

Introduction

1 Scope and Challenges

This volume presents the core material – in the form of an Inventory of fourth-century Athenian decrees attested in the literary texts – of this two-volume study of Athenian decrees. Such an assemblage of material marks a new contribution for three reasons: the testimonia pertaining to such decrees have never previously been brought together in such a format as they are in Volume 1; they have never been previously been subject to systematic historical analysis on a case-by-case basis as they are in Volume 1; they have never been assessed for the perspectives they offer into the significance of the decree as an institution in fourth-century Athenian politics and its legacy (the subject of Volume 2). In this Introduction to Volume 1, I set out the basic premises of this study of decrees of the fourth-century Athenian assembly (*ecclesia*) that are preserved in ancient literature.

Decree-making is a defining aspect of ancient Greek political activity: it was the means by which city-state communities went about deciding to get things done. Between the late sixth century BC and the third century AD, the institutions of Greek political and religious associations, both democratic and non-democratic, enacted political transactions known as *psephismata* (literally, ‘things voted by ballot’, but generally translated as ‘decrees’). In fourth-century Athens, they concerned a broad area of administration and decisions, including the bestowal of honorific awards (including crowns, statues, proxeny-status and citizenship), alliances, declarations of war, mobilisation of military forces and religious and administrative regulations; they were a tool central to the *demos*’ organisation of citizens’ performance of duties and to the initiation of judicial and legislative processes. Many Greek communities inscribed their decrees on marble slabs and set them up in locations with religious and civic importance; some states even stored records of their decrees in archives.¹

1 This discussion of the nature of decrees in the Greek world and Athens is expanded in the Introduction to Volume 2.

An important premise of this two-volume work is the view that, in order to understand the social and political significance of the decree to fourth-century Athenian political life, it is necessary to study not only their publication on stone inscriptions, of which there is a rich scholarly tradition,² but also the representations of them and reactions to them that appear in ancient literary texts. Literary texts, and in particular those which were produced by contemporaries who drew upon decrees in the formulation of arguments and narratives, offer views of the content of decrees, insight into the identity of their audiences, and the ways in which they were read and deployed in support of a range of accounts and stances. By combining the literary and epigraphical evidence for the decree in fourth-century Athens, we can enhance our understanding of an important aspect of Athenian democracy and its legacy.

This publication offers perspectives on the decree on the basis of a comprehensive study of decrees of fourth-century Athens (403/2–322/1) that are quoted and paraphrased in the ancient literary sources. At the core of Volume 1 of this work is the Inventory of Decrees (divided into two parts (A and B), according to the degrees of certainty of each reference to a decree), which collects, translates and offers discussions on the literary testimonia for decrees of the fourth-century Athenian assembly. In Volume 2, five analytical chapters explore the deployment of decrees in political and litigious contexts, the dissemination of knowledge about decrees, and their literary representation. The emphasis on the decree as a social, political and cultural transaction places the topic in a broader historical and literary context.

While there has been extensive discussion of types of Athenian decrees in a number of scholarly contexts,³ the literary evidence for Athenian decrees of the period 403/2–322/1 has never previously been comprehensively published

² For a recent study of the epigraphical publication of Athenian decrees, see the analyses of Hedrick, 'Democracy'; Sickinger, 'Nothing to do'; Meyer, 'Inscriptions' and 'Posts'; Lambert, *IALD: Epigraphical Essays*. Discussion of decrees has been the subject of considerable discussion in studies of Athenian democratic institutions: see Hansen, *Athenian Assembly*, 108–18; Rhodes, *Athenian Boule*, 52–87; Schoemann, *De comitiis*, 129–47. The sole monograph dedicated to the Athenian decree is Biagi, *Tractatus*, 1785; the work took the form of an extended commentary on a decree of the Athenian council responding to a request of an association of ship-owners and merchants for permission to set up a statue of its host (*IG II² 1012*); Boeckh commented on how it published the decree 'cum immense et usque ad nauseam prolixo fatuoque commentario' (Boeckh, on *CIG I.124*).

³ See for instance Osborne, *Naturalization*, collecting both the epigraphical and literary data and discussing the implications of citizenship decrees.

as a dataset,⁴ nor have its implications been analysed. Important developments (pertaining to both the material and literary evidence) mean that the time is ripe for study of this material. From an epigraphical perspective, Lambert's publication of the third edition of inscribed Athenian decrees of the period 353/2–322/1 (*Inscriptiones Graecae* II³ 1, referred to hereafter as *IG* II³ 1) in 2011 and the ongoing development of an open-access website (www.atticinscriptions.com/) – which translates and offers historical commentaries on these and other Athenian inscriptions – has opened up a wide range of epigraphical perspectives on decrees to historians of fourth-century Greece.⁵ From a literary perspective, the publications of Canevaro and Harris have argued that the documentary versions of decrees appearing in the corpus of the Attic orators are not authentic copies of the decrees that they purport to represent.⁶ Their work does not, however, rule out the possibility that editors of such documents drew upon genuine decree-based material but, as Canevaro and Harris have shown, such a hypothesis can be tested only on the basis of extant evidence. It

4 Several scholarly works assisted the collection of data on decrees: Develin's *Athenian Officials* lists decisions of the Athenian assembly on a year-by-year basis, but does not amount to a comprehensive dataset. For a list of decrees attributed (in both the literary and epigraphic record) to proposers, see Hansen, *The Athenian Ecclesia II*, 34–69; for an overview of the content of decrees preserved in the literary and epigraphical records, see Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly*, 108–13. Hansen's book about the *graphe paranomon* (Hansen, *The Sovereignty*), the procedure that was used to challenge decrees in Athens, and Osborne's collection of citizenship decrees (Osborne, *Naturalization*) were also important.

5 For historical perspectives on Athenian decrees, see now Lambert *IALD: Historical Essays*.

6 Canevaro, *The Documents*; Canevaro and Harris 'The documents'; Harris 'The authenticity'; Canevaro and Harris, 'The authenticity'. For a list of the documents purporting to decrees discussed by Canevaro, see Volume 2, Appendix 2 note 1. Only a limited number of documents in the Demosthenic corpus have, since the late nineteenth century, been widely accepted as genuine. The authenticity of certain decrees has been the subject of recent debate (in particular those of Patrokleides, Demophantos (D19) and Teisamenos (D7) in Andocides' *On the Mysteries*): some scholars, such as Sommerstein ('The authenticity') and Hansen ('Is Patrokleides' decree ...?', 898–901), maintain the authenticity of the decree of Demophantos: for discussion, and Harris' reply (Harris 'The authenticity'), see D19 below. For a defence of the authenticity of the decree of Teisamenos (D7 in this collection), see Hansen 'Is Teisamenos' decree...?'; for a response, re-asserting that it is a forgery, see Canevaro and Harris 'The authenticity'. It is important to underline the fact that whereas the concern of this current work is with decrees alone, Harris and Canevaro's work addresses the wider question of documents in the Attic orators. Canevaro recognises the possibility that the documentary versions of several laws in Demosthenes' speech 24 may well be authentic: Canevaro 2013: 113–38, 151–7. But even those documents which appear to purport to refer to a decree genuine in the sense that it appears to have been proposed and enacted, such as the decree of Epikrates (D93), are established by Canevaro as inauthentic in terms of their substance: Canevaro, *The Documents*, 112. Carawan, 'Decrees' takes the view that the editor of Andocides' *On the Mysteries* drew upon earlier sources, including Krateros' work on decrees, to reconstruct the documents which appear in the text.

is, therefore, high time to analyse what the non-documentary literary material contributes to the view of fourth-century decrees.

The status and reception of the fourth-century decrees of Athens in literature has not yet been comprehensively assessed: this book aims to fill that gap and to explain the significance of the decree to political life in this era. As will become clear, the literary evidence on decrees offers perspectives alternative to those of the inscriptions: whereas, as Osborne has argued,⁷ inscribed versions of decrees, acting as a monumentalised record of decisions taken by the Athenians, tone down the controversial aspects of their domestic political circumstances and present them as the uncontroversial decisions of the Athenian *demos*, the literary sources often tell stories about the political intentions and implications of decrees, portraying them at times as the political acts of self-interested individuals. Accordingly, the literary evidence does not offer a 'window' into the substance of Athenian decrees, but it sets them in particular literary, historical and rhetorical contexts which are distinct from those of the inscribed record; it gives us a view of which Athenian decrees were viewed as having substantive historical impact, their significance in the negotiation of domestic and inter-community relations, and, more broadly, the relationship between decrees of the Athenian assembly and those of the inscribed record.

As we shall see, the primary literary evidence for decrees is that of the genre of oratory. Assembly (symbouleutic) oratory – which survives far less extensively than forensic oratory – contains some, but limited, reference to decrees, perhaps as most published speeches reflected the usually extemporaneous nature of speeches as they were made in the assembly; speakers at the assembly seem reluctant to name original proposers of past decrees.⁸ But most oratorical references occur in lawcourt (forensic) speeches, in particular those pertaining to cases which were purported to be relevant to issues of major public consequence. Self-interested orators quote, discuss and make reference to decrees of the Athenian assembly in a wide range of different contexts, but what the references have in common is that they are deployed in persuasive contexts and in support of arguments. Some orators constructed arguments contesting the legality or sense of a decree, seeking to overturn them within one year of their enactment by way of indictment by *graphe paranomon*.⁹ To accept

7 Osborne, 'Inscribing democracy'.

8 On the revision and publication of assembly speeches, see Volume 2, Chapter 2 note 24. On decrees in symbouleutic oratory, see Volume 2, Chapter 2.3.1 and 2.5.2. On symbouleutic oratory, see now Edwards, 'Greek political oratory', suggesting at 30 that 'Demosthenes was unusual in writing out drafts of his speeches in advance, perhaps through nervousness'.

9 On the *graphe paranomon*, the indictment against an illegal decree, see Hansen, *The Sovereignty and Yunis*, 'Law'.

straightforwardly the content of such claims about decrees without analysis is problematic: however, as we see in the Commentaries to individual entries in the Inventory, a challenge that we face when trying to analyse the literary sources for decrees is posed not only by their opaqueness but also by the fact that often a shortage of comparative testimonia means that it is hard to critically assess their substantive content;¹⁰ this makes it difficult to be certain about whether they provide accurate testimony on a decree.¹¹ Moreover, it is in terms of the intentions behind their proposal and the consequences of decrees that oratorical exaggeration and distortion is most pronounced. Other than oratory, there are some historiographical sources (primarily Xenophon, and the narrative sections of the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*) where there are passing references to decrees in political and military narrative. Moving beyond the contemporary sources, we encounter later writers like Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, whose claims about decrees can be taken on board only with great caution. Finally, there are sub-literary texts such as those of lexicographers and ancient commentators; some such authors clearly drew on authentic material pertaining to decrees, but their testimonia must be treated on an individual basis.¹²

As already mentioned, Canevaro and Harris have demonstrated the absence of authentic documentary versions of fourth-century Athenian decrees in the manuscript tradition of the Attic orators. Accordingly, secure knowledge of Athenian decrees in the literary record is reliant entirely upon the sources' descriptions – rather than documentary quotation – of decisions. There are times when the texts, in particular those of the orators, claim to quote verbatim the wording of an Athenian decree, as Demosthenes did when he compared the behaviour of the members of the second embassy to Philip with the decree that set out their orders (Dem. 19.278 = D133 T4).¹³ Indeed, on the whole, it seems reasonable to accept the view, enunciated recently by Carawan, that the Athenians, when discussing political activity in the courts,

10 Compare the methodological points well made by Johnstone, *A History of Trust*, 8.

11 The issue of distortion of decrees by literary authors will be discussed briefly here, but is treated on an *ad hoc* basis over the course of the Inventory.

12 In particular extant hypotheses tend to over-simplify the content of decrees as straightforward prohibitions: see, for instance, the *hypothesis* to Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*, positing the existence of a decree straightforwardly banning citizens from leaving the city; cf. Commentary on D168.

13 For other quotations of the texts of decrees, see D133 T3 (= Aeschin. 2.104) below; D130 T9 (= Dem. 19.4–9); D131 T1 (Aeschin. 3.73–5); D179 T1 (= Aeschin. 3.34).

'did not tamper with the text of laws, decrees, and other documentary evidence'; when they claimed to be quoting a decree, it is likely that they were indeed doing so.¹⁴

Carawan's view can reasonably be accepted for texts that were read out loud in public contexts. But particular factors mean that we cannot uncritically accept all accounts of decrees that appear in the literary texts at face value. First, we should note that Carawan's principle applies only to those decrees referred to in the law courts and assembly by those orators who drew upon knowledge of them for the purposes of persuasion and substantiation of arguments: while the corpus of Attic oratory is the most substantial source for decrees, there are many other sources too, such as biography, historiography and sub-literary texts. Particularly in later sources, there are times when a tradition – hostile or otherwise – about a particular individual has led to a rather distorted record of a decree: one such case is the claim in the *Life of Lysias* ([Plu.] *X Or.* 835f–6a = D6) that Thrasyboulos proposed a grant of citizenship for Lysias, which seems to be a misrepresentation of his proposal in favour of those non-Athenians who had opposed the Thirty: see D6 Commentary.

In the courts, too, it was well within the powers of speakers to distort their intentions or to present the scope of particular pieces of legislation as more narrowly focussed or more restrictive than they in fact were.¹⁵ This is hardly surprising given the contexts of persuasion in which laws were deployed. Critical analysis of such claims is difficult owing to the fact that only very rarely are there preserved speeches pertaining to both sides of a legal contest.¹⁶ Only on rare occasions, then, can an element of misrepresentation be detected: at the courts in 343, for instance, Aeschines (*Aeschin.* 2.121) implicated Demosthenes with moving of a decree praising the members of the controversial second embassy

14 Carawan, *The Athenian Amnesty*, 13. Harris, *Aeschines*, 7–16 outlines a very clear set of principles for assessing the credibility of claims made by the orators. For the view that versions of speeches revised for publication did not seriously distort the content of laws and decrees as they were presented in the courts, see Worthington, 'Greek oratory'.

15 For discussion of the ways in which orators sometimes narrowed the scope of the legislation they discussed, see Aviles, 'Arguing' and Johnstone, *A History of Trust*, 161. A good example of the limitation of scope is that which is proposed by Epikrates in Hypereides' *Against Athenogenes* (3–11): Epikrates argued, against his opponent, that the law that held all private agreements to be binding was limited only to fair agreements; this detail did not appear in the law with which he was concerned, but he put forward this interpretation on the basis of other laws which made exceptions. For the view that Isaeus (10.10) distorted a law about women's rights to be involved in transactions so that it would appear more limiting, see Schaps, *The Economic*, 61 and Morris, *Foragers*, 218–19. For discussion of the treatment of doubtful claims and other oddities in Attic oratory, see Todd, 'The use and abuse' and Bers, 'What to believe'.

16 The two pairs most relevant to the study of decrees are Dem. 19 and Aeschin. 2 and Aeschin. 3 and Dem. 18.

to Philip upon their return to Athens; Demosthenes' reply to this was that the council's decree that arose in response to his report did not honour them (19.31). In all likelihood, the council had passed a non-committal *probouleuma* (recommendation) to the assembly about the reception of the ambassadors upon their return to Athens, but stopped short of praising them (Dem. 19.34). Aeschines misleadingly implied that Demosthenes was the author of a decree praising the embassy. It is clear, then, that there is potential for distortion on the basis of detail, though Aeschines is on this occasion being economical with the truth rather than straightforwardly inventing a decree.¹⁷

While false quotation of decrees was too politically risky to be undertaken in the assembly and courts, it is clear that orators were often able to make claims about their impact and intentions in support of their arguments: one example is Philokrates' decree extending the peace treaty with Philip to posterity, which Demosthenes (19.47–9 = D130 T9) claimed had the effect of handing over the Phokians to Philip. Of course this was not the primary intention of Philokrates' decree, though it may arguably have contributed to the process which led to the destruction of Phokis. Cases like this, however, are most fruitfully discussed on an *ad hoc* basis, and for this reason they are treated in detail in Inventory A. Finally, when considering the authenticity of claims made about laws and decrees, it is important to be aware of the possibility that revision of lawcourt speeches after they had been delivered may well have given rise to alterations in their shape and argument.¹⁸ However, for the most part, as Worthington has argued, it seems to have been the case that the process of revision tended to address compositional issues rather than affecting the accuracy of content.¹⁹

In the next section I outline the terminology which I have identified as indicating the existence of a decree, the mode of research and principles of organisation of the Inventory.

2 Criteria for Inclusion in the *Inventory of Athenian Decrees*

In the initial stages of work on this project (which was initiated in spring 2005), I collected literary references to decrees of the Athenian assembly of the period

17 See the discussion of this issue in Volume 2, D128 Commentary.

18 MacDowell (*Demosthenes, On the False*, 23–4) suggests that the versions we have of some speeches represent 'a copy of what the speech-writer prepared in advance' in the form of notes, but that in other cases what we have is 'a copy of what was prepared after the trial for distribution to readers. This may or may not incorporate material written beforehand, which the writer has revised with additions and deletions.'

19 On revision of oratorical texts and the implications for historical reliability, see Worthington, 'Greek oratory'.

between the archonship of Eukleides in 403/2 and the end of archon year 322/1. This was undertaken by carrying out *TLG*-database searches for the relevant terms in contemporary sources and later writers. An analysis of these results revealed reference to 245 decrees of the period, plus reference to a further 90 testimonia for decisions (such as peace treaties, the dispatch of ambassadors, military expeditions, cleruchs, etc.) which, by analogy, we can reason were carried out on the basis of a decree of the assembly. These were then arranged (as far as possible) into chronological order; their testimonia are published in the core of this volume (the inventories of testimonia for decrees: Inventory A1 (403/2–353/2) and Inventory A2 (352/1–322/1), together with translations and historical commentaries; the testimonia for possible decrees about which there can be less certainty are accounted for in a terser format alongside accounts of other occasions when a decree of the people may have been involved (Inventory B). Decrees of the Athenian council are collected in Volume 1, Appendix 1; a number of literary fabrications are collected in Volume 2, Appendix 2.

The best way of identifying literary testimonia for decrees is by detecting the appearance of words used to describe a proposal or a decree that was enacted.²⁰ Texts that were searched consisted of contemporary sources (primarily the speeches and fragments of the Attic Orators, historiography, and *Atthidography*), the works of later writers on areas of relevance (such as Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, Diogenes Laertius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus), and relevant sub-literary texts (Didymus, Harpokration, Pollux, Suda, and relevant scholia, whose mention of decrees can reasonably be used to assert knowledge of a literary tradition about a decree).

The primary search-term was the word ψήφισμα ('decree'), but searches were undertaken also for δόγμα ('act'), which was on occasion used as a way of referring to political enactments. Searches were completed for cognates of the verb ψηφίζομαι ('I cast a vote'), which was used frequently to refer to the process of voting on a proposal in the assembly. Literary texts were trawled also for traces of the enactment formulae – ἔδοξε (τῆι βουλῆι καὶ) τῶι δήμῳ ('the *demos* (and *boule*) resolve') – which appear on inscribed Athenian decrees. I looked for terms which refer to a proposal, γνώμη ('proposal'), to a recommendation of the council, προβούλευμα ('recommendation'), and searched also for cognates of the verb γράφω ('I propose'). Searches were undertaken also for those terms which were often used to refer to situations and phenomena which arose as a consequence of decrees of the Athenian assembly, such as συμμαχία

20 For this approach, see Hansen, *The Athenian Ecclesia II*, 165 note 15.

(‘alliance’); σύμμαχοι (‘allies’); ἀτέλεια (‘exemption’); ἐπαινός (‘praise’). The other aspect of data-collection surveyed modern scholarship.²¹

Omitted from this collection are those pieces of legislation described simply as a *nomos* (‘law’): one such example is Lycurgus’ proposal to set up statues of the fifth-century tragedians and provide that their plays be written down and placed in the archive ([Plu.] *X Or.* 841f). But there are some instances where enactments are referred to both as decrees and laws:²² the nature of the enactment is discussed in the Inventory (see DD 9, 10, 11, 17 Commentary).

In the remainder of this section, I outline the particular words and phrases used in the identification of particular decrees. For the sake of clarity, testimonia on decrees are classified into a hierarchy of five Attestation Types; Types 1 and 2 constitute strong evidence for the testimonia to be classified with a high degree of certainty as decrees of the Athenian assembly; they are marked as ‘D’ in the Inventory and make up Inventory A; Types 3 and 4 constitute reasonable evidence for near-certainty, and are marked as ‘DP’ (‘Probable Decrees’) of the Athenian assembly (see Inventory B1). Type 5 consists of ‘other possible decrees’, occasions where the sources do not associate particular developments with a decision of the people, but which plausibly might have been the consequence of a decree; some account of these is given in Inventory B2. This typology does not distinguish decrees that are of suspicious authenticity, but such decrees are marked with a dagger in the Checklist of decrees (see pp. 17–38 below); less convincing literary fabrications are discussed in Volume 2, Chapter 5 and in Appendix 2. Proposals which appear to have been rejected by the assembly are marked with a single asterisk (*) and those which appear to have been overturned by *graphe paranomon* are marked with a double asterisk (**).

In terms of organisation of the Inventory, testimonia for Attestation Types 1 and 2 are collected together under the heading ‘D’ in Inventory A: they are translated, analysed in detail, with commentary and bibliography; testimonia for Attestation Types 3 and 4 are collected under the heading ‘DP’ in Inventory B, translated, and discussed in a brief commentary; testimonia for Attestation Type 5 are simply listed.

21 For the scholarly works drawn upon in the initial stages of this work, see note 4 above.

22 As Hansen, *The Athenian Ecclesia*, 165–9 points out, on a few occasions enactments were referred to by literary sources with both the terms *nomos* and *psephisma*. In fourth-century Athens, laws were distinguished from decrees by a rather different set of procedural practices, and the conventional view is also that they were different in terms of their substance, usually being directed to long-term or general regulations, whereas decrees were aimed at short-term and specific matters: see Hansen, *The Athenian Ecclesia*, 161–205 and Volume 2, Chapter 1.2.2. For a selection of references to the initiation of the law-making process (*nomothesia*), see Inventory B2.6 below.

Attestation Type 1

The following are considered as strong indicators of a decree of the Athenian assembly, and are classified as 'D':

- (a) The description of a decision of the people with the term ψήφισμα ('decree'; 'the thing decided on by the *psephos* (ballot)'), e.g.: D5 T1; D14 T1; D16 T1; D20 T2; D27 T2; D39 T1; D44 T1; D46 T2; D67 T1; D71 T1; D76 T1; D81 T1; D91 T1; D94 T1; D98 T1; D101 T1; D105 T1; D107 T1; D111 T1; D115 T1; D116 T2; D119 T1; D121 T1; D122 T1; D127 T2; D129 T1; D130 T2; D131 T1; D132 T1; D133 T1-3; D138 T1; D140 T1; D159 T1; D161 T1; D162 T3; 165a T1; D166 T2; D167 T2; D169 T1; D175 T1; D176 T1 1; D177 T2; D179 T2; D181 T1; D186 T1; D193 T1; D194 T1; D195 T1; D196 T1; D199 T1; D200 T1; D202 T2; D205 T1; D206 T1; D207 T1; D209 T1; D212 T1; D213 T1; D214 T1; D215 T1; D217 T1; D218 T1; D219 T1; D220 T1; D223 T1; D232 T1; D237 T2; D238 T1; D240 T1; D241 T1). This can take the form of a passing report of a decree or the instruction to the secretary to read out a decree ('ἀναγνώσεται ὑμῖν τὸ ψήφισμα': D15 T1; cf. D23 T2; D41 T1; D64 T2; D70 T1; D85 T1; D88 T1; D93 T1; D134 T1; D135 T1; D147 T1; D160 T1; D170 T1), or an order for a secretary to fetch it (D114 T1; D128 T1). Aristophanic parody suggests three real decrees of the assembly of the period after 403/2 (DD 95-7).
- (b) An activity might be described as having taken place 'ὑπὸ ψηφίσματος' (D37 T1; cf. D69 T1), which constitutes very strong evidence for it being set in motion by the decree of the people. The mention that something was added to a decree 'προσγράψαντες τῷ ψηφίσματι' (D60 T1) also constitutes very strong evidence for enactment by a decree.
- (c) The attribution to the *demos* (sometimes addressed even in the lawcourts, as 'ὑμεῖς', the assembly, or 'the Athenians' of a decision with the verb ψηφίζομαι ('I vote'; 'I decide by vote') constitutes very good evidence for an Athenian decree. The verb might take the form of an indicative (e.g. in the 2nd person, ἐψηφίσασθε: D7 T1; D8 T1; D9 T1; cf. D34 T1; D38 T1; D55 T1; D68 T1; D106 T1; D142 T1; D191 T1, or in the 3rd person, ἐψηφίσαντο or ἐψηφίσαντο: D2 T2; D10 T2; cf. D19 T3; D45 T1; D50 T1; D56 T3; D65 T1; D120 T1; D143 T1; D151 T1; D164 T1; D168 T1; D182 T2; D183 T1; D190 T2; D197 T3), a participle form (e.g. D1 T6: 'τοῦ γὰρ δήμου κατελθόντος ἐκ Πειραιῶς καὶ ψηφισαμένου'; cf. D42 T1; D51 T1; D53 T1; D64 T1; D85 T1; D123 T1; D201 T1), or a passive (D222 T1: 'ἐψηφίσθη'). The attribution to the *polis* of a decision in this way (e.g. D11 T1: 'ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν ἐψηφίσαντο τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον') also is strongly indicative of a decree.
- (d) A report of the enactment formulae ('ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ': D13 T1) is strong evidence of a decree of the people. On one occasion, there is an extant