A Relational Theory of World Politics

Drawing on Chinese cultural and philosophical traditions, this book offers a ground-breaking reinterpretation of world politics from Yaqing Qin, one of China's leading scholars of International Relations. Qin has pioneered the study of constructivism in China and developed a cultural approach, arguing that culture defined in terms of background knowledge nurtures social theory and enables theoretical innovation. Building upon this argument, this book presents the concept of "relationality," shifting the focus from individual actors to the relations amongst actors. This ontology of relations examines the unfolding processes whereby relations create the identities of actors and provide motivations for their actions. Appealing to scholars of international relations theory, social theory and Chinese political thought, this exciting new concept will be of particular interest to those who are seeking to bridge Eastern and Western approaches for a truly global International Relations project.

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Preface

I

My father once took me to Mount Tai, the most famous mountain in Northeast China, when I was a teenager. As we were climbing, he told me to recite a short poem by a well-known Chinese scholar-poet, Su Shi (1037–1101). It is about Mount Lushan, another famous mountain in China. The poems go as follows:

> I see a range from one side and a peak from another,
> I have different views from above or below, from far or near,
> I fail to get the true face of Mount Lushan,
> Simply because inside the mountain I myself stand.

My father told me on the spot that you see a different image from a different angle even if you are observing the same thing. In addition, you can only see one image at one time without being able to see the whole picture simultaneously because you yourself are an observer from within.

It seems quite true of society and social scientists. Every social scientist is an observer from within society and can see only one side of it at one time. The whole picture perhaps exists, but no human can see it as it is. A different angle is significant, for it provides people with a different image they cannot see from other angles. A new image implies creation.

Cultures provide different angles for observation and different perspectives for understanding and interpretation. Culture is the shared background knowledge of a community of practice. It is true that there are commonalities across cultures, but there are also differences among them. These differences enable observers to have different angles from which they observe. As Su Shi's poem tells, an observer sees the mountain as a peak from one angle and as a range from another. It is not that the mountain changes; rather it is the angle of the observer that changes. It is exactly the reason why culture is a rich resource for theoretical invention and creation.

Society is similar. There are common features of a society anywhere, and power, authority, norms, and rules exist in every society. But how to

understand and interpret such phenomena depends very much on the background knowledge of a cultural community, which has formed, accumulated, and developed over long history and practice. Gradually it has become part of their life, shaping their way of thinking, speaking, doing, and representing, just as people from different parts of the world have different mindsets and speak different languages. It is not a question of being true or false; it is a matter of perspectives.

I define culture in terms of shared background knowledge. However, I do not agree with the view that places background and representational knowledge in a dualistic structure. Theorists of the international practice approach argue that there is a representational bias in social theorizing, which overemphasizes the role of representational knowledge and overlooks the significance of practical knowledge. This dichotomization of representational and practical knowledge is misleading. Representational knowledge is produced by people embedded in background knowledge. Academicians who generate representational knowledge are members of a community of practice, sharing completely the background knowledge of this community. Representation is practice, and doing academic work is practice, too, reflecting important elements of the background in which the producer of representational knowledge is embedded. Since background knowledge is the unintentional and preintentional that make the international function, as Searle argues, representational knowledge grows out of the background knowledge and the two are complementary and mutually reinforcing. A knowledge producer can hardly create some representational knowledge irrelevant to or different from the background in which she grows and develops. Background enjoys ontological priority and provides nutriment for representational knowledge to be generated; at the same time, representational knowledge articulates and reinforces important elements of background knowledge. They are the two sides of the same phenomenon.

Civilization-based cultures provide perhaps the most significant angles for observation. The more distant the two cultural communities are from each other, the more different are the angles they provide. It is because the background knowledge that defines them has more different and distinct elements inside. Western culture is obviously different from Chinese culture, which is in turn very much unlike Islamic culture. If culture is defined in terms of background knowledge and if background knowledge provides different angles for observation of social facts, it is crucial to explore cultural resources for innovation in social theorizing. In the discipline of International Relations (IR), scholars in the West have done a great deal in this respect, finding and refining significant concepts and perspectives for their knowledge production and reproduction. Non-Western cultures, however, remains very much an underexplored land.

II

This book is organized around a key concept: relationality.

One of the most significant concepts of Western scholarship is, perhaps, "rationality." It is a key word of the representational knowledge of the West and comes from the background knowledge of Western communities, fully explored and continually refined by Western knowledge producers especially since the Enlightenment. It has contributed remarkably to progress in many areas. It constitutes a most important worldview which believes in the universal and ultimate rationality and reflects the understanding and interpretation of Westerners about the natural, the social, and the human.

What then can we get from the angle of the Chinese culture? I argue that "relationality" is perhaps to Chinese what rationality is to Westerners. As rationality, relationality is a key concept that has been embedded in the long practice of Confucian communities. It has been repeatedly emphasized by ancient Chinese thinkers such as Confucius, Mencius, and many others thereafter. It comes from Chinese practice and in turn has influenced Chinese practice for millennia. To some extent, Chinese society is called a "relational" society, meaning that the social is first of all a nexus of relations. Unfortunately, it remains an underexplored concept in modern times, especially since China met the West. As a result, it continues to be highly significant in practice, but fails to be refined as a significant element of the representational knowledge.

A careful conceptualization of relationality is therefore very much needed. To do it we should begin to ask some fundamental questions that are behind the concept itself. First, what is our world and what is our world composed of? It is a question of ontological significance. Although some IR scholars oppose discussion on ontological issues, it is highly important, for the answer to such questions sustains where one starts theorizing. Mainstream scholarship in the West largely sees the world as composed of discrete and independent entities acting and interacting, very much with the push of outside forces. An application of this logic to the social world leads naturally to a belief that individual actors are entities independent of one another and each is endowed with *a priori* properties and attributes. A clear identification of their properties and attributes will tell us what they are and how they behave. Rationality is indeed a great discovery, for it defines clearly and succinctly the characteristic attributes of human beings: They are egoistic individuals, always ready to maximize their self-interest at the lowest cost. Starting from rationality so many influential social theories have been developed, from economics through sociology to political science. Thus, I argue, this most

significant concept of rationality is a spirit that has haunted the field of Western social theorizing and is rooted in the soul of Western knowledge producers. And I further argue that it is a concept drawn and refined from the practice of Western societies and a frame from which the world is seen and interpreted. It is an angle, a perspective, or a worldview that influences members of Western communities when they try to observe, understand, and conceptualize what is around them.

Relationality comes from a different angle. Chinese tend to see the world as one composed of complex relations, relations among the heaven, the earth, and the human, relations among humans, and relations among all things under the sun. In the social world it pays special attention to human relations in society. Its focus is not on the individual actor, but on relations among them. Its emphasis on human relations leads to some meaningful corollaries. In short, it holds that self-existence is simultaneous with coexistence; that self-identity is formed in and through social relations; and that self-interest is shared with other-interest and collective interest. Contrary to many who believe that traditional Chinese culture values collectivity at the cost of individuality, Confucianism values both. Because it places special emphasis on relations among actors, it holds that self-existence, self-identity, and self-interest are all related to other-existence, other-identity, and other-interest. In society, for example, self-existence is significant, but the self exists simultaneously with others. It is therefore wrong to argue that self-existence comes before or enjoys ontological priority over coexistence, and vice versa. It is also true of self-interest. While self-interest should be recognized as legitimate and significant, it is hard to define in isolation. Since the self exists simultaneously with others, their interests are related, shared, and realized through joint effort. It is mistaken to assume that self-interest is of primacy and it is equally mistaken to assume that collective interest comes before everything else. For Confucianism, a balance of the two is the key to a healthy society and governance, for they depend on each other for articulation, realization, and evolution.

The relational theory takes "relation" as its central piece and conceives the world in general and the international relations world in particular as composed of dynamic relations. Then how do we understand the multiple relations that connect actors in such a world? What is the nature of such relationships? How should such relations be managed? These questions are relevant in terms of both epistemology and methodology. The Chinese *zhongyong* dialectics provides a useful lens in this respect and it is also the methodology for my relational theory throughout. It assumes two poles, *yin* and *yang*, or the feminine and masculine forces in both nature and human affairs, and believes that all in the universe is

made by the interaction of these two forces. Since the *yin-yang* relationship is representative of all other relationships, it is the "meta-relationship." The *zhongyong* dialectics studies the relationship between these two opposite forces. It first of all posits that the basic state of this meta-relationship is harmony. From such an assumption it is inferred that all relations are fundamentally harmonious and are able to be managed as such. This postulation about the basic state of the meta-relationship differs fundamentally from the Hegelian dialectics, which also assumes two opposite forces but at the same time interprets their relationship as fundamentally conflictual. Second, *yin* and *yang* are immanently inclusive of each other. Unlike the opposite terms in the Hegelian philosophy, which are interactive but not immanent, *yin* and *yang* are of each other and within each other. They are simply two inseparable parts of the same whole. In the final analysis, therefore, conflict between the two is ontologically baseless, while the basic state of harmony is well grounded. Third, *yin* and *yang* are complementary. The two inclusively interacting items complement each other in a dynamically interpenetrating process. *Yin* and *yang*, or any pair of seemingly contradictory polar terms, such as cold and hot, weak and strong, nothing and something, etc., are complementarily related to each other so that they together create life and lead to a balanced form of life. The balance is not static, for it is always maintained through the dynamic complementation of the two extremes. The strength of one pole implies simultaneously its weakness, which is necessarily made up for by the strength of the other pole, and vice versa. *Yin* and *yang*, fundamentally different from the Hegelian thesis and antithesis, constitute co-theses which are inclusive of and complementary to each and whose immanently dynamic interaction enables what I term "coevolutionary harmony." This dynamic interaction is at the same time a process of generating new life, which inherits from both co-theses but is irreducible to neither.

From these basic assumptions, we may get a logic of relationality. It means that human action is based on relations. The IR literature has discussed some important logics of human action. The logics of consequences and of appropriateness, for example, are the mainstream arguments, one dealing with the instrumental aspect of human action, and the other highlighting the normative dimension. Even though in recent years the study of international norms has become a conspicuous project in IR research, due mainly to the rise of social constructivism, people can hardly tell which, interests or norms, is more important as a mover of human action. The logic of practicality is said, in theory, to have ontological priority over other logics. It is so indeed. Practicality provides the

ontological foundation for any other logics that are concerned with human action. But in the actual analysis by practicality scholars, it has been equaled with other logics, making the debate between the logic of practicality on the one hand and the logics of consequences and appropriateness on the other one that tries to figure out which logic is more significant as a base for action. The logic of relationality argues that a social actor weighs carefully the various relationships involved before she takes an action. Instrumental rationality works only when the relationship between actors has been defined. A business person's rational action toward her customers may not be rational and is even irrational when she does the same to her family. Norms are useful as an important mover of action in society, but norms are designed more to govern relationships rather than individuals. Each of the five cardinal relationships defined by Confucius has a corresponding norm to govern and manage such a relationship. Filial piety is the norm for the father-son relationship and sincerity for the relationship between friends. There is no norm that comes into being without a relational context. In this sense, the logic of relationality enjoys priority over the logic of consequences and appropriateness. Or rationality is defined in terms of relationality. At the same time it comes from long practice, and therefore the logic of practicality has ontological priority over the logic of relationality.

These assumptions constitute the major part of the relational theory. It sees the world as one composed of complex relations and the social world as one composed of human relations, giving "relation" an important ontological status and assuming humanity as the key to the understanding of the social. It employs the Chinese *zhongyong* dialectics as its major device of epistemology and methodology and with this dialectics argues that the basic state of the various and multiple relationships is harmony. It also proposes the logic of relationality, which holds that human action is based largely on relations. The simultaneity of self-existence and coexistence, of self-identity and co-identity, and of self-interest and co-interest indicates that relationality is a key concept in understanding human action in the social context. In short, from a different angle, we see a different world and a different social world; from such a world we develop a theory of relationality; and with such a theory we may reconceptualize some key ideas in international relations.

III

There are three parts in the book. Part I posits that culture provides one of the richest resources for social theory construction and knowledge production. Of course cultural influence is not linear and does not provide

direct causality. Rather culture, defined in terms of shared background knowledge, shapes the mindset, the way of thinking and doing, and the worldview of knowledge producers who are also members of a certain cultural community. Since background knowledge tends to be inarticulate and unreflective, its influence is often subtle and imperceptible, but it is everywhere, bearing on everyone embedded in a cultural community, which is also the prototype of a community of practice.

Chapter 1 discusses the two approaches to social theory construction: monism and pluralism. The former holds that natural theory and social theory are not substantially different and therefore should follow the same logic of theorizing. It implies that reality is the same everywhere and its explanation should be the same accordingly. It thus denies a place for culture to play a role in theory development. Pluralism, on the other hand, argues that the social world is not identical with the natural world and that social theory also differs from natural theory in that the former is not only to explain, but also to understand, interpret, and even construct and create. Ideas, values, mindsets, and worldviews therefore matter a great deal. The monist approach is self-closed and would naturally lead to a poverty and decay of social theory, while the pluralist attitude provides an open system in which various nutriments, including culture, may prosper the growth of social theory in general.

Chapter 2 focuses on one concept: the metaphysical component of the theoretical hard core. Culture matters for social theory development mainly through its long and invisible influence on the mindset of students who generate social knowledge. It is most deeply reflected by the metaphysical component of the hard core of a social theory. The hard core defines a social theory, but it is not a monolithic whole. Rather it consists of two parts: the substantive and the metaphysical. While the former perceives, the latter conceives. Once the substantive component receives signals from the outside world, they are sent to the metaphysical component for understanding, interpreting, and constructing. The substantive component deals with the more material and visible out there and the metaphysical component digests them and provides meaningful feedback. It is exactly this metaphysical component that is nurtured and informed by the background knowledge that comes from the long practice of a cultural community.

Chapter 3 further explores how the metaphysical component may contribute to theoretical innovation. Knowledge producers who come from different cultural communities are likely to have different mindsets and therefore produce different metaphysical components of the hard core for a social theory. Observers may see the same thing, but their angles are different and their understanding and interpreting differ accordingly.

The different understandings and interpretations are valuably positive rather than negative, for each angle may provide a fresh and meaningful theoretical perspective. They greatly encourage innovation for social theorizing. Since the metaphysical component is quite decisive in theoretical innovation and since it is nourished in culture, defined in terms of shared background knowledge, efforts to explore cultural resources for social theory development should be encouraged for the prosperity of the social sciences.

Chapter 4 uses the Western mainstream IR theory, referring mainly to neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism in the United States and also including the English School of IR theory, as typical cases to illustrate the importance of the metaphysical component of the theoretical hard core. Deeply implied in the metaphysical components of these theories is an element deeply embedded in the background knowledge of Christian culture and explicitly articulated by generations of knowledge producers in the West. It is individualistic rationality. It is a big idea indeed, and has produced enormous influence on theorizing especially since the Enlightenment. IR is no exception. All the three major paradigms in the United States share this key element in the metaphysical component of their theoretical hard cores. It is true that they have identified different master variables that influence the behavior of the individual actor. They are, respectively, distribution of capabilities, international institutions, and normative ideas. But all the big three theories depend on individualist rationality to work as social theories. It is instrumental rationality for neorealism and neoliberalism and normative rationality for constructivism. The English School used to be a distinct theory with its initial idea of "international society" to distinguish itself from mainstream American theories in the post-WWII years. But with the rise of Wendtian constructivism, the English School and American constructivism found a ready echo in each other and normative rationality was identified as a shared element in their metaphysical component. The convergence of American mainstream IR theories, and between the American mainstream and the English School, seems to be no accident. It is the shared metaphysical component in their theoretical hard cores that has led eventually to such a happy rendezvous.

Part II develops a relational theory of world politics. It explores the Confucian philosophical and cultural tradition so that a different angle can be found to see the world. Chapter 5 describes the world from a Confucian perspective of ontology: a world of relations and a universe of relatedness. Furthermore, the social world is seen as one of human relations. It is ontologically significant because a world of relations differs from a world of atoms. In such a world, relations become the pivot of

society and accordingly should constitute a most important unit of analysis. Actors in such a world are relators, relating and being related all the time. As mentioned above, self-existence is simultaneous with coexistence, self-interest simultaneous with collective and other-interest, and self-identity is shaped in and through relations. In short, to relate is human. The social world is a relational world and humans are relational animals. It subverts the dominant assumption that the world is composed of discrete individuals who follow the logic of individualistic rationality.

A major epistemological scheme and methodological device is presented in Chapter 6. It is the Chinese *zhongyong* dialectics. The discussion of this dialectics is unfolded in a comparison with the tenets of formal logic and the principles of the Hegelian dialectics. It differs from formal logic mainly in its particular emphasis on a "both-and" rather than an "either-or" way of thinking and on its appreciation of the "middle" rather than its exclusion. Two opposite arguments, for example, are not taken as one being true and the other false. Rather there may well be something reasonable in each and both of them. It agrees with the Hegelian dialectics in that both understand things as consisting of polarities and their development through the interaction of such polarities. It differs from the Hegelian dialectics in that the *zhongyong* dialectics interprets the basic state of the relationship between the two polarities as harmonious while the Hegelian dialectics sees conflict as the nature of such relationship. This difference is fundamental. The two polar terms, seemingly opposite, are in fact two sides of the same phenomenon, immanently related and inclusively interdependent, relying on each other for life and for the production of new life. It does not deny the fact that conflict exists, but does deny it an ontological status. Conflict is a necessary deviation from harmony. There are no such dichotomous terms such as "thesis" and "antithesis"; there are only concepts like "co-theses." Thus the *zhongyong* dialectics always tries to find the appropriate middle where the common ground lies, while the Hegelian tradition tries to diagnose the key contradiction, which is key to crumpling the old and creating a new synthesis.

The proposed relational theory explains human action and Chapter 7 puts forward the logic of relationality. It argues that a social actor takes action in a relational context and therefore bases her action on relations. It is not an argument against the logics of both consequences and appropriateness, both of which take individualistic rationality as the sustaining assumption, instrumental rationality for the former and normative rationality for the latter. The logic of relationality holds that social actors are rational because they are relational in the first place. It is relational rationality. As the well-known example by Wendt shows, the

US nuclear policy toward Britain differs fundamentally from that toward North Korea. It is not an issue of double dealing; rather it is a consideration and action based upon different relationships. Every state does the same. It is also true of norms. Actors are able to apply norms to action only after they know well what relationship constitutes the context where norms are to be applied. Norms for a Hobbesian anarchy differ from those for a Kantian community because the nature of relationships among actors in a jungle is fundamentally unlike that in a community marked by friendship. What action to take and what norm to apply depend very much on the nature of relationships. Relations select.

Part III provides from a relational perspective a reconceptualization of power, cooperation, and governance respectively in Chapters 8, 9, and 10. Chapter 8 discusses power. As a key concept, it is commonly taken in IR as the ability to overcome resistance and realize one's interest, making others do what they otherwise would not do or wish to do what they otherwise would not wish. It is understood that power is influence based upon resources and that resources are possessed by the individual actor as her essential property. However, if it is assumed that self-existence is simultaneous with other-existence, and coexistence and self-interest simultaneously shared with other-interest, then power may well come from relations among actors and is more the ability to co-empower rather than to coerce. Just as *yin* and *yang*, they are always in an ongoing process of co-empowering, complementing each other and making up for each other's weaknesses. As such, power is sharable and exchangeable. It enables actors to overcome and destroy, but also enables them to empower and produce. The negative dimension of power has been more than fully explored, perhaps because international politics has been defined largely as the struggle for survival through overcoming the threat in anarchy, but the positive dimension has long been unduly neglected, thus making the power of power politics even more powerful.

Chapter 9 provides an alternative answer to the question "Why do actors cooperate?" Cooperation research has largely been carried out around the basic assumption that the individual actor is an egoist, trying to maximize her interest at the lowest cost. Whatever is the motivation for cooperation, it is the individualistic rationality that makes independent decisions. From the perspective of relational theory, I suggest that relatedness is a primary mover for cooperation and hypothesize that the more intimately related the actors are, the more likely they are to cooperate. Family members are the least egoistic in their dealing with one another and close allies in international relations are more ready to help

each other. A single-move prisoner's dilemma (PD) game leads naturally to defection, while an iterated one is more likely to produce cooperation. No matter what other causal mechanisms work there, the shadow of the future or the expectation of continued relationship, for example, one factor is significant: The two players become related after their first encounter. It is the relatedness between them that makes a difference. Cooperation in a relational world is thus realized through three mechanisms: kin selection, the Confucian improvement or reciprocity, and Mencius optimality. Kin selection most explicitly shows how intimate relatedness promotes cooperation, reciprocity indicates that continued relationship makes cooperation more likely and easier, and Mencius optimality tells that a community of harmonious relations provides the best overall condition for its individual members to realize their self-interest. In a relational world, a serious obstacle to cooperation is kinsperson's dilemma (KD), or relator's dilemma, which occurs when one cooperates with a related actor, and she has to defect from another equally related actor, even though she wants to cooperate with both. In world politics, therefore, to get related facilitates cooperation and, furthermore, how to manage relations constitutes a major problem for decision-makers.

Chapter 10 discusses global governance. The IR theoretical literature on governance is perhaps the narrowest in scope and the most destitute in content. With some discussion of hegemonic stability as the background, it has grown mainly out of the study of rules and regimes, which became a most attractive research area. It is not an exaggeration to say that the globalizing tide since the late 1980s and early 1990s has been accompanied by the dominance of neoliberal institutionalism, with almost all the emphasis placed on governance by rules embedded in international institutions. It is undeniable that rules and regimes are extremely important, but governance does not rely completely on one single model. In other fields, governance should and can be explored in a much broader sense. Scholars of business management, for example, have been studying relational governance for years, especially since the rise of Asian firms. The model of relational governance, within the framework of my relational theory, contains three important factors: trust, relations as the governed, and governance as a process of relational management. "Trust" is not in the instrumental sense as the business management literature has defined it in its dealing with relational governance. It is genuinely human and provides the foundation for a fiduciary community. A security community, for example, is first of all a fiduciary community where members genuinely believe that force is not a means to solve conflict. The governed in the relational governance

model is relations among actors rather than actors *per se*, shifting the focus of governance from individuals to relations among them. Furthermore, global governance, and in fact any form of governance, is a process of relational management. It is a process of negotiating socio-political arrangements that manage complex and multiplex relationships in a community to produce order so that members behave in a reciprocal and cooperative fashion with mutual trust evolved over a shared understanding of social norms and human morality. Of course, relational governance is also one of the many models for governance and a synthetic model of rule-based and relation-based governance may prove more practical and effective.

IV

The relational theory of world politics proposed in this book tries to see and interpret the international relations world from a different angle, the angle of relationality. It is not out of thin air. Rather it comes from the long practice of Confucian communities and constitutes an indispensable part of their background knowledge. It has been extensively discussed and refined by generations of Confucian scholars and therefore is perhaps one of the most important concepts, if not the most important, in the representational knowledge that they have generated.

To relate and be related is human. Relations are significant in every society and the concept of relationality goes far beyond Confucian communities. Despite the fact that there are various understandings of relations, relationality as social practice is everywhere and generically human. It is, however, a very much underdeveloped and underexplored concept in the global academic world. To some extent, it has been overshadowed by the dominant concept of rationality, which has been a great idea in Western culture. Individualistic rationality has been so significant in modern times and is related to many of the human ideals and pursuits such as freedom, independence, and dignity. Together with it there have been great theories and institutions. But at the same time rationality becomes the ultimate word and the most powerful super force that has been moving farther away from humanness. The process of theorizing in IR, for example, is at the same time a process of dehumanization. Enormous efforts have been made to reduce to the minimum the complexity, reflectivity, and potentiality embedded in humanness so that general laws may be found to regulate and predict human behavior and to develop universally applicable theories. Gradually it has become an integral part of the shared background knowledge and the academic culture of Western societies.

But, what is the soul of IR as a discipline and what is the essence of world politics as practice? It is humanness. World politics, or politics of any kind, is human in the first place. Devoid of this spirit, there would be no world politics and no IR. To foreground relationality in social theorizing, therefore, is perhaps a small step toward bringing humanness back to the study of world politics.

Acknowledgments

I began to have an idea to develop a relational theory of world politics when I joined scholars from various countries in the project entitled "Why is there no non-Western IR theory," organized by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan in 2005. The inspiration I got from it is that it is far from sufficient simply to discuss why there is no non-Western theory. Rather it is more important to develop non-Western IR theory so that IR can become a genuine global discipline. As I was writing my paper for the project, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory," this initial idea loomed larger. I started thinking about an IR theory from a Chinese perspective when the project was completed and the findings in the form of seven articles were published in the *Journal of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* in 2007. My sincere thanks therefore should go to Acharya and Buzan as well as all the participants in the project, for the initial idea was inspired by the dialogue, discussion, and debate. In addition, Acharya and Buzan have discussed with me many times over the past ten years. Their valuable suggestions are highly appreciated.

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