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THE  
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.

A TRANSLATION

BY

SIR RICHARD CLAVERHOUSE JEBB,  
O.M., Litt.D.,  
late Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge,

EDITED

WITH AN INTRODUCTION  
AND WITH SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

BY

JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, Litt.D.,  
Fellow of St John's College, and Public Orator

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## PREFACE

MORE than thirty years have passed since I had the privilege of revising and editing for the Syndics of the University Press the *Commentary* on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which was left in a nearly finished form by the late Mr Edward Meredith Cope, formerly Senior Fellow and Tutor of Trinity. It was under the advice of two other distinguished Fellows of that College, Mr Munro and Mr Jebb, that Mr Cope's brother did me the honour of inviting me to revise and complete the work, and it has now fallen to my lot to prepare for the press another posthumous work connected with the same subject, the *Translation* of the *Rhetoric* left in manuscript by one of the admirable scholars above mentioned, the late Sir Richard Jebb.

From memoranda found in various parts of the manuscript, it appears that the translation was begun 'about August 20, 1872,' that the first two Books were finished on March 22, and the third on May 26, 1873. Thus, in the period of its preparation, it falls between the date of the translation of the *Characters of Theophrastus* (1870), and that of the publication of *The Attic Orators* (1876). The first two Books of the *Rhetoric* were among the set subjects for the Classical Tripos of 1874 and 1875, and, as an Assistant Tutor of Trinity, Mr Jebb lectured on all three Books during

the academical year 1872–3, and again in 1873–4. The lectures were open to members of other Colleges, and among those who attended them was one of the present Syndics of the Press, who still retains a vivid recollection of the clear and vigorous English in which the text was then rendered. It was with a view to this course of lectures that a considerable number of original and selected notes was written out, followed (in the case of Book I) by a second draft subsequent to the publication of Cope's *Commentary* in 1877. The manuscript contains very few notes on Book III.

The whole of the translation was copied out for the press by an amanuensis; and the editor has had before him the original draft, written out with perfect clearness by the translator himself, as well as the transcript. At an uncertain date, a proof of the first twelve pages was prepared, but this proof remained uncorrected, and, owing probably to the pressure of other duties in an increasingly busy life, the printing was never resumed. The translation has been carefully revised by the editor; a few accidental omissions of single clauses or whole sentences have been supplied, and some other unimportant oversights have been corrected. It may be added that a certain amount of uniformity has been introduced into the various transliterations of Greek names, in which the translator shows, during the progress of his work, an increasing preference for the forms in *k*, such as Perikles and Iphikrates, and similarly in the case of the word 'epideiktic.' A brief analysis, partly founded on the translator's own memoranda, has been prefixed to the translation, besides being printed in slightly varying language in the margin of the successive portions of the text, and, necessarily, in a still briefer form in the head-lines of the pages. References to the sections of each chapter in the Oxford Variorum edition of 1820, and to the pages of Bekker's Berlin edition of 1831, have been placed

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in the margin and at the head of the pages, so that any passage can be easily found, while the translation can readily be used side by side with Mr Cope's *Commentary* (in which the Oxford sections are indicated) as well as with the critical editions of Bekker, Spengel, and Roemer.

As the commentaries of Spengel and of Cope are accessible to scholars and to students, it has not been deemed necessary to indulge in any large amount of explanatory annotation. Almost all, however, of the translator's few notes on Book III are here printed, with a selection from those on Books I and II. These notes are distinguished by the initials of the translator. For all the rest the editor is responsible. In the latter, the sources of Aristotle's numerous quotations are indicated, and the literary or historical allusions briefly explained; any variations in the text, so far as they affect the translation, are noticed; and, in some few cases, alternative renderings or alternative opinions as to the author's meaning have been added. The editor has also supplied an Introduction on the general subject of the treatise, in which the translator's own references to that subject, in the course of his *Attic Orators*, have been specially kept in view. The Introduction is followed by an Analysis of each of the successive chapters, while reference to the contents of the work is further facilitated by the Index.

J. E. SANDYS.

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*The Treatise on Rhetoric is a magazine of intellectual riches... Nothing is left untouched, on which Rhetoric, in all its branches, has any bearing. The author's principles are the result of extensive original induction. He sought them, if ever man did seek them, in the living pattern of the human heart. All the recesses and windings of that hidden region he has explored: all its caprices and affections, —whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuse, to gratify, or to offend it, —have been carefully examined. The reason of these phænomena is demonstrated, the method of creating them is explained.... The whole is a text-book of human feeling; a storehouse of taste; an exemplar of condensed and accurate, but uniformly clear and candid reasoning.*

EDWARD COPLESTON'S *Reply* (Oxford, 1810), p. 26 f.



## INTRODUCTION

**Greek eloquence in prehistoric times.** EVEN in the heroic age, long before the rise of any theory of rhetoric, the practice of oratory is brilliantly exemplified in the Homeric poems. The eloquent speaker is there regarded as a divine being<sup>1</sup>; the elders of Troy are able orators<sup>2</sup>, while, on the side of the Greeks, the speech of the aged Nestor 'flows sweeter than honey,'<sup>3</sup> and words 'fall like flakes of snow' from the lips of Odysseus<sup>4</sup>. By the side of beauty of physical form, and soundness of intellectual sense, the Homeric triad of human excellences includes the god-given power of discourse. The oratory of that age is represented as an extraordinarily brilliant type of natural eloquence, an eloquence approaching the modern ideal simply because its great examples are to be found in the region of debate, while the greatest of all (as the answer of Achilles to the envoys in the First Book of the *Iliad*,) take the form of reply. But the distinction of being a 'speaker of words,' as well as a 'doer of deeds,'<sup>5</sup> was reserved for the kings and the nobles; the voice of the people found utterance only in the terse animadversions of the Homeric *tis*, the unnamed and hardly recognised representative of the multitude; and the first condition of civil eloquence, the right of the commoner to speak his mind on affairs of State, was still wanting<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *Od.* viii 173.

<sup>2</sup> *Il.* iii 150.

<sup>3</sup> *Il.* i 249.

<sup>4</sup> *Il.* iii 222.

<sup>5</sup> *Il.* ix 433.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Jebb's *Attic Orators*, I cviii-cxi; and *Essays and Addresses*, 130-133.

In historic times, men of political power, such as Solon, Peisistratos and Kleisthenes, have the credit of being able speakers, for the times in which they lived<sup>1</sup>; but it was not until the expulsion of the tyrants and the establishment of democracy in 510 B.C., that civil eloquence could really flourish in Athens<sup>2</sup>. Between this date and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the two foremost Athenian orators were Themistokles<sup>3</sup> and Perikles<sup>4</sup>, but the fame of their eloquence rests on tradition alone. In the case of Perikles, although the historian supplies us with the purport of three of his speeches, a few striking metaphors, such as those preserved in the *Rhetoric*<sup>5</sup> of Aristotle, where Ægina is called the 'eye-sore of the Peiræus,' and where the State that has lost its young heroes in war is compared with 'the year that is reft of its season of Spring,' are almost all that has descended to posterity. His eloquence, like that of his political precursors, was apparently of a purely practical type, uninfluenced by the theoretical treatment of the art which was soon to reach Athens from another quarter<sup>6</sup>.

While the home of eloquence was Athens, the native land of rhetoric was Sicily. It was there that, 'after the fall of the tyrants,' that is, after the expulsion of Thrasydaïos by the Agrigentines (in 472) and of Thrasybulos by the Syracusans (in 466), the establishment of a democracy and the requirements of a new order of things, with its claims for the restitution of confiscated goods, and its suits for succession to property, aroused a distinct demand for professional instruction in the art of speech. Among the clever and disputatious Sicilians this demand was supplied by one Korax, who is said to have reduced the practice of speaking to a formal shape by drawing up a rhetorical treatise, which was the first of its kind. Before the time of Korax and his pupil Tisias, though many

**Eloquence of early Greek statesmen.**

**Origin of Greek rhetoric.**

**Korax and Tisias.**

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Brutus*, 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Brutus*, 45.

<sup>3</sup> Thuc. i 138; Cic. *Brutus*, 28.

<sup>4</sup> Thuc. i 139 § 4; *Brutus*, 44.

<sup>5</sup> III x 7.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. Introduction to Cicero's *Orator*, pp. ii-iv, ed. Sandys.

*Korax and Tisias*

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speakers had expressed themselves with care and precision, and had even written their speeches, no one had composed by rule of art.

Such is the story of the origin of Greek rhetoric, as given by Cicero<sup>1</sup>, on the authority of Aristotle. The story was doubtless derived from the work in which Aristotle collected all the treatises on rhetoric which preceded his own<sup>2</sup>. The loss of this work has been only in part made good in modern times by the *Artium Scriptores* of Spengel (1828), in which the scattered fragments of the earlier rhetorical treatises are collected and discussed. Korax is said to have divided all speeches into five parts, proem, narrative, arguments (*ἀγῶνες*), subsidiary remarks (*παρέκβασις*), and peroration<sup>3</sup>. In indicating the sources from which arguments might be derived, he confined himself to the illustration of a single topic, the argument from probability. The stock example of this is the case of assault, when a strong man is charged with attacking a weak man, in the absence of witnesses. The use of such an argument, as shown by Aristotle, might easily degenerate into the merest quibbling<sup>4</sup>. This topic is quoted by Aristotle from the 'art' of Korax, to whose pupil, Tisias, it is ascribed by Plato<sup>5</sup>. It was doubtless the common property of both.

To the school of Korax and his pupil is due the early definition of rhetoric as the 'artificer of persuasion,'<sup>6</sup> 'a definition which is at once immoral and inadequate; immoral, because it makes persuasion at any price the object of rhetoric; inadequate, because it is equally applicable to other things,—for example, to bribery.'<sup>7</sup> In the familiar story of the lawsuit between Korax and his pupil for the recovery of his fee, the pupil begins with the inquiry: 'Korax, what did you undertake to teach me?' 'To persuade anyone you please.' 'If so, I now persuade you to receive no fee; if not, you have failed to teach me to persuade you: in either case, I owe you

<sup>1</sup> *Brutus*, 46.

<sup>2</sup> συναγωγή τεχνῶν.

<sup>3</sup> Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* iv 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Rhet.* II xxiv 11; Jebb's *Attic Orators*, I cxxi.

<sup>5</sup> *Phaedrus*, 273 A B.

<sup>6</sup> πειθοῦς δημιουργός, Proleg. in Hermogenem, p. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Introduction to Cicero's *Orator*, p. v.

nothing.’ Korax retorts with a similar dilemma: ‘If you persuade me, I have taught you the art; if not, you have failed to persuade me to remit the fee: in either case, you are bound to pay.’ Whereupon the court dismisses the case with the contemptuous proverb: *κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ῥών*<sup>1</sup>. It is not the subtlety of the new art that is expressed by this story, but rather its ‘grotesque unpopularity.’<sup>2</sup> The technical treatise ascribed to Tisias was probably only an expansion of that of his master, which it appears to have superseded.

The teaching of Korax and Tisias was transmitted to the foremost representative of the Sicilian school, the link between the rhetoric of Sicily and that of Athens, Gorgias of Leontini. ‘The foremost man of his age in rhetorical skill,’ he appeared at Athens for the first time in 427, as the leading envoy of his native city, when ‘the clever Athenians, with their fondness for eloquence, were struck by the foreign air of his style, by the remarkable antitheses, the symmetrical clauses, the parallelisms of structure, the rhyming terminations, and the other similar figures of speech, which were then welcomed because of their novelty.’<sup>3</sup> He returned to report the result of his mission, and he probably revisited Athens not long after. The greater part of his declining years was spent in Thessaly, and it was there that he is said to have counted among his pupils the famous rhetorical teacher, Isokrates. The frequent employment of metaphor gave a poetic colouring to the style of Gorgias<sup>4</sup>, while his use of rare and foreign words imparted a novel and striking character to his speeches. He has been recognised as ‘the founder of artistic prose.’<sup>5</sup>

‘Beauty of speech’<sup>6</sup> was the special aim, and the cultivation of a semi-poetical type of prose the main purpose, of the Sicilian school represented by Gorgias and his pupils. Among these the impetuous Pólos, ‘colt by name and colt by nature,’<sup>7</sup> is familiar to us from the *Gorgias* of

<sup>1</sup> Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* iv 13 f, v 215 f; *Introduct. to Orator*, p. vi.

<sup>2</sup> Jebb’s *Attic Orators*, I cxxiii.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, xii 53; cp. *Attic Orators*, I cxxiii–cxxviii.

<sup>4</sup> *Rhet.* III i 9.

<sup>5</sup> *Attic Orators*, I cxxviii.

<sup>6</sup> *εὐέπεια* (of Pólos), Plato, *Phaedrus*, 267 c.

<sup>7</sup> *Rhet.* II xxiii 29 n.

*Lykymnios. Alkidamas* xiii

Plato, while from an obscure passage of the *Phædrus* it has been inferred that he not only invented a number of technical terms, but also borrowed others from his friend **Lykymnios**. Lykymnios<sup>1</sup>, whose ‘art of rhetoric’ supplies Aristotle with examples of needless nomenclature in the form of new names for the different parts of the speech, such as ‘speeding on,’ which he apparently applied to the straightforward course of uninterrupted narrative, and ‘aberration’ and ‘ramifications,’ to digressions from it<sup>2</sup>.

Another pupil of Gorgias, named Alkidamas, insisted on the importance of acquiring a capacity for extemporaneous speech. Of the two declamations bearing his name, the one that is almost certainly genuine is an attack on the composers of elaborately written discourses most prominently represented by Isokrates<sup>3</sup>. His deliberative orations included a speech in which he pleaded for the freedom of the Messenians, a speech twice quoted in the *Rhetoric*<sup>4</sup>. In an extant fragment of his ‘art of rhetoric’ he partly anticipates Aristotle’s definition by describing this art as the ‘faculty of persuasion.’<sup>5</sup> Aristotle quotes from his pages a considerable number of examples of faults of taste due to his fondness for strange words or poetic compounds, and for the inordinate use of epithets and metaphors. Modern critics of style would certainly be less severe than Aristotle in denouncing his metaphorical description of the *Odyssey* as ‘a fair mirror of human life.’<sup>6</sup>

The use of foreign words and poetic compounds is a fault of taste exemplified by Lykophron<sup>7</sup>, a rhetorician belonging to the middle of the fourth century<sup>8</sup>. Another rhetorician, Polykrates, who flourished about 390, and is best known through his ‘Accusation of Sokrates’ and his ‘Defence of Busiris,’ is only definitely named in the *Rhetoric*

<sup>1</sup> *Phædrus*, 267 c, with Thompson’s note.

<sup>2</sup> III xiii 5.

<sup>3</sup> *περὶ τῶν τοῦς γραπτῶς λόγου γραφόντων*, in Appendix to Antiphon, ed. Blass, 1871.

<sup>4</sup> I xiii 2; II xxiii 1.

<sup>5</sup> *δύναμις τοῦ ἔντος πιθανοῦ*, Proleg. in Hermog. in Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* vii (1), 8.

<sup>6</sup> III iii. See, in general, Vahlen, *Der Rhetor Alkidamas*, Vienna, 1864; Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, II (1892) 364; Brzoska in Pauly-Wissowa.

<sup>7</sup> III iii 1–2.

<sup>8</sup> Blass, *Att. Ber.* II 364.

xiv *Protagoras. Thrasymachos*

as the author of a trivial encomium on mice, and of a laudation of Thrasybulos<sup>1</sup>; but he is also sometimes supposed to be the author of a panegyric on Paris, anonymously quoted in several passages<sup>2</sup>.

In contrast with the 'beauty of speech' cultivated by the Sicilians, 'correctness of speech'<sup>3</sup> was the aim of the Greek school represented by Protagoras, Prodikos, Hippias and Thrasymachos. Thus Protagoras was apparently the first to give special attention to elementary points of grammar and philology, to distinctions of gender in nouns<sup>4</sup>, to the classification of modes of expression, to the criticism of poetry and to speculations on language and etymology<sup>5</sup>. He is also noted for the Commonplaces which he caused his pupils to commit to memory, while his Dialectic is famous for its undertaking to make the weak cause the stronger<sup>6</sup>. Prodikos concerned himself with questions of etymology and with distinctions of synonyms<sup>7</sup>. Hippias included grammar and prosody among his many accomplishments, while he also aimed at a correct and elevated style<sup>8</sup>. In the opinion of Aristotle's pupil, Theophrastos, Thrasymachos of Chalkêdôn opened a new epoch in the prose style of Greece by blending the elaborately artificial style of writers like Thukydidēs with the simple and plain style subsequently represented by Lysias<sup>9</sup>. Aristotle himself, in treating of rhythm in prose, tells us that the rhetoricians, from Thrasy-machos downwards, made use of the *pæan*<sup>10</sup>. His treatise on pathos is the theme of an elaborate allusion in the *Phædrus*<sup>11</sup>, and is definitely mentioned in the *Rhetoric*<sup>12</sup>. Lastly, Theodôros of Byzantium,

<sup>1</sup> II xxiv 3, 6.

<sup>2</sup> II xxiii 5, 8, 12; xxiv 7. See, however, Blass, II 371.

<sup>3</sup> ὀρθοέπεια (of Protagoras), *Phædrus*, 267 C.

<sup>4</sup> *Rhet.* III v 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cope in *Cambridge Journal of Cl. and Sacred Philology*, iii 48–52.

<sup>6</sup> *Rhet.* II xxiv 11.

<sup>7</sup> *ib.* iii 57; Plato, *Prot.* 337 A, 340 A, 358 A D, etc.

<sup>8</sup> Plato, *Hipp.* I, 285 C D; II, 368 D; Cic. *De Or.* III 127.

<sup>9</sup> Dion. Hal. *Dem.* c. 3; cp. Jebb's *Attic Orators*, I cxiii–cxvi; II 423.

<sup>10</sup> III viii 4.

<sup>11</sup> 267 C.

<sup>12</sup> III i 7.

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*Theodōros. Isokrates*

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whom Aristotle couples with Tisias and Thrasymachos as one of the most important contributors to the development of rhetoric<sup>1</sup>, introduced some novel terms for the subdivisions of a speech. Plato satirically describes them as the ‘niceties of his art,’<sup>2</sup> while Aristotle denounces them as absurd and unnecessary<sup>3</sup>.

The ‘art of Kallippos,’ possibly one of the earliest pupils of Kallippos. Isokrates<sup>4</sup>, is described by Aristotle as including Pamphilos. the topic of consequence<sup>5</sup>, and that of possibility, which was also contained in the ‘art’ of another early rhetorician, Pamphilos<sup>6</sup>. Aristotle complains that the earlier writers of ‘arts’ (such as those above-mentioned) had confined themselves to the Forensic branch of rhetoric<sup>7</sup>; and the same complaint had been made, half a century previously, by Isokrates<sup>8</sup>.

The most independent, and the most distinguished, of the pupils of Gorgias was the great rhetorician, Isokrates. Isokrates (436—338). During part of his early career (403—393), he was a professional writer of forensic speeches,—a fact which he affected to ignore at a later date. About 392 he opened a school of rhetoric near the Lyceum. In that school he professed to teach the art of speaking, or writing, on large political subjects, as a preparation for advising or acting in political affairs,—the pursuit, in fact, of journalism, as a preparation for parliament. He describes this art as his ‘philosophy,’ his theory of culture, and he now casts contempt on the forensic rhetoric of his earlier career. The fame of his school extended over the whole of the Hellenic world, and, apart from public men such as Timotheos and Leōdamas, his pupils included the future orators, Isæos, Lykurgos, and Hypereides. His style is marked by a smoothness due to the avoidance of ‘hiatus’; he is recognised by Cicero as the earliest artist in the rhythm proper to prose<sup>9</sup>, and by Dionysios of Halikarnassos as the master of an ample and

<sup>1</sup> *Soph. El.* 183 b 32.

<sup>2</sup> τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης, *Phaedrus*, 266 D.

<sup>3</sup> III xiii 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Antid.* 93.

<sup>5</sup> II xxiii 14.

<sup>6</sup> *ib.* 21.

<sup>7</sup> I i 10.

<sup>8</sup> *In Sophistas*, 19; cp. Jebb’s *Attic Orators*, II 133.

<sup>9</sup> *Brutus*, 32.

xvi *Aristotle's relations to Isokrates,*

luxuriant type of period which 'leads one on' like a winding river<sup>1</sup>. He is the creator of a standard type of literary rhetorical prose<sup>2</sup>.

In considering Aristotle's relations to Isokrates, we have to distinguish between the two periods of Aristotle's residence at Athens, the earlier period of 367 to 347, and the later period of 335 to 322. Isokrates died three years before Aristotle's return to Athens, so that any personal relations between them must belong to the first of the above periods and probably to its latter part. To Aristotle, according to some later authorities, the popularity of the school of Isokrates appeared undeserved, and his indignation at the rhetorician's undue regard for mere beauty of diction, to the neglect of the essentials of the art, led to his determining on setting up a rival school in which rhetoric should be studied in a more philosophical manner. Parodying a line from a tragic poet,—'twere shame to keep silence and suffer *barbarians* to speak,' he is said to have exclaimed,—'twere shame to keep silence and suffer *Isokrates* to speak.'<sup>3</sup> He is also said to have sneered at the bundles of the rhetorician's forensic speeches that were hawked about by the booksellers<sup>4</sup>.

Notwithstanding the 'feud' between Aristotle and Isokrates during Aristotle's first residence at Athens, both were inspired with Macedonian sympathies. Moreover, the artificial style of Isokrates lent itself readily to citations illustrating rhetorical forms of expression. Hence in the *Rhetoric*, which belongs to Aristotle's second period of residence at Athens, there is no author that is more frequently quoted; there are as many as ten citations in a single chapter<sup>5</sup>. But, although Aristotle was at Athens during the delivery of the *First Philippic* (351) and the *Three Olynthiacs* (349), he never illustrates a single rule of rhetoric from any of the

<sup>1</sup> *Dem.* 4.

<sup>2</sup> See, in general, Blass, *Att. Ber.* II esp. 101–213; Jebb's *Attic Orators*, II 36–79; Introd. to Cicero's *Orator*, xvi–xxiii.

<sup>3</sup> ἀσχρὸν σιωπᾶν Ἰσοκράτην δ' ἔαν λέγειν. Cp. Cic. *De Or.* III 141; Quint. iii 1, 14.

<sup>4</sup> Dion. Hal. *De Isocr.* 18.

<sup>5</sup> III ix.



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*Demosthenes, and Plato* xvii

speeches of Demosthenes. To Demosthenes he ascribes an isolated simile, which is not to be found in his published speeches<sup>1</sup>, while he cites the saying of a minor orator, to the effect that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of the disasters of Athens, as an example of fallacious reasoning<sup>2</sup>. He illustrates the metaphorical use of *βοήσσαι* from an obscure contemporary of Demosthenes<sup>3</sup>, though he might have found a better illustration in Demosthenes himself<sup>4</sup>. Aristotle, who lived as a foreigner at Athens, and had close relations with Philip and Alexander, may well have felt a sense of delicacy in exemplifying the precepts of rhetoric from the speeches of the great opponent of Macedonia<sup>5</sup>.

The two dialogues of Plato specially concerned with the criticism of rhetoric are the *Gorgias* and the *Phædrus*. In the former he declares that rhetoric, so far from being an art, is only a happy knack acquired by practice<sup>6</sup>, and Gorgias and his pupil are taken to task as representatives of the current rhetoric of the day. In the *Phædrus* we find a treatise on rhetoric thrown into a dramatic form. Here, as before, the writer ridicules the popular manuals of the art, but, instead of denouncing rhetoric unreservedly, he even draws up an outline of a new rhetoric founded on a more philosophical basis, resting partly on dialectic, which aids the orator in the invention of arguments, and partly on psychology, which enables him to discriminate the several varieties of human character in his audience, and to apply the means best adapted to produce the 'persuasion' which is the aim of his art<sup>7</sup>. The hints thrown out by Plato in the *Phædrus* are elaborately expanded in the first two Books of the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, which deal with the means of producing persuasion. In the first Book these are classified, while the second includes '(1) a careful analysis of the affections of which human nature is susceptible and also of the causes by which such affections are

<sup>1</sup> III iv 3.

<sup>2</sup> II xxiv 8.

<sup>3</sup> III x 7.

<sup>4</sup> xix 92, 129.

<sup>5</sup> *History of Classical Scholarship*, i (1906) 81 f.

<sup>6</sup> 463 B, 501 A.

<sup>7</sup> Thompson's *Phædrus*, p. xiv.

xviii *Theodekteia. Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*

called forth; (2) a descriptive catalogue of the various modifications of the human character and the sort of arguments adapted to each.<sup>1</sup> The first two Books, dealing with the invention of arguments, are followed by a third, which is occupied with style and with the arrangement of the several parts of the speech, the subject of delivery being touched upon in such a way as to show that its adequate treatment is still in the future. While Plato regards rhetoric with contempt, and describes dialectic as the crown or 'coping-stone of all the sciences,'<sup>2</sup> and rhetoric as only 'the shadow of a part of politics,'<sup>3</sup> Aristotle insists, at the very outset of his work, that 'rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic,' and a branch of dialectic and of politics<sup>4</sup>. In his logical works he has discovered the Syllogism, and has invented logic: in the *Rhetoric* he declares that the rhetorical counterpart of the Syllogism is the Enthymeme, that is, 'a syllogism drawn from contingent things in the sphere of human action.'<sup>5</sup>

In the third Book we are told that 'the commencements of periods have been enumerated in the *Theodekteia*.'<sup>6</sup>  
**Theodekteia.** This may be reasonably regarded as a reference to a work on rhetoric written by Aristotle himself in the earlier part of his career, probably while he was still carrying on his rhetorical school. It derives its name from the author's pupil Theodektes<sup>7</sup>.

Among the works once ascribed to Aristotle is the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, the spuriousness of which was divined by Erasmus. It has been assigned by Victorius and by Spengel to the authorship of Anaximenes (c. 380—320)<sup>8</sup>. The latest event mentioned in its pages be-

<sup>1</sup> Thompson, p. xx. The knowledge of human nature displayed in the first 17 chapters of this book finds its parallel in many passages of Shakespeare quoted in Joseph Esmond Riddle's *Illustrations of Aristotle on Men and Manners*, Oxford, 1832.

<sup>2</sup> *Rep.* 534.

<sup>3</sup> *Gorg.* 462.

<sup>4</sup> I i 7; iv 5.

<sup>5</sup> I ii 8 n.

<sup>6</sup> III ix 9 n.

<sup>7</sup> Cope's *Introd.* 55-67.

<sup>8</sup> *Anaximenes ars rhetorica*, ed. Spengel (1847); Cope, *Introd.* 401-464; Blass, *Att. Ber.* II 378-399; Brzoska in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Anaximenes; P. Wendland (Berlin, 1905); and W. Nitsche, *Dem. u. Anaximenes (ib.* 1906). The commentary of Didymos on Demosthenes, first published by Schubart and Diels in 1904, preserves the tradition that the pseudo-Demosthenic speech (*Or.* XI) *πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τῆν Φιλίππου*, was composed by Anaximenes.

*Date of Aristotle's Rhetoric* xix

longs to 340 B.C., but the exact date of its publication is unknown. It is never quoted in the *Rhetoric*, but it has some superficial points of resemblance with that treatise. Its moral purpose, however, is totally distinct. There is no extant work that gives us a clearer view of the sophistical type of rhetoric, which makes success at any price the aim of the art.

There is no definition of rhetoric, but the writer is clearly in sympathy with the sophistical tradition which makes rhetoric the 'art of persuading,' whereas Aristotle defines it as 'the faculty of observing or discovering in every case the possible means of persuasion.'<sup>1</sup>

In the course of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle refers to the *Politics*, and to his *Treatise on Poetry*, as well as to his *Analytics* and his *Topics*<sup>2</sup>. The *Treatise on Poetry* was, to all appearance, mainly written after the first two Books of the *Rhetoric*<sup>3</sup>, but before the third<sup>4</sup>; the reference to the former in Book I<sup>5</sup> may have been added by Aristotle himself at a later date.

Aristotle may possibly have begun the *Rhetoric* before his second residence in Athens. The reference to 'the *Attic* orators' and to the 'orators at Athens' prompts the suspicion that these passages were written while the author was still absent from Athens, but they are also consistent with a sense of aloofness from Athenian politics which was natural in a Macedonian resident at Athens. As a whole, the work is best assigned to the period of his second residence (335—322). In the second Book he mentions an embassy sent by Philip and his allies asking the Thebans for permission to pass through their territory into Attica<sup>6</sup>. This embassy belongs to the year 338,—shortly before the battle of Chæronea<sup>7</sup>. He also mentions the 'Common Peace.'<sup>8</sup> This has been identified with the peace which all the Greeks (with the exception of the Lacedæmonians) made with Alexander after the death of Philip in 336<sup>9</sup>. If 336

<sup>1</sup> I i 14; ii 1, 7.

<sup>2</sup> See *Index*.

<sup>3</sup> *Poet.* c. xix (on δίδουα), ἐν τοῖς περὶ ῥητορικῆς κείσθω.

<sup>4</sup> *Poet.* mentioned in III i 13; ii 2, 5, 7.

<sup>5</sup> I xi 29.

<sup>6</sup> II xxiii 6.

<sup>7</sup> Spengel, *Specimen Comment.*, 1844.

<sup>8</sup> *ib.* 18.

<sup>9</sup> Spengel, *Specimen Comment.*, 1839. His general conclusion in 1851 was that the work might be assigned to c. 330.

was the date of its completion, the author was then 48 years of age, and a new interest is added to his own statement that 'the mind is in its prime *about* the age of 49.'<sup>1</sup>

While Anaximenes was the author of 'the best practical treatise on rhetoric that has come down to us in Greek,' Aristotle stands alone in the philosophic treatment of the subject. Yet 'the school of Aristotle...produced not a single orator of note except Demetrius Phalereus; the school of Isokrates produced a host.' 'Isokrates, though inferior in his grasp of principles, was greatly superior in the practical department of teaching.' 'Aristotle's philosophy of rhetoric proved comparatively barren, not at all because rhetoric is incapable of profiting materially by such treatment, but because such treatment can be made fruitful only by laborious attention to the practical side of the discipline. Had Aristotle's *Rhetoric* been composed a century earlier, it would have been inestimable to oratory. As it was, the right thing was done too late.'<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, it was Aristotle, not Isokrates, who 'fixed the main lines on which rhetoric was treated by most of the later technical writers.'<sup>3</sup>

It was the opinion of Niebuhr that the *Rhetoric* was one of those works of which the 'first sketch' belongs to the early period of the author's life, while it has continued to receive additions and corrections down to its close<sup>4</sup>. Brandis, who was at first inclined to accept this view, afterwards saw nothing to suggest an early period of composition, or a long and desultory elaboration; on the contrary, the regularity and uniformity with which the plan was carried through, indicated a continuous and uninterrupted application; he accordingly regarded it as *ein Werk aus einem Gusse*<sup>5</sup>. Similarly, Sir Alexander Grant has observed that the first part of the work bears marks of having been in the author's mind for many years before it

<sup>1</sup> II xiv 4; cp. *History of Classical Scholarship*, i 81.

<sup>2</sup> *Attic Orators*, II 431.

<sup>3</sup> *Greek Literature* in *Cambridge Companion to Greek Studies*, p. 139.

<sup>4</sup> *Roman Hist.* i note 39 (Cope, *Introd.* 40 f).

<sup>5</sup> *Philologus*, iv 1, 8 f.

*Grant. Spengel. Cope*

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was reduced to writing. 'The outlines of its arrangement are characterised by luminous simplicity, the result of long analytic reflection; the scientific exposition is made in a style which is, for Aristotle, remarkably easy and flowing; and each part of the subject is adorned with a wealth of illustration which indicates the accumulations of a lifetime.'<sup>1</sup>

Turning from these general characterisations to some of the more special criticisms of the condition in which the work has come down to modern times, we note that it has been urged by Roemer<sup>2</sup> that the present text is made up of two editions of the treatise, and that it consists of a combination of a longer and a shorter recension.

The 13th and 14th chapters of the First Book have been attacked by Rudolf Hirzel<sup>3</sup>.

It had previously been pointed out by Spengel<sup>4</sup> and Vahlen<sup>5</sup> that the last nine chapters of the Second Book, on logical proofs, ought really to have preceded the first seventeen, which deal with proofs connected with the feelings and the character; while Professor Cook Wilson<sup>6</sup> has argued against the genuineness of the 25th and 26th chapters of that Book.

The author's original plan may well have been limited to the first two Books<sup>7</sup>, and some confusion of expression may be noticed in the last paragraph of Book II owing to the subsequent addition of a third Book. The genuineness of that Book has been attacked by Sauppe<sup>8</sup> and Rose<sup>9</sup>, and defended by Spengel<sup>10</sup>, by Cope<sup>11</sup>, and by

<sup>1</sup> *Aristotle* (1877), 77 f.

<sup>2</sup> Pref. to Teubner text, ed. 2, 1898.

<sup>3</sup> *Abhandl. d. sächs. Ges.* xx (1900) 11.

<sup>4</sup> Munich Acad. 1851, 32-37.

<sup>5</sup> Vienna Acad., Oct. 1861, 59-148.

<sup>6</sup> *Trans.* Oxford Philol. Soc., 1883-4, pp. 4 f, criticised by Susemihl in Bursan's *Jahresb.* xlii 38 f.

<sup>7</sup> The list of Aristotle's works in Diogenes Laërtius includes *τέχνης ῥητορικῆς ᾧ β̄*, *περὶ λέξεως ᾧ β̄*, the latter apparently referring to the two parts of Book III, also described as *περὶ λέξεως καθαρᾶς ᾧ* (Rose, *Fragm.* p. 14).

<sup>8</sup> 1863; *Ausg. Schr.* 354 f. <sup>9</sup> *Ar. Pseud.* 137 (cp. Zeller, 78, 1; 74, 2 E.T.).

<sup>10</sup> Ed. 1867, ii 354, 'tertius liber, quem nostratium quidam temere et inepte Aristotelis esse negant, si quis alius ingenuus philosophi nostri foetus est.'

<sup>11</sup> *Introd.* 1867, p. 8, 'If the third book of the Art of Rhetoric did not proceed from the pen of Aristotle, all evidence of authorship derived from resemblance of style, manner, method, and diction, must be absolutely worthless.'

Diels<sup>1</sup>, who shows that it fits into its proper place as the immediate precursor of the rhetorical works of Aristotle's pupil, Theophrastos. The numerous *lacunæ* in all three Books alike, as well as the confusion in the arrangement of the contents of the whole work, are explained by Diels. Marx<sup>2</sup> on the supposition that the work was prepared by a pupil of Aristotle from imperfect notes of his master's lectures. Errors in the text, such as Hêgêsippos for Agêsipolis<sup>3</sup>, and γνώμη for μνήμη<sup>4</sup> in a well-known passage of Isokrates, are attributed to the lecturer's indistinctness of utterance<sup>5</sup>; while the last six chapters of the work are regarded as a report of a lecture in which Aristotle attacked a lost treatise on the several parts of the speech, which had been put forth by some unknown pupil of Isokrates.

J. E. S.

<sup>1</sup> Berlin Acad. 1886, iv 1-37.

<sup>2</sup> *Ber. d. sächs. Ges.* 1900, 241-328.

<sup>3</sup> II xxiii.

<sup>4</sup> III vii.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle was τραυλὸς τὴν φωνήν (Diog. Laërt. v i).

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## ANALYSIS

### BOOK I

RHETORIC is an Art. Hitherto, the essence of this Art has been neglected for the accidents, and the Deliberative branch for the Forensic. The master of Dialectic will be the true master of Rhetoric. Rhetoric is useful, because it is (1) corrective, (2) instructive, (3) suggestive, and (4) defensive. It is not concerned with any single or definite class of subjects, but is the counterpart of Dialectic. Its function is not to persuade, but *to discover the available means of persuasion in each case*. It has a fallacious branch, but those who pursue this branch are not, as in Dialectic, called by any distinctive name; they are in either case called 'rhetoricians' (i).

Rhetoric being defined as 'the faculty of discerning in every case the available means of persuasion,' we proceed to the subject of proofs. These are either (I) 'artificial' or (II) 'inartificial.' Artificial proofs are (1) ethical, (2) pathetic, (3) logical. (1) Ethical proof is wrought, when the speech is so spoken as to make the speaker credible; (2) pathetic, when emotion is stirred in the audience by the speech; (3) logical, when a truth, or an apparent truth, has been demonstrated by the means of persuasion available in each case. (The faculty of rhetoric has two elements, corresponding respectively to (1) dialectical skill, and (2) political science.) Logical proof is either (a) deductive, proceeding by means of Enthymeme, i.e. 'rhetorical syllogism,' or (b) inductive, proceeding by means of Example, i.e. 'rhetorical induction.' Rhetoric must address itself to *classes*, not to individuals; its subjects are *contingent*; and its premisses must be *probabilities*. Every premiss of the enthymeme is either a 'probability' or a 'sign.' The 'probable' and the 'sign' (whether fallible or infallible) are thereupon defined; and a distinction drawn between enthymemes proper and not proper to Rhetoric (ii).

There are three species of Rhetoric, deliberative, forensic, and epideiktic, differing in their elements, their times, and their ends (iii).

The topics of Deliberative Rhetoric are five in number:—ways and means, war and peace, defence, commerce, and legislation (iv). The deliberative speaker exhorts, or dissuades, with a view to the happiness of the persons addressed; the elements of happiness are good birth, the possession of goodly and numerous offspring, wealth, good repute, honour, health, happy old age, troops of friends, good fortune, and virtue (v). He appeals to the interest of his audience; interest is a kind of 'good'; we must therefore define and analyse things 'good' (vi). But the question will arise, which of two 'good' things is 'better'; hence we must treat the topic of degree (vii). The greatest aid towards giving good counsel is to be found in discriminating the four forms of government,—democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, and the institutions and interests peculiar to each (viii).

The Epideiktic branch of Rhetoric is concerned with Virtue and Vice in their popular conceptions. ('Praise' expresses moral approbation, while 'encomium' is concerned with actual achievements.) Of all the topics that of amplification is most useful in the Epideiktic branch of Rhetoric; examples to the Deliberative; and enthymemes to the Forensic (ix).

Forensic Rhetoric has for its elements, accusation and defence, and, for its end, justice or injustice. We must therefore begin by analysing injustice, and inquiring into the motives and aims of wrong-doing. Actions are either voluntary (arising from habit, reason, anger, or lust), or involuntary (from chance, nature, or force). All things that men do of themselves are good or apparently good, pleasant or apparently pleasant; the former has been discussed under Deliberative Rhetoric; let us now speak of the latter (x). Then follows a popular definition of pleasure, and an analysis of things 'pleasant' (xi). From the motives of wrong-doing we pass to the characters which dispose men to do wrong, and which expose men to suffer wrong (xii). Wrongs are classified (*a*) in reference to law, either special or universal; or (*b*) according as the wrong is done to the individual or the community. The definition of an offence often raises a legal issue. It is needful, therefore, to define and distinguish the principal offences. In contrast to the written rules of right and wrong are the unwritten. The latter are of two kinds: (1) those that refer to acts that merit public praise or disgrace, public honour or dishonour; (2) those that are supplementary to the written law, and are concerned with things 'equitable' (xiii). The topic of degree is next applied to wrongs, with a view to distinguishing the different degrees of wrong (xiv).



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## Book II

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The Inartificial Proofs proper to Forensic Rhetoric are derived from Laws, Witnesses, Contracts (or other documents), Torture, or Oaths (xv).

### BOOK II

A good impression of *the speaker's character* may be produced by means of his speech. He should make his audience feel that he possesses intelligence, virtue, and good-will. We must therefore analyse (*a*) the virtues, and (*b*) the moral affections. The *virtues* have, in fact, been already analysed in I ix. In regard to each of the *moral affections*, we have to discern (1) its nature; (2) its antecedents; and (3) its objects (i).

Analysis of the *affections*:—anger (ii) and mildness (iii); friendship and enmity (iv); fear and boldness (v); shame and shamelessness (vi); gratitude (or favour) and ingratitude (vii); pity (viii) and indignation (ix); envy (x) and emulation (xi).

In appealing to the affections or feelings, the speaker must take account of the general *character of his audience*; according as they are young or old, rich or poor, etc. Hence we must analyse the character of youth (xii), old age (xiii), and middle age (xiv); also that of good birth (xv), wealth (xvi), power, and good fortune (xvii).

A brief retrospect is here followed by an introduction to the analysis of the '*universal*' *classes of argument* which are applicable to all special premisses derived from special branches of knowledge (xviii).

These classes of argument are (1) the topic of the possible and impossible; (2) the topic of fact past and of fact future; (3) the topic of degree; (4) the topic of amplification and depreciation (xix).

The *proofs common to all branches of rhetoric* are example and enthymeme. There are two kinds of example, involving the use of either historical or artificial parallels, the latter including fables (xx). A maxim, or general statement concerned with objects of action, is an incomplete enthymeme (xxi). Then follow general precepts on the enthymeme. (1) The rhetorical reasoner must not draw his conclusion from points that are too remote; (2) he must leave out those propositions which his audience can readily supply; (3) he must know the special facts from which enthymemes can be derived in each subject. Enthymemes are of two kinds:—demonstrative, and refutative (xxii). Then follows an enumeration of twenty-eight heads of argument from which enthymemes can be constructed; the 'demon-

strative' enthymeme is almost exclusively treated, but the 'refutative' can be inferred from it (xxiii). Next succeed ten topics of apparent, or sham, enthymemes (xxiv). An argument may be refuted, either by opposing enthymeme to enthymeme, or by bringing an objection against a particular point (xxv). The Book ends with supplementary criticisms, apparently meant to correct errors made by previous writers on rhetoric. (1) 'Amplification and depreciation' are not a mere topic of an enthymeme; they form one of the 'common topics' of c. xviii. (2) 'Destructive' enthymemes are not different in *kind* from 'constructive.'

This may suffice for the *inventive* province of rhetoric,—the way to find arguments, and the way to refute them (xxvi).

## BOOK III

We have next to speak of *diction*, or style, and first of the art of delivery, which has not yet been touched, except by Thrasymachos in his work *on Pathos* (i).

*Diction in regard to single words* (or *diction proper*) has for its principal merits, clearness and appropriateness, the latter including the due use of accepted terms, of proper terms, and of metaphors (ii). Faults of style are next classified under four headings, with examples of each:—(1) poetic varieties of compound words, (2) rare or archaic words, (3) inordinate epithets, and (4) unsuitable metaphors (iii). The simile (which is a metaphor with a term of resemblance prefixed) is too poetical to be often available in prose; examples of its use are, however, quoted from Plato and the orators. Similes can readily be converted into metaphors (iv).

*Diction with regard to composition* (properly *σύνθεσις*) has for its primary requisite idiomatic purity, dependent on the proper use of connecting particles, the use of special and not general terms, the avoidance of ambiguity, and the observance of gender, and of number.

In every case a composition should be easy to read, easy to deliver; it should avoid solecisms arising from a neglect of symmetry; it should also avoid long parentheses (v).

*Dignity* of style is aided by the use of (1) the description, instead of the name, (2) suitable metaphors and epithets, (3) the plural instead of the singular number, by (4) the repetition of the article, (5) the use of conjunctions and other connective words, and (6) of description by means of a series of negations (vi).

### Book III

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*Propriety* of style depends on its appealing to the feelings of the hearer, and on its being characteristic of the speaker, and proportionate to the subject (vii).

Prose must have *rhythm*, but not *metre*. The rhythm must not, however, be too precise. The heroic measure is too grand; the iambic, too common; the trochaic, too comic. There remains the pæan, the 'first pæan' (— ∪ ∪ ∪) suiting the beginning, and the 'fourth pæan' (∪ ∪ ∪ —) the end of the sentence (viii).

The style must be either running and unbroken in its chain, or compact and periodic. The period may have one or more members. It must be neither curt nor long. The period of more than one member may be either simply divided, or antithetical. 'Antithesis' implies contrast of sense. When the members are equal, this is 'parisôsis'; when their first or last syllables are alike, 'paromoiôsis,' or, when the terminations alone correspond, 'homoioteleuton' (ix).

Pointed sayings depend on the use of metaphor, antithesis, and actuality, i.e. on 'setting things before the eyes' (x). Those words 'set a thing before the eyes' which describe it in an active state,—a device often employed by Homer. A striking effect is secured by using a metaphor which involves a touch of surprise. The hearer has the pleasure of learning something new; hence also the pleasure given by riddles. Then follow some remarks on similes and on hyperbole (xi).

There is a difference between the literary and the combative style (and, in the latter, between the deliberative and the forensic). It is necessary to know both. The literary style is the most precise; the combative, best fitted for delivery; this fitness depends on the expression of character, or on the expression of emotion. The deliberative style is like drawing in light and shade; it is meant to produce its effect at a distance, and will not bear looking at closely. The forensic admits of greater finish. The epideiktic is best suited for writing; its proper function is to be *read*. The chapter ends with criticisms on various superfluous classifications of style under the headings of 'sweetness' and 'magnificence' (xii).

Style having now been discussed, both generally and particularly, it remains to speak of *arrangement*. There are only two essential parts of a speech:—*statement* and *proof*. The received four-fold division applies strictly to the forensic branch alone; if we are to add any parts to *statement* and *proof*, they can be only *proem* or exordium, and *epilogue* or peroration (xiii).

*Proem*. In an epideiktic speech, the proem need not be closely connected with the sequel. It is like the prelude in music, which

is linked on to the key-note of the main theme. In a forensic speech, the proem is comparable to the prologue of a tragedy or of an epic poem. The contents of a proem come usually under one of two heads, (1) exciting or allaying prejudice, (2) amplification or detraction. In a deliberative speech, a proem is comparatively rare, for the subject is already known and needs no preface (xiv). The various forms of argument for 'exciting or allaying prejudice' are next enumerated (xv). ('Amplification' and 'detraction' have already been treated in II xix.)

*Narrative*, in relation to the three branches of rhetoric. In the epideiktic branch, it should be broken up and diversified. In the forensic, the narrative of the defendant can usually be shorter than that of the plaintiff. In joining issue with the plaintiff, the defendant ought not to waste time over unnecessary narrative. In the deliberative branch, there is least need of it (xvi).

*Proofs*. These must have reference to one of four possible issues:—(1) fact, (2) harmful quality, (3) legal quality, (4) degree. Example (or 'rhetorical induction') is best suited for deliberative rhetoric; enthymeme (or 'rhetorical syllogism') for forensic. Proof is harder in deliberative, since it deals with the future. The forensic speaker, again, has the law as a mine of argument (xvii). Interrogation of the adversary may be used within certain limitations, to enforce an argument (xviii).

*Epilogue*. Its aim is (1) to prepossess the audience in our favour, (2) to amplify or extenuate, (3) to excite emotion, and finally (4) to recapitulate the facts.