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Excerpt

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INTRODUCTION

For British diplomats posted to Germany 1871 was a year of vigilant observation. The Franco-Prussian War, France's defeat, and the subsequent Treaty of Frankfurt, the proclamation of the German Emperor and the establishment of imperial institutions for the newly unified Germany were of epochal significance both for Germany and her European neighbours. Benjamin Disraeli's notorious assessment of the Franco-Prussian War representing 'the German Revolution, a greater political event than the French Revolution of last century' epitomizes the magnitude of change as perceived from the other side of the Channel.¹ However, as Paul M. Kennedy has observed, 'perceptions of Germany were not clear-cut and absolute, but complex and relative',² and British envoys to the *Kaiserreich* contributed to these multi-layered assessments in many ways and for many years to come.

The present volume presents a comprehensive selection of diplomatic correspondence that was sent from the British missions in Germany to the Foreign Office between 1871 and 1883; it is the first of a two-volume mini-series which covers the years up to 1897. For Great Britain, as for the other Great Powers of Europe, it seemed necessary 'to keep a watchful eye over the new Empire'.³ Indeed, regardless of their individual inclinations towards German unity diplomats were predestined to fulfil a role as 'watch dogs',⁴ and until the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 they filed well over 25,000 dispatches to the respective secretaries of state for foreign affairs. In so doing they contributed not only to the making of British foreign policy,⁵ but provided an invaluable repository for the history of

¹Speech in House of Commons, 9 February 1871, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Ser. III, Vol. 204 (1871), col. 81.

²Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914* (London, 1980), p. 27.

³Howard to Granville, 23 January 1871, TNA FO 9/208.

⁴Evidence, Malmesbury (21 March 1870), Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services; together with the proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix, 25 July 1870 [382] (1870), qq. 778.

⁵See in general T.G. Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865–1914* (Cambridge, 2011).

Anglo-German relations which serves as the backbone of numerous scholarly works and historical editions.

The two volumes of *British Envoys to the Kaiserreich, 1871–1897* concentrate on Anglo-German history prior to German *Weltpolitik* and complement the two seminal editorial series of diplomatic documents before 1914: *British Documents on the Origins of War, 1898–1914* and *British Documents on Foreign Affairs (Part I; F)*.⁶ In this series, therefore, Anglo-German relations and the disputed question of antagonism are put into a broader chronological framework and historical context.

The diplomatic correspondence before 1898 modifies traditional – and often teleological – accounts of Anglo-German history not least because it highlights the volatility of relations, and the heterogeneous character of perceptions of Germany; indeed, the dispatches cover a wide and, at times, surprising range of diplomatic, political, social, and cultural affairs.⁷ To a great extent the diversity of these British observations is due to the simultaneous reportage emanating from five permanent diplomatic missions: the Berlin embassy, and continuing independent representation in four of Germany's twenty-seven constituent states in Darmstadt (Hesse and, from July 1871, simultaneously accredited to Baden), Dresden (Saxony), Munich (Bavaria), and Stuttgart (Württemberg). Correspondence from these so-called 'minor missions', which were maintained despite misgivings about their existence at the Berlin Foreign Office on Wilhelmstrasse, opens up new and comparative perspectives. In this respect *British Envoys to the Kaiserreich* builds on the preceding series, *British Envoys to Germany, 1818–1866*.⁸

I

The preservation of several British diplomatic missions in Germany is one of the most notable continuities in official Anglo-German relations

⁶ *British Documents on the Origins of War, 1898–1914*, 11 vols (London 1926–1938); *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part I, Series F, Europe*, 35 vols (Frederick, MD, 1987–1991). The Foreign Office correspondence on Germany is available on microfilm from 1906 onwards: *Confidential British Foreign Office Political Correspondence: Germany, Series 1, 1906–1925: Part 1, 1906–1919* (Bethesda, MD, 2005).

⁷ See Jan Rüter, 'Revisiting the Anglo-German Antagonism', *The Journal of Modern History*, 83 (2011), pp. 579–617; and the chapter 'British Views of Germany, 1815–1914', in James Retallack, *Germany's Second Reich: Portraits and Pathways* (Toronto, 2015), pp. 44–85.

⁸ *British Envoys to Germany, 1818–1866*, Royal Historical Society, Camden Fifth Series, 4 vols (Cambridge, 2000–2010). The omission of 1867 to 1870 is intended to enable the publication of a substantial selection of dispatches in two coherent and balanced volumes, an aim that would have been compromised by the inclusion of vast reportage on the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. It is hoped that this gap can be closed at a future time.

between 1815 and 1914 – it was, however, not undisputed. From the 1850s doubts about the usefulness of these missions and criticisms of the cost were brought forward in Parliament, and these reverberated in the press and featured prominently in several parliamentary Select Committees and Royal Commissions.⁹ With the exception of the legation in Hanover, which was closed down in August 1866 on account of the annexation of the Kingdom of Hanover by Prussia, and the consulate general in Hamburg, which had served as a diplomatic legation to the Hanse towns since 1841 but was discontinued from 1 July 1870, the map of independent posts remained largely unchanged and outlasted the founding of the new *Kaiserreich*.¹⁰ In lieu of the closed British mission at the Diet of the German Confederation at Frankfurt, the representation at the Grand Duchy of Hesse, in nearby Darmstadt, gained autonomy in 1866 and continued to exist – alongside the embassy in Berlin and the other smaller legations – until diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off in August 1914. The only exception to this continuity was the amalgamation of Stuttgart and Munich in 1890.

Yet, although the Foreign Office succeeded in fighting off calls for the total abolition of the minor missions, diplomatic representation to Germany was not left unscathed. From an institutional point of view, the most important change was the downgrading of second- and third-class missions to fourth-class missions, which were headed by secretaries of legation, secretaries of embassy, or ministers resident, instead of envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary. This development began with Robert Morier's appointment to Darmstadt in November 1866. The following year, in December 1867, another secretary of legation, Joseph Hume Burnley, was accredited to Dresden, a mission which had been withdrawn in August 1866 but which was reinstated in consequence of 'a feeling of disappointment, and [...] of annoyance, in Germany'.¹¹ In 1872, after a short interlude as chargé d'affaires at Stuttgart, Morier succeeded Henry Howard at Munich; Howard was the last of the former envoys extraordinary to be replaced by a lower-ranking diplomat.

⁹On the committees and the development of diplomacy in general see Raymond A. Jones, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815–1914* (Gerrards Cross, 1983); for the missions in Germany see Markus Mösslang, 'Gestaltungsraum und lokale Lebenswelt: Britische Diplomaten an ihren deutschen Standorten, 1815–1914', in Hillard von Thiesen and Christian Windler (eds), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel* (Cologne and Vienna, 2010), pp. 199–215.

¹⁰For information on British missions and diplomats see *The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Yearbook* (London, 1852–1914).

¹¹Evidence, Derby (2 May 1870), Report from the Select Committee, qq. 2428.

Over the following decades dispatches regularly reported upon the peculiarities and, at least from the respective diplomats' point of view, the hardships of everyday diplomatic practice in these rump-missions which in many cases – and especially during the summer months – were staffed with one diplomat only. In 1871, by contrast, the diplomatic personnel at the Berlin embassy, besides the ambassador, consisted of one secretary of embassy (who was in charge during the ambassador's absence), a military attaché (who contributed valuable insights into and contacts with the German army), as well as five further second and third secretaries and attachés.¹² Against this background the smaller missions' requests for assistance in order to master tedious daily demands, and be able to attend 'to work of more real interest and importance',¹³ seem not unreasonable. Desires for a more adequate salary were especially urgent: 'Without a private fortune', Joseph Hume Burnley wrote from Dresden, 'no man could live here on the official salary and it would be much more charitable to abolish the Post altogether than to condemn a man to live in a style not becoming the representative of a rich country like that of England.'¹⁴ For Burnley's successor, George Strachey, who had to endure increased prices and a doubling of house rents, his financial limitations were 'no longer compatible with respectability' and, in his view, ultimately led to a 'loss of prestige' and 'utility' for the legation.¹⁵

These problems notwithstanding, being a head of mission, however small, offered the chance to prove oneself and – in distinction to other colleagues of similar rank elsewhere – to be in continuous communication with the foreign secretary. Three of the diplomats presented in this volume, Robert Morier, Francis Clare Ford, and Charles Scott eventually reached the highest echelons of the diplomatic service, becoming ambassadors in the 1880s and 1890s. While their reportage indicates their talents and ability for greater future tasks – something especially true of Morier¹⁶ – the occupational stagnation of others, such as Joseph Burnley and George Strachey, who retired from their posts in Germany, cannot simply be ascribed to lesser forms of patronage or professional inability but also indicates the uncertainties of a diplomatic career and the general blockage in the pipeline for promotions. Indeed – just as was the case for

¹² *The Foreign Office List* (1872), pp. 8–11.

¹³ Morier to Derby, 8 August 1874, FO 9/224.

¹⁴ Burnley to Granville, 7 July 1871, FO 68/153.

¹⁵ Strachey to Derby, 18 March 1874, FO 68/158 (not included in this volume) and 27 January 1875, FO 68/159.

¹⁶ For Morier's early career in Germany see Scott W. Murray, *Liberal Diplomacy and German Unification: The Early Career of Robert Morier* (Westport, 2000); Rosslyn Wemyss, *Memoirs and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Morier, G.B.C., From 1826–1876*, 2 vols (London, 1911).

three colleagues who died during their tenure in Germany¹⁷ – Burnley and Strachey had joined the diplomatic service as attachés before the more restrictive policy of entry was introduced in the 1850s.¹⁸ It is not without irony that George Strachey, when asked about the expediency of the smaller German missions in 1861, fourteen years before being appointed to Dresden, answered that they may form ‘valuable nurseries for agents of a lower rank than minister’.¹⁹ This argument was repeated by the foreign secretary, the Earl of Clarendon, in the Select Committee on Diplomatic Service in 1870.²⁰ However, it was probably just as important that the Foreign Office did not want to relinquish posts that would not be replaced elsewhere – never mind the fiscal pressure from Parliament.

The evidence given before the Select Committee sheds light on some of the additional reasons behind the perpetuation of the legations in Germany. The fact that the other European powers kept their diplomatic representation in the minor states was probably the strongest argument.²¹ Any closure would have undermined British claims to a leading role in international politics and would have had – as in the case of Dresden in 1866 – ‘an unseemly appearance in the eyes of Europe’.²² This was also true in the cases of Darmstadt and Coburg, where close ties between the respective courts and the British royal house existed. At Darmstadt, Queen Victoria’s second daughter, Princess Alice, was married to Prince Ludwig, heir to the Grand Duchy of Hesse. Similar connections prevailed at Coburg where Britain had been represented by a chargé d’affaires since Victoria’s marriage to Albert in 1841, ‘with this additional bond, that Her Majesty’s second son will succeed to the present Duke’.²³ While the permanent under-secretary for foreign affairs, Edmund Hammond, in his well-prepared defence of these two so-called family missions, attributed to Darmstadt ‘a certain degree of political importance’, he confined himself in the case of Coburg to the observation ‘that the change in the political status of Germany affords no valid

¹⁷Evan Montague Baillie, Gerard Francis Gould, and William Nassau Jocelyn died while serving in Germany, aged 50, 48, and 60 respectively.

¹⁸Jones, *Diplomatic Service*, pp. 159–63.

¹⁹Evidence, Strachey (30 May 1861), Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic Service; together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index 23 July 1861 [459] (1861), qq. 2701.

²⁰Evidence, Clarendon (16 June 1870), Report from the Select Committee, qq. 3931.

²¹For a list of foreign representatives at the lesser German courts see, Fourth Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into Civil Establishments of the Different Offices of State at Home and Abroad [C. 6172] (1890), Appendix, p. 182.

²²Hammond, Memo in preparation of Committee 1870, 3 March 1870, FO 391/27; see also Evidence, Hammond (10 March 1870), Report from the Select Committee, qq. 164.

²³Ibid.

reason' to discontinue the presence of a diplomat who is 'an injury to nobody'.²⁴ Indeed, Charles Townshend Barnard's sporadic and meagre correspondence from Coburg, which is not included in this edition, confirms – at least from a British point of view – the impression that Coburg was a politically negligible entity. The Select Committee was, however, successfully assured of the diplomatic value of the other missions. The evidence given from March to July 1870 repeatedly referred to the unclear state of German affairs, and it is remarkable that in the following March, three months after unification had taken place, witnesses stressed the continued autonomy of the individual states and their importance for German and European affairs – and especially emphasized Bavaria's future importance. The committee concluded in May 1871 that, 'in the present condition of Europe', it was 'not prepared to recommend an immediate reduction of the smaller German missions'; yet it was 'of opinion, that there is a reasonable likelihood, at a no very distant date, that there may cease to be any good grounds for maintaining some of them'.²⁵

On this premise, choosing the right personnel for the disputed German missions seemed essential. In the course of reshuffling the posts in the new German Empire and creating 'chargé d'affaireships'²⁶ in Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Munich, the foreign secretary, Lord Granville, wrote to Gladstone: 'This will be in the spirit of the recommendation of the Diplomatic Committee, and we shall have three most intelligent men in Germany to watch the progress of unification.'²⁷ Evan Montagu Baillie, George Petre, and Robert Morier lived up to these high expectations and set the standard of reportage for their successors, which included close observations of the smaller states that could not easily be provided from Berlin as well as more general considerations of German policy. The docketts of the dispatches from these missions reveal that they were treated on the same basis as those from more important legations and embassies. With few exceptions these letters were read by the foreign secretary (Granville, Derby, and Salisbury) and also forwarded to the Queen and the prime minister. Two-thirds of the dispatches selected for this volume reached either Gladstone or Disraeli. This remarkable dissemination corresponds with the diplomats' self-image as independent representatives as well

²⁴Ibid. qq. 163–166.

²⁵238, First Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic and Consular Services; together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, 18 May 1871 [238] (1871), p. vi.

²⁶Evidence, Morier (30 June 1870), Report from the Select Committee, qq. 4514.

²⁷Granville to Gladstone, 18 October 1871, in Agatha Ramm (ed.), *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1868–1876*, Royal Historical Society, Camden Third Series, Vols 81–82, 2 vols (London, 1952), Vol. II p. 276.

as with their seemingly ascribed role of ‘the English Minister’²⁸ in their host countries.

Nevertheless, there was only one fully fledged ambassador to imperial Germany, and the strict separation of the four minor missions (five, including Coburg) from business in Berlin echoed the prominent and detached status of the British embassy there. Indeed, the exclusive attitude of the Berlin embassy is perhaps reflected in the scant reference that it made to the correspondence of the minor missions, despite the fact that this was often sent to the Foreign Office via Berlin, or forwarded to the latter in original or copy. The ambassadorship also came with the seasonal calendar of the new capital city and the obligations of being accredited to an imperial court.²⁹ Lord Augustus Loftus’ delivery of his letter of recall as well as his successor’s, Lord Odo Russell’s, description of the presentation of his credentials illustrate the ceremonial and formal aspects of diplomacy which were – for the most part – lacking in the smaller territories. Here, as can be seen in the case of a court ball in Munich in 1875, for example, court etiquette did not permit permanent *chargé d’affaires* to rank with other heads of missions.³⁰

In Berlin, where Russell was doyen of the diplomatic corps, the role of ambassador allowed direct access to the emperor. Amongst a number of similar sorts of dispatches, the account of a private interview following the funeral of Prince Carl of Prussia in 1883 indicates a close personal relationship between Wilhelm and Russell, then Baron Amphyll, which had no equivalent at the smaller German courts.³¹ To a considerable extent Russell’s appointment in October 1871, which was deemed necessary in consequence of Lord Loftus’ unpopularity in Berlin, rested on his existing personal acquaintance with both Wilhelm and the Prussian chancellor Bismarck, which he had cultivated when on a special mission to the headquarters of the German Army in Versailles from November 1870 to March 1871.³² By contrast the diplomats in Darmstadt, Dresden, Munich, and Stuttgart were more detached from the courts in their respective

²⁸Strachey to Derby, 27 January 1875, FO 68/159.

²⁹See Hans Philippi, ‘Die Botschafter der europäischen Mächte am Berliner Hofe 1871–1914: Eine Skizze’, in Oswald Hauser (ed.), *Vorträge und Studien zur preußisch-deutschen Geschichte* (Cologne and Vienna, 1983), pp. 159–250.

³⁰See Morier to Derby, 4 February 1875, FO 9/226 (not included in this volume).

³¹Amphyll to Granville, 24 January 1883, FO 64/1024. (Russell was created Baron Amphyll in March 1881).

³²For Odo Russell’s ambassadorship see Winifred Taffs, *Ambassador to Bismarck: Lord Odo Russell, First Baron Amphyll* (London, 1938); Karina Urbach, *Bismarck’s Favourite Englishman: Lord Odo Russell’s Mission to Berlin* (London, 1999); and Paul Knäplund (ed.), *Letters from the Berlin Embassy: Selections from the Private Correspondence of British Representatives at Berlin and Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, 1871–1874, 1880–1885* (Washington, DC, 1944).

capitals and their daily routines less constrained by the machinery of local governments, programmes of social engagements, and general politicking. Accordingly, they keenly reported on their audiences with their respective sovereigns or when, having been in conversation with representatives of other nations, they were able to furnish insights into international developments. Only occasionally were such dispatches marked confidential or secret. The diplomatic backwaters nonetheless allowed the diplomats more leeway in their reportage and they often provided more comprehensive assessments of the domestic situation and public opinion than was possible in times of hectic diplomatic manoeuvres in Berlin. In this way, they provided the Foreign Office with a multifaceted and also – with regard to the peculiarities of developments beyond Prussia and Berlin – more nuanced picture of the new *Kaiserreich*.

II

British envoys were not unanimous in their views but mostly sympathetic towards the solution of the German question in 1870–1.³³ Negotiations between Prussia and the states of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse in the autumn of 1870 and the conclusion of the November treaties had set the course for the new empire – although from a foreign observer’s point of view these were overshadowed by the Franco-Prussian War. In fact, when Wilhelm I was formally proclaimed German Emperor in January 1871, Her Majesty’s representatives, with the notable exception of Henry Howard in Munich, did not feel prompted to comment on the occasion nor does their reportage reflect the full extent of political change in the newly unified Germany. It is striking, for example, that the elections to the new *Reichstag*, which replaced the Diet of the North German Confederation, and its sittings drew little more attention than was usually devoted to parliamentary proceedings in Germany. Likewise, at a state level, many of the dispatches on political life in the smaller capitals and their respective courts suggest that the diplomats took the political unification of Germany in their stride. This also rings true for reportage on incidents of chiefly local interest, more ‘exotic’ topics, as

³³See in general Klaus Hildebrand, ‘Großbritannien und die deutsche Reichsgründung’, in Eberhard Kolb (ed.), *Europa und die Reichsgründung: Preußen-Deutschland in der Sicht der großen europäischen Mächte, 1860–1880* (Munich, 1980), pp. 9–62; and Kennedy, *Anglo-German Antagonism*, pp. 3–153.

well as general social and economic issues,³⁴ which British diplomats on the spot continued to have occasion and time to report upon.

Despite this ‘business as usual’ attitude the coverage of newsworthy items in Germany naturally evolved. Firstly, the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the conclusion of the Treaty of Frankfurt on 10 May 1871 allowed the envoys to write significantly more dispatches on domestic affairs than had been the case in 1870. Secondly, diplomats, who had previously speculated on the future relationship between a new federation and its constituent states – or reported on such speculations – now focused on the implementation of the new federal procedures and especially on the integration of the three smaller kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, as well as the two grand duchies of Hesse and Baden, within the Prussian-dominated empire.

The usage of terms like ‘Emperor King’ for Wilhelm I, ‘Reichsrath’ for *Reichstag*, and ‘Imperial German Council of the Realm’ for the *Bundesrat* (Federal Council) indicate that British diplomats had to adapt to the language of the new *Reich* and its institutions.³⁵ At the same time they provided the Foreign Office with information on the terms and conditions of the imperial machinery, especially on the legislative competence of the empire. Robert Morier had earned his reputation as an expert on German constitutional matters of Germany in his junior years at the Berlin legation (1858–1866) and was probably best suited to this task. At his successive posts in Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Munich he never tired of informing London of the intricacies of German constitutional practice. Two of these often long-winded dispatches are included in this volume.³⁶ Frequent references to the so-called ‘reserved rights’ of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse as well to the blocking minority in the Federal Council were also made by other diplomats, for example, when they reported on the extension of imperial competence to civil law. However, the picture which emerges from these dispatches of the 1870s is neither distinct nor consistent. Particularly in the early years of the *Kaiserreich* the extent of the reallocation of political power in Germany was subject to speculation, not least because of the differing evidence in the individual states. A report on the King of Württemberg’s opinion regarding the superfluity of state parliaments and a report on

³⁴In most cases economic issues were dealt with in anaemically written reports, and were largely based on German statistics. These dispatches, marked ‘Commercial’, are for the most part not included in this selection.

³⁵Loftus to Granville, 25 March 1871, FO 64/719; Strachey to Derby, 21 October 1874, FO 68/158; Jerningham to Derby, 3 June 1875, FO 30/244; Russell to Granville, 22 December 1872, FO 64/748.

³⁶Morier to Granville, 27 December 1871, FO 82/150 and 9 November 1873, FO 9/220.

the Saxon chambers' dedication 'to stem the tide which threatens to overwhelm their separate existence' can be found within three weeks of each other, in early 1872.³⁷

Assessing inter-state relations and German federalism was probably the most difficult task for British observers – especially for Odo Russell whose presence in Berlin and his proximity to the imperial chancellor seem at times to have led him to misjudge the federal dimensions of the empire. This can be seen in two dispatches in this selection. In February 1872 Lord Odo predicted that the Prussian school inspection bill, if rejected by the Prussian *Landtag*, might ultimately be passed by the German *Reichstag* and the Federal Council – yet neither body had legislative powers over Prussian schools.³⁸ More significant, and illustrative of fundamental discrepancies between reports from Berlin and the other missions, is Russell's assessment of Bismarck's imperial railway purchase scheme in February 1876. While he estimated that the 'acquisition of the whole German Railway system by the Empire [was] merely a question of time',³⁹ reports from the minor missions sketched in a more complicated, particularistic, and ultimately more realistic picture. The existing state railways were unified only in 1920.

Railways are but one example of imperial legislation which called for reflections on federal integration, German nation-building, and unity, and which gave rise to different views. Yet reports from Berlin, where imperial policy was conceived, and reports from the smaller German capitals, where it was echoed in the local press and parliaments, also complement each other. At times the first-hand experience in the *Länder* yielded deeper insights into the imperial government. This is evident in a dispatch on the ministry in Hesse, for example, which, noted 'the very slight importance, if any, that attaches to the general sayings of Ministers in the position of Messrs Hofmann & Freydorf', yet deemed those 'sayings' to be representative of the Bismarckian party in Germany.⁴⁰ In justification of his post in Saxony, George Strachey likewise stressed Dresden's importance as 'an official suburb of Berlin', 'probably unsurpassed as a German "Ear of Dionysius"'.⁴¹

Although diplomats occasionally felt cut off from the imperial seat of power, they did not refrain from assessing the more general state of the empire. The annual Sedan Day celebrations, elections to the *Reichstag*,

³⁷Morier to Granville, 27 February 1872, FO 82/153; Burnley to Granville, 19 March 1872, FO 68/155.

³⁸Russell to Granville, 24 February 1872, FO 64/742.

³⁹Russell to Derby, 28 April 1876, FO 64/851.

⁴⁰Jerningham to Derby, 13 May 1875, FO 30/244 (not included in this volume).

⁴¹Strachey to Derby, 27 January 1875, FO 68/159.