

## *Introduction*

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Inside the Fez medina in Morocco, at the eleventh-century Chouara tannery, pictured on the cover of this book, scores of tourists on viewing balconies snap photos with their smartphones, literally looking down on tannery workers as they practice their craft, seemingly as they did a thousand years ago. Inside neighboring buildings, residents escape the overwhelming smells of urine and chromium with the help of Mexican and Turkish telenovelas beamed into homes via rooftop satellite dishes. The tannery celebrates an ancient art by affiliating with the surrounding leather shops where tourists routinely spend as much as \$1,800 a day on wallets, bracelets, shoes, handbags, and jackets (Curwood 2014). The workers below, who earn between \$2 and \$5 a day, ignore their audience as they repeat the labor-intensive steps of their craft, first soaking cow, sheep, goat, and camel skins in open vats filled with a mixture of cow urine, pigeon feces, quicklime, salt, and water in order to soften the hides and loosen the hair and animal fat. Next, the dried hides are scraped down with double-edged knives, after which the workers plunge the skins into vats traditionally filled with plant-based dyes. Finally, the skins are dried, then hauled off in massive piles for cutting and production (Chouara Tannery 2017).

The workers, some of whom begin as apprentices at thirteen years old, put in long days outdoors, standing barefoot and bare-legged up to their thighs in the vats of liquid. On a damp January day, temperatures might not get out of the 40s Fahrenheit. In July, they can soar to 100 degrees. The stunning tourist views (and well-priced leather goods) hide the complexity of this craft, where chromium – a well-known carcinogen with other toxic health effects – has been used in the process since the 1800s and many vegetable dyes have been replaced with synthetics, sickening the workers who spend their days wading in these vats and the residents who drink the water polluted by the chemicals, bacteria, and animal by-products dumped monthly into the Sabou and Fez rivers. In Fez, fifty-five modern tanneries outside

the old city now use high-tech filtration to produce less pollution, and maintain high safety standards for their workers (Curwood 2014). But, when we visit as tourists, we do not want to see factories. We want to see – and buy, and take selfies with – “authentic” Moroccan crafts. Instead, we reinforce systems of exploitation and pollution that are unlikely to exist without our interest. At the same time, with so much of the Fez economy dependent on our tourist dollars, what would happen if we lost interest? Chouara alone employs two hundred men in a country with an unemployment rate of 10.4 percent (World Bank 2017).

These are some of the problems that students have wrestled with over the last decade as they stood on a leather shop balcony overlooking the colorful dye vats with University of Maryland professor David Crocker (and in one year also with then Assistant Director Stacy Kosko, one of this volume’s editors). There, as elsewhere, Crocker invited us to consider the realities that outsiders often miss. We noticed the workers and also the satellite dishes that open “traditional” societies to the world. But, the world offers many visions. Limited economic agency, Crocker reminded us, requires local political agency reinforced by inclusive and deep democratic activism, sometimes with alliances of insiders and outsiders, to further the goals of worthwhile human development. In helping students of international development and public policy to come to terms with what they see – and smell – at Chouara, Crocker makes good use of the tools and insights of development ethics.

### **Agency and Democracy in Development Ethics**

What are the justified ends and means of worthwhile human development? Whatever else the answer might entail, it is clear that agency and democracy are among the core themes of global development. They are especially important within development ethics, a field that David A. Crocker, together with many of this volume’s contributors, has done much to forward. This volume brings together a diverse set of voices from scholars and practitioners with various disciplinary and geographical backgrounds to discuss these themes. The contributors use a number of techniques ranging from philosophical analysis of a priori concepts to detailed examination of empirical situations through economic, political, educational, and legal lenses. Although

the volume's contributors present different ideas about how best to understand, promote, or protect agency and democracy within the many contexts of global development, development ethicists from every disciplinary background and every continent agree both that agency and democratic participation are necessary parts of ethical development and that the intellectual engagement and scrutiny of agency and democracy is a key part of development ethics.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine serious discussions about ethical development that do not relate to the core themes of agency and democracy. Yet, there was a time, in the 1970s, when philosophical discussions about global development were limited to Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" (1972), which argues along utilitarian lines that we ought to give money to aid organizations like OXFAM in order to help the poor, and Garrett Hardin's "Lifeboat Ethics" (1974), which argues against helping the world's poor through financial aid due to worries about overpopulation. (John Rawls [1971] and Robert Nozick [1974] were discussing sophisticated views of distributive justice, but these discussions were limited to distribution within the nation state.) Thus, the conversation about global development at this time was restricted to the question of should we (the rich) help them (the poor), where "help" always meant "give money" and "we" always stood in juxtaposition to "them." This was the academic landscape before philosopher David A. Crocker joined the conversation. Crocker is among the pioneers who transformed this relatively barren academic landscape populated only with narrow considerations of aid into the rich and flourishing field of development ethics, which now exists as a well-established sector of applied ethics within philosophy, and as an interdisciplinary field of study and practice within and beyond global development, throughout the world.

Since the late 1970s, Crocker's work on issues of agency and democratic participation has been linked to development, but Crocker has been concerned with these themes for more than five decades. His earliest work, including his 1970 PhD dissertation "A Whiteheadian Theory of Intentions and Actions" (Yale University), concerns authentic choice, agency, and action. After completing his dissertation, Crocker became increasingly interested in the proper relationship between individual and collective agency, and normative theory for social action. As a Fulbright scholar in Munich, Germany (1973–1974), Crocker enjoyed a deep engagement

with the Frankfurt School's critical theory, especially Jürgen Habermas and his influential democratic social theory. Crocker's own notions of social action as *praxis* were also influenced by an intellectual group of Yugoslavian dissidents (Crocker 2008, p. 25 n. 9). His first book *Praxis and Democratic Socialism: The Critical Social Theory of Marković and Stojanović* (1983) reflects these interests as it critically and productively engages the Yugoslavian democratic socialist school of thought.

Crocker's knowledge of and interest in human agency and democratic participation found a new outlet in 1978 when he was asked to join two colleagues, one an animal science professor, the other a philosopher with expertise in India, in teaching a graduate seminar in "Ethics and Rural Development" at Colorado State University (Crocker 2008, p. 2). A reluctant Crocker agreed to teach the course despite his misgivings about whether his expertise in philosophical ethics, meta-ethics, and Anglo-American and European social political philosophy would prove useful to issues of rural development. Teaching this course not only drew on Crocker's expertise on agency and democracy, it challenged him to work across academic disciplines, across cultural norms, and across borders.

In preparing for this new seminar, Crocker discovered and was influenced by Denis Goulet, who is often called the "father" of development ethics (Dower 2008, p. 184; Wilber, Dutt, and Hesburgh 2010). A student of French economist Louis-Joseph Lebret, Goulet distinguished between undesirable antidevelopment and worthwhile authentic development, the kind that facilitates what Lebret called a "human accent" in which people become "more human" (Goulet 1971, pp. 189, 215). Goulet called for a human-centered development ethics that can explore and address "the ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning and practice" (1977, p. 5). Crocker found a kindred spirit in Goulet, whose insistence that individuals be active agents in their own development resonated powerfully. In taking up questions in development theory, planning, and practice, Crocker's work on agency and democracy soon went far beyond what was expected of an academic philosopher. But, Crocker never abandoned the use of valuable philosophical insights and methods. Instead, he applied his keen mind to making useful critical distinctions and clarified concepts at work in development. In so doing, Crocker not only changed how we think about development, he also broadened the

scope of practical ethics within academic philosophy and interdisciplinary ethics.

As he broadened the scope of his own research, Crocker became immersed both intellectually and personally in a deeply interdisciplinary and intercultural dialogue. During a 1986–1987 Fulbright fellowship to Costa Rica, he strengthened and began to articulate his attitudes about the kinds of relationships that are necessary for worthwhile human development to succeed. Reflections on local stakeholder “insiders” and concerned “outsiders” led to his “insider–outsider hybrid” for development practitioners and scholars and the insight that people in all of these categories have roles to play in democratic processes. This highly influential account appears in his article “Insiders and outsiders in international development ethics” (1991).

Many of Crocker’s other published contributions, including his powerful 2008 book *Ethics and Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy*, further clarified and advanced the concepts of agency and democracy, especially in the Capability Approach to human development. The Capability Approach was first established by economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum in the late 1980s. Although both Nussbaum and Sen already recognized the importance of agency and democracy for ethical development, Crocker provided original, insightful, and rigorous analysis of the concepts, resulting in more refined and robust accounts of both. Crocker proposed an understanding of agency in human development (and in all human action) that gave primacy to the person, and to her exercise of critical and informed reason, including and especially through democratic deliberation, rather than only to the achievement of her preferred goal. This thinking is the basis for his influential “agency-oriented capability approach,” a process-oriented view of human development that continues to evolve today, including in many of the chapters in this volume as well as in Crocker’s own concluding chapter.

In the development of this agency-oriented capability approach, Crocker drew from Sen’s various mentions of agency in providing a clear and complete account of the concept:

A person is an agent with respect to an action X just in case she (1) decides for herself (rather than someone or something else forcing the decision) to do X; (2) bases her decisions on reasons, such as the pursuit of goals; (3) performs

or has a role in performing X; and (4) thereby brings about (or contributes to bringing about of) change in the world.

Crocker displays a characteristic wisdom in not insisting that the rigid philosophical standards for rational concepts fit the world as we find it when he writes, “[r]ather than make each one of these necessary and together sufficient for agency, let us say that the more fully an agent’s action fulfills each condition, the more fully is that act one of agency” (2008, p. 157).

Crocker also developed the ideal of deliberative democracy in a way that extended work done in development ethics, including on the Capability Approach, in valuable ways. He proposed a process-focused version of deliberative democracy in which fair procedures, which allow all voices to be heard and preferences to be transformed, provide legitimacy to the democratic process. Crocker argues that democratic deliberation should be understood as an endeavor aimed at

(1) identifying specific problems and overcoming differences as to the solutions, in order to form joint intentions for action; (2) doing so in ways that further the goals of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability; (3) improving background conditions that enhance deliberation in the foregoing ways – such as equal political liberty, equality before the law, economic justice, and procedural fairness. (Drydyk 2011, pp. 222–223)

In practice, deliberative democratic participation should be open to all people (including men, women, sexual and gender minorities, religious and secular persons, insiders, outsiders, etc.) and should take place “in a variety of venues – from small villages, through development planning ministries, to the World Bank” (Crocker 2008, p. 95).

This expansive view of deliberative democracy grounds Crocker’s innovative model of integrated “development theory-practice.” According to Crocker, “development theory-practice is a more or less integrated totality composed of the following components: (A) ethical and normative assumptions, (B) scientific and philosophical assumptions, (C) development goals, (D) scientific or empirical understanding, (E) policy options and recommendations, (F) critique, and (G) development activities and institutions” (2008, p. 71). Crocker explains the informative relationship between the normative and nonnormative aspects and the empirical aspects of these components. Making explicit how empirical information, for example literacy rates, corresponds to normative judgments, for example that all people ought to be able to

read a newspaper, allows us to see not only “value assumptions that masquerade as facts” but also “to justify beliefs about what actions we should take” (2008, p. 72). Crocker’s integrated development theory-practice is not a theory, but a tool that can be used by anyone to evaluate a situation and promote a transparent dialogue about how to proceed. Taken together, Crocker’s contributions offer a compelling response to Goulet’s call for a human-centered development ethics that can explore and address “the ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning and practice” (Goulet 1977, p. 5).

## The Chapters

The chapters in this volume and the scholars who wrote them all share a debt to Crocker as they offer their own explorations of the ethical questions posed by development. The chapters in the first section, *Development Ethics*, are all concerned with foundational issues of the scope and nature of development ethics. Lori Keleher explicitly draws on Crocker’s definition of development ethics as “the ethical reflection on the ends and means of development” in her “Why Development Needs Philosophy.” Keleher explains both why development ethics is a legitimate practice for serious philosophers and why authentic development needs philosophy. She then argues that development ethics should involve not only philosophy’s three established domains of ethical inquiry – meta-ethics, normative ethics, and practical (or applied) ethics, but also reflections in a new domain that she calls “personal or integral ethics.”

Eric Palmer’s “What Is Development?” provides a historical and conceptual analysis of how we understand “development” as a normative concept, before building on Crocker’s work in participatory democracy as he argues for a dialectical process of public reason that may result in the generation of new capabilities to be promoted and protected by public institutions, including constitutions. Gasper and Comin’s “Public Goods and Public Spirit: Reflections on and Beyond Nussbaum’s *Political Emotions*” considers the role of public emotions and “public-spiritedness” and their influence on the democratic deliberations that determine a key part of global development: the distribution of public goods at the global level. In “The Choice of a Moral Lens: LGBTI Persons, Human Rights, and the Capabilities Approach” Chloe Schwenke considers the lenses of both global

development and human rights activism as she examines the constraints that limit full human agency and diminish the well-being of people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTI). She argues that an agency-oriented capabilities approach can offer insights for critical improvements in mainstream normative lenses, improvements that ethical development requires. Finally, in “Peacebuilding, Development, Agency and Ethics,” Nigel Dower highlights Crocker’s ideas and thought as he argues that development ethics and peacebuilding are normatively, conceptually, and practically parallel and intimately connected. Dower argues that both agency and democracy are valuable conceptual aspects of peacebuilding and identifies both general and particular ways in which this is the case.

Although the themes of agency and democracy are woven throughout all the chapters in this volume, the second section, *Agency*, features chapters in which agency plays a prominent role as authors follow Crocker’s lead in understanding agency as a necessary and important part of development. Christine M. Koggel offers a poignant critical evaluation of agency in her “Expanding Agency: Conceptual, Explanatory, and Normative Implications.” She focuses on the relational capacity of people as she explains that agents are situated not only in personal relationships but that these are nested in broad and overlapping networks of relationships that create vulnerabilities and needs and shape possibilities for agency. Koggel effectively argues that focusing on relationships facilitates analyzing oppression and power at all levels from personal to global, and that the explanatory power of the relational aspect of agency makes the normative implications for enhancing agency more apparent and compelling. Serene J. Khader and Stacy J. Kosko, in “‘Reason to Value’: Process, Opportunity, and Perfectionism in the Capability Approach,” evaluate alternative interpretations of the phrase “reason to value,” which plays a key role in Amartya Sen’s version of the Capability Approach. After fruitful consideration of several alternatives, the authors conclude that the idea of a capability approach whose only normative commitments are to respect for freedom and agency (at least of nonvalue-laden sorts) is untenable. Both of these chapters prove especially fruitful for Crocker’s own concluding chapter of this volume. Moreover, Crocker’s (re)considerations of process and perfectionism have implications for our understanding of agency in development practice, and especially in Crocker’s agency-oriented version of the Capability Approach.



The remaining three chapters in the section provide powerful examples of the ways in which development ethics is truly interdisciplinary. In “The Multidimensionality of Empowerment: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations,” philosopher Jay Drydyk proposes that empowerment can be conceived as a complex change in three dimensions: (1) expansion of choice; (2) shift in power relations; and (3) expansion of well-being freedom. Drydyk’s understanding of empowerment is then “field tested” by participatory development specialists Alejandra Boni, Alexandre Apsan Frediani, Melanie Walker, and Aurora López-Fogués in three empowerment projects involving Spanish youth, neighborhood representatives in Kenya, and university students in South Africa. The evidence suggests that each of the three theoretical dimensions matter to real people.

Economists Gonzalo Salas and Andrea Vigorito use statistical analysis to provide an empirical illustration of agency levels and inequality in Uruguay in their chapter “Agency, Income Inequality, and Subjective Well-Being: The Case of Uruguay.” The focus is on three agency domains: economic control and choice, potential for change, and impact in the community. They find that although overall agency and economic agency exhibit a progressive evolution with regards to income, increases in potential for change are higher in the middle of the distribution, and power in the community shows bigger improvements for the higher income strata. Moreover, they find a positive correlation among the overall agency index, income, and subjective well-being, which is at odds with the adaptive preferences hypothesis. Finally, in “The Legal Status of Whales and Dolphins: From Bentham to the Capabilities Approach,” Rachel Nussbaum Wichert and Martha C. Nussbaum advance the discussion of agency in nonhuman animals as they address the issue of whether whales and dolphins can be accorded legal status, especially in situations such as in captivity and in scientific experiments. They then sketch an approach by which cetaceans might be understood as “nonhuman persons” who are not merely passive recipients of experience but shapers of lives, or agents.

The third section of the volume is comprised of chapters that focus on deliberative democracy and its theoretical and practical limits. In “On Some Limits and Conflicts in Deliberative and Participatory Democracy,” Luis Camacho explores the ways in which participation and representation may enter into conflict. He defends the idea that limitations and conflicts are not excuses to avoid the need to improve

democratic regimes by participation. However, since neither participation nor deliberation can guarantee that a decision is morally right, there will always be a role for ethical debate on normative issues. Adela Cortina directly engages with David Crocker's formulation of deliberative democracy in "An Agency-Focused Version of Capability Ethics and the Ethics of Cordial Reason: The Search for a Philosophical Foundation for Deliberative Democracy." Cortina evaluates Crocker's focus on agency in Sen's Capability Approach and deliberative democracy in development. She then seeks a normative foundation for a globalized deliberative democracy in a multicultural world, and asks if Crocker's proposal is capable of providing such a foundation, or whether this task instead requires *cordial reason*: the intersubjective recognition of dignity, or the cultivation of agency through education. In "The Double Democratic Deficit: Global Governance and Future Generations" Francis Stewart recognizes the value of deliberative democracy, before identifying and exploring the nature and agency-limiting implications of two major deficiencies in democracy as currently practiced, before proposing solutions to each. The first deficit is a lack of democratic decision-making at the global level because of deficiencies in mechanisms of global governance. The second deficit is the absence of future generations in current deliberations. Stewart suggests that new or reformed global institutions can remedy the first, while the second may require that people alive today "represent" future generations in various ways.

The final two chapters in this section apply work on deliberative democracy to two specific areas: transitional justice and national policy-making. Colleen Murphy's "Deliberative Democracy and Agency: Linking Transitional Justice and Development" directly engages Crocker's work as Murphy observes that the concepts of agency and deliberative democracy are central to his theories of both development and transitional justice. Murphy explains deeper connections among what may seem at first glance to be separate and distinct normative ideals in Crocker's theories of development and transitional justice before discussing differences and possible tensions in their joint pursuit. The final chapter in this section is Javier M. Iguíñiz Echeverría's "Consensus-Building and its Impact on Policy: the National Agreement Forum in Peru." This normatively rigorous case study explores the value of consensus-building in deliberative democracy by examining the composition, characteristics, and impact of the National