There are strong moral and legal pressures against harming civilians in times of conflict, yet neither just war theory nor international law is clear about what responsibilities belligerents have to correct harm once it has been inflicted. In this book, Marcus Schulzke argues that military powers have a duty to provide assistance to the civilians they attack during wars, and that this duty is entailed by civilians’ right to life. Schulzke develops new just war principles requiring belligerents to provide medical treatment and financial compensation to civilian victims, and then shows how these principles can be implemented in governmental, military, and international practice. He calls for a more individual-focused conception of international law and post-war justice for victims – as opposed to current state- or group-based reconstruction and reparation programs – which will provide a framework for protecting civilian rights.

Marcus Schulzke is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of York. His work has appeared in journals including Perspectives on Politics, Review of International Studies, International Studies Perspectives, and Political Studies, and he is the author of The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation (2016).
Just War Theory and Civilian Casualties

Protecting the Victims of War

Marcus Schulzke

University of York
Dedicated to Kevin Patrick Carroll, whose sense of justice inspired this book
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