Introduction

The Circus Freak

On the morning of January 2, 1943, during the New Year’s holiday and at the height of the Asia-Pacific War, the circus came to Tokyo. Despite a food rationing system in place since 1941, two young munitions workers, Yamada Futarō and his friend Kaneko, started the day with sweet fruit jelly (mitsumame), cake (kēki), and tempura bowl (tendon), before arriving at the circus inside Kōrakuen Stadium. Above the tent fluttered a red banner which read: “Kinoshita Circus Troupe” (Kinoshita sākasu dan). Festive music blared from hidden speakers. Inside the tent, according to newspaper advertisements, Kinoshita Circus promised exotic attractions complete with acrobatic feats and elephants.

However, just as Yamada and Kaneko were about to enter the circus tent, a policeman ran up to shoo them away. “Go home!” he shouted. “Those who don’t have tickets for today, go home!” Yamada “exchanged glances with Kaneko, bored and fed up (unzari shite).” Circus tickets were 1.55 yen apiece, which the two young men had neglected to purchase. This was the official circus: promoted by carefully watched newspapers and protected from nonpaying customers by police officers.

As they were about to leave, the two workers noticed through the dust cloud a smaller, dirtier red-curtained circus nearby. The tent was surrounded by a large crowd hoping to catch a glimpse of a “show” featuring a half-man, half-dog circus freak as the main attraction. The small stage consisted of a red curtain stretched around a shapeless figure. The curtain

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3 January 2, 1943 entry, Senchūha mushihēra nikki: 83.
4 (Advertisement) Asahi Shinbun, January 1, 1943.
tantalizingly went up a little before coming down again. Suddenly, as
Yamada later recalled in his diary:

Ja-Jaaann! A bell rang, and a young girl dressed in Chinese attire came out of the curtain. The girl stepped into a faint beam of light. Her soft and flabby flesh was a rather depressing kind of deformity.

(Of course, she wasn’t the “half-man, half-dog.”)

With no expression or emotion, she moved right and left before the curtain, with gaudy makeup oozing out.

Kaneko wanted to watch but I said it was all so obviously fake. I declined with a word, knowing that whether the freak (kiikeiji) was born deformed or not, it was all just creepy. We trudged along toward Suido-bashi Station in the middle of a dust cloud. 5

It might seem surprising to learn of Japanese factory workers going to the circus during the Pacific War years – a time usually remembered for economic deprivation, political repression, and cultural barrenness; a time when, as at least one scholar argues, wartime mass culture was dominated by “sentimentalism” tightly controlled by the state. 6 In 1940, a year before Japan declared war on the United States, the New Order movement propelled sweeping state controls over all forms of popular entertainment complete with official performer licenses and certificates. 7 And not a moment too soon, for the Yomiuri Shinbun reported in December 1940 that “ghetto theater troupes” (basue gekidan) illicitly operated in the squalid outskirts of Tokyo, moving from place to place to perform unauthorized vaudeville, theatrical plays, and sword-fighting. The newspaper urged the fledgling New Order movement to bring these troublemakers in line. 8 The brazen performance two years later of the half-man, half-dog circus freak next to the officially approved Kinoshita Circus suggests that elements of the unofficial “ghetto theater troupe” survived in the shadows of total war. Indeed, in February 1943, the Yomiuri ran an article calling for more “cheerful” (meiro) circus performances, pointing to the prevalence of the disabled performing as circus freaks and children forced to perform in dangerous acrobatic stunts, all of which “makes one imagine many dark shadows.” The Greater Japan Entertainment Association (Dai Nippon kōgyō kyōkai), the state-sponsored organization of theater and circus troupes, publicly

8 “‘Basue gekidan’ ni, tōkyoku ga torishimari noridasu,” Yomiuri Shinbun, December 11, 1940.
vowed to “sweep away performances by rokurokubi [folkloric monsters with long stretched-out necks], spider-girls (kumo musume), and other grotesque things; and, to the extent possible, redirect the crippled performers (fugusha) to other occupations in the wartime industries."\(^9\)

This book is about the evolution of mass culture into what I term “carnival war” in Japan, reorienting our perspectives on daily life between 1937 and 1945. Although the Asia-Pacific War created the opportunity for the state to expand its control over society, it also fractured Japanese people’s sense of identity, which spilled out through a cultural framework which, this book will argue, is best understood as carnival war. Carnival war encompassed both “official” cultural practices shining in the spotlight and “unofficial” cultural practices lurking in the shadows. It requires thinking not only about the activities of official purveyors of entertainment like Kinoshita Circus, but also the “ghetto” circus, the half-man, half-dog circus freaks who echoed, mocked, and inverted the pristine, official national culture the wartime state was trying to build. Second, a study of carnival war examines the unevenness of state attempts to mobilize society for war; the dynamic, improvisational dimension to total war mobilization. It is about why the police officer and, by extension, the police agency and wartime state celebrated and protected spectacles like Kinoshita Circus while simultaneously viliying and ignoring unofficial circus performances. Beginning in 1943, the Japanese home front began to grapple with a deteriorating war situation and worsening material shortages. Slowly but steadily, the government moved away from earlier intrusive cultural controls designed to elevate the intellectual refinement of the masses and towards a grudging patronage of pure entertainment spectacles to raise morale and wartime productivity.\(^10\) Finally, carnival war is a story about how Japanese people interacted with cultural practices that absorbed and deformed official ideologies – note Yamada’s eye-rolling boredom at the policeman’s high-handed demeanor and flippant dismissal of the alternative freak show as a “fake.” Part of his ability to move between official and unofficial ideology rested on the fact that high-earning munitions workers could literally partake of the “sweets” of the total war economy while other civilians struggled with material shortages and food scarcity. Mobilization, it would seem, introduced

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\(^9\) “Meirō ni naru misemono: shintai shōgaisha ya kodomo no kyokugei wo issō,” Yomiuri Shinbun, February 27, 1943.

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a new political economy and cultural life that paradoxically united and divided the home front.

The idea of carnival war challenges the view that wartime Japan was an inert, oppressive period in which the state unquestioningly ruled over most facets of daily life and in which smooth harmonious collaboration between public and private actors defined the experience of total war. In stark contrast to the lively and cosmopolitan “erotic grotesque nonsense” mass culture of the 1920s and early 1930s filled with liberated “modern girls,” dance halls, and jazz music, Japanese wartime mass culture after 1937 is usually depicted as descending into a dark morass of strict state controls, censorship, and ideologies of national sacrifice. Thomas Havens described Japan’s mobilization experience beginning in 1937 as a “dour” and “humorless” project full of “gloomy melodies” and a general “lack of exhilaration.” More recently, Alan Tansman reiterated this common view about wartime Japan: “National mobilization meant the beginning of the end of the pursuit of material comfort and pleasure – the end, that is, of the fun of urban life. The time for play was over, except, perhaps, for spiritual play.”

In exploring the intersection between imperialism and mass culture during the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Asia-Pacific region, this book contends that ordinary Japanese people shifted between their roles as loyal imperial subjects of the state who sacrificed all for nation and consumers of a transnational mass culture where desire was prioritized over sacrifice.

To study the Japanese cultural practices and attitudes amid total war requires a careful reading of the primary sources. For just as the Japanese man, woman, child (or Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese) constantly shifted between the roles of consumer and subject, so too did artifacts of wartime mass culture. They must be read and then reread against conflicting messages and symbols that shift in meaning depending on the context. This form of analysis requires a special sensitivity to the unique “grammar” employed by Japanese consumer-subjects in order to make sense of mass cultural practices during a time of rising state authoritarianism and censorship but also cultural innovation and creativity filtered through a capitalist industrialized mass media system.

Writing a History of Total War

I acknowledge the power of print media, film, and radio in the 1930s and 1940s in the construction of a “national public sphere” in Japan and its transformation into a “fascist public sphere,” which helped consolidate popular support for war. But I do not see this as a smooth and relatively seamless transition with passive consumers easily manipulated by state institutions and powerful media companies. For even within the public consensus appearing in mass media and well-documented in scholarship, many Japanese cultural producers and consumers would come to have contentious views of the objectives and meanings of the war itself. And as the war escalated and mass culture continued to evolve within the vortex of national mobilization, the home front and battlefront became simultaneously more entangled and estranged. These tensions played out in mass culture through conflicting messages over wartime solemnity versus silliness and mass sacrifice versus mass desire. In trying to capture this moving target, I utilize the critical methodologies of cultural historians of prewar Japan within the framework of the total war system. To unite these two seemingly disparate approaches—one privileging individual capacities to resist state ideologies and construct new cultural mores, the other fixated on how the massive state edifice mobilized and irrevocably transformed society for war—requires an overarching model that can incorporate both elements.

Writing a History of Total War

Carnival war is both a cultural history of wartime Japan and, more broadly, a cultural history of total war. To interrogate Japanese society in wartime is not simply an excursion down a familiar path of historical research but an appreciation of the broad significance of the war in historiography. Chronological frameworks such as prewar, wartime, post-war, and more recently, “post-postwar” and “transwar” all point to the centrality of the Asia-Pacific War in how scholars conceptualize and organize the fundamental contours of modern Japanese history. However, despite the importance of the war for historical periodization, scholarship has only just begun to explore what the war actually meant to Japanese people at the time.

Since the 1980s, many scholars have identified the 1931 Manchurian Incident as the start of the so-called “Fifteen Year War” as a way to

highlight the cumulative effect of Japan’s imperialist aggression in Asia lasting until 1945. This approach has very usefully critiqued the problematically narrow focus on the “Pacific War” in older scholarship on wartime Japan. However, this book explicitly locates the start of “wartime” to Japan’s 1937 invasion of China. In this respect, I take partial exception to Louise Young’s pathbreaking monograph *Japan’s Total Empire*, which draws upon the Fifteen Year War framework to argue that both Japan and Manchuria mutually transformed each other through mobilization on multiple political, social, and cultural levels. While I agree that Manchuria powerfully transformed mass cultural practices on the home front, we need to know more about how the relationship between mobilization and mass culture changed after 1937 when the China War unleashed far greater socioeconomic transformations across all social strata in Japan. As the scale of mobilization accelerated following the start of the China War, that intensity in turn unleashed unexpected twists and turns in mass culture which redefined how such mobilization infiltrated down to lived experience. My exploration of Japanese wartime mass culture suggests that the empire became a bit less “total” after 1937 as the realities of mobilization clashed with a modern mass society, forcing improvisation and accommodation among state institutions. Elements of “total empire” certainly did continue past 1937 and lasted until the destruction of Japan’s empire in 1945. But to understand the relationship between mobilization and mass culture after 1937, we need to analyze total war itself, alongside total empire, as a significant historical rupture.

By moving the start of wartime from 1931 to 1937, this book aligns more closely with works which, while drawing upon the insights found in the Fifteen Year War theory, have raised skepticism over the Fifteen Year War chronology. From the perspective of economic and political history, this group of Japanese scholars have pointed out that Japan’s economic structure and political organization assumed their distinctive wartime characteristics only after Japan’s 1937 invasion of China proper.


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Similarly, other scholars have demonstrated that the democratic institutions and consumer culture of prewar “modernism” in the 1920s were still strongly in force well past the 1931 Manchurian Incident, thereby suggesting that the prewar era itself was a longer and more vigorous historical phase than assumed in the Fifteen Year War framework.  

If Japan’s wartime began in 1937, what kind of “war” was it? I refer to “total war” with full acknowledgment that scholarly works have already demonstrated its methodological limitations in characterizing the Asia-Pacific War and the Second World War in general. It is true that the actual fighting of the war varied at different stages with the China War phase (1937–41) being in many respects less “total” than the Pacific War phase (1941–5) in terms of the extent and intensity of rationing, food supplies, and conscription rates. Food rationing and labor conscription on the Japanese home front, for example, did not really take effect until after 1941. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that even the Second World War does not quite hold up to the “total war” label upon close scrutiny.  

Nevertheless, carnival war reminds us that “total war” was both an actual battlefield experience unleashing drastic material changes on the

18 For example, Hara Akira contends that Japan’s war economy defined by intensive state economic controls and inflationary military spending did not really begin until after 1937. Before that, Japan’s economy was still in peacetime mode. See Hara Akira, “Japan: Guns before Rice,” in Mark Harrison, ed., The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 224–225. Banno Junji argues that a powerful movement for “Shōwa Democracy” lasted until at least 1937 in Shōwa shi no kettei-teki shunkan (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2004) and more directly in Jiyū to byōdō no Shōwa shi: 1930-nendai no Nikō seiji (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2009): 181–191. Sakai Tetsuya intriguingly views the political turmoil, right-wing agitation, and military insubordination of the early to mid-1930s not as signs of the impending collapse of democracy but as testimony to the tenacious power of Taishō Democracy – i.e., that it took drastic and repeated assaults by conservative, authoritarian groups well into the late 1930s to finally destroy Japan’s entrenched democratic institutions. See Sakai Tetsuya, Taishō demokurashii taisei no hōka: naisei to gaihō (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1992). Minami Hiroshi and others found that the culture of “modernism” or an embrace of a consumerist, cosmopolitan way of life emphasizing the individual over the state, and private family over the public household began in the early 1920s and continued until the stresses of the China War curbed such trends. See Minami Hiroshi, ed., Nikō modanizumu no kenkyū: shisō, sekatsu, bunka (Tokyo: Buren Shuppan, 1982) and Minami Hiroshi, ed., Shōwa bunka (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1987).


home front by the early 1940s and a constellation of war-inspired cultural ideas and imagery already circulating in Japanese society and elsewhere in the late 1930s. Although prewar consumer and economic life continued in many respects in early wartime Japan, the invasion and occupation of China after 1937 signaled to the Japanese that the empire was entering a new phase of modern life dominated by war. That is, while postwar scholars have rightly shown that actual conditions of “total war” did not neatly correspond to the years commonly labeled as such, we must take care to note that the idea of “total war” and all the mobilization campaigns pursued by state and society to ready the home front for total war did correspond to the years 1937 to 1945. Similar to the interwar and wartime European political figures invoking “total war” as rhetorical flourish to promote their own particular policy or sectional interests, Japanese media, cultural, military, and civilian leaders, and institutions in the 1930s and 1940s made references to “total war” and “national mobilization” to justify their actions and ideologies. Much of the discussion of “total war” in Japan was framed as preparation for an inevitable future war that would reproduce on a larger scale the trauma of the Great War in Europe.21 Just as the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japanese consensus that the empire must always strive to be “modern” and achieve “modernity” inspired powerful social transformations, so too did the sense of urgency of mobilizing for a future total war provide the important context for all cultural activities in the 1930s and early 1940s.22 In other words, “total war” or its later wartime synonym “decisive war” (kessen) became an unstressed ideological tense and shorthand for a new, unprecedented historical moment, which framed the rancorous public debates on the Japanese home front.23


23 Kessen previously appeared in Japanese newspapers in reference to game matches or certain impressive battles overseas, as in Germany’s blitzkrieg attacks in Europe in 1939–1940. Beginning in 1941, with the growing likelihood of war against the United States, the frequency of the term noticeably increased. For example, a quick search on the National Diet Library online catalog for book titles with the word kessen yields only six entries between 1937 and 1940. By contrast, seven entries appear for 1941 alone,
These debates gave discursive power and force to carnival war, even during years when the actual fighting conditions overseas and levels of rationing on the home front did not approach the ideal type of total war. Mobilization, in turn, inspired and justified new radical state programs to reengineer society on a total war footing. While the invasion of China was initially dubbed by the government and media as the “China Incident” and not a “war” until 1941 – partly to avoid entanglement with US neutrality laws and triggering economic sanctions – the idea that Japan was entering a new historical phase defined by war was very much on people’s minds from the beginning. Thus, carnival war was a cultural phenomenon that echoed both the mobilization of society in preparation for total war and the actual “total” conditions imposed by total warfare on the home front.

To more rigorously think about the points of contact between total war conditions and total war discourse, I rely on Yamanouchi Yasushi’s total war system theory for directly bringing the experience of total war to the center of historical analysis. Yamanouchi avoids the normative assumptions implicitly inherent in much scholarship of the Second World War by provocatively arguing that all the major belligerent countries of that conflict shared the experience of war mobilization. Thus, as he argues, “the differences between Fascist-types and New Deal-types should be studied as internal parts subordinate to an analysis of societal changes brought on by total war.” Yamanouchi argues that the Asia-Pacific War was a “total war” in which the state mobilizes all peoples and resources for industrialized warfare. The resulting “total war system” transformed the home front from a highly stratified, hierarchical, and strife-riven “class society” to a more “leveled” function-based “system society.” In the name of total war mobilization, the state forcefully broke down to varying degrees class, gender, and racial barriers to better integrate subjects into the nation-state, ready to contribute to the war effort. The total war system theory emphasizes, perhaps uncomfortably so for some, the
close connections between war mobilization and progressive features of twentieth-century contemporary society in all forms such as social-welfare policy, public health and hygiene, social egalitarianism, and mass politics. Mobilizing for total war was incredibly violent and liberating at times, and powerfully demonstrates how total war accelerated the modernization process in Japan and laid the foundations for “paciﬁst” postwar Japan.

The total war system theory offers an intriguing way to concretely explore the impact of total war on mass society beyond a superficial view of war as some kind of natural disaster or just another national project like industrial planning or irrigation. It reminds us again that total war was an affair of both state and society. It also raises important comparative possibilities by forcing scholars to look at wartime Japan alongside not only the usual suspects of Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany but also the United States and Great Britain through the prism of total war mobilization. The total war system theory, in short, helps scholars historicize total war itself. In this respect, I ﬁnd the total war system theory much more helpful for thinking comparatively about wartime Japan and the Japanese home front than the recent revival of the “fascist” label, which is overburdened with political baggage, a lack of engagement with total war as transnational modern phenomenon, and an instinctively narrow comparison of wartime Japan with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy with little attention to the “liberal” democratic home fronts in wartime America and Britain.

The total war system theory is weakest, however, when used to explore mass culture because it presumes the state successfully and seamlessly mobilized a society along functionalist lines thereby leaving us with a triumphal narrative of the state overpowering the people to do its bidding. There are today numerous studies on Japanese wartime culture which, consciously or not, draw from the total war system framework. One study exploring how the total war system incorporated despised minorities into the nation-state can be found in Takashi Fujitani’s discussion of “vulgar racism” and “polite racism” against Korean soldiers in the Japanese military and Japanese-American soldiers in the American military. See Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011).


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