Economics of Electricity

This comprehensive and up-to-date book explains the economic rationale behind the production, delivery and exchange of electricity. Cretì and Fontini explain why electricity markets exist, outlining the economic principles behind the exchange and supply of power to consumers and firms. They identify the specificities of electricity, as compared to other goods, and furthermore suggest how markets should be optimally designed to produce and deliver electricity effectively and efficiently. The authors also address key issues, including how electricity can be decarbonized. Written in a technical yet accessible style, this book will appeal to readers studying power-system economics and the economics of electricity, as well as those more generally interested in energy economics, including engineering and management students looking to gain an understanding of electricity-market analysis.

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Economics of Electricity

Markets, Competition and Rules

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A. C.: A te, Manfredi.

F. F.: Alla mia famiglia. Loro sanno perché!
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