Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-19462-5 — How to Divide When There Isn't Enough William Thomson Table of Contents <u>More Information</u>

Contents

Lis	t of Fig	ures		<i>page</i> xii
Lis	t of Tal	bles		xix
Aci	knowled	dgments		XX
Ge	neral N	lotation		xxi
1	Intro	duction		1
	1.1	Claims	s Problems	1
	1.2	The M	odel	3
	1.3	Two Pu	uzzles in the Talmud	9
	1.4	Three .	Approaches	11
		1.4.1	Direct Approach	12
		1.4.2	Axiomatic Approach	12
		1.4.3	Game-Theoretic Approach	15
	1.5	Histori	ical Note	16
	1.6	Road N	Мар	16
	1.7	How to	o Use This Book	17
	1.8	Conclu	iding Comment	18
2	Inver	ventory of Division Rules		21
	2.1	An Inv	rentory of Rules	22
		2.1.1	Proportional Rule	22
		2.1.2	Constrained Equal Awards Rule	23
		2.1.3	Constrained Equal Losses Rule	26
		2.1.4	Concede-and-Divide	28
		2.1.5	Piniles' Rule	31
		2.1.6	Talmud Rule	32
		2.1.7	Constrained Egalitarian Rule	34
		2.1.8	Random Arrival Rule	37
		2.1.9	Minimal Overlap Rule	38
		2.1.10	Rule Based on Random Stakes	43

Cambridge University Press	
978-1-107-19462-5 — How to Divide When There Isn't Enoug	;h
William Thomson	
Table of Contents	
More Information	

viii	Contents

	2.2	Families of Rules	45
		2.2.1 Sequential Priority Family	45
		2.2.2 Young's Family	46
		2.2.3 ICI and CIC Families	53
	2.3	Summary	60
3	Basic	Properties of Division Rules	62
	3.1	Balance	62
	3.2	Continuity	63
	3.3	Homogeneity	64
	3.4	Lower and Upper Bounds on Awards and Losses	65
		3.4.1 Defining Bounds	65
		3.4.2 Recursive Assignment of Lower Bounds	72
	3.5	Conditional Full Compensation, Conditional Null	
		Compensation, and Related Properties	75
	3.6	Symmetry Properties	79
	3.7	Order Preservation Properties	89
4	Monot	conicity Properties	94
	4.1	Endowment Monotonicity and Related Properties	95
	4.2	Claim Monotonicity and Related Properties	105
	4.3	Inverse Sets Axioms	115
5	Claims	s Truncation Invariance and Minimal Rights First	118
	5.1	Claims Truncation Invariance	119
	5.2	Minimal Rights First	123
6	Comp	osition Down and Composition Up	131
	6.1	Composition Down	131
	6.2	Composition Up	140
7	Dualit	1 I	157
/	7 1	Duality for Pulse	157
	7.1	Duality for Bromentics	157
	7.2	Duality for Theorem	103
	7.5	Duality for Theorems	1/1
	7.4	Characterizations	172
8	Other	Invariance Properties	182
	8.1	No Advantageous Transfer	182
	8.2	Claims Separability and Variants	184
	8.3	Convexity and Additivity Properties	187
	8.4	Rationalizing Rules as Maximizers of Binary Relations	195
9	Operat	tors	200
	9.1	Claims Truncation Operator	200

Cambridge University Press	
78-1-107-19462-5 — How to Divide When There Isn't Enoug	h
William Thomson	
Table of Contents	
More Information	

9.2 Attribution of Minimal Rights Operator	202	
9.3 Convexity Operator	205	
9.4 Relating and Composing the Operators	206	
9.5 Preservation of Properties under Operators	214	
9.5.1 Properties Preserved under Claims Truncation	215	
9.5.2 Properties Preserved under Attribution of Minimal		
Rights Operator	218	
9.5.3 Properties Preserved under the Composition of		
the Claims Truncation and Attribution of Minimal		
Rights Operators	219	
9.5.4 Properties Preserved under Convexity	221	
9.6 Extension Operators	222	
9.7 Summarizing	227	
10 Variable-Population Model: Consistency and Related Properties	229	
10.1 The Variable-Population Model	230	
10.2 Consistency and Related Properties	231	
10.3 Converse Consistency	239	
10.4 Other Logical Relations between Consistency, Its Converse,		
and Other Properties	241	
10.5 Lifting of Properties by Bilateral Consistency	249	
10.6 Characterizations	255	
10.7 Average Consistency	266	
11 Constructing Consistent Extensions of Two-Claimant Rules	270	
11.1 A General Extension Technique	271	
11.2 Consistent Extensions of Two-Claimant Rules Satisfying		
Equal Treatment of Equals	277	
11.2.1 Consistent Extension of Weighted Averages of		
the Two-Claimant Constrained Equal Awards and		
Constrained Equal Losses Rules	277	
11.2.2 Two-Claimant Rules that Have No Consistent		
Extension	282	
11.2.3 Consistent ICI and CIC Rules	283	
11.2.4 Other Consistent Families	288	
11.3 Consistent Extensions of Two-Claimant Rules that May Not		
Satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals	289	
11.3.1 Generalizing the Talmud Rule by Not Insisting on		
Equal Treatment of Equals	290	
11.3.2 Consistent Extensions of Two-Claimant Rules		
Satisfying Homogeneity, Composition Down, and		
Composition Up	297	

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19462-5 - How to Divide When There Isn't Enough
William Thomson
Table of Contents
More Information

x Contents

	11.4	Further Characterizations Involving Consistency and Other	
		Axioms but Not Equal Treatment of Equals	302
12	Varia	ble-Population Model: Other Properties	308
	12.1	Population Monotonicity and Related Properties	308
	12.2	Guarantee Structures	313
	12.3	Merging and Splitting Claims; Manipulation Issues and	
		Extension Operators	315
		12.3.1 No Advantageous Merging or Splitting and Variants	316
		12.3.2 Extension Operators Based on the Merging of	
		Claims	320
	12.4	Replication and Division: Invariance and Limit Results	324
		12.4.1 Convergence of Rules under Replication	330
	12.5	Balanced Impact and Potential	334
	12.6	Multiple Parameter Changes; Logical Relations and	
		Characterizations	335
13	Ranki	ing Awards Vectors and Ranking Rules	339
	13.1	Orders Based on the Lorenz Criterion	340
		13.1.1 Maximality and Minimality Results	340
		13.1.2 A Criterion for Lorenz-Domination within the ICI	
		Family	342
	13.2	Preservation of Orders by Operators	348
	13.3	Lifting of Orders by Bilateral Consistency	351
	13.4	Other Properties of Rules Pertaining to Orders	352
	13.5	Orders Based on Gap and Variance	354
14	Modeling Claims Problems as Games		359
	14.1	Modeling Claims Problems as Cooperative Games	359
		14.1.1 Bargaining Games	359
		14.1.2 Coalitional Games	367
	14.2	Modeling Claims Problems as Strategic Games	380
		14.2.1 Game of Stakes	380
		14.2.2 Game of Rules	383
		14.2.3 Sequential Game of Offers	388
15	Varia	nts and Generalizations of the Base Model	390
	15.1	Claims Problems in Which No Claim Exceeds the	
		Endowment	390
	15.2	Claims Problems in Which the Data Are Natural Numbers	391
	15.3	Claims Problems with a Large Number of Claimants	393
	15.4	Surplus-Sharing Problems	395
	15.5	Generalizing the Notion of a Rule	396

Cambridge University Press
978-1-107-19462-5 - How to Divide When There Isn't Enough
William Thomson
Table of Contents
More Information

	Contents		xi	
	15.6	Computational Issues	397	
	15.7	Incorporating Additional Information into the Model	397	
	15.8	Experimental Testing	405	
	15.9	A Concluding Comment	406	
16	Summ	ary Graphs and Tables	408	
17	Appen	dices	416	
	17.1	Deriving a Formula for the Minimal Overlap Rule	416	
	17.2	More about the CIC Rules	417	
	17.3	Paths of Awards of the DT Rule	420	
	17.4	Neither Claim Monotonicity Nor No-Transfer Paradox Is		
		Preserved under the Duality Operator	422	
	17.5	Claim Monotonicity Is Not Preserved under the Attribution		
		of Minimal Rights Operator	426	
	17.6	Lifting of Properties by Bilateral Consistency	428	
	17.7	Characterizing the Family of Equal-Sacrifice Rules	429	
	17.8	On the Existence and Uniqueness of Average Consistent		
		Extensions	432	
	17.9	Constructing Consistent Extensions	434	
	17.10	On the Consistent Members of the CIC Family	436	
	17.11	Characterizing a Family of Sequential Talmud Rules	438	
	17.12	Completion of the Proof of the Characterization of		
		Family \mathcal{M}	440	
	17.13	Population Monotonicity Is Not Preserved under Duality	444	
	17.14	Characterization of the Constrained Equal Awards Rule as		
		Offering Maximal Group Guarantees	447	
	17.15	Under Replication, the Random Arrival Rule Converges to		
		the Proportional Rule	449	
	17.16	Convexity of the TU Coalitional Game Associated with a		
		Claims Problem	452	
	17.17	Proof of the Correspondence between the Talmud Rule and		
		the Nucleolus, and of the Constrained Equal Awards Rule		
		and the Dutta-Ray Solution	453	
Refe	erences		456	

Index

472