

Newcomb's Problem

Newcomb's Problem is a controversial paradox of decision theory. It is easily explained and easily understood, and there is a strong chance that most of us have actually faced it in some form or other. And yet it has proven as thorny and intractable a puzzle as much older and better-known philosophical problems of consciousness, skepticism and fatalism. It brings into very sharp and focused disagreement several long-standing philosophical theories concerning practical rationality, the nature of free will and the direction and analysis of causation. This volume introduces readers to the nature of Newcomb's Problem, and ten chapters by leading scholars present the most recent debates around the Problem and analyze its ramifications for decision theory, metaphysics, philosophical psychology and political science. Their chapters highlight the status of Newcomb's Problem as a live and continuing issue in modern philosophy.

Arif Ahmed is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. He is the author of Saul Kripke (2007), Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations': A Reader's Guide (2010), and Evidence, Decision and Causality (2014), and is the editor of Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations': A Critical Guide (2010).



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Newcomb's Problem

Edited by

Arif Ahmed

University of Cambridge







Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India

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Contributors

Arif Ahmed is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge.

Chrisoula Andreou is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah.

José Luis Bermúdez is Professor of Philosophy and Samuel Rhea Gammon Professor in Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University.

Melissa Fusco is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University.

Robert Grafstein is the Georgia Athletic Association Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia.

Preston Greene is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at NTU Singapore.

James M. Joyce is the C. H. Langford Collegiate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan.

Yang Liu is Research Fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge.

Huw Price is the Bertrand Russell Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge.

Robert Stalnaker is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Reuben Stern is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy.



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