

Index

Adams, Robert, 209, 211-214, 215, 217 divine desire theory, 209, 215, 222-224 divine intention theory, 209, 215, 220-222 agency, 158, 193, See also Naturalism; agencybased naturalism divine virtue theory, 215-216 analysis, 16, 27, 34-35, 132, 177, 181 non-obvious analyses, 133, 177 Eliot, George, 96 paradox of, 23, 86, 117, 130-132, 133, 177 epistemic norm localism, 256-257 reductive analysis, 171 epistemic circularity argument for, 258-260 Aristotle, 3, 156 Pyrrhonian argument for, 257-258 autonomy of ethics, 1, 89-95 epistemic relativism, 254-255, See also epistemic 19th Century views of, 82-84 norm localism Kant's view of, 81-82 and the naturalistic fallacy, 260-264 logical autonomy, 75, 79-80 evolutionary ethics, 2, 5 ontological autonomy, 80, 86 Broad's criticism of, 106 semantic autonomy, 76, 77, 79-80, 86, 87-89 Darwin on the evolution of morality, 98 axiological pluralism, 10-13 Darwinism, 114-115 Ayer, A.J., 25, 74 Moore's criticism of, 103-105 Sidgwick's criticism of, 100-102 barren tautology argument, 85 Spencerianism, 110-114 Bell, Clive, 13 Spencer's evolutionary ethics, 10, 98-100 Blackburn, Simon, 20, 130, 167, 251 existence and being, 28 Bloomsbury Group, 12 expressivism, 124, 190, 193 Bradley, F.H., 11, 55, 56, 57, 58 and moral attitudes, 135-136, 238-240 and moral deliberation, 244-246 Brentano, Franz, 11, 65, 190 Butler, Joseph, 161, 226 and moral error, 246-249 cognitive expressivism, 240-242 expressivism about reasons, 237 conservativeness of logic, 77, 81, 84, 94 hybrid expressivism, 124, 134, 135 conservativism, 10 constitutivism, 28, 193, 196 constructivism, 193-194, 202, See also Foot, Philippa, 25 Naturalism; agency-based naturalism Frankena, William, 48, 54, 55, 179, 183, 188, Street's relativistic constructivism, 195-197, 226-227 203-204 Frege, Gottlob, 15, 16, 131 Frege-Geach problem, 27, 130 Darwall, Stephen, 133, 139, 158-159, 189-190 Darwin, Charles, 97-98, 100-101, 103, 110, 111, Gibbard, Allan, 130, 133 114-115 good definist fallacy, 183, 226 as a simple property, 44-46 definition. See analysis as a sui generis property, 4, 24, 64, 105, 141

as distinct, 46-48

divine command theory, 209, 215, 217, 218, 219



Index 283

as related to conduct, 68-71 Lewy, Casimir, 20, 65 commendatory use of, 128 connected to evaluation, 142-143, 144-146, McTaggart, J.M.E., 11, 65, 72 195, 213 metaethics, ix, 4, 9, 13, 20, 24-29, 30, 68, 108, 134, connected to right, 15, 139, 147 dependency of, 20, 51-52, metaphysical theories of ethics, 10, 24, See also 182, 184-187 theological ethics different questions about, 4, 9 Mill, John Stuart, 3, 10, 32, 36, 38, 64, 68, 72, distinct from good-making features, 146-147, 82-84, 87, 121 Moore, George Edward emotive use of, 125 accusations of naturalistic fallacy, 2-3, 55, 69, idea of, 15, 62, 65, 180, 226 100, 103-104, 141, 162, 210 indefinability of, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17-19, and non-metaphysical realism, 28 20-24, 25, 35, 37, 38, 39, 67, 75, 85-87, 119, and the is/ought gap, 41-44, 54, 73 140-142, 174, 181, 210 antecedents, 11, 65, 82 non-attributive use of, 15 anti-psychologism, 64-71 normativity of, 188-192 as non-naturalist, 2, 4, 12, 24, 54, 64-65, 80, not an intrinsic property, 184-187 105, 163 primacy of, 1, 9, 11, 13, 26, 189 barren tautology argument, 85 subjective accounts of, 85, 128, Cambridge influences, 56-61, 100 197-199, 203 formulations of the naturalistic fallacy, 17, theistic accounts of, 211-212, 213, 215 18-19, 26, 31-33, 37-40, 54, 119-121, Green, Thomas Hill, 3, 10, 12, 38 173-175, 180-188 on analysis, 16, 131 Hare, R.M., 6, 25, 74, 92, 125-128, 129, 130, 134, on beauty, 67-68 137 on intrinsic properties, 19, 185 hedonism, 10, 11, 61, 68, 186, 213 on natural and metaphysical objects and Hudson, W.D., 74, 75, 92-93 properties, 18, 36, 49-52, 55, 65 Hume, David, 26, 41, 54, 73-79, 85, 87, 92, 93, 97, on rightness, 147, 177 102, 105, 109, 164 on the distinct branches of ethics, 4 Hurka, Thomas, 12, 65 on the distinctness of good, 46-48 Huxley, Julian, 106, 111 on the idea of good, 15-16 Huxley, Thomas Henry, 96, 102 on the simplicity of good, 44-46 open question argument, 4, 20-24, 85-86, 118-119, 141-142, 145, 210, 211, 214 idealism, 12, 62 rejection of sense/reference distinction, 16 internalism (in ethics), 125-130 Trinity dissertations on Kant, 61-63 intuitionism, 11, 61, 163 writing style, ix, 12, 33-35 is of predication vs. is of identity, 35, 119-122, moral realism, 28, 164, 201, 207, 228, 234-236, is/ought gap. See no ought from is thesis isolation test (for intrinsic value), 11, 13, 20, 67 new wave moral realism, 27 Murphy, Mark, 218, 219, 221 Jackson, Frank, 162, 165, 166-172, 177 Joyce, Richard, 3, 228 naturalism agency-based naturalism, 195-205 analytic or definitional naturalism, 4, 24, Kant, Immanuel, 10, 39, 56, 59, 60-63, 66, 69, 71, 166-168 81-82, 87, 90, 115 in epistemology, 252-253 Kuhn, Thomas, 107, 256



284 Index

naturalism (cont.)	138–161, 172–178, 179, 210, 212–214, 218,
in ethics, 10, 27, 64-66, 91, 93, 131, 138,	226, 227
140-142, 146-161, 163-165, 182, 188-194,	
213	phenomenology (of moral deliberation),
in science, 57, 58	226–234, 242–244
non-reductive naturalism, 140, 141	as argument for realism, 234–236
synthetic or metaphysical naturalism, 2, 24,	explained by expressivism, 241–242,
166, 197–199	244–249
naturalistic fallacy, the, 27, 69	
and normativity, 188, 191	Platonism, 12, 70, 105, 113 pragmatism, 105
arguments for. See barren tautology argument	
and open question argument	Principia Ethica, ix, 2, 42–53, 54,
distinct interpretations of, 1–3, 17–19, 35–49,	103–105, 226
	influence of, 12–13, 85
54–55, 173–175	key claims, 9–11, 31–33
in epistemology, 252–264	preface to the second edition, 3, 15, 17–20, 26,
inferential (Humean) forms of, 1, 26, 41–44,	34, 65, 121–122, 179, 188
54, 73	principle of organic unities, the, 10, 11, 13, 20,
influence on metaethics, 24–29, 106–110	187
Moore's formulations of. See Moore, George	Prior, A.N., 42, 73, 75, 90
Edward; formulations of the naturalistic	properties, 1, 15, 33
fallacy	axiological, 208, 210-214
not a fallacy, 14, 19, 48–49, 55, 111–114,	complex, 44
118–122, 141	contingent, 19
not naturalistic, 10, 14, 55, 210, 226	deontic, 209, 214-225
ontological forms of, 1, 17-19, 35-39,	evaluative, 36, 142, 145, 149-161
44-48	good-making, 146
semantic forms of, 1, 25, 40, 76, 85	intrinsic, 19, 186
writers and theories accused of, 2-3, 10,	metaphysical, 18, 36, 49-53, 65
103–104, 210	natural, 18, 20, 26, 36–37, 49–53,
Naturphilosophie, 111, 112	65, 164
ness-ity-hood principle, the, 34	non-natural, 80, 105, 165
no ought from is thesis, 42, 73-95, 102, 109, 164,	normative, 191–192
See also naturalistic fallacy, the; inferential	synonymy criterion of identity of, 23, 86, 119,
(Humean) forms of	138, 141
non-cognitivism, 25, 27, 73–76, 87–95, 125–137,	psychologism, 57–71
177, 231, See also expressivism	populatiogram, e, , , i
emotivism, 123–125	quasi-realism, 27, 180
prescriptivism, 74, 177	quasi-realishi, 27, 160
non-naturalism, 2, 4, 24, 25, 28, 55, 71, 75, 82,	D. H. D. 100 104 107 200
105, 139, 157, 160, 163–166, 177, 204, 210,	Railton, Peter, 133, 194, 197–203
227, 234–237, 249	Rashdall, Hastings, 11, 65
	Richards, R.J., 111, 113, 114
non-naturalistic fallacy, the, 228, 250	Ross, W.D., 13, 65
normative ethics, 3–4, 13, 27, 30,	Russell, Bertrand, 12, 56–57, 67,
114, 170	71, 80, 84, 85, 87
Nowell-Smith, P.H., 25, 92, 92	
	Schelling, F.W.J., 111–112
Ogden, C.K and Richards, I.A., 123-124	sense and reference, 15-16
open question argument, 4, 20-24, 25, 27,	Sidgwick, Henry, 3, 10, 11, 32, 58, 61-63, 65, 66,
28, 85–87, 94, 117, 118, 131–137,	67–68, 82–84, 100–102



Index 285

Skorupski, John, 12
Spencer, Herbert, 2, 10, 26, 64, 98–102, 103–106, 110–111, 121
Stevenson, C.L., 25, 124, 128–129, 130, 134–135, 237
Street, Sharon, 193, 195–197, 199–204
supervenience, 130, 165, 167–170, 177, 187, 192, 218
Sylvan, Richard, 13

theological ethics, 206–214, *See also* divine command theory, divine virtue theory, divine intention theory *and* divine desire theory

use/mention distinction, 33

Williams, Bernard, 48 Wilson, Edward O., 108–113 Woolf, Virginia, 12, 72