Framing effects are everywhere. An estate tax looks very different to a death tax. Gun safety seems to be one thing and gun control another. Yet, the consensus from decision theorists, finance professionals, psychologists, and economists is that frame-dependence is completely irrational. This book challenges that view. Some of the toughest decisions we face are just clashes between different frames. It is perfectly rational to value the same thing differently in two different frames, even when the decision-maker knows that these are really two sides of the same coin. *Frame It Again* sheds new light on the structure of moral predicaments, the nature of self-control, and the rationality of cooperation. Framing is a powerful tool for redirecting public discussions about some of the most polarizing contemporary issues, such as gun control, abortion, and climate change. Learn effective problem-solving and decision-making to get the better of difficult dilemmas.

José Luis Bermúdez is Professor of Philosophy and Samuel Rhea Gammon Professor of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University. His many books include *The Paradox of Self-Consciousness*, *Thinking without Words*, and the highly successful textbook *Cognitive Science*, now in its third edition.
DECISION-MAKING

NEW TOOLS FOR RATIONAL

AGAIN

FRAME

José Luis Bermúdez
Contents

List of Figures page vi
List of Tables viii
Acknowledgments ix
1 Priming the Pump: Framing Effects and the Litany of Human Irrationality 1
2 Framing: The Classic Experiments 20
3 Where the Rubber Hits the Road: Investors, Frames, and Markets 44
4 Juliet’s Principle 66
5 Rational Frames? 90
6 Agamemnon and Climate Change 113
7 Framing Temptation and Reward: The Challenges of Self-Control 138
8 Chickens and Chariot Races: Framing in Game Theory 164
9 Fair’s Fair: Framing for Cooperation and Fairness 192
10 Getting Past No: Discursive Deadlock and the Power of Frames 215
11 Opening the Door to Non-Archimedean Reasoning 240

Appendix: Frames in the Brain 273
Bibliography 300
Index 316
Figures

2.1 Representing an agent’s attitude to risk page 31
2.2 Utility for agents who are risk-neutral 32
2.3 Utility for a typical risk-averse agent 33
2.4 Utility for a typical risk-seeking agent 34
2.5 Utility curves and attitudes to risk: a summary 35
3.1 The NIKKEI 225 Japanese stock market index from 1984 to August 2016, with the value on August 31, 2016 marked in black 53
3.2 How the curvature of utility curves indicates degrees of risk-aversion 56
3.3 How Benartzi and Thaler think that a typical investor would evaluate a portfolio composed solely of stocks vs. a portfolio composed solely of bonds 60
4.1 A schematic representation of the different stages in decision-making 69
4.2 A schematic illustration of feedback channels in decision-making 70
4.3 The S-shaped curve of prospect theory 87
4.4 Representing loss-aversion in the S-shaped value curve of prospect theory 88
6.1 Leonard Savage’s omelet example in The Foundations of Statistics 119
7.1 A paradigm case of self-control represented as a sequential choice problem 146
7.2 Hyperbolic discounting leading to self-control 149
7.3 Reframing the decision problem in Figure 7.1 157
List of Figures

11.1 The key framing techniques for non-Archimedean, frame-sensitive reasoning 245
A.1 A vertical cross-section of the human brain 275
A.2 The division of the left cerebral hemisphere into lobes, showing the basic functions that each of the four lobes is believed to be specialized to perform 276
A.3 The principal subcortical structures in the human brain 277
A.4 The experimental set-up in De Martino et al. 2006 289
A.5 Representing loss-aversion 298
## Tables

1.1 System 1 and System 2 reasoning compared  
page 16

3.1 Measuring the magnitude of the equity risk premium in the  
United States  
page 54

3.2 The equity risk premium in a range of economies outside  
the United States  
page 55

11.1 Selman’s stages of social perspective-taking  
page 259
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