Introduction

In this book, I examine a particular account of moral wrongdoing from the European Middle Ages, but I do so from a perspective different from the one traditionally considered. Often, medieval thought on wrongdoing and evil is seen by contemporary philosophers as engaging what has become known as the problem of evil. Quite briefly, the traditional problem of evil is concerned with the relationship between the existence and/or nature of (often the specifically Christian) God and the presence and amount of (especially horrific) evil in our world. The Christian conception of God is that of an omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely good God. Such a being would have the knowledge of how to prevent evil from occurring, have the power to do so, and presumably also have the desire to do so by virtue of his goodness, and yet there is evil in our world, much of which appears to be gratuitous. For many philosophers, the presence of such evil in the world constitutes a decisive reason to think that there is no God. For the Christian, then, the challenge is to explain how evil is compatible with the existence of God. There exists an entire philosophical industry to address this challenge.¹

My project is a different one. I have nothing to say on how to resolve the preceding issue, which Peter Kivy has designated as the theological problem of evil.² Kivy contrasts this problem with what he calls the secular problem of evil (Kivy, 481–86). For him, the issue is how to account for cases of evil in which the perpetrator appears to pursue no real or apparent good. Kivy argues that the most prominent accounts of motivation for action face this problem because they presuppose that agents act always for a good, which he characterizes as either their own

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¹ A number of important classic essays on the problem are collected in The Problem of Evil, Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, eds. (Oxford University Press, 1990). Essays on the so-called evidential argument from evil can be found in The Evidential Argument from Evil, Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996).

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self-interest or the interests of others. Although Kivy ultimately puts his point in terms of whether human beings can perform what he calls “unmotivated malice” (i.e., malice not out of self-interest or for the sake of someone else), his secular problem of evil raises the question of whether human beings can choose evil for its own sake. As we shall see, the account of moral wrongdoing that I examine in this book also must confront this particular issue. Although Kivy’s problem is an important one that I address down the road, my main concern is with a broader issue that is also nontheological in nature, one that I would argue will interest both the theologically minded and the non-theologically minded. The general issue on which I shall concentrate is how to explain why agents engage in wrongdoing or evildoing in the first place.  

I find it curious that until relatively recently the attempt to explain wrongdoing on its own terms has been neglected in philosophical discussions. The logical place for it falls under ethics, but traditionally philosophers have been concerned with issues surrounding the nature of the good, the right, or the nature of morality itself (whether from a deontological, utilitarian, or virtue perspective). Although there are some notable exceptions, by and large, philosophers have spent most of their energy developing accounts of the good or accounts of moral rules, which they use to define what is wrong or evil in terms of what violates those rules or what is not good. In other words, traditionally philosophers have given derivative accounts of evil instead of explaining wrongdoing or evildoing on its own terms. But derivative accounts are unsatisfactory in trying to understand wrong actions. First, they are often thin when it comes to trying to explain the phenomenon in question. For example, a common objection to the evil-as-privation account is that it is not helpful or enlightening to be told that evil is (merely) the absence of a good that ordinarily ought to be present. It does not help to explain which actions are wrong or why they are wrong. Secondly, examining what goes wrong can be helpful in determining an adequate account of the good. For example, Miranda Fricker has argued recently that examining unjust testimonial silencing is fruitful in developing an account of virtuous testimonial practices.  

She argues that we understand better how to achieve what she calls “ideal testimonial practice” by coming to

3 In English, the word “evil” has a special awkwardness to it. Sometimes we use it as a general term to include all kinds of wrongdoing, and sometimes we use it to differentiate a specific group of wrong actions that we find particularly horrific. I try to be precise in my use of the term, but there will be times when I will have to depend upon context to make my meaning clear.

understand the function of inapparent prejudices held by privileged speakers that contribute to unrecognized testimonial injustice. Without an awareness of how the unjust practice works, we cannot hope to achieve the testimonial ideal in her view (Fricker, 304). Analogously, one might not recognize how one’s account of the good is deficient without an awareness of what can go wrong. An understanding of wrongdoing can function as an important test of the adequacy of one’s moral theory.  

In the debate over the theological problem of evil, traditionally philosophers have taken one of two routes. Sometimes they have simply presupposed that we all recognize or can agree upon certain cases as paradigmatically evil and then devoted their arguments to reconciling the presence of that with the existence of God. Alternatively, they have given thin accounts of evil as the basis of their arguments before giving their reconciliation arguments. These accounts have been structured, by and large, either in terms of what causes human suffering, distinguishing between so-called natural evil and moral evil, or in terms of a privation, an account that has appeared implausible to many.

This neglect has begun to change. The literature on evil has grown considerably in recent years, regarding both the theological problem and the nontheological problem of evil. Even within the discussion of the theological problem, philosophers have begun to recognize that an adequate resolution of the central issues requires an explanation of evil itself. The number of accounts of evil developed independently of any particular

5 I return to this idea in Chapter 5 when I consider Laurence Thomas’s argument that an account of the good can fail to identify injustice if that account is too thin.

6 I have much more to say about the privation account in Chapter 2. Quite briefly, the privation account holds that all evil is a privation of the goodness that ordinarily ought to be present.


8 For an especially vivid approach of this sort, see Eleonore Stump’s recent book, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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theological commitment has also grown to the point that it is becoming impossible to survey all of them. Evil as a philosophical topic has arrived.

My subject of examination in this book is the theory of wrongdoing developed by what is arguably the most famous philosopher of the European Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas. The literature on Aquinas continues to be an industry in its own right, and yet astonishingly, there are very few book-length treatments of his account and none that purport to do what I intend to do in this book, namely, to examine his account in the context of his broader moral psychology. There are several reasons why it is important, first of all, to look at Aquinas’s explanation of wrongdoing and, secondly to look at it in the context of his larger account of human action. Some of these reasons have to do with the value of Aquinas’s account on its own terms, while other reasons are apologetic in nature. First, I address the apologetic reasons.

Despite the acknowledgment of Aquinas’s stature in the history of philosophy and the increasing interest in and recovery of medieval philosophy as a whole, too many scholars are quick to dismiss the Middle Ages in terms of its value to current philosophical debates. I certainly would not deny that the level of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular has moved well beyond that of the medieval world; our perspectives are, of course, much different than those of medieval thinkers.

The collection of essays in Aquinas & Maritain on Evil: Mystery and Metaphysics, James G. Hanink, ed. (Washington, DC: American Maritain Association Publications, distributed by Catholic University of America Press, 2013), also seeks to develop accounts of evil within a traditional Christian context. G. Stanley Kane argues that the privation account of evil was a traditional attempt to describe the nature of evil and was seen as essential to the project of theodicy; see G. Stanley Kane, “Evil and Privation,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (1980): 43–58, esp. 52–53. See also Patrick Lee, “The Goodness of Creation, Evil, and Christian Teaching,” The Thomist 64 (2000): 239–69, for an argument that theodicy requires the privation account.

While I grant that Augustine is a very important figure for medieval philosophy, I would argue that he belongs to the late ancient Roman world. For a general survey of medieval theories of evil from Abelard to Buridan with some discussion of Aquinas, see Bonnie Kent, “Evil in Later Medieval Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2007): 177–205.

Still, I often find that dismissals of medieval views have more to do with a failure to understand those views than with any particular argument that their conclusions irrevocably rest on outdated perceptions of the natural or social worlds.

A case in point is the medieval discussion of wrongdoing. In general, two different critiques are given of the medieval world on this topic. Each critique is rooted in what its proponents take to be the nature of medieval metaphysics and the relationship between that metaphysics and medieval accounts of ethics. First, there are scholars who assert that medieval metaphysics or theological commitments grounded in that metaphysics did not enable its proponents to develop a robust account of evil. Hence María Pía Lara argues that Augustine’s project of theodicy led him to characterize evil as (in her words) “metaphysical degradation” (Lara, 240). By this, I take it that she interprets Augustine as a proponent of the privation account. G. Stanley Kane agrees, arguing that Augustine felt that he had no choice but to adopt the privation account in order to resolve the problem of evil (Kane, 52). Neither he nor Lara takes this account to explain adequately the existence or nature of evil. Both agree that the ultimate concern of medieval thinkers was to ensure that God was not responsible for evil, which was supposed to be secured by the privation account (Kane, 53; Lara, 240). Kane argues that while the privation account is not defeated by the standard objections raised against it, still it is not sufficiently robust to account for all types of evils and in the end fails to divert responsibility for evil from God (Kane, 48–56). Lara argues that the privation account fails to explain how human beings come to commit evil and so fails as an explanation (Lara, 240). I examine the privation account in more detail in Chapter 2 because Aquinas does indeed profess a commitment to it. I argue there that this account does not exhaust the meaning of evil for Aquinas. In examining Aquinas’s complete theory of wrongdoing in this book, I hope to demonstrate that his account does explain why human beings engage in evildoing. Thus I plan to establish that it is false to think that no medieval thinker developed a robust account of evil.

The second prominent critique of the medieval approach holds that medieval explanations of evil inherently depend upon theological-metaphysical-supernatural entities such as the devil for their explanatory power. As such, these theories have no relevance for anyone who does not hold those theological-metaphysical commitments, which, of course,
It is undeniable that the medieval worldview invariably included a commitment to the existence of God. Aquinas, of course, shares this religious commitment, and the extent to which one can separate a purely philosophical (i.e., “secular”) theory from the religious context of his views is a contentious issue among Thomistic commentators. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 1, Aquinas holds that human beings are oriented toward God as their ultimate end, whether they understand or acknowledge this. Thus the content of his account of action has a religious orientation and framework. Nevertheless, Aquinas acknowledges that this notion of the ultimate end is controversial (ST I-II.1.7); he is willing to grant that not everyone agrees that union with God is their ultimate end, although he thinks that he has established through argumentation that all human beings have an ultimate end, which he calls happiness. Given that Aquinas grounds his account of moral wrongdoing directly in his accounts of human nature and action, the basic outlines of those accounts are established in an empirical reality that he often discusses independently of his religious commitments. Thus, while Aquinas’s texts are written within a Christian context, much about that context is not essential or particularly relevant to his basic theory. While an understanding of Aquinas’s religious context is necessary in order to understand his account, one can describe Aquinas’s theory of moral wrongdoing in secular terms without distortion. Aquinas himself often describes his views from both specifically religious and specifically nonreligious perspectives.


For example, he distinguishes between a theological sense and a philosophical sense of sin. A theologian defines sin as an offense against God, while a philosopher defines sin as a violation of the order of reason (ST I-II.71.6.ad 5). In his general discussion of vice and sin in Summa theologiae, Aquinas defines sin as a disordered act (actum inordinatum; ST I-II.71.1) and describes sins simply as bad acts (actus mala; STI-II.74.1).

In the De malo account, Aquinas distinguishes between a moral and a nonmoral understanding of sin. Theological and philosophical accounts of sin are related for Aquinas insofar as the order of reason is ultimately laid out by the eternal law, which has its source in God. But as I discuss later in the book, the order of reason is tied to the notion of human flourishing, which need not be considered from an explicitly theological perspective. Although Aquinas holds that human beings do not flourish without this relationship with God, still he often discusses his account simply in terms of beatitudo or the ultimate end in general (e.g., see STI-II.1–5). Aquinas also holds that human beings cannot avoid sin without the aid of God, but it does not follow from this, in his view, that human beings do not commit sins voluntarily or that somehow those actions are not imputed as sins (see ST I-II.109.8.co and ad 1; ST II-II .156.2.ad 1). As will become clearer from my discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, there is much upon which Aquinas and philosophers can agree vis-à-vis their theories of action.

This is true even with what are often considered to be explicitly theological notions. Consider the distinction between mortal and venial sins. This distinction is derived from the effects of sin on one’s orientation to the ultimate end. By definition, a mortal sin alienates one from the ultimate end. Since for Aquinas the ultimate end is union with God, a mortal sin severs one’s relationship with God and does so irrevocably unless one obtains forgiveness from God. Venial sin does not have this effect (ST I-II.88.1; see also SCG III.144 and In II Sent., d.42, q.1, a.4 and a.5).

Because a relationship with God is beyond the human capacity to develop on one’s own, it requires an infused virtue, charity (along with the other two theological virtues, faith and hope; see STI-II.62.1 and 3). By definition, charity is a particular kind of friendship with God (STII-II.23.1), uniting us with God (STII-II.23.3). It enables us to love God above everything else.

14 QDM 2.2. I discuss this account in more detail in Chapter 3.
and submit ourselves to God’s will (ST II-II.24.12). It also enables us to love others out of a love of God and so perfects our relationships with one another (STII-II.25.1). Mortal sin, by definition, turns us away from our genuine end by placing an obstacle to our continued reception of charity (ST II-II.24.12). In pursuing this serious sin, one refuses to submit to God and rejects friendship with God (ST II-II.24.12). One has turned one’s back on what in Aquinas’s view will make him happy. The sinner remains alienated from his true end unless or until he is restored by God to a state of grace. A venial sin, however, although blameworthy, is not as serious. It does not sever completely the connection between God and the sinner. It does not alienate one from the ultimate end God intends for human beings (ST I-II.88.1). 16 Although the agent who commits a venial sin engages in a disordered act, what he pursues by and large is compatible with love of God or love of neighbor. 17 Hence venial sins might damage our relationship with God (and dispose us toward committing a mortal sin), but it does not destroy that relationship completely (see ST I-II.88.3).

The distinction between mortal and venial sins obviously has theological connections and is important from the point of view of the theologian (which Aquinas considered himself to be). It fits within the entire theological framework of Aquinas’s account of human nature, of the ultimate end, and of good and bad actions and explains the effects of sin on our relationship with God. But it can also be useful from a nontheological perspective. 18 From a philosophical perspective, one also wants to grant that some actions are worse than others. Mortal sin is grave and deadly sin that cuts us off from what we want the most. Venial sin is less serious. The very worst sins are those that violate human integrity and exclude us from the human community. 19 In other words, these actions destroy human relationships or what Aquinas would call love of neighbor. These are mortal sins in both a theological and a philosophical sense. In many of these cases, exactly what can be done to remedy the situation is a difficult

16 Commentators have raised a number of complications for Aquinas’s view on this matter; for more on this issue, see Steven J. Jensen, “Venial Sin and the Ultimate End,” in Aquinas’s Disputed Questions on Evil: A Critical Guide, 75–100.

17 ST I-II.88.2. I say “by and large” here because a complication arises insofar as Aquinas is willing to grant that actions that are mortal sins in and of themselves (e.g., blasphemy, which is incompatible with love of God, and murder, which is incompatible with love of neighbor) could be venial under certain circumstances, and analogously, a sin that is ordinarily venial could be a mortal sin depending upon one’s intention. This issue arises often in Aquinas’s discussion of the capital vices in De malo. I acknowledge it here only to set it aside as not relevant for my present purposes.

18 In fact, in the Sentences commentary, Aquinas describes a philosophical sense of mortal sin; see In II Sent., d.42, q.1, a.4.

19 I discuss this issue in more detail in Chapter 5.
question. If the harm is severe enough, the answer may be that there is nothing humanly possible that can be done. Venial sins, however, are clearly blameworthy but are such that reconciliation can be brought about by such human conventions as apologies and reparations.

Thus at least some of Aquinas’s explicitly theological terms can be accommodated without much strain by nonreligious theories. Aquinas holds an account that both theists and nontheists could accept, at least in principle. Of course, it is a further question whether Aquinas’s account is satisfactory, and in the course of this book, I argue that it is. If my arguments succeed, then it follows that there is at least one medieval account of wrongdoing that contemporary philosophers ought to take seriously.

In the current literature, evil is often considered either from a perspective divorced from the whole of human life or from a rather thin account of human nature. If we examine the few treatments of Aquinas’s account of evil in the literature, they often situate that account within his metaphysics of goodness. In my view, both discussions are deficient. Both fail to account for the fact that wrongdoing in general and evil-doing in particular arise within the context of ordinary human life. As an interpretation of Aquinas, the second approach is particularly incomplete. In my view, Aquinas situates his account of wrongdoing squarely on the foundation of his general account of human nature and human action. While his metaphysics of goodness is relevant to a discussion of wrongdoing, it is not the entire foundation. Furthermore, without a discussion of his account of human nature and action, his account of wrongdoing is difficult to understand and appreciate.

I grant that Aquinas’s conception of human nature rests largely on an Aristotelian account of science that has been superseded. It also affirms a teleology that many philosophers find implausible. Nevertheless, I argue that his basic vocabulary involves technical terms employed to capture elementary observable phenomena that still make sense to us today. While our worldviews have been transformed by events that have taken place since the passing of the European Middle Ages and, of course, in places other than Europe, still Western perspectives have been importantly shaped by that past, and it remains relevant for that reason. I argue,

卡德有一个关于这个问题的有趣讨论，从一个纯粹的世俗角度；见卡德，166-210。这个问题也是在工作中的真理和和解委员会在南非种族隔离时期。对于一个有趣（但痛苦）的讨论南非的状况，见普拉·戈博多-马拉基泽拉，《人类在那个晚上死亡》，（波士顿：霍顿·米夫林，2004年）。

21 对于讨论，普通的人来犯下可怕的恶行，见詹姆斯·沃尔，成为恶（牛津大学出版社，2002年）。
however, that the value of Aquinas’s theory transcends such merely explanatory value, however important that may be. I hope to show by the end of this book that the theory as an explanation of wrongdoing stands on its own terms.

One might wonder, though, whether Aquinas and those working on current moral debates understand the concept of morality in the same way. Even a cursory consideration of the history of ethics makes it evident that approaches to ethical theory have undergone major shifts across the ancient, medieval, modern, and current periods. Scholars have debated, for example, whether the ancient Greek philosophers held the same concept of morality as those working today. Bernard Williams has argued that the ancient Greeks did not possess a concept of morality at all, while Elizabeth Anscombe maintains that we inherited the notion of the moral from Aristotle, although our usage no longer matches his. Terence Irwin argues that at least in Aristotle we can find the fundamental ideas that ground current conceptions of morality, namely, in his view, duties or obligations to others and voluntariness or control. Julia Annas holds that there are many points of convergence between ancient and current ethical theories. For example, both distinguish between virtuous (i.e., moral) and nonvirtuous reasons for action and hold that moral reasons carry more weight. In her view, both also make claims about the character of the virtuous person and the right actions to perform (although they weigh the importance of these claims differently). Furthermore, like Irwin, she argues that ancient accounts understand morality as fundamentally other-regarding and nonegoistic and accept voluntariness as a necessary condition for moral approbation and moral responsibility.

It is clear that sometimes Aquinas understands moral language differently than the current debate. For example (similar to Aristotle), Aquinas understands the phrase “moral virtue” (virtus moralis) as a technical term referring to virtues that perfect appetitive powers.

Yet, in other places in his texts, Aquinas uses the terms “moral” and

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25 ST I–II.58.1. “Et ideo non omnis virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi appetitiva.”