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978-1-107-18027-7 — Newcomb's Problem
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Index

Abramson, P. R., 110–12
Acts, 2, 75, 108, 119, 139
Addiction, 27, 54, 66
Ahmed, A., 34–35, 92–93, 155–59, 191–92, 197
Ambiguity aversion, 156–57
Appointment in Samarra, 12–13, 140–41, 151–59, 193
  coin flip variant of, 155–59
  Semi-Frustrater variant of, 152–55
Arntzenius, F., 148
Aumann, R., 39, 108

Bayesianism
  Bayesian dynamics, 149
  conditionalization, 76, 82–83, 196, 199
Behavior, 104, 113
Briggs, R., 80
Broome, J., 32–33

Cartwright, N. L. D., 57, 166, 178
Causal autonomy, 212–13
Causal Decision Theory, explanation of, 8, 17–18, 25, 76–77, 101, 124, 144–46, 187–88, 201–2
Causal graphing, 204–7, 211–12
Causal independence, 3, 22, 61–62, 64, 142
Causal Markov Condition, 204
Causal principle, 2
Causal structure, 187
Causation, 10, 166
  agency theory of, 10
  as linked to rationality, 61–62, 160, 167, 171, 173
  as objective, 160–61, 167–68, 179
  temporal direction of, 10, 20–21, 162–66, 174
  v. quasi-causation, 163, 165
CDT. *See* Causal Decision Theory, explanation of
Chance, 124, 161, 174–76
Choice, 103–4, 107, 212–13
  as intervening, 209–13
  as openness, 213–15
Click example, 164–65, 168
Cohesive decision theory, 134–36
Common cause, 3, 10, 32, 103, 172, 204. *See also* Event classes, restrictions to; Tickle defense; Screening off
Constrained maximization, 47–52, 132–36
Counterfactual conditional, 25, 124, 142, 166, 168–70
Credence, 15, 124–25, 175–76

Death in Damascus. *See* Appointment in Samarra
Deliberational decision theory, 2–13
Deliberational dynamics, 13, 148–50
Deliberational equilibrium, 148–50
Deliberative dispositions, 48
Dependency hypotheses, 77, 83, 122, 124, 188
Directed acyclic graph. *See* Causal graphing
Dominance, 3, 6–8, 19, 187
Dummett, M., 1, 162–74

EDT. *See* Evidential Decision Theory, explanation of
Eells, E., 24, 28–32, 79
Egan, A., 126–27, 193–94
Epistemic factors, 122
Epistemic freedom, 211–12, 215–20
Epistemic uncertainty, 122–25
Euthyphro dilemma, 160, 174
Event classes, restrictions to, 56–62, 79. *See also* Common cause; Tickle defense; Screening off
Evidential Decision Theory, explanation of, 8, 16–17, 76, 144–46, 201–2
Evidential principle, 2
Expected utility, 15, 76, 110, 144, 207–8
  maximization of, 15, 19, 45, 75–76, 201
Experimental approach, 116–28, 130–36
Extended Dilemma, 191–92

False consensus effect, 99–100, 102, 109
Fatalism, 16, 59–60
Focal points, 117–18
Free will, 96–97, 103–7, 143, 212

Game theory
  classical, 38–39, 108, 117, 180–85, 194–96
  epistemic, 185–88, 195–96
Gauthier, D., 47, 49, 115–16, 132–33
Gibbard, A., 49, 129, 140, 142, 193

Harper, W., 49, 129, 140, 142, 193
Hurrying to class example, 81–82, 90–91

Idealization, 118–19, 122, 127–28, 130, 195–96, 199
Inconsistency, 44, 147–48
Instability, 13, 148–50, 194–96
Insurance cases, 196–99
Intention, 211–15
Interventionist Decision Theory, 203, 207–10

Jackson, F., 30–32
Jeffrey shift, 149
Jeffrey, R., 23, 41
Joyce, J., 63–64, 119–20, 148

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Index
More Information

Kavka, G., 45–46

Levi, I., 22–23, 107, 146, 216–18
Lewis, D., 35–41, 83–84, 129, 161, 175–76, 178–79, 187–91
Libet-type scenarios
  matching games, 69–71
  rock, paper or scissors, 65
Lottery, 65, 68–69

Mackie, J. L., 20–21
Matching game. *See* Libet-type scenarios: matching game
Maximization. *See* Expected utility: maximization of
McClennen, E. F., 115–16, 133–34
Meacham, C. J. G., 115–16, 134–36
Mellor, D. H., 124, 161, 174–75
Mood candles example, 77–80, 90
Morgenstern, O., 180–85

Neighborhood, of Newcomb predictor, 49
Newcomb Insurance, 198–99
Newcomb predictor
  reliability of, 20–21, 25, 96–97, 123, 142–43
Newcomb problem
  abstract structure of, 3–4, 21–23, 77, 138–40
  as rewarding irrationality, 44, 52, 129
  explanation of, 1, 19, 43, 55, 140, 201
  other variants of, 119–20, 169–70
  pseudo variants of, 151–59
  realistic variants of
    economic variants, 32–35, 105–6
    medical variants, 4, 9, 23–32, 126–27, 172–73
    prisoners' dilemma, 35–41, 97–98, 100–4, 188–92
    voting variants, 4–5, 109–12, 194
  transparent variant, 11, 50–51, 115, 120, 199–200
Newcomb-reveal. *See* Newcomb problem: transparent variant
Newcomb's hospital, 84–89, 94–95
Newxin puzzle, 49–52
Nozick, R., 1, 43, 123

Opportunities, 11, 63, 151–54, 157–58
  C-opportunities, 64–71
  E-opportunities, 63–65
Outcomes, 2, 75, 139

Parfit, D., 73–74, 84
Pargetter, R., 30–32
Pearl, J., 81, 90, 202, 205–7
Policy ineffectiveness proposition, 105–6
PP. *See* Principal principle
Predictor. *See* Newcomb predictor
Price, H., 10, 216
Principal principle, 176–79
Prisoners' dilemma. *See* Newcomb problem: realistic variants of: prisoners' dilemma
Psycho Insurance, 197–98
Psychobutton. *See* Psychopath Button
Psychopath Button, 193–94

Quantum entanglement, 10
Quinn, W., 52–54

Rationality, 44, 97, 104, 112–13, 115, 169, 182, 213
  as instrumental, 42, 116, 119
Reichenbach, H., 204
Resolute choice, 47, 50–51, 133–34. *See also* Constrained maximization

Sargent, T., 105–6
Savage, L. J., 76, 177
Schelling, T., 117–18
Screening off, 78–81, 90, 92. *See also* Common cause; Event classes, restrictions to; Tickle defense
Self-torturer puzzle, 52–54
Semi-Frustrater, the. *See* Appointment in Samarra: Semi-Frustrater variant of
Sequences, of decisions, 197–200
Simpson's Paradox, 59–60
Skyrms, B., 24, 145, 148–49
Smoking lesion. *See* Newcomb problem: realistic variants of: medical variants
Social science, 97–98, 100–4, 109–14, 184
Solution concept, 186–87
Spencer, J., 152–55
Stalnaker, R., 142
States, 2, 75, 119, 139
Stochastic dependence, 3, 108
Strategies, 181–88, 194–200
  involving sequences. *See* Sequences, of decisions
  mixed, 38, 183, 195–96
Success-first, 54, 115, 118, 132–36

Theory extensionality, 130–31
Tickle defense, 9–10, 26–32, 58, 80. *See also* Common cause; Event classes, restrictions to; Screening off
Time bias, 73–95, 146
Toxin puzzle, 45–47
Trembles, 38, 103

Utility, 15

Variables, independent and dependent, 39, 118–19, 122, 129–30
Von Neumann, J., 180–85
Voter turnout paradox. *See* Newcomb problem: realistic variants of: voting variants
Voting. *See* Newcomb problem: realistic variants of: voting variants

Wallace, N., 105–6
WAR. *See* Why ain'cha rich objection
Wells, I., 152–55
Why ain'cha rich objection, 11, 44, 55–71, 115, 152, 165, 168–69, 172–73. *See also* Opportunities

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