Introduction

In early October 2013, two young Indian archers missed their flight to China. Immigration authorities at Delhi's Indira Gandhi International Airport had refused to let them pass: the Chinese visa they had been granted to attend an archery competition in Guangzhou was not stamped, as for other Indian citizens, but stapled. This was no coincidence. The two women were from Arunachal Pradesh, a Himalayan state on India's north-eastern extremity that is roughly the size of Austria. Chinese authorities thereby indicated that they considered Delhi's rule over the region, and the archers' Indian citizenship, to be dubious at best (Map 1).

This was not the first time Arunachalis had been issued stapled visas. Athletes or sports representatives from the state had many times been denied visits to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on that basis. Before, Beijing had altogether refused issuing visas for Arunachalis: China held Arunachal to be part of Tibet – and the Arunachalis, ergo, to be Chinese citizens. The row over stapled visas led Delhi to cancel plans to ease restrictions on PRC visitors to India.

The spat was but the latest in a series of incidents. Just before the new Chinese Prime Minister's visit to Delhi in May 2013, a three-week standoff between Indian troops and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had taken place in Ladakh, high in the western Himalayas. Meanwhile, Indian naval authorities worried about Chinese activism in the Indian Ocean.[1] But the year 2013 was not an extraordinary one for Sino-Indian relations. Tensions have plagued the relationship between China and India for decades, and they have gone well beyond diplomatic spats and armed stand-offs. Back in 1962, war erupted between the two countries high up in the Himalayas. In 1987, another military escalation was averted. Delhi and Beijing have officially agreed to maintain

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[1] Fayaz Bukhari, 'China, India troops set up rival camps in Himalayan desert', *Reuters*, 20 April 2013; 'After Ladakh incursions, China flexes its muscles in Indian Ocean' (IBN Live, 14 May 2013).

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2   Introduction

'peace and tranquillity' on their vast Himalayan border since then, but incidents occur on a regular basis.

A voluminous scholarship has tried to explain these tensions between the world's two biggest countries. The disputed Sino-Indian boundary looms large in many of these accounts. From afar, the Himalayas look like a wall between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent, but on the ground, India and China have antagonistic views of where their territories end and meet. Delhi stands by boundary lines inherited from British times, deeming them identical to India's historical and natural borders: the Ardagh–Johnson Line in the north-west of the Himalayas, near Ladakh, and the McMahon Line, on the massif's eastern extremity. Beijing's boundary claims lie far to the south of Indian assertions. The result is a dispute over the ownership of more than a hundred thousand square kilometres of territory, mainly near Ladakh (the Aksai Chin) and in the eastern Himalayas (Arunachal). An intense debate surrounds the validity of both claims.[2]

For many analysts, however, the boundary dispute hides a broader rivalry. China and India consider themselves great powers and expect to be treated as such, but their ambitions overlap across Tibet, South Asia, and even South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean.[3] Their conceptions of national security also seem at odds. For India, a non-threatening South Asia is one devoid of Chinese influence and under Indian leadership; for China, South Asia can only be a safe hinterland if Indian hegemony is kept at bay.[4] The Tibet question adds to the antagonism. India had strong cultural and economic ties with the plateau historically and had inherited special rights in the region from British rule. Since 1959, it has hosted the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile and the biggest Tibetan refugee community in the world.[5]

[2] For instance: Alastair Lamb, *The China–India border: The origins of the disputed boundaries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Neville Maxwell, *India's China war* (London: J. Cape, 1970); Elliot Sperling, 'The politics of history and the Indo-Tibetan border (1987–88)', *India Review*, 7:3 (2008), 223–239; Parshotam Mehra, 'India–China border: A review and critique', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 17:20 (1982), 834–838; Karunakar Gupta, 'Distortions in the history of Sino-Indian frontiers', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 30 (1980), 1265–1270.

[3] *The India–China relationship: Rivalry and engagement*, ed. by Francine R. Frankel and Harry Harding (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004); Mohan Malik, *China and India: Great power rivals* (Boulder, CO: First Forum, 2011); Harsh V. Pant, 'Rising China in India's vicinity: A rivalry takes shape in Asia', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25:3 (2013), 1–18; David Brewster, *India's ocean: The story of India's bid for regional leadership* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[4] John W. Garver, *Protracted contest: Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth century* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[5] Dawa Norbu, 'Tibet in Sino-Indian relations: The centrality of marginality', *Asian Survey*, 37:11 (1997), 1078–1095; Steven A. Hoffmann, 'Rethinking the linkage between Tibet

This book argues that these existing analyses miss a fundamental ele-
ment of the Sino-Indian rivalry: the difficulty of coexisting in the
Himalayas, a region whose distinct human landscape exposes India and
China's imperial nature. It is not just the boundary dispute or power
games that create tension, but the fact that India and the PRC both seek
to consolidate their presence in the regions east of Bhutan by achieving
exclusive authority and legitimacy over local people.

The Indian Union and the PRC alike derive their geographical claims
to the Himalayas from the conquests of a foreign empire (Manchu for
China, British for India), but these empires' territorial inheritance in the
Himalayan regions east of Bhutan was fragile, if not flimsy. Chinese and
Indian authorities' presence there is in fact very recent. Indeed, it truly
dates back to the 1950s. Effective, lasting state expansion largely hap-
pened *after* formal decolonisation.

The story of China and India is that of two post-colonial *and*
imperial polities seeking to deepen their rule over Himalayan regions
where they encounter people starkly different from their 'core' citi-
zenry. China and India's brutal experience of Western colonialism
long obscured their own imperial tendencies, but there is growing
recognition that Qing China was an expansionist empire comparable
to European powers. Moreover, its successor states employed colo-
nial policies on China's geographic peripheries – Tibet included.[6]
As for independent India, its long freedom struggle and professed
unity-in-diversity ideal coexist with imperial strategies towards
Kashmir or Nagaland. Decolonisation is nowhere as clear cut or
emancipatory a process as official history would have it.[7]

This intimate entanglement between the imperial and the national has
shaped China's and India's expansion in particular ways. The 'process

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and the China–India border conflict: A Realist approach', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8:3
(2006), 165–194.

[6] Laura Hostetler, *Qing colonial enterprise: Ethnography and cartography in early modern
China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Peter C. Perdue, 'China and other
colonial empires', *Journal of American–East Asian Relations*, 16:12 (2009), 85–103; Kirk
W. Larsen, 'The Qing Empire (China), imperialism, and the modern world', *History
Compass*, 9:6 (2011), 498–508; Justin M. Jacobs, 'Empire besieged: The preservation of
Chinese rule in Xinjiang, 1884–1971' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of
California, San Diego, 2011); Benno Weiner, 'The Chinese Revolution on the
Tibetan frontier: State building, national integration and socialist transformation,
Zeku (Tsékhok) County, 1953–1958' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia
University, 2012).

[7] Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Introduction', in *From the colonial to the postcolonial: India and
Pakistan in transition*, ed. by Dipesh Chakrabarty (New Delhi; Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007).

of empire' has been put to the service of nationalism.[8] Colonial trauma renders Chinese and Indian authorities particularly sensitive to their perceived status (whether past glory or current prestige), driving them to assertiveness on questions of sovereignty.[9] On the one hand, India and China see themselves as victims of imperialism; on the other, they resort to claims and governance methods inherited from it. The tension between the two imbues them with a lasting sense of anxiety and vulnerability, particularly strong in the eastern Himalayas. There, Chinese and Indian authorities have encountered people not only culturally distinct, but also ready to move – whether in search of better opportunities or to escape a polity seen as oppressive. People's mobility has been a source of deep anxieties for states, and China and India are no exception. From the perspective of officials on either side, border populations cannot be easily pinned down by coercive measures; worse, their location gives them the option to 'defect' to the other side.[10]

In the absence of an easily enforceable border and of strong legal, cultural, emotional, or historical claims to the eastern Himalayas' inhabitants, China and India's proximity became inherently threatening. Local men and women did not identify with (or care for) either polity, but the possibility to look on the other side meant that they could at least compare the two states, from the threat they might pose to the trade, welfare, and development opportunities they might bring. Indian and Chinese state-making and nation-building turned into processes of mutual observation, replication, and competition to prove themselves the better state – becoming in short, anxiety-fuelled attempts at self-definition against one another.

In Westminster political systems, the opposition's leaders collectively and individually 'shadow' each and every member of the Cabinet, closely following their government department's policies and questioning them in parliament. This Shadow Cabinet offers people an alternate choice of

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[8] David Ludden, 'The process of empire: Frontiers and borderlands', in *Tributary empires in global history*, ed. by Christopher Bayly and Peter Fibiger Bang (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 132–150; Uradyn Bulag, *Collaborative nationalism: The politics of friendship on China's Mongolian frontier* (Lanham, MD; Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Dibyesh Anand, 'China and India: Postcolonial informal empires in the emerging global order', *Rethinking Marxism*, 24:1 (2012), 68–86.

[9] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, *Wronged by empire: Post-imperial ideology and foreign policy in India and China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

[10] Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge, 'On moving targets', *Public Culture*, 2 (1989), i–iv; James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasant: Rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Benjamin D. Hopkins, 'The frontier crimes regulation and frontier governmentality', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 74:2 (2015), 369–389.

programme and leadership, forcing the incumbent government to always try to keep one step ahead.[11] This idea of an always discernible, readily available, and equally viable *alternative* political project is a key element of bilateral tensions. China and India see themselves as each other's 'shadow state' in the Himalayas.

This book is an attempt to study China–India relations not through their high politics, but from the ground up, and to show how this yields novel possibilities to understand tensions between the two countries. To do so, it explores India's attempts to entrench itself in the eastern Himalayas from 1910 onwards, and how they collided with China's own plans to deepen its hold over Tibet. It suggests that this led to the emergence of competitive 'state shadowing' between Chinese and Indian authorities and eventually participated in the outbreak of war between the two countries in 1962.

Anatomy of a Borderland

The region described here as the 'eastern Himalayas' lies to the east of Bhutan, at the juncture of the Himalayan range and two lower massifs, the Hengduan and the Patkai. There, monsoon winds come crashing against the mountains, sometimes eight months out of twelve. Heat and humidity foster the growth of dense jungles and high biodiversity. At higher altitudes, subtropical environments give way to temperate or alpine ones. Higher still are the snowline and the glaciers. The dry, windy landscape of the Tibetan plateau only starts under the 'rain shadow', beyond the highest peaks. But even there, zones of warmer temperatures, higher rainfall, and tangled forests subsist. Powerful rivers tumble down the Himalayas. Some have broken through the upper range, and where they do, their valleys act as funnels that propel the rain-carrying winds further, all the way to the plateau (Figure I.1).[12]

The most powerful of these rivers, the Tsangpo, has its source 1,700 kilometres away in far western Tibet. For most of these, it follows a leisurely course across the plateau, its braids-like channels turning surrounding areas into Tibet's agricultural heartland. As it approaches the Himalayas' easternmost peak, Namcha Barwa, the Tsangpo picks up

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[11] Joel Bateman, *In the shadows: The Shadow Cabinet in Australia* (Australian Government – Department of Parliamentary Services, 2008).

[12] Mark Aldenderfer and Yinong Zhang, 'The prehistory of the Tibetan plateau to the seventh century AD', in *The Tibetan history reader*, ed. by Gray Tuttle and Kurtis R. Schaeffer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 3–48; Francis Kingdon-Ward, *Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges: Retracing the epic journey of 1924–25 in South-East Tibet*, ed. by Kenneth Cox (additional material by Kenneth Cox, Kenneth Storm, Jr. and Ian Baker) (Woodbridge: Garden Art Press, 2008).

Figure I.1 The Lohit Valley, c. 1945
© Centre of South Asian Studies (CSAS), Cambridge. Mainprice
Collections, Box 19

the pace. Its waters now follow but one narrow channel, fighting their way
through jungle-clad gorges overlooked by glaciers. Instead of
pushing further east, the river circles Namcha Barwa, carving out the
world's deepest canyon, and, its U-turn completed, plunges down the
Himalayas to emerge in the Assam plain as the Brahmaputra River – 240
kilometres further and 3,000 metres below (Map 2).

   Though sparsely populated, the eastern Himalayas' human landscape
is a complex one. Its northern edge straddles two Tibetan regions: central
Tibet, culturally and politically the heartland of the Dalai Lama's govern-
ment, and Kham, which has a distinct identity and history. Besides
Tibetan populations, the eastern Himalayas host a variety of groups
who practise Tibetan Buddhism and Bon (the pre-Buddhic religion of
Tibet) and use classical Tibetan as a written language. The Monpas who
inhabit alpine regions near Bhutan have their own idiom. So do their
southern neighbours, the Sherdukpens, and the Membas of Pemakö.
People from various parts of Kham have also moved near the Tsangpo's
Great Bend.

But not all the eastern Himalayas belong to a greater Tibetan sphere. A great variety of groups inhabit the valleys – Hrussos, Puroiks, Apatanis, to cite but a few – and some, like the Adis, the Nyishis, or the Mishmis, have their own subgroups. Beneath these differences, these populations share a similar material culture, such as the widespread use of bamboo, speak Tibeto-Burman languages, and have oral rather than written traditions. Historically, most of them also practised shifting cultivation and held 'animist' beliefs.

The eastern foothills, near the plains of Assam, are inhabited by yet different people. The Khamtis and the Singphos follow Theravada Buddhism and have close links to the populations of the South-East Asia highlands. So do the non-Buddhist Tangsas, Noctes, and Wanchos who inhabit the lower mountains of the Patkai and are related to Naga populations living in the central part of the range. It is there that population densities are at their highest. Shared socio-economic ties and cultural practices often blurred the boundaries between supposedly different groups. The Nyishis of the upper Subansiri traditionally dressed their hair in Tibetan fashion, when those further south tied it into a bun on their forehead.[13] To the east, the Bokar Adis' indigenous beliefs were interspersed with Buddhist practices, whereas the Padam Adis, nearer to the plains, sometimes wore Assamese dress and peppered their language with Assamese words.[14] Identities and belonging could form complex assemblages, for instance among Tibetan Buddhist groups, whose shared religious identity and sense of difference vis-à-vis non-Buddhists were tempered by strong regional identifications (Map 3).

This linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity and ambiguity betrayed the historical fluidity of human settlement in the region, assumed to have ultimately originated from either Tibet or the Yunnan–Burma borderlands. Migration was not a single, en masse movement but a constant, protracted, small-scale process. People moved at different times, for different reasons, and to different places. Individuals, families, at times entire villages could migrate, and sometimes move on, yet again. Some moved in search of better land, others because of a famine, a feud, a disaster, or an epidemic; some moved to marry or join relatives; some moved to benefit from trade opportunities; some migrated for religious reasons, or because of war and political strife; some moved due to the

[13] New Delhi, NAI, External Affairs Proceedings (1945), Tour diaries of Capt Davy in the Dafla hills, 241-CA/45 (26 January entry).

[14] See respectively Tarun Kumar Bhattacharjee, *The frontier trail* (Calcutta: Manick Bandyopadhyay, 1993), p. 80; Gindu Borang, 'Trade practices of the Adis with special reference to Padams', *Yaaro moobang: A land of peace, prosperity and happiness*, 1 (2001), 14–18 (pp. 16–17).

migratory pressures of other groups; some wanted to escape punishment; and some moved, not of their own accord, but because they had been captured and enslaved.[15]

Seasonal migrations added to this fluidity. Every winter, the Sherdukpens descended from their altitude villages to camp in the Assam plains, profiting from their warmer clime and the trade opportunities.[16] Many Tsona Monpas similarly relocated to Tawang over the cold season.[17] Northern Adis travelled to Tibetan-speaking areas as seasonal labourers.[18]

Contact and interaction accompanied migration. People travelled to visit relatives, to build alliances, to search for prey – men among the non-Buddhist groups were skilled hunters – and above all, to trade. Himalayan people depended on the plateau and the plains for essential commodities such as salt, agricultural implements, or weapons, which they exchanged against available surpluses. Barter, often through a series of intermediaries, was the most widespread form of exchange. The Buddhist Membas acted as middlemen between the Tibetan plateau and their southern Ramo, Pailibo, and Galo neighbours, giving them wool, weapons, or beads and ornaments in exchange for hides, cane, chillies, and Assamese silk.[19] The Mishmis' chief source of wealth was their export of poisonous and medicinal plants.[20]

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[15] Stories of origins and migration play an unusually important role in constructing the continuity and distinctiveness of local identities. The Nas and the Mras of the Subansiri Basin tell how their ancestors descended from the sky to settle on the Tibetan plateau before migrating south. Neighbouring groups, such as the Nyishis, also believe they came from the north, but their legendary ancestor is a trickster called Abotani. *Origins and migrations in the extended eastern Himalayas*, ed. by Stuart Blackburn and Toni Huber (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012). Buddhist migration into Pemakö thus began in the seventeenth century, when war, political turmoil, and religious oppression sent many people searching for sacred 'hidden lands' (*beyül*). It continued over the next centuries, under different guises and with different degrees of importance. Kerstin Grothmann, 'Population, history and identity in the hidden land of Pemakö', *Journal of Bhutan Studies*, 26 (2012), 21–52.

[16] Yeshe Dorjee Thongchi. Interview with the author, 8 February 2014, Itanagar (Arunachal Pradesh).

[17] Interview with Karma Wangdu (Interview #46M). Interviewed by Rebecca Novick on 13 April 2010 (held at the Tibet Oral History Project), www.tibetoralhistory.org/interviews.html (accessed 27 January 2015). Monyül also hosted small semi-migratory herder communities, the Pangchenpas and Thingbupas. Bibhas Dhar, *Transhumants of Arunachal Himalayas: The Pangchenpas and the Thingbupas of Tawang District* (Guwahati: Geophil, 2009).

[18] Stuart Blackburn, 'Memories of migration: Notes on legends and beads in Arunachal Pradesh', *European Bulletin of Himalayan Research*, 25/26 (2003–2004), 15–60 (p. 25).

[19] R.K. Billorey, 'Oral history in north-east India', in *Proceedings of the North-East India History Association, Second Session* (Shillong: Singhania Press, 1981), pp. 14–22 (pp. 19–20).

[20] Sudatta Sikdar, 'Tribalism vs. colonialism: British capitalistic intervention and transformation of primitive economy of Arunachal Pradesh in the nineteenth century', *Social Scientist*, 10:12 (1982), 15–31 (p. 17).

Local and regional trading networks coexisted with long-distance cara-van routes, particularly for rice and salt. These generally involved currency and followed three main corridors: in the far west, the route from Charduar in Assam to Tawang, Tsona, and Lhasa; in the far east, the Sadiya–Rima route through the Lohit Valley, which connected Assam to Kham and western China; and the Hukawng Valley route to Burma.[21] Lhasa stationed an official at Tsona specifically to control the purchase of rice from the plains, either sold to locals or used for New Year celebra-tions in Lhasa; in return, he gave Monpa intermediaries equally precious salt.[22]

Pilgrimages acted as another nexus of trade. Tibetan Buddhists could go as far as Lhasa; pilgrims conversely flowed in, attracted by the great monastery at Tawang or the eastern Himalayas' 'hidden lands', earthly paradises where believers could find refuge, a place to settle, and Buddhist liberation. Pemakö was considered the purest of them. Tsari, north of the Subansiri, was the holiest mountain of Tibet. Every twelve years, 20,000 people from around Tibet circumambulated it. Of all the Tibetan Buddhist pilgrimages, this was the greatest and the most danger-ous. Some pilgrims, finally, passed through en route to the Buddhist sites of Assam.[23]

The reach of the Dalai Lama's government over the eastern Himalayas' Tibetanised regions was highly uneven on the eve of the twentieth cen-tury. Scholars generally agree that the Tibetan state did not exercise direct, unlimited, or exclusive control over land and people. Lhasa ruled both through temporal mechanisms – government officials such as the *dzongpön*s, in charge of districts where they had much day-to-day autonomy – and spiritual ones, through the influence of Gelugpa mon-asteries. Its authority diminished the farther one got from the capital.[24]

Configurations of 'Tibetan' power were particularly complex in the eastern Himalayas, which Lhasa considered a geographic and

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[21] J.B. Bhattacharjee, 'The eastern Himalayan trade of Assam in the colonial period', in *Proceedings of the North-East India History Association, First Session* (Shillong: Singhania Press, 1980), pp. 174–192 (p. 176); R.B. Pemberton, *Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India* (Guwahati: Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies, 1991 [1835]).

[22] Short Interview with Karma Wangdu (Interview #46M). For an overview of these trans-Himalayan trade networks, see Blackburn, 'Memories of migration' (pp. 33–34).

[23] Toni Huber, *The cult of Pure Crystal Mountain: Popular pilgrimage and visionary landscape in southeast Tibet* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Toni Huber, *The Holy Land reborn: Pilgrimage and the Tibetan reinvention of Buddhist India* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

[24] William M. Coleman IV, 'Making the state on the Sino-Tibetan frontier: Chinese expansion and local power in Batang, 1842–1939' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 2014), pp. 6–10.

civilisational periphery. Monyül – the land of the Monpas – and nearby Chayül were administered by Lhasa-appointed *dzongpön*s, who collected taxes, requisitioned labour, and administered justice.[25] So was Dzayül, on the other end of the eastern Himalayas. But other regions remained outside of secular authorities' influence. Pomé, north of Pemakö, was a semi-independent kingdom.[26] Finally, since the eastern Himalayas historically served both as a space of refuge from the Tibetan state or a place of exile, some Tibetanised communities were fully outside of Lhasa's reach.[27]

Non-Tibetan Buddhist societies had seen fewer processes of local state formation. While the Khamtis had forged a small kingdom, most people lived in relatively egalitarian socio-political structures. Sources of authority were varied – clan, village council, chieftain, or head of the household. The highest of them was seldom at the level of the entire tribe.

A complex political economy had linked the lower Himalayan slopes and Assam prior to the colonial period. The foot of the hills was an area of overlapping authority and resource use between highland-centred groups and polities such as the Ahoms, a kingdom that ruled most of Assam for six centuries. Local forests played a crucial role in nearby hill dwellers' subsistence, while Ahom subjects formed villages in their vicinity. Relations were managed through *posa*, a practice whereby Ahom officials relinquished part of these settlements' revenues to the Nyishis or the Adis to guarantee peaceful relations. For the latter, *posa* was a form of rent, due to them as the first users of land others now wished to occupy.[28]

The transitional regions at the foot of the trade corridor between Assam, Monyül, and Tibet were a particularly complex area, where a variety of Bhutanese, Mughal, Hrusso, or Monpa power holders enjoyed seasonal or time-limited control. This fluid system was maintained through the exchange of 'tribute' in multiple directions, and trade

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[25] Monyül had been permanently annexed by Lhasa at the end of the 5th Dalai Lama's reign, in 1680. His successor, the 6th Dalai Lama, was born there. Michael Aris, *Hidden treasures and secret lives: A study of Pemalingpa (1450–1521) and the sixth Dalai Lama (1683–1706)* (London: Kegan Paul, 1989).

[26] Santiago Lazcano, 'Ethno-historic notes on the ancient Tibetan kingdom of sPo Bo and its influence on the eastern Himalayas', *Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines*, 7 (2005), 41–63.

[27] Toni Huber, 'Pushing south: Tibetan economic and political activities in the far eastern Himalaya, ca. 1900–1950', in *Sikkim Studies: Proceedings of the Namgyal Institute Jubilee Conference, 2008*, ed. by Alex McKay and Anna Balikci (Gangtok: Namgyal Institute, 2011) (p. 261).

[28] On indigenous notions of space and authority, see Gunnel Cederlöf, *Founding an empire on India's north-eastern frontiers, 1790–1840: Climate, commerce, polity* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter 2.