

## Index

- Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA),  
 21, 118. *See also* generic drug application;  
 Hatch-Waxman Act (U.S., 1984)
- AbbVie, 6
- Abilify (antipsychotic, Otsuka), 110–12
- acceleration clauses, 57–59
- Accupril (hypertension drug), 53–56
- Actavis (drug company)  
*FTC v. Actavis* and, 24, 43–45, 49–50, 65  
 product hopping of Namenda to Namenda  
 XR, 76–78
- Actelion (drug company), 82–83
- active ingredient  
 defined, 27  
 strength of, 27
- Actos (antidiabetic drug, Takeda), 58–59
- Aleve (naproxen), 4
- Alice line of cases, 84
- Alnylam, 6
- antitrust cases, 24. *See also FTC v. Actavis*  
 as curb of citizen petitions as delay  
 tactic, 133–35  
*In re Cipro* (California Supreme Court), 46–47  
*In re Loestrin*, 61, 64  
*Noerr-Pennington* cases, 99–100, 134  
 rule of reason test in, 45–46  
 Teva over provigil (narcolepsy drug), 47–48  
*Trinko* opinion, 134
- Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic  
 Equivalence Evaluations. *See* Orange Book
- Argatroban (drug to prevent blood clotting), 117
- Asacol (chronic ulcerative colitis drug, Warner  
 Chilcott), 74–76
- AstraZeneca  
 product hopping of Prilosec to Nexium  
 by, 71–74
- authorized generics, 59–60
- automatic substitution laws, 20
- Bayer, 46
- Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act  
 (2002), 110
- bioequivalency of generics, 22
- Biogen, 6
- biotech stocks  
 concern over drop in at J.P. Morgan  
 Healthcare Conference (2016), 1–2
- Bloomberg*, 1, 16
- boy scout contract clauses, 59–61, 137  
 defined, 24  
 Product hopping by Endo and, 78–79
- brand-name drug companies  
 costs to society of unscrupulous monopoly  
 extensions and patent abuse by, 23  
 efforts of to block generic competition, 9  
 loss of market share after generic  
 drug entry, 7  
 use of clinical trial data of by generic  
 competitors, 22
- business method patents, 83
- carve-out requests, 103–04  
 carve-outs defined, 103  
 for generic Abilify (antipsychotic,  
 Otsuka), 110–12  
 for generic Crestor (AstraZeneca),  
 108–10, 111–12  
 for generic Skelaxin (King  
 Pharmaceuticals), 105–08
- Celgene (pharmaceutical company), 83–84
- Cipro (antibiotic, Bayer)  
*In re Cipro* antitrust case, 46–47

- citizen petitions
  - FDA attempts to curb abuse of, 97–98
  - FDA denial rates of, 94
  - In re Suboxone* case and, 95–97
  - Mutual Pharmaceuticals ‘orange juice’ petition, 92–94
  - number of filed since 2007 amendments, 98–99
  - original purpose of, 113
  - pharmaceutical company use of for generic delay, 91, 92
  - Section 505(q) amendments and, 97–98
  - sham citizen petitions assertions, 99–100
  - staggered petitions for Doryx by Warner Chilcott, 100–02
  - summary denial provision via 505(q) amendment, 99, 134
- citizen petitions as delay tactic, 25, 91, 92, 131
  - by AstraZeneca for Crestor, 108–10, 111–12
  - compilation of documents related to empirical analysis, 116
  - effectiveness of 2007 FDA amendments and, 128–31
  - empirical evidence of rise in petitions with potential to delay generic applications, 99, 122–23
  - by Endo for Opana, 94–95
  - filing dates for generic applications and, 119–20
  - identifying petitions that delay entry, 117–18
  - key findings from empirical analysis of, 113–15, 122
  - key metrics in, 121–22
  - by King Pharmaceuticals for Skelaxin, 105–08
  - matching petitions to relevant generic applications, 120–21
  - need for FDA transparency in, 135–36
  - overview of methodology of empirical analysis of, 115–17
  - procedural block to curb, 132–33
  - punitive deterrents to curb, 133–35
  - simple prohibition to curb, 131–32
  - staggered petitions and, 100–02
  - timing data with generic applications and, 119
  - timing of filing in relation to final approval, 123–28
- Colombia, 6
- Crestor (statin, AstraZeneca), 108–10, 111–12
- CVS Health, 5
- Daraprim (antimalarial and HIV infections drug, Turing Pharmaceuticals), 9–10, 84
  - price increase in, 3
- Delzicol (chronic ulcerative colitis drug, Warner Chilcott), 74–76
- Doryx (antibiotic and antimalarial drug, Warner Chilcott), 100–02
- dosage form
  - defined, 27
- Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 21, 32. *See also* Hatch-Waxman Act (U.S., 1984)
- drug pricing. *See* pharmaceutical pricing and costs
- drug product selection (DPS) laws, 20
- drug safety and efficacy, 22, 28, 83
  - carve-out requests and, 103
  - companies claims of concerns over for product hops and citizen petitions, 95
  - labeling information and, 109
  - subversion of FDA guidelines and, 67
- Egypt, deal with Gilead, 5–6
- Elements to Assure Safe Use (ETASU), 81–82
  - defined, 81
- Endo Pharmaceuticals, 94–95
  - product hopping via boy scout contract clause by, 78–79
- esomeprazole (Nexium), 4
- evergreening, 69
  - defined, 69
- exclusivity period
  - 180 days of under Paragraph IV certification, 22
  - parking of, 39
- FDA drug approval
  - before 1962, 28
  - changes after thalidomide crisis (1961), 28
  - citizen petitions and, 97–98
  - denial rates of generic-related petitions between 2001 and 2010, 94
  - Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) and, 97
  - generic delay and, 26
  - Kefauver-Harris Amendments and, 28
  - need for transparency in, 135–36
  - summary denial provision for citizen petitions and, 134
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
  - on authorized generics, 60
  - decrease in pay-for-delay settlements post-FTC v. Actavis, 46
  - FTC v. Actavis, 43–45, 49–50, 65
  - FTC v. Actavis rule of reason test, 45–46

- Felodipine. *See* Plendil (high blood pressure drug, Mutual Pharmaceuticals)
- Flonase (allergy drug, GlaxoSmithKline), 68
- Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (2007), 33
- Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), 97
- FTC v. Actavis*, 24, 43–45, 49–50, 65  
 rule of reason test in, 45–46
- Generation 1.0 strategies, 23–24. *See also*  
 Generation 2.0; Generation 3.0;  
 pay-for-delay; reverse payment schemes
- Generation 2.0 strategies, 24, 65. *See also*  
 Generation 1.0 strategies; Generation 3.0  
 strategies; pay-for-delay
- acceleration contract clauses, 57–59
- boy scout contract clauses, 24, 59–61, 137
- diminishment of pay-for-delay deals and, 66
- FTC v. Actavis* and, 65
- In re Lipitor* case of *Pfizer v. Ranbaxy*, 53–56
- K-Dur* case, 50–51, 52
- King Drug* case of *Glaxo v. Teva*, 61–65
- no-authorized-generic, non-cash agreements  
 and, 61–64
- non-cash provisions post-*Actavis* and, 49–50
- side deals in, 24, 51–52, 57, 59, 62, 65, 137, 139
- Generation 3.0 strategies, 24–25, 65, 137. *See also*  
 Generation 1.0 strategies; Generation  
 2.0 strategies; pay-for-delay; REMS (Risk  
 Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies)
- Actelion* case and, 82–83
- boy scout contract clauses, 137
- carve-out request for generic Abilify  
 (antipsychotic, Otsuka), 110–12
- carve-out request for generic Crestor  
 (AstraZeneca), 108–10, 111–12
- carve-out request for generic Skelaxin  
 (King Pharmaceuticals), 105–08
- Endo's boy scout clause, 78–79
- evergreening as obstruction strategy, 69
- FDA acceptance of obstructionist petitions  
 filed by brands against generics, 69
- generic substitution systems as obstruction  
 mechanism, 66–67
- product hopping by *Actavis* from *Namenda* to  
*Namenda XR*, 76–78
- product hopping of *AstraZeneca* from *Prilosec*  
 to *Nexium*, 71–74
- product hopping of *Warner Chilcott* of *Asacol*  
 to *Delzicol*, 74–76
- product hopping steps, 69–71
- profits from obstructionist strategies for  
 delay, 67–69
- skinny labels and carve-out requests and, 103–04
- subversion of FDA safety guidelines as, 67
- generic competition
- Big Pharma's efforts to extend monopoly profits  
 by blocking entry of, 9
- effect on pharmaceutical pricing and costs  
 and, 20–21
- Hatch-Waxman Act as new era for, 21, 33
- loss of market share for brand name drug  
 companies and, 7
- as patent cliff, 8
- restricted distribution system and pricing  
 controversy over *Darapim*, 9–10
- restricted distribution system and pricing  
 increases for *Thiola* (*Retrophin*), 10–11
- threat of to pharma executives, 7
- generic delay. *See also* citizen petitions as delay  
 tactic; Generation 2.0 strategies; Generation  
 3.0 strategies; pay-for-delay
- costs to society of unscrupulous, 23
- multiplicity tactics in, 25, 76, 137
- generic drug application, 26–27. *See also*  
 Hatch-Waxman Act (U.S., 1984); Paragraph  
 IV certification
- requirements for an ANDA, 21–22
- 30 month stays on via patent infringement  
 litigation, 31
- generic drugs, 7
- authorized generics, 59–60
- Roche v. Bolar* (U.S., 1984) and, 28
- generic entry, 21–23. *See also* Hatch-Waxman  
 Act (U.S., 1984)
- citizens petitions and, 91
- need of reform of, 25
- rise in generic drugs and prescriptions, 22
- slowness of before Hatch-Waxman Act, 21
- generic substitution
- automatic substitution laws, 20
- automaticity of w/o patient intervention, 19, 20
- Gilead
- deal with Egypt on *Sovaldi* (hepatitis c drug), 5–6
- monopoly profits from *Sovaldi*, 9
- Sovaldi* pricing (med for hepatitis C) and, 2
- Gilenya* (fingolimod, multiple sclerosis drug), 87
- GlaxoSmithKline
- generic delay of *Flonase* by, 68
- King Drug* case and, 61–65
- Gleevec* (leukemia treatment), 6

- Hatch-Waxman Act (U.S., 1984), 21–23, 25.  
     *See also* Paragraph IV certification  
     allowance of patent-protected brand-name  
       information for generic research, 26–27  
     amendments to, 33  
     complexity of as opportunity to hold off generic  
       competition, 23  
     expediting of generic applications before patent  
       expiration, 28  
     forfeiture provision for exclusivity period  
       adjustments, 39–40  
     forfeiture provision loopholes in 2003  
       amendment of, 40  
     generic drug applications and, 21–22, 26–27  
     new drugs non-patent exclusivities and, 32–33  
     as new era for generic competition, 21, 33  
     Orange book of brand name patents for generic  
       applications, 29–30, 55  
     purpose and complexity of, 26  
     restoration of time lost to approval processes for  
       pharmaceutical companies by, 32  
     skinny labels and carve-out requests and, 103–04  
     terms and acronyms defined, 26–27  
 HIV outbreak, 94  
 House Committee on Oversight and Government  
   Reform  
     Shkreli's questioning by in February 2016, 4  
  
*In re Cipro* (antitrust case, California), 46–47  
*In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation*, 68  
*In re K-Dur* case, 52  
*In re Lipitor* case, 53–56  
*In re Loestrin*, 61, 64  
*In re Suboxone* case, 87–90, 95–97  
 innovation, 12  
 intellectual property systems, 12  
  
 J.P. Morgan Healthcare Conference, 1, 12  
   concern and protests over rising pharmaceutical  
     prices at 2016 conference, 2, 4  
   concern over drop in stocks at 2016  
     conference, 1–2  
   defense of rising pharmaceutical prices at 2016  
     conference, 6–7  
   Martin Shkreli's lack of attendance at 2016  
     conference, 2  
*Journal of the American Medical Association*, 5  
  
 Kaiser Family Foundation, 2  
*K-Dur* (potassium deficiency drug, Schering-  
   Plough), 50–51, 52  
  
 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, 28  
*King Drug* case, 61–65  
 King Pharmaceuticals, 105–08  
  
 labeling information  
   carve-outs and, 109  
   defined, 27  
 Lamictal (anticonvulsant drug, Glaxo), 61–65  
 launching at-risk, 55  
 Lipitor (statin drug, Pfizer), 53–56  
  
 MannKind, 3  
 MCMB Capital, 4  
 Medicare Modernization Act (2003), 33, 39  
 medication guides, 87  
 metaxalone. *See* Skelaxin  
 method-of-use patents, 103  
 monopoly profits, 9  
 Motrin, 4  
 MSMB Capital Management, 2  
 multiplicity tactics, in generic delay, 25, 76, 137  
 Mutual Pharmaceuticals  
   orange juice petition of, 92–94  
  
 Namenda and Namenda XR (Alzheimer's drug,  
   Actavis), 76–78  
 naproxen (Aleve), 4  
 NASDAQ's Biotechnology Index, 1  
 new chemical entity (NCE) exclusivity, 32  
*New York Times*, 4, 5  
 Nexium (esomeprazole), 4  
   monopoly profits from, 9  
   product hopping of from Prilosec, 71–74  
 Niacor-SR (cholesterol drug, Upsher-Smith), 50  
 no-authorized-generic agreements, 61–64  
   defined, 60  
*Noerr-Pennington* cases, 99–100, 134  
 non-patent exclusivities, 32  
 Novartis, 6  
 NPR's *All Things Considered*, 94  
  
 Obama, Barack  
   on rising costs of prescription medication, 5  
   off-label use of medication, 104  
 Opana (opiate painkiller, Edon), 94–95  
 Orange book, 29–30, 55  
 Orphan Drug Act, 33, 109  
 Orphan Drug Designation  
   for Abilify (antipsychotic, Otsuka), 110–12  
   for Crestor (statin, AstraZeneca),  
     108–10, 111–12

- Paragraph IV certification, 22. *See also*  
 Hatch-Waxman Act (U.S., 1984)  
 defined, 29  
 duopoly and profits created by exclusivity  
 period, 22, 30–31  
 exclusivity period elapsement for first generic  
 filers and, 38  
*K-Dur* case, 50–51, 52  
 patent infringement litigation and, 22  
 weak or misapplied patents for quick generic  
 entry and, 29–30
- patents, 7–9  
 allowance of patent-protected brand-name  
 information for generic research via  
 Hatch-Waxman Act, 26–27  
 business method patents, 84  
 costs to society of abuse of patent systems  
 and, 23  
 defined, 8  
 method-of-use patents, 103  
 new drugs non-patent exclusivities in, 32–33  
 Orange book of Hatch-Waxman, 55  
 patent infringement litigation under Paragraph  
 IV (Hatch-Waxman Act), 22  
 pharmaceutical explanation for strong patent  
 rights, 8  
 weak drug patents, 29–30
- pay-for-delay, 24, 34–35, 65, 137. *See also*  
 Generation 2.0 strategies; Generation  
 3.0 strategies  
 as anticompetitive, 41–43  
 as bottleneck to entry for generics, 38–39  
 cost to consumers in increased drug prices, 38  
 decrease in settlements post-*FTC v.*  
*Actavis*, 46, 66  
 diminishment of, 66  
 fines for UK pharma companies  
 engaging in, 46  
 forfeiture provision for exclusivity period  
 adjustments in Hatch-Waxman, 39–40  
 forfeiture provision loopholes and, 40  
*FTC v. Actavis*, 43–45  
*FTC v. Actavis* rule of reason test, 45–46  
*In re Cipro* case (California Supreme Court)  
 and, 46–47  
 increase in settlements since 2003  
 amendment, 40  
 non-cash provisions post-*Actavis*, 49–50  
 as procompetitive according to drug  
 companies, 41  
 reverse payment schemes and, 35
- settlement of Teva for provigil (narcolepsy  
 drug), 47–48  
 side deals in, 24, 51–52, 57, 59, 62, 65, 137, 139  
 six-month duopoly period and, 36–37  
 pay-for-delay settlements is that the incentives  
 of both the brand-name drug company and  
 the generic company are aligned with each  
 other – but not with society's interests, 36
- pediatric HoFN, 109, 112  
 pediatric homozygous familial  
 hypercholesterolemia. *See* pediatric HoFN
- pediatric labeling  
 Abilify and, 110–12  
 Crestor and, 108–10, 111–12  
 Pepcid, 4, 86  
 Pfizer, 9  
*In re Lipitor* case of, 53–56
- pharmaceutical companies. *See* brand-name drug  
 companies; by individual company
- pharmaceutical economics, 13–19
- pharmaceutical pricing and costs, 7  
 benefits of despite high prices and regulatory  
 abuse, 12  
 concern and protest over rising costs of at J.P.  
 Morgan Healthcare Conference (2016), 2, 4  
 Daraprim of Turing Pharmaceuticals and, 3  
 defense of rising costs at J.P. Morgan  
 Healthcare Conference (2016), 6–7  
 effect of Big Pharma's blocking of generic  
 competition on, 9  
 generic competition effect on brand name  
 drugs, 7  
 generics and, 20–21  
 increased drug prices via pay-for-delay, 38  
 Obama on rising costs of prescription  
 medication, 5  
 overview of complexity of pharmaceutical  
 economics, 13–19  
 pharma companies perspective on, 7  
 protests over Sovaldi pricing (hepatitis C drug,  
 Gilead), 2  
 reports of global pricing scandals in media  
 (2016), 4–6  
 restricted distribution system of Daraprim  
 and, 9–10  
 restricted distribution system of Thiola  
 (Retrophin) and, 10–11  
 schemes and tactics used by drug companies to  
 keep prices high, 11, 12  
 sunshine laws and, 25  
 Valeant Pharmaceuticals and, 3

- pharmaceuticals
  - benefits of despite high prices and regulatory abuse, 12
- Plendil (high blood pressure drug, Mutual Pharmaceuticals), 92–94
- Prilosec (AstraZeneca)
  - product hopping of to Nexium, 71–74
- product hopping
  - by Actavis from Namenda to Namenda XR, 76–78
  - by AstraZeneca's from Prilosec to Nexium, 71–74
  - by Edon from Opana ER to Opana ER CRF, 94–95
  - Endo's boy scout clause and, 78–79
  - evergreening and, 69
  - steps in, 69–71
  - by Warner Chilcott's of Asacol to Delzicol, 74–76
  - defined, 61, 66
- Provigil (narcolepsy drug, Teva), 47–48, 51, 57–59
- Ranbaxy, 51
  - In re Lipitor* case of, 53–56
- Reckitt Benckiser (drug company)
  - In re Suboxone* case of, 87–90, 95–97
- reform of generic entry
  - need for, 25
- REMS (Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies)
  - Actelion* case and, 82–83
  - bills against REMS abuse, 90–91
  - Celgene REMS safety plan, 83–84
  - defined, 80
  - Elements to Assure Safe Use (ETASU) and, 81–82
  - In re Suboxone* case and, 87–90
  - medication guide or communication plans and, 87
  - Single Shared REMS program (SSRS), 87, 90
  - specialty pharmacies and, 85–86
  - Suboxone and, 81
- restricted distribution schemes
  - Daraprim of Turing Pharmaceuticals, 9–10, 84
  - as mandated by FDA safety protocols, 10
  - specialty pharmacies and, 85–86
- Retrophin, 4
  - restricted distribution system and pricing increases for Thiola, 10–11
- reverse payment schemes, 24, 35
  - In re K-Dur* case, 52
  - In re Lipitor* case, 53–56
- Revlimid (lenalidomide, Celgene), 83–84
- Roche v. Bolar* (U.S., 1984), 28
- route of administration
  - defined, 27
- rule of reason test, in antitrust cases, 45–46
- Sanofi, 6
- Schering-Plough
  - K-Dur* case, 50–51, 52
  - Niacor-SR and, 50
- Section 505 amendments, 118
- Section 505(q) amendments, 97–98
  - defined, 97, 99
- Shkreli, Martin, 84
  - appearance at House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (February 2016), 4
  - arrest of, 4
  - notoriety of in biotech, 2–3
  - on patent cliff of generic drugs, 8
  - price increase for Daraprim (antimalarial and HIV infections drug, Turing Pharmaceuticals), 3
- side deals, in pay-for-delay, 24, 51–52, 57, 59, 62, 65, 137, 139
- Single Shared REMS program (SSRS), 87, 90
- Skelaxin (muscle relaxant, King), 105–08
- skinny labels, 103–04
  - example of, 102
- Sovaldi (hepatitis C drug, Gilead), 12
  - in Egypt, 5–6
  - monopoly profits from, 9
  - protests over pricing of, 2
- specialty pharmacies, 85–86
- strength of active ingredient
  - defined, 27
- Suboxone (drug for opiate addiction, Reckitt Benckiser), 95–97
  - In re Suboxone* case and, 87–90
  - REMS plan for, 81
- sunshine laws, 25
- Takeda (pharmaceutical company), 58–59
- Teva (pharmaceutical company), 47–48, 51
  - acceleration clauses and, 58–59
  - King Drug* case and, 61–65
- thalidomide crisis, 28
- Thalomid (thalidomide, Celgene), 83–84
- Thiola (kidney drug, Retrophin), 10–11
- Tourette's Syndrome, 110–12
- Trinko* opinion, 134
- Turing Pharmaceuticals, 3. *See also* Shkreli, Martin

- restricted distribution system and pricing  
     controversy over Daraprim, 9–10
- U.S. Supreme Court, 12
  - business method patents and, 84
  - decrease in pay-for-delay settlements
    - post-*FTC v. Actavis*, 46
  - FTC v. Actavis*, 43–45, 49–50
  - FTC v. Actavis* rule of reason test, 45–46
  - King Drug* case and, 65
  - Noerr-Pennington* cases, 99–100
  - Trinko* opinion of, 134
- UC Hastings Institute for Innovation Law, 11
- United Kingdom
  - pay-for-delay fines for pharma companies in, 46
- United Therapeutics, 7
- Usher-Smith
  - K-Dur* case, 50–51, 52
  - Niacor-SR and, 50
- use indications
  - defined, 27
- Valeant Pharmaceuticals
  - acquiring of Vimovo by, 4
  - exorbitant pricing by, 3
  - specialty pharmacies and, 85–86
- Vimovo, 4
- Vioxx (arthritis drug), 80
- Wall Street Journal*, 5
- Warner Chilcott
  - denial of staggered petitions for Doryx, 100–02
  - product hopping of Asacol to Delzicol
    - by, 74–76
- weak drug patents, 29–30
  - generics companies success in challenging, 30
- weak patent claims, 30, 33
- Wu-Tang Clan, 3, 4