

## Frame It Again

Framing effects are everywhere. An estate tax looks very different to a death tax. Gun safety seems to be one thing and gun control another. Yet, the consensus from decision theorists, finance professionals, psychologists, and economists is that frame-dependence is completely irrational. This book challenges that view. Some of the toughest decisions we face are just clashes between different frames. It is perfectly rational to value the same thing differently in two different frames, even when the decision-maker knows that these are really two sides of the same coin. *Frame It Again* sheds new light on the structure of moral predicaments, the nature of self-control, and the rationality of cooperation. Framing is a powerful tool for redirecting public discussions about some of the most polarizing contemporary issues, such as gun control, abortion, and climate change. Learn effective problem-solving and decision-making to get the better of difficult dilemmas.

José Luis Bermúdez is Professor of Philosophy and Samuel Rhea Gammon Professor of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University. His many books include *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness*, *Thinking without Words*, and the highly successful textbook *Cognitive Science*, now in its third edition.

Cambridge University Press  
978-1-107-19293-5 — Frame It Again  
José Luis Bermúdez  
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NEW TOOLS FOR RATIONAL  
DECISION-MAKING

AGAIN

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CAMBRIDGE  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom  
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA  
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia  
314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,  
New Delhi – 110025, India  
79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906

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Information on this title: [www.cambridge.org/9781107192935](http://www.cambridge.org/9781107192935)

DOI: 10.1017/9781108131827

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First published 2021

Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd, Padstow Cornwall

*A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.*

ISBN 978-1-107-19293-5 Hardback

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## Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to the American Association of Learned Societies for a Fellowship allowing me to devote myself to writing this book during the 2018–2019 academic year, and also to the Department of Philosophy and College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M for allowing me to take up the Fellowship. Thanks are due also to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Summer Stipend, which I held in the summer of 2018.

I greatly appreciate having had the opportunity to present three lectures on framing to the Institut Jean Nicod at the École Normal Supérieure in Paris, and I learned much from discussing the ideas in this book with audiences at the European Society for Philosophy of Psychology, the Foundations of Normativity project at the University of Vienna, the Logos Research Group at the University of Barcelona, and the Department of Philosophy at UC San Diego. An early draft of the first seven chapters was discussed at an enjoyable retreat with faculty and students in the Philosophy Department at Davidson College, North Carolina.

Chapter 7 draws on my “Frames, rationality, and self-control” (in J. L. Bermúdez, Ed., *Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality*, Cambridge University Press, 2018). That paper originated in a workshop at Texas A&M that was funded by a grant from the Templeton Foundation via the Philosophy and Psychology of Self-Control project at Florida State University, directed by Al Mele.

Three anonymous referees for Cambridge University Press gave very helpful comments on the manuscript. I thank them, and also Michael Schmitz, Richard Pettigrew, and Al Mele, who commented on individual

chapters. Clare Palmer read every chapter, several on multiple occasions, greatly improving style and content.

Finally, I would like to thank the editorial team at Cambridge University Press: Ilaria Tassistro, David Repeto, and, especially, Janka Romero, who signed the book up and commented on almost every chapter.