see in the case of the Spartans and Persians; simple fare and abstinence ensure health, and consequently pleasure; on the other hand rich food and gluttony produce discomfort and disease, as the anecdotes told of Timotheus and Plato show. A Sardanapallus was little better than a brute, §§ 97–101. Nor is wealth required for the satisfaction of the artistic tastes, which are gratified not by possession of works of art but by contemplation of them, § 102.

Again obscurity or unpopularity need not cause unhappiness. Men like Demosthenes or Democritus should be above the judgment of the vulgar, as even a flute blower is in the practice of his profession. A community often hates or neglects its most eminent citizen, as the people of Ephesus and of Athens did in the cases of Hermodorus and Aristides: a life of ease and contemplation is better than a public career after all, §§ 103–105.

Many men fear exile, unreasonably; but its usual cause, unpopularity, and its frequent concomitant, poverty, have been already shown to be of no consequence, and merely to be absent from one's country is not a misfortune; many go abroad for gain, many philosophers to acquire knowledge—if one is exiled for crime that is a different matter. A philosopher is equally at home in every place where he is well off. Of this history furnishes many examples, §§ 106–109.

The best antidote to annoyance is a mind pleasantly occupied, as Epicurus teaches. Such a mind is unaffected even by the awful calamity of blindness, which might seem to deprive us of the noblest sense. A philosopher can meditate in the dark, witness the examples of Diodotus and Democritus: Homer was blind and yet how lifelike are his descriptions; if Polyphemus bewails his blindness to the ram, it is because the one was no more a philosopher than the other, §§ 113–115.

Deafness, again, which is reckoned a misfortune, is what we all suffer from (in a sense) without pain; for everyone is deaf in respect of a language he does not understand; and if a deaf man misses music, he misses along with it many unpleasant sounds, and he can always converse with himself, § 116.

If, finally, a man is overwhelmed with all these at once, the remedy is in his own hands—he need not continue to live; like a guest at a banquet unable to partake of the good cheer he had better depart at once. Epicurus and Hieronymus both sanction this remedy, §§ 117, 118.

Epilogue. If Epicurus, to whom virtue is an empty name, can say what he does of the happiness of the philosopher, why should not the followers of Socrates and Plato who lay so much stress upon virtue in comparison with everything else say at least as much? After all, the difference between the Stoics and the Peripatetics is a mere matter of terminology.

The five days' discussion being now over, Cicero promises to write an account of them in five books which he will dedicate to Brutus in the hope that they may confer upon others the same comfort that the discussion has brought to himself, §§ 119–121.

THE SOURCES OF BOOKS III—V.

BOOK III.

The most divergent views have been propounded as to Cicero's sources for this book. Posidonius, Chrysippus, Crantor, Antiochus, Philo have each been named as Cicero's principal authorities, though the possibility of his having used such subsidiary sources as Panaetius, Plato and Dicaearchus is admitted even by those who hold to the doctrine of one main and principal authority.

It is hardly necessary to criticize each of these views in detail: it will be sufficient to give the main grounds upon which the claims of each authority have been urged, and develope any necessary criticism of them in the analysis which follows.