

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-49250-9 - Aristotle De Anima
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Excerpt
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ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ Α.

1 Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίῳ τὴν εἶδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλ- 402a
 λον δ' ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε
 καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι' ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυ-
 χῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
 πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἢ γνώσις αὐτῆς μεγάλη συμβάλ- 5
 λεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ
 τῶν ζώων. ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γινῶναι τὴν τε φύ-
 σιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶθ' ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτὴν·
 ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι'
 2 ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζώοις ὑπάρχειν. πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἔστι τῶν 10
 χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς. καὶ γὰρ ὄν-
 τος κοινῶς τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ
 τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, τάχ' ἂν τῷ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι
 μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γινῶναι τὴν οὐ-
 σίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, 15
 ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι μία
 τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον
 γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἑκα-
 στον τὴν ὁ τρόπον. εἰ δὲ φανερόν ἦ, πότερον ἀπόδειξις τίς
 ἔστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καὶ τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλάς 20

Codices E S T U V W X y: libro secundo P, libro tertio L.

1. μᾶλλον...3. εἶναι Alexander Philopono teste spuria notabat || 2. τε om. E Torst., leg-
 runt Philop. Soph. || 3. ταῦτα om. E Torst., leg. Philop. Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 1, 18 ||
 περὶ om. S T U W X Bek. Trend., add. Soph. Torst. || τῆς om. V y Soph. || 9. κοινὰ pro
 δι' ἐκείνην y, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ καὶ τοῖς ζώοις δι' ἐκείνην U, receptum textum tumentur Them.
 Soph. || 10. δὲ καὶ πάντως S T U V W y, πάντῃ δὲ πάντως etiam Philop. || 12. καὶ om.
 E X Bek. Trend. Biehl Rodier || 13. τὸ] τοῦ S V W X Philop. Bek. Trend., τὰ T U ||
 15. ἀπόδειξιν S U W X Bek., ἢ ἀπόδειξις T, ἀπόδειξις etiam Soph. || 17. καὶ κοινὴ τις
 U W X y || τὸ] τοῦ S T U W X || 19. post τρόπος virgulam Bek. || ὅταν S U W, εἰ V,

DE ANIMA. Book I.

Cognition is in our eyes a thing of beauty and worth, and this **1**
 is true of one cognition more than another, either because it is
 exact or because it relates to more important and remarkable
 objects. On both these grounds we may with good reason claim
 a high place for the enquiry concerning the soul. It would seem,
 too, that an acquaintance with the subject contributes greatly to
 the whole domain of truth and, more particularly, to the study of
 nature, the soul being virtually the principle of all animal life.

The sub-
 ject of
 enquiry. Our aim is to discover and ascertain the nature and
 essence of soul and, in the next place, all the accidents
 belonging to it; of which some are thought to be
 attributes peculiar to the soul itself, while others, it is held, belong
 to the animal also, but owe their existence to the soul. But every- **2**
 where and in every way it is extremely difficult to arrive at any
 trustworthy conclusion on the subject. It is the same here as in
 many other enquiries. What we have to investigate is the essential
 nature of things and the What. It might therefore be thought
 that there is a single procedure applicable to all the objects
 whose essential nature we wish to discover, as demonstration is
 applicable to the properties which go along with them: in that case
 we should have to enquire what this procedure is. If, however,
 there is no single procedure common to all sciences for defining
 the What, our task becomes still more difficult, as it will then be
 necessary to settle in each particular case the method to be
 pursued. Further, even if it be evident that it consists in demon-
 stration of some sort or division or some other procedure, there

ἐὰν etiam Simpl. p. 10, 4 || *τις* post *ἀπόδειξις* om. pr. E T U W X, etiam Philop. Biehl (in alt. ed.) || 20. post *μέθοδος* punctum Bek. || *ἔτι δὲ πολλὰς* T U V W Bek., *δὲ* om. etiam Soph.

ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν· ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων.

3 πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστὶ, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποῖον ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καὶ τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν 25 δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· διαφέρει γὰρ οὗ τι 4 σμικρόν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον 4021 ὁμοειδῆς ἅπασα ψυχὴ ἢ οὐ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδῆς, πότερον εἶδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζη- 5 τοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης εἰκόασιν ἐπι- 5 σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λαυθάνῃ πότερον εἰς ὁ λό- 5 γος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ, καθάπερ ζώου, ἢ καθ' ἐκάστην ἕτερος, οἶον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῶον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐ- 6 θέν ἐστὶν ἢ ὕστερον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο κατη- 6 γοροῖτο· ἔτι δ' εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ 7 ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια. χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ 10 τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἶον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως 7 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἂν 15 τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἶον 15 8 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ. εἶοικε δ' οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστὶ γινῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον ἢ τί γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπί- 15 πεδον πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἰ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι 20 ἴσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέ- 15 γα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστὶν· ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἔχω-

26. μᾶλλον] μόνον E (Trend.), μᾶλλον tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. || τι om S V W X y, legit Soph. || 402 b, 2. ὁμοειδῆς utrobique T U V W X, ὁμοειδῆς tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. || 4. μόνον y Torst., μόνης corr. E et reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. 36, 7 Soph. || 6. ἐκάστην pr. E Torst., etiam Soph., ἕτερον V y, ἕκαστον reliqui ante Torstrikiom omnes, etiam, ut videtur, Simpl. 13, 4 et Philop. in prooemio ad lib. II. 205, 20 || 7. δέ] γὰρ V, Alex. ἀπ. καὶ λύσ. (ed. Bruns) p. 21, 15. 22, 2. 24, 4, etiam Soph. || 8. κατηγορηται E, sed η in rasura (Trend.), κατηγορεῖται Torst., κατηγοροῖτο reliqui, etiam Simpl. Alex. 23, 19 || 11. τοῦτο V || ἀλλήλων ἕτερα X || 12. δεῖ U W X || 15. πρότερον T U V W X Philop. Soph. Bek. Trend. || 16. νοῦ EVX, in textum recepit Biehl (cf. 429 a, 17), νοητοῦ S, νοητικοῦ reliqui et scripti et impressi, etiam Philop., pro αἰσθητικοῦ et νοητικοῦ legi vult αἰσθάνεσθαι et νοεῖν Belger, Hermes, 1878, p. 302, at αἰσθητικοῦ etiam Philop. || 19. καὶ τί τὸ κ. S U W y, καὶ τί κ. T X || 22. εἰδέσαι S T U W X y, εἰδήσειν V.

is still room for much perplexity and error, when we ask from what premisses our enquiry should start, for there are different premisses for different sciences; for the science of numbers, for example, and plane geometry.

The first thing necessary is no doubt to determine under which 3
 of the *summa genera* soul comes and what it is; I mean,
The problems. whether it is a particular thing, i.e. substance, or is
 quality or is quantity, or falls under any other of the categories
 already determined. We must further ask whether it is amongst
 things potentially existent or is rather a sort of actuality, the
 distinction being all-important. Again, we must consider whether 4
 it is divisible or indivisible; whether, again, all and every soul is
 homogeneous or not; and, if not, whether the difference between
 the various souls is a difference of species or a difference of genus:
 for at present discussions and investigations about soul would
 appear to be restricted to the human soul. We must take care not 5
 to overlook the question whether there is a single definition of soul
 answering to a single definition of animal; or whether
Is there a single definition? there is a different definition for each separate soul, as for
 horse and dog, man and god: animal, as the universal,
 being regarded either as non-existent or, if existent, as logically
 posterior. This is a question which might equally be raised in
 regard to any other common predicate. Further, on the assump- 6
 tion that there are not several souls, but merely several different
 parts in the same soul, it is a question whether we should
Questions of procedure. begin by investigating soul as a whole or its several
 parts. And here again it is difficult to determine which
 of these parts are really distinct from one another and whether the
 several parts, or their functions, should be investigated first. Thus,
 e.g. should the process of thinking come first or the mind that
 thinks, the process of sensation or the sensitive faculty? And so
 everywhere else. But, if the functions should come first, again 7
 will arise the question whether we should first investigate the
 correlative objects. Shall we take, e.g., the sensible object before
 the faculty of sense and the intelligible object before the intellect?

It would seem that not only is the knowledge of a thing's 8
 essential nature useful for discovering the causes of its
A test of a good definition. attributes, as, e.g., in mathematics the knowledge of what
 is meant by the terms straight or curved, line or surface,
 aids us in discovering to how many right angles the angles of a
 triangle are equal: but also, conversely, a knowledge of the
 attributes is a considerable aid to the knowledge of what a thing is.

μεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκό-
 των, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας
 ἔξομέν τι λέγειν κάλλιστα· πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ 25
 τί ἐστίν, ὥστε καθ' ὅσους τῶν ὀρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμ-
 βεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐ- 403a
 μαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες.

9 ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάν-
 τα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστὶ τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐ-
 τῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ράδιον δέ. φαίνε- 5
 ται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθέν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ
 ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι.
 μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία
 τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ
 10 σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ 10
 παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μη-
 θέν ἐστίν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ
 εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἄπτεσθαι τῆς χαλ-
 κῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἄψεται οὕτω χωρι-
 σθὲν τὸ εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ αἰετὰ μετὰ σώματός τι- 15
 νός ἐστίν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι με-
 τὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι
 χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πά-
 σχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐν-
 αργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φο- 20
 βεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν
 ὀργᾶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχη ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι
 δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν· μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνον-
 τος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ' οὕτως
 ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ εἰσι. ὥστε οἱ ὄροι 25

25. τι λέγειν T U V, τι insert. E₂ Simpl. Soph. || ὅτι κάλλιστα T V X y, τι κάλλιον W, κάλλιστα etiam Simpl. Philop. || γὰρ tuentur praeter omnes codd. Philop. Alex. apud Philop. Simpl. || 403 a, 6. δὲ om. E || τῶν μὲν E X y Philop. Soph. Torst., μὲν om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes || ἄνευ τοῦ σώμ. E Philop. Soph. Torst., τοῦ om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes || 8. ἴδιω S W X y, Simpl. Philop. Trend. ed. pr., ἴδιον etiam E, sed on in ras., ω superscr. (Bhl.), ἴδιον etiam Them. Soph. || 9. ἄνευ τοῦ σώμ. W y et, ut videtur, Philop. 46, 5, τοῦ om. etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 13. ἢ εὐθεί W et E₂, ἢ εὐθύ E₁ (Stapf.) || 14. οὕτω solus E et Bonitz (Hermes VII, 417), reliqui ante Biehlium omnes τούτου, etiam Philop. Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 7, 28 || 18. καὶ τὸ μισεῖν S W X || γὰρ et 19. τι om. E, leg. Soph. || ἅμα... 19. σῶμα unc. incl. Torst., tuentur haec verba praeter codd. Simpl. Philop.,

For when we are able to give an account of all, or at any rate most, of the attributes as they are presented to us, then we shall be in a position to define most exactly the essential nature of the thing. In fact, the starting point of every demonstration is a definition of what something is. Hence the definitions which lead to no information about attributes and do not facilitate even conjecture respecting them have clearly been framed for dialectic and are void of content, one and all.

A further difficulty arises as to whether all attributes of the **9** soul are also shared by that which contains the soul or whether any of them are peculiar to the soul itself: a question which it is indispensable, and yet by no means easy, to decide. It would appear that in most cases soul neither acts nor is acted upon apart from the body: as, e.g., in anger, confidence, desire and sensation in general. Thought, if anything, would seem to be peculiar to the soul. Yet, if thought is a sort of imagination, or not independent of imagination, it will follow that even thought cannot be independent of the body. If, then, there be any of the **10** functions or affections of the soul peculiar to it, it will be possible for the soul to be separated from the body: if, on the other hand, there is nothing of the sort peculiar to it, the soul will not be capable of separate existence. As with the straight line, so with it. The line, *quâ* straight, has many properties; for instance, it touches the brazen sphere at a point; but it by no means follows that it will so touch it if separated. In fact it is inseparable, since it is always conjoined with body of some sort. So, too, the attributes of the soul appear to be all conjoined with body: such attributes, viz., as anger, mildness, fear, pity, courage; also joy, love and hate; all of which are attended by some particular affection of the body. This indeed is shown by the fact that sometimes violent and palpable incentives occur without producing in us exasperation or fear, while at other times we are moved by slight and scarcely perceptible causes, when the blood is up and the bodily condition that of anger. Still more is this evident from the fact that sometimes even without the occurrence of anything terrible men exhibit all the symptoms of terror. If this be so, the attributes are evidently forms or notions realised in matter.

e.g. 50, 22, Soph. || 19. σημείον E Torst., μὴνύει reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Them. Soph. || μὲν ὑπὸ ἰσχ. T U V W X Soph. || 21. δ'] δὲ καὶ U V W y, om. καὶ etiam Them. Soph. || ἐὰν S T V W X Soph., ὅταν etiam Simpl. || 23. μᾶλλον τοῦτο S T V W X y, τούτου μᾶλλον coni. Torst., τούτω coni. Christ || 25. ὅτι καὶ τὰ U V y || ἐν ἕλλη E T, ξυλλοι etiam Them. Philop. Soph.

τοιούτοι οἶον τὸ ὀργίξασθαι κίνησιν τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ
 11 μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη
 φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.
 διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὀρίσαιντο φυσικός τε καὶ διαλεκτικός
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἶον ὀργῆ τί ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀρεξίω ἀντιλυ- 30
 πήσεως ἢ τι τοιούτων, ὁ δὲ ζέσειν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος
 ἢ θερμοῦ. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ 403b
 εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος εἶδος τοῦ πράγματος,
 ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλη τοιαδί, εἰ ἔσται· ὡσπερ οἰκίας
 ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιούτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ'
 ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ 5
 πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ' ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος ἕνεκα των-
 δί. τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικός τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ
 λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον; ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ
 ἀμφοῖν. ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἐκάτερος; ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ
 τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ μηδ' ἢ χωριστά, ἀλλ' 10
 ὁ φυσικός περὶ ἅπανθ' ὅσα τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοι-
 αύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἢ τοιαῦτα, ἄλ-
 λος, καὶ περὶ τινῶν μὲν τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχη, οἶον τέκτων ἢ
 ἰατρός, τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μὲν, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου σώμα- 15
 τος πάθη καὶ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ μαθηματικός, ἢ δὲ κεχωρι-
 σμένα, ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος.
 ἐλέγομεν δ' ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς
 ὕλης τῶν ζώων, ἢ δὴ τοιαῦθ' ὑπάρχει, θυμὸς καὶ φόβος,
 καὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον.

26. κίνησιν E κινήσεις etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. Cf. ad 402 a, 15 || τις om. E S Soph.,
 τις leg. etiam Simpl. Philop. || 27. ἡδη] δὴ S T V W y, om. X || 29. ὀρίσαιο φ. V, ὀρίσαιο
 ὁ φ. S T U W X y Soph. || καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικός W y, ὁ om. etiam Soph. || 31. τοιούτο S T U V W,
 τοιούτων etiam Soph. || verba αἵματος καὶ (vel ἢ) removenda esse censet Steinhart, Symb.
 Crit. 1843 || 403 b, 1. ἢ] καὶ E Bek. Torst., ἢ etiam Philop. Soph. Trend. || 2. εἶδος τοῦ]
 εἶδος mihi suspectum, ὅδε τοῦ W et, ut videtur, Soph. 8, 35, fortasse recte, ὁ δὲ τοῦ
 E S T V y Simpl. Philop. Plutarchus ap. Simpl. 21, 35 || 3. εἶναι τοιούτων V, τοῦτον
 εἶναι W || ἐπὶ οἰκίας W y || 4. ὅτι] τις S, τις ὅτι X, ἂν εἴη T W, ἂν εἴη ὅτι U V ||
 5. καυμάτων καὶ ὄμβρων W X, ὄμβρων καὶ πνευμάτων E, textum tuentur etiam Them.
 Philop. Soph. || φησι S V X y || καὶ πλ.] καὶ om. V || 6. ἐν om. W || 9. post ἀμφοῖν
 interrogandi signum Bek., correxit Trend. || δὴ om. U V || 10. post μὴ χωριστὰ
 virgulam Bek. et Trend., sustulit Torst. || 11. πάνθ' T, ἅπανθ' etiam E, sed a
 eras. (Stapf.) || τοῦ om. S U W || τοιουδὶ] φυσικοῦ T || 12. ὅσα E Philop. Torst., reliqui
 ante Torst. omnes ὅποσα || ἦν E, sed ν expunct. (Stapf.), ἦ Simpl. Bon. (Metaph. p. 284)
 Torst., omisisse videtur Philop. in interpr. 62, 16, reliqui ante Torst. omnes ἦ || 13. τινος
 T, τινα U W y, τινῶν etiam Simpl. Philop. Soph. || 15. ὁ om. E, leg. etiam Soph. ||

Hence they must be defined accordingly: anger, for instance, as a certain movement in a body of a given kind, or some part or faculty of it, produced by such and such a cause and for such and such an end. These facts at once bring the investigation of soul, **II**

Digres- whether in its entirety or in the particular aspect
sion. described, within the province of the natural philosopher.

But every such attribute would be differently defined by the physicist and the dialectician or philosopher. Anger, for instance, would be defined by the dialectician as desire for retaliation or the like, by the physicist as a ferment of the blood or heat which is about the heart: the one of them gives the matter, the other the form or notion. For the notion is the form of the thing, but this notion, if it is to be, must be realised in matter of a particular kind; just as in the case of a house. The notion or definition of a house would be as follows: a shelter to protect us from harm by wind or rain or scorching heat; while another will describe it as stones, bricks and timber; and again another as the form realised in these materials and subserving given ends. Which then of these is the true physicist? Is it he who confines himself to the matter, while ignoring the form? Or he who treats of the form exclusively? I answer, it is rather he who in his definition takes account of both. What then of each of the other two? Or shall we rather say that there is no one who deals with properties which are not separable nor yet treated as separable, but the physicist deals with all the active properties or passive affections belonging to body of a given sort and the corresponding matter? All attributes not regarded as so belonging he leaves to someone else: who in certain cases is an expert, a carpenter, for instance, or a physician. The attributes which, though inseparable, are not regarded as properties of body of a given sort, but are reached by abstraction, fall within the province of the mathematician: while attributes which are regarded as having separate existence fall to the first philosopher or metaphysician. But to return to the point of digression. We were saying that the **Conclu-** attributes of the soul are as such,—I mean, as anger and
sion. fear, inseparable from the physical matter of the animals to which they belong, and not, like line and surface, separable in thought.

17. οὔτε ὡς χωριστὰ ex solo E Biehl Rodier, quasi 19. καὶ οὐχ huic οὔτε respondeat, sed aut <οὔτε χωριστὰ> οὔτε aut οὐδέ pro οὔτε minus incommodi haberet, χωριστὰ T V X, οὐ χωριστὰ Soph. Torst. Dembowski, Woch. f. class. Phil. 1887, p. 430, reliqui ἀχώριστα, etiam Them. Philop. Simpl. || 18. ἢ δὴ] ἢ γε U Simpl., εἰ γε T, ἢ X, ἢ δὴ etiam Philop. Soph. || τοιαύτη X.

2 Ἐπισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον ἅμα διαπο-
 ροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐπορεῖν δεῖ προελθόντας, τὰς τῶν προτέρων
 δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο,
 ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ κα-
 2 λῶς, τοῦτ' εὐλαβηθῶμεν. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι
 τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ ἔμφυ- 25
 χον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυοῖν μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει
 τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προ-
 γενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς· φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι
 καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινεῖν. οἰηθέντες δὲ
 τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν 30
 3 κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι. ὅθεν Δημόκριτος μὲν
 πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν εἶναι· ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων 404a
 σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέ-
 γει, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν
 ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτίσιν, ὧν τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν
 τῆς ὅλης φύσεως στοιχεῖα λέγει· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος· τού- 5
 των δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχὴν, διὰ τὸ μάλιστα διὰ παντὸς δύ-
 νασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς τοιοῦτους ῥυθμοὺς καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ
 κινούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ
 παρέχον τοῖς ζώοις τὴν κίνησιν. διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὄρον εἶναι
 τὴν ἀναπνοήν· συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα 10
 καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζώοις
 τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὰ ἡρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν
 γίγνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν·
 κωλύειν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἐκ-
 κρίνεσθαι, συναείργοντα τὸ συναγον καὶ πηγνύον· καὶ ζῆν 15
 4 δὲ ἕως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν
 Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν· ἔφασαν
 γὰρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ

20. δὲ πάλιν περὶ S || 21. προδιελθόντας S Philop. Soph., διελθόντας X et pr. T, ante προελθόντας virgulam ponunt Bek. Trend. || 22. συμπαραλαμβάνειν T W X, διαλαμβάνειν V, συμπαραλαμβάνειν etiam Them. Philop. Soph. || 23. καλῶς om. T, post εἰρημένα ponit U || μήτι U V || 24. τοῦτ' ἀληθῆ θῶμεν S || 26. δυεῖν E, δυσι SV W X || μάλιστα ante δυσι W || δοκεῖ διαφέρειν X || 28. φασί] φασὶ μὲν V || ἔνιοι γὰρ W || 29. πρώτων E T, πρώτως etiam Philop. Simpl. Soph. || 30. μηδ' ἐνδ. V y || 31. ψυχὴν οὕτως ὑπ. U y || Δημ. μὲν] καὶ Δημ. V || 404 a, 1. αὐτὴν φησιν T W || 2. τὰ σφαιρ...λέγει et 4. ὧν delenda et 5. ὁμοίως...Λεύκιππος parenth. includenda censet Madvig, adversaria critica I, p. 471, probat Rodier II, p. 45, τὰ σφαιρ...4. ὧν ut antiquam glossam delevit Diels, Fragmente